The reforms of Solon

The city-states of ancient Greece witnessed many violent shifts of political regime in the seventh and sixth centuries, in particular in connection with military crises, which of course easily turned into economic crises. In the seventh century, Athens was ruled by a birth aristocracy. It was an aristocratic prerogative to hold the offices of state, of which the most important were the nine elected archons. Ex-archons had a seat in the Council of the Areopagos, where membership was for life. At the beginning of the sixth century, social tensions in Athens led to what is often described as a revolutionary situation. According to Aristotle (The Athenian Constitution V.1–2), ‘the people rose against the notables [and] the party struggle [was] violent’. As a consequence, the aristocrat Solon was appointed archon and mediator for the year 594/3.

The situation that faced Solon is a clear case of a revolutionary threat – an economic crisisFootnote ⁴ – like the one envisaged in the A&R model. Several factors may have contributed to increasing tensions between the rich elite and the rest of the population. Morris (Reference Morris, Cartledge, Cohen and Foxhall2002) suggests that population growth had reduced the production per capita, making dependent farmers increasingly worse off. The divide between rich and poor may have been exceptionally large in Athens (Morris, Reference Morris2000: 288, 305). In addition, it is generally presumed (not least on the basis of the subsequent reforms) that there were individuals who were wealthy but who were excluded from political and judicial power, qua not belonging to the old aristocracy.

To prevent a revolution, Solon gave political rights to the rich non-aristocrats and improved the economic situation of the poor. Firstly, he co-opted the rich non-elite by substituting wealth for noble birth as a qualification for holding office. Whether he enacted other constitutional changes is more contentious. The Assembly of all citizens probably existed before Solon, but he may have instituted a new Council of 400, where issues had to be discussed before being taken up in the Assembly.Footnote ⁵

Secondly, Solon enacted economic concessions to the population at large – cancellation of debts, abolishment of slavery for debt, etc. It is debatable whether these economic concessions were seen as a credible commitment to ease the economic situation of the ordinary population in the long run,Footnote ⁶ but given the fact that the most likely leaders of a revolt were given some political power, so that the collective action problem of the ordinary farmers was exacerbated, these measures were apparently sufficient to defuse the situation in the short and medium run. ‘It may be sufficient for the elite to co-opt the middle class rather than concede a comprehensive democracy’ (A&R: 39).

Note that political power was given to those who were rich, but outside the traditional birth aristocracy – obviously there was no threat that this small step towards a more democratic regime would lead to the poor majority taxing the rich. If a nondemocratic elite can manipulate the institutions of democracy so as to guarantee that radical majoritarian policies will not be adopted, then democracy becomes less threatening (A&R: 34).

The tyranny of Peisistratos and his sons

The sixth century witnessed many instances of continued political turmoil in Greece. Sometimes a single member of the elite took control over the state as a tyrant. The material is often very scanty,Footnote ⁷ but it appears that tyrants usually replaced aristocratic oligarchies. The sixth-century tyrants often came to power with outside help (Osborne, Reference Osborne1996a: 272), but arguably ruled with at least the implicit consent of a large part of the population. From the middle of the seventh century and onwards, well-to-do farmers who could afford the equipment of a hoplite (heavy infantryman) were of considerable military importance. It is often argued that the tyrants tried to please the common people, e.g. by spending on public works.

In the middle of the sixth century, Peisistratos established himself as a tyrant in Athens, after two unsuccessful attempts. This turn of events is not particularly surprising because, I would argue, the Solonian measures had not entailed any fundamental change in the economic situation of the poor; in the long run, they would again fall into debt to the elite, who could also use their control over the political and judicial system to further their own interests.Footnote ⁸ Furthermore, while the poor did not risk debt bondage (of which we hear nothing more in Athens), they may have suffered economically by the inability to use their own person as collateral (Ober, Reference Ober1989: 62). Hence, over time, it is likely that discontent with elite rule once again became widely spread.

