Gregory Golden's object in this revision of his doctoral dissertation is to examine institutional responses to military and political crises in the Republican period of Rome's history. He takes crisis to mean “a situation in which a decision maker, or a group designated as the decision makers within a community, perceives a threat to itself or to things upon which the decision maker places very high value” (4). This broad definition allows him to distinguish specific moments of danger to Rome, his chief interest, from periods of prolonged crisis, as represented by the familiar phrase ‘the crisis of the Roman Republic’ (used in reference to the period 133–31 BC). In effect the book is a study of three forms of response. First, appointments to the dictatorship, an irregular constitutional office that conferred on its holder extraordinary, short-term authority to deal with threats to the res publica. Second, the institution of tumultus, the senate's declaration of a state of military emergency in which no exemptions from conscription were permitted and regular public business was suspended (the iustitium; civilian dress was also exchanged for military dress to symbolize the community's placement on a war footing). Third, passage of the so-called senatus consultum ultimum—the term is a modern convenience—a senatorial decree which allowed Rome's two senior annual magistrates, the consuls, to take whatever steps they thought necessary to safeguard the res publica. This instrument was first used in 121 BC and became a feature of Rome's revolutionary era, the most notorious case occurring in 63 BC when the consul Cicero was empowered to deal with the coup d'état planned, as he saw it, by the renegade noble Catiline. It is sometimes characterized as tantamount to a declaration of martial law. The dictatorship, in contrast, was, as Golden confirms, an instrument most commonly used in the fourth and third centuries BC, while declarations of tumultus could apparently be made at any time. (The earliest examples of both items are shrouded in legend.) A separate chapter discusses emergency measures outside the three main categories.
The crises Golden identifies, attributable to external aggression or internal sedition, seem to have been incessant. But the original accounts from which they are known are often fragmentary, at odds with one another, full of anachronisms, or subject to other constraints. This inevitably means that detailed recovery of many critical situations is impossible. The slave rebellion led by the gladiator Spartacus, for example, presented Rome with a serious crisis in 73 BC, as Golden is well aware (75–79); yet precise knowledge of its origins and progression—it lasted two years—is unattainable, owing to the small amount and lacunose character of the source material on the uprising that now remains. (This, incidentally, renders all attempts to discover Spartacus's aspirations in raising revolt speculative.) The result is that Golden often does little more than summarize passages from classical authors and offer guesses about the occurrence of the emergency measures with which he is concerned. At times the summaries extend beyond the central issue, as with his description of Rome's war against the Numidian prince Jugurtha (90–91); but sometimes they are elliptical, omitting explanation of key references and names (Allia [16], Bocchus [80], Manlius [84]). He shows a wide command of scholarly bibliography, but as in his treatment of the Bacchanalian crisis of 186 BC (164–65), he frequently refers his reader to previous contributions without extended comment. With tumultus, moreover, the word's ambivalent meaning—“tumult” in general as well as a state of emergency—impedes recovery of the incidence of the formal device.
Golden's most perceptive proposal, made in the two final chapters, is that the three principal modes of response to crisis, all of which sanctioned the use of force, were manifestations of a violence that permeated Roman society at large. He rightly points to the powerful impressions this deep-seated characteristic made on Greek observers (216), and the connection he draws between institutions and culture gives his book an advantage over many similar works of military and political history. Rome of course was a profoundly militaristic society, and throughout its history Romans took physical punishment as normative in law and found pleasure in the grisly forms of entertainment staged in circus and arena. Golden's point is thus well made. In regretting the absence of nonviolent means of crisis resolution that he thinks characteristic of the contemporary United States, courts and elections for instance, he perhaps tends to the judgmental, overlooking the implications of such egregious modern responses to crisis as rendition, enhanced methods of interrogation, and unlimited imprisonment without charge or access to counsel. But no one is likely to dispute his main conclusion that the instruments he examines did little to prevent the eventual onset at Rome of civil war and the end, as its leaders perceived it, of the free Republic.