An important consideration for the Peisistratids – as for any ruler (North, Reference North1981) – was their ability to reward those who supported their regime, which depended both on their revenues and on their other expenditures. Under Peisistratos, tax revenues likely increased with the increase in trade and real incomes (cf. below), but the increase in tax revenues also made it more attractive to challenge their rule ceteris paribus (Greif, Reference Greif1994b). Another important source of revenue was the personal assets of Peisistratos and his sons (Hippias and Hipparchos), which included property in the Mount Pangaeus region, well known for its gold mines.

As time passed, military expenditures increased. Peisistratos himself largely ruled without external conflicts (Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution XVI.7), but his sons were engaged in wars (Thukydides, VI.54.5), and their expenditures were greater than their father's (Andreades, Reference Andreades1979 [1933]). Furthermore, the threat from the Persians increased after the fall of Lydia in 546. About this time, the trireme – an expensive and specialized warship – was increasingly adopted, adding to the cost of war considerably and entailing state navies (Morris, Reference Morris, Morris and Scheidel2009). The Persians built a fleet in the late 520s. As a result of Darius’ campaign against the Scythians, the Persians took control of much of Thrace, probably in 512, making income from the Mount Pangaeus area a very uncertain source of revenue for Hippias at best (Lewis, Reference Lewis1988: 297). The Persian expansion would also have reduced any revenue from Sigeon, which may have been seen as a family possession (Andrewes, Reference Andrewes1982: 403–404).

Hence, we find Hippias increasingly being unable to commit credibly to rewarding his followers to the same extent as before. The deteriorating balance between revenues and expenditures can help explain why Kleisthenes of the Alkmaionid family managed to form a coalition that ended Hippias’ rule. The loss of the Thracian possessions may have been instrumental – it certainly coincides nicely in time (probably in 512) with the first attempt by Spartans to oust him (probably in 511) and their eventual success (510). This being said, we should also note that the decline of tyranny was a trend in the Aegean at this time (Morris, Reference Morris, Morris and Scheidel2009).

The Athenian democracy and its tenacity

After the fall of the Peisistratids, it is a good guess that everybody expected a return to traditional elite competition for power. Tyranny was – after all – just an extreme outcome of the aristocratic rivalry (Osborne, Reference Osborne1996a: 272–285). The Peisistratids had not changed the formal institutions. However, in the ensuing political struggle, Kleisthenes inadvertently took a step that started a long-term process of democratizing developments – he turned to the common people for support in the aristocratic struggle. This was an unprecedented action.

Kleisthenes’ action and his success in the ensuing struggle temporarily put him in a position where he could reform the constitution. He divided Attica into 139 demes, distributed among ten new artificial tribes, and a new Council with 500 members replaced the Solonian council. We do not know if Kleisthenes made any changes in the criteria for eligibility, or any other significant changes with respect to the formal rules for the archonships, the Assembly or the Areopagos.Footnote ⁹ Many scholars argue that the deme-reform was used to reduce the influence of the old nobility over the population (thus strengthening Kleisthenes’ relative position), for example by breaking the political influence of old cult centres (Salmon, Reference Salmon, Derow and Parker2003). Furthermore, several scholars suspect that Kleisthenes tried to manipulate the distribution of demes in order to increase the influence of his family (Ostwald, Reference Ostwald1988: 310–319), but we do not know if the irregularities were introduced after Kleisthenes (Osborne, Reference Osborne1996a: 300–303).Footnote ¹⁰

The most important of Kleisthenes’ actions, however, was the fact that he violated the unwritten informal rules of the aristocratic struggle for power when he appealed to the common people – an important institutional change. The elite realized that they had a new tool to use against each other. As the aristocracy adapted to the new situation, they would become more and more prone to advocate measures that would benefit the common people. ‘Rich and well-born Athenians competed vigorously, sometimes savagely, with each other for political influence, and they used appeals to the masses as ploys in their ongoing political struggles’ (Ober, Reference Ober1989: 84).

At this point, event-history makes an inevitable appearance in this structural account. In the absence of Kleisthenes’ particular action, Athens may well have remained an oligarchy, as the experiences of other Greek city-states show. Kleisthenes hit upon a solution to his short-run problems that had tremendous long-run consequences, since it changed the nature of aristocratic competition for power. It provides an example of how particular circumstances can set a society on a path that ends in democracy.

Gradually, as people became more aware of the issues at stake, and with new measures increasing the influence of the less-affluent majority (cf. below), the process would become self-reinforcing. Those who tried to direct Athenian policy constituted a relatively small group and they were usually active in politics for a considerable time (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: Ch. 11). To be successful in the Assembly, a political leader would increasingly have had to advocate measures that benefited the poor majority, even though leaders themselves were initially of high birth. ‘Whatever authority they wielded was dependent upon the people's continuing approval . . . rhetores [politicians] were judged each time they stood up in the Assembly’ (Ober, Reference Ober1989: 121).

For the ordinary people, the incentives to take part in the political process increased, because trade and reliance on imports increased (cf. Section 4). Reliance on market relationships rather than self-sufficiency implies that one is more affected by public policy measures. Furthermore, the Athenian Empire (cf. below) meant that a significant portion of the Athenian population had a direct interest in foreign policy as it affected their livelihood.

Between the year of Marathon and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (i.e., 490–431), the constitution of Kleisthenes was gradually transformed into what was for the male citizens a far-reaching direct democracy (women, non-citizens and slaves were excluded). When the transition was complete, archons, councillors, and other magistrates were all chosen by lot for one year. Jurors were selected by lot for one day. The only elected magistrates of importance were the ten generals. Citizens of all classes could speak in the Assembly and serve as jurors in the popular courts. Theoretically, the lowest property class was still excluded from the Council and offices, but this rule probably already ceased to function in the fifth century. Each man could only serve twice in his lifetime on the Council (once in other offices). The Areopagos had lost almost all of its judicial powers. Citizens were paid for serving as jurors, on the Council and in other offices. Few of these changes can be dated with any certainty. Selection by lot for archons was introduced in 487. Several of the other reforms occurred around 460–50, and are associated with Ephialtes and Perikles.

This development was not uncontroversial; for example, Ephialtes was murdered and Thukydides (I.107.4–5) mentions an abortive aristocratic coup in 458/7.Footnote ¹¹ Nevertheless, the process continued largely without causing violent attempts by the elite to regain control of the Athenian state. Several factors help explain this. The necessary condition was that it remained credible that the poor majority would show restraint in using its political power to tax the rich.

Firstly, the existence of a ‘middle class’ of military importance, consisting of well-to-do farmers, made democracy more acceptable to the rich elite as it ensured that the poor would not conduct too radical taxation policies.Footnote ¹² Secondly, in 478/77, the Delian league, later to become the Athenian Empire (more aptly labelled The Greater Athenian State (Morris, Reference Morris, Morris and Scheidel2009)), was formed as a military coalition against the Persians. Over time, it increased the prosperity of Athenian citizens in several ways, despite the cost of keeping a fleet (Morris, Reference Morris, Morris and Scheidel2009). The poor gained from employment in the fleet and (from the 440s) in the building projects on the Acropolis. For the rich, the Empire brought overseas acquisitions, while the poor could move abroad as settlers in colonies (cleruchies). Trade increased, and the revenue from harbour dues increased as Athens benefited from its position. Hence, the rich Athenians had a positive interest in not rocking the boat, while the situation of the poor could improve without increasing the tax burden on the rich. Thirdly, it has been argued that landholdings in Attica were relatively egalitarian by 500 (Morris, Reference Morris, Cartledge, Cohen and Foxhall2002, Reference Morris2004). An egalitarian distribution of assets meant that there was less of a threat of excessive taxation of the rich (A&R: 35ff). While the distribution of non-landed wealth was probably much less equal, such wealth was also more difficult to tax, being much less visible (Gabrielsen, Reference Gabrielsen1986). Fourthly, there was the revenue from the new silver mines in Laureion.

Then the Peloponnesian War (431–404) obviously changed the situation. The Athenians lost the war, and, with the loss of the Empire, the poor could no longer credibly commit not to start taxing the rich at much higher rates than before. Military expenditures and other public expenditure would in the future have to be financed through internal revenues. The internally financed military expenditures were already increased during the war (cf. Section 5), and revenues from taxation of trade must have been at a low ebb immediately after the war.

So it comes as no surprise that members of the elite staged a coup d’état in 411 (in the aftermath of the disastrous military expedition to Sicily) and that they used the Spartans to set up an oligarchy in 403 (after the end of the war). These attempts by the elite to take over failed, and there were lots of contingent reasons for these two oligarchic coups. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that something had to give if future attempts by the rich to put an end to democracy were to be avoided.

The solution was to reduce the power of the Assembly and to increase the influence of those institutions where the elite had more influence, in particular the Areopagos. In 403–399, the Athenians codified and revised their laws, and the Assembly was deprived of a number of its powers (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991). For example, the right to pass laws (nomoi) was transferred to boards of nomothetai, appointed (probably) by lot for one day from the 6,000 jurors that were chosen by lot for one year.Footnote ¹³ The authority of the council of the Areopagos was gradually extended from 403 and through the fourth century. For example, in 403/2, the Assembly decreed that the Areopagos was to supervise the administration of the laws by the magistrates. Around 355, the Assembly was deprived of its jurisdiction in major political trials. (Some scholars argue, however, that traditional accounts exaggerate the changes between the fifth and fourth centuries (Millet, Reference Millet, Flensted-Jensen, Heine Nielsen and Rubinstein2000; Ober, Reference Ober1989: 95ff).)

With the restoration of democracy in 403/2, payment to jurors and councillors was reinstated. Payment to magistrates, however, was not reintroduced. Instead, assembly pay was introduced and raised in the decade following the restoration of democracy (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: 188, 240–41, 254). It is probably significant that Assembly pay was introduced after the reduction of the powers of the Assembly, while payment to magistrates was discontinued, which meant that these positions would be in the hands of the relatively affluent in society. I would also argue that it is unlikely that the working poor could afford to sit as jurors. The expected pay for turning up would be around 1 obol (1/3 chance of being picked, remuneration 3 obols; Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: Ch. 8), whereas the daily wage is usually thought to have been between 1 and 2 drachmas (1 drachma = 6 obols).

Hence, the overall tendency of the reforms was to reduce the threat of excessively populist policy decisions. The elite were given more influence over what happened in the Athenian democracy, thus making it more acceptable to them. In retrospect (and arguably also as perceived at the time), this was necessary for the continued existence of democratic rule. It nicely illustrates Ober's (Reference Ober2008) argument that the Athenian democracy showed great capacity to adapt its institutions to changing circumstances. While many authors note that the Athenians wanted a ‘less radical’ democracy, the changes have not been connected to the issue of credible commitments with respect to treatment of the rich.

Economic development 800–322

Morris (Reference Morris2004) has estimated that there was almost a ten-fold increase in population in Greece including Attica over the period 800–300, but that this was outpaced by economic growth, so that real income per capita increased by 50–100% over the period. For example, by ‘300 the typical Greek house cost something like five to ten times as much as the typical house had around 800’ (Morris, Reference Morris2004: 720).

Trade expanded at least from the eighth century with concomitant specialization (Osborne, Reference Osborne1996a, Reference Osborneb; Thomas and Conant, Reference Thomas and Conant1999; Morris, Reference Morris, Cartledge, Cohen and Foxhall2002; Reed, Reference Reed2003). In the late seventh century, ‘a handful of Greeks were aggressively pursuing gain all across the Mediterranean and doing very well out of it’ (Morris, Reference Morris, Cartledge, Cohen and Foxhall2002: 32). Probably by 500, major Greek cities such as Athens were permanently reliant on imported grains,Footnote ¹⁴ and olive oil and wine were exported by a number of Aegean states (Davies, Reference Davies, Scheidel, Morris and Saller2007: 343). By the sixth century, there were true cities with resident artisan and traders. There was extensive horizontal specialization in the form of diversified occupations in classical Athens (Harris, Reference Harris, Cartledge, Cohen and Foxhall2002), and exports included also ceramics and other manufactured goods (Amemiya, Reference Amemiya2007: 86).

The expansion of trade was facilitated by the introduction of coinage. It is commonly argued that this important institutional change, which occurred in Greece in the mid sixth century, was probably not motivated by any desire to facilitate trade (despite statements by Herodotos and Aristotle to the contrary (von Reden, Reference Von Reden1997)). Irrespective of the original purpose, however, the beneficial effects of coinage on economic transactions will have become quickly apparent. Not surprisingly, small denominations, conducive to monetizing everyday transactions, have now been shown to have already appeared in connection with the beginnings of silver coinage in the sixth century (Kim, Reference Kim, Cartledge, Cohen and Foxhall2002). Monetization was also encouraged by payment of taxes in cash – another institutional change, which pushed in particular the rich into the market. ‘The Greek micro-states all became monetized fiscal systems in the fifth century’ (Davies, Reference Davies, Scheidel, Morris and Saller2007: 358).

As a result of grain imports and specialization, Athens ceased to be a community of self-sufficient farmers. In the fourth century, we meet one Phainippos who prefers to produce wine on his well-watered lands, a crop that could provide cash (Osborne, Reference Osborne, Rich and Wallace-Hadrill1991: 127). ‘Phainippos’ farming policy certainly was not centred on self-sufficiency, and [we have] no warrant for ascribing to him a ‘satisficer’ rather than a ‘maximizer’ mentality’ (Osborne, Reference Osborne, Rich and Wallace-Hadrill1991: 140). Similarly, Christesen (Reference Christesen2003) argues that individuals in fourth-century Athens displayed instrumental, income-maximizing behaviour.

Reliance on the market was not restricted to the rich. ‘In bad years most and in normal years many Athenians had to buy their cereals. Aristophanes tells us about a peasant who carries his wine to the market to sell it and buy flour instead’ (Hansen, Reference Hansen1987: 12.) ‘Extensive specialization of labour made it inevitable that the average Athenian . . . would have dealings with those outside the restricted circle of family, neighbours, and friends. When he bought and sold, he thus had to enter the world of market relations’ (Harris, Reference Harris, Cartledge, Cohen and Foxhall2002: 76).Footnote ¹⁵ The growing importance of the market is illustrated by an innovation in language; the word agora originally signified public meeting place, but by the middle of the fifth century a new verb, agorazo, ‘I buy’ had appeared (Davies, Reference Davies, Scheidel, Morris and Saller2007: 335).

At least by the late fifth century, it is evident that market forces are at play and that people are aware of this. Several remarks in the comedies of Aristophanes make it clear that prices fluctuate with supply, for example people rushing to buy cheap sardines (Knights 640ff). Land was being bought as an investment to improve and resell (Xenophon, Oeconomicus XX. 22–26), and deliberate investment for profit becomes visible in the form of urban rental property (Davies, Reference Davies, Scheidel, Morris and Saller2007: 357). Aristotle, Finley (Reference Finley1970: 13–14) notes, ‘knew perfectly well that prices sometimes responded to variations in supply and demand’. Loomis (Reference Loomis1998: 254) argues that ‘economic forces of supply and demand are a . . . likely explanation for differences in wage rates across occupations and over time in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries’. Indeed, according to Bitros and Karayiannis (Reference Bitros and Karayiannis2008), Athens became ‘a vibrant market economy’ and this development was encouraged both by a value system conducive to entrepreneurship and by measures that facilitated private contracting. Similarly, Amemiya (Reference Amemiya2007: XI) finds that ‘fifth and fourth century Athens had an extensive monetary and market system’. The gradual shift of political power towards the common people likely functioned as a coercion-constraining institutional change, conducive to the expansion of market transactions.

In the second half of the fourth century, changes in legislation were undertaken in order to facilitate commercial activity, in particular for foreigners (Burke, Reference Burke1992; Cohen, Reference Cohen1992). The procedures for hearing commercial disputes were altered to allow adjudication within a month, and the law was changed to admit to litigation individuals without regard to their nationality (consequently public revenues increased in the 330s, in all probability from harbour dues). Also by the fourth century, there were private banks in Athens that took deposits and lent to private entrepreneurs. ‘The bank is a business yielding a hazardous revenue from money which belongs to others’ (Demosthenes, For Phormio XXXVI.11).

To sum up, we have three simultaneous and interdependent developments: income growth, increasing trade and specialization, and a movement towards a monetized market economy. The pace and scope of this development are open to debate, but the direction seems clear. It should be envisaged as a gradual process, beginning no later than the seventh century and possibly accelerating after the Peloponnesian War. These processes were encouraged by institutional changes (coinage, taxation, etc). At the same time, the development arguably had repercussions for people's behaviour, their belief system, and their moral attitudes.

Consequences of the changes in economic life in Athens

It seems reasonable to argue that the gradual expansion of individualistic market relationships (the logic of the market) encourages self-interested behaviour and an individualistic ethos,Footnote ¹⁶ that is more of what we would call ‘economically rational behaviour’, and less ‘embededness’, paving the way for a further expansion of markets.

Tentatively, I would argue that over the three centuries 600–300 an increasing prevalence of market transactions (in contrast to giving and lending from family, friends, and neighbours) thus induced people to think and behave differently, but also, equally importantly, to expect another kind of behaviour from their fellow citizens. The individual would increasingly expect economically rational behaviour – looking after one's own interest – whether in business transactions, politics, as taxpayers, or in public administration (an example of intertransactional linkages, to use the term recently introduced by Greif (Reference Greif2006: 48)). Compare Thukydides’ (I.70) description of the Athenians: prone to innovation, inclined to take the utmost advantage of any possibility, constantly on the lookout for new opportunities. That this ‘economic rationality’ gradually evolved does not mean that it describes all behaviour at any point in time in this period; but then it does not describe all behaviour in modern society either.

These changes may have been further encouraged by an interaction between individual behaviour and income levels. Obviously, the rise in incomes gave room for leisure and thus facilitated political participation, but an increase in average incomes may also have affected the nature of individual behaviour. To see why, consider how people make decisions in everyday life. There are two polar modes (ideal types) of decision making: on the one hand, the individual who makes conscious efforts to engage in explicit and calculated decision-making on the basis of expected costs and benefits associated with different alternatives, and, on the other hand, those who follow their habits, who explain their behaviour with reference to the habitual, and who act in an unreflective manner. The former type corresponds to ‘economically rational behaviour’: it is assumed in most economic analyses. Everybody obviously follows habits to a large extent; otherwise, life would be unmanageable (Hodgson, Reference Hodgson1997).

In modern society, there are several reasons to believe that those with fewer resources at their disposal are more prone to rely on habits (Lindbladh and Lyttkens, Reference Lindbladh and Lyttkens2002). From a sociological perspective, one could argue that among those in low social positions, an adjustment to the long-term experience of narrow margins generates a disposition to act in accordance with the principle of habit; it makes it natural and comfortable to keep things as they are – it just seems meaningless to devote resources to explicit decision making.Footnote ¹⁷ From an economic perspective, one would argue that explicit decisions are costly (transaction costs) and as such more likely to be undertaken by the affluent in society. Additionally, experience in the process of explicit decision-making reduces the cost of that same activity, so the tendency for the well-off to involve themselves more in explicit decision-making is self-reinforcing.

The implication of these considerations is that a general increase in prosperity is likely to produce more of explicit decision-making, more of economically rational behaviour, and more of a positive attitude towards such behaviour. This is probably particularly important in times of rapid changes in society, as is the case now and as arguably was the case in the late archaic and classical periods in ancient Greece as well. Consequently, I would suggest that similar considerations are likely to apply in ancient society, mutatis mutandis, so that the prevalence of economically rational behaviour – interpreted as explicit decision-making based on perceived costs and benefits – is likely to have been encouraged in Greece as real income increased over the centuries.

The changes in attitudes and behaviour, as well as changes in what kind of behaviour people expect from others, have important implications for the effects of different institutional set-ups and for the incentive to change institutions. For example, the basis for compliance with the property taxation was eroded as the act of tax compliance became more of a consciously calculated decision for the rich, rather than being something which followed automatically (by habit) with one's social position. In a first stage, the basis for compliance likely shifted from custom to ‘quasi-voluntary’ compliance. With the latter notion, Levi (Reference Levi1988) suggests that individuals may choose to pay taxes even in situations where in principle it is individually rational to evade the burden (e.g., because the probability of detection is low), but only if it is believed that others also pay their taxes and that the revenue is used in a way they find beneficial. When either of these two conditions ceases to be fulfilled, tax evasion follows. The latter change probably had taken place at least by 400, because we hear numerous stories from the law courts of individual tax evasion in the fourth century (cf. below). The emergence of economically rational behaviour arguably also increased the demand for market-enhancing institutions, such as those introduced in Athens to facilitate commercial activity.

Importantly, the change in attitude must also have had repercussions in another domain, namely the political market. When people expect others to act as economically rational, self-interested individuals, the political market becomes more obviously an arena for the extraction of surplus from others; in other words, conforming more and more to the rational-actor model in A&R. The changes in outlook that followed from the increasing importance of market relationships will have strengthened the tendency that successful politicians had to advocate policies that benefited the poor majority.

Those active in the governing of the state were originally members of the elite, and it is among them that we would expect the change in attitude to have manifested itself first. If we think of this process as under way already in the sixth century, Kleisthenes’ ‘unprecedented’ action becomes a natural consequence of an increasing tendency to view the political arena as a means to further one's own interests. It helps explain why other members of the elite followed his example and advocated measures that benefited the majority in order to gain their support in the competition within the elite.

As time passed, this new political attitude would spread to the common people, reinforcing the tendency among the elite to try to enlist them by promising them benefits of different kinds. By the time we can talk about a fully developed democracy, after the reforms of Perikles around 450, it must have become an issue of the extent to which the poor would use the political arena to exploit the rich through redistributive measures such as taxation, confiscations, etc. It is a recurrent theme in the ancient literature that the poor in a democracy might exploit the rich in political trials. A trial could lead to heavy fines or outright confiscation of property. The revenue from the courts could make a large contribution to state revenue, but it is not known to what extent rich persons actually suffered in the courts (Ober, Reference Ober1989: 200–202). In an oration spoken after 338, ‘there are three examples of how the Athenian courts did not fall into the temptation of condemning a number of rich mining-concessionaires. On the other hand . . . in those very same years, the richest of all . . . Diphilos, was condemned . . . and his fortune of 160 talents distributed among the citizens’ (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: 315). At that time, 160 talents corresponded to some 13% of total public revenue.

The change in outlook probably also contributed to (and was reinforced by) changes in the composition of the class of political leaders in Athens. An increasingly economic outlook would mean that – over time – leaders would not be supported qua belonging to the traditional elite, but rather based on what they could be expected to deliver in terms of benefits. Unsurprisingly, one finds that ‘Down to and including Perikles all Athenian leaders . . . had been aristocrats and landowners; after him they were often of lower birth – just as wealthy . . . their power was based much more on their ability to persuade people in the Assembly’ (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: 39). In the fourth century, noble ancestors largely ceased to have a role, and we even find men of modest means among the politicians (Ober, Reference Ober1989: Ch. 6.E; Davies, Reference Davies1981: Ch. 6). In the fourth century, public payments that benefited the poor increased.

The increasing tendency towards economically rational behaviour can help explain another feature of Athenian democracy. The Athenians were extremely careful to establish institutions that enabled them to prevent magistrates (and anybody else who handled public money) from enriching themselves at the public's expense, and rules that meant politicians were held accountable for the advice they gave. ‘The Athenians had the characteristic of being honest with themselves about themselves . . . they went on the basis that, given the chance, every one of them would have his hand in the till and make a profit out of political activity, and they took every possible means to limit the chances’ (Hansen, Reference Hansen1991: 310). This overriding aspect of the Athenian institutions has a very natural explanation in the emergence of economically rational behaviour.

One should point out at this juncture that experience of the practical running of the democratic institutions was widely spread among the citizens. In the fourth century, the male citizens numbered perhaps around 30,000 and Assembly meetings (of which there were 40 a year) were generally attended by at least 6,000 citizens. Hansen (Reference Hansen1991: 313) calculates that the rules regulating rotation on the council and magistracies ensured that every third citizen served at least once on the council, and that the pool of magistrates must have been well above 1,200 citizens. This popular participation likely had far-reaching consequences and was instrumental in enabling the Athenians to adapt their institutional structure to changing conditions and to maintain a social equilibrium between the elite and the common citizens (Ober, Reference Ober2008).