On 24 May 1962, the Ukrainian Football Federation’s chairman, Mikolai Kuznetsov, announced to a (probably) stunned audience of several thousand football fans at the ‘Kyiv Football Fan Club’ meeting in Kyiv’s Republican Stadium that due to the great strides made by Ukrainian football, ‘at the next FIFA conference the Soviet delegates will submit a petition for Ukraine to join FIFA’.Footnote 1 This FIFA affiliation would have given the Ukrainian Football Federation international parity with the All-Union Soviet Football Federation and meant true independent international representation for the first time since Soviet occupation. Interestingly, Kuznetsov pointed towards the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic’s (from now on referred to as Ukraine) membership in the United Nations (UN) to imply that Ukraine should also have one more seat at another international organisation, that is, FIFA.Footnote 2
Though parallels can be drawn to Ukraine’s inclusion in the UN, which the Soviet government instigated to increase the number of votes the Soviet Union controlled in the UN General Assembly, the FIFA membership held greater significance because Ukrainian officials, not All-Union institutions, initiated it. Kuznetsov’s assurances that a Soviet FIFA delegation would request Ukraine’s FIFA candidature were false. Soviet archival files prove that between 1959 and 1965, Ukrainian Football Federation officials urged Soviet sports functionaries in writing and at sports congresses to finally confer the ‘necessary’ international representation to ‘the biggest state in Europe’ and forty-two million Ukrainians, as well as more independence for the Ukrainian Football Federation.Footnote 3
In this article, I suggest that Kuznetsov’s move had its origins in the Soviet Central Committee, Sports Committee and Football Federation’s efforts to re-establish Moscow clubs and players at the summit of Soviet football in the early 1960s. This antagonised the Ukrainian Football Federation to such a degree that it pushed for de facto independence from the Soviet Football Federation.Footnote 4 Following years of strong favouritism towards Moscow football, the Sports Committee and Football Federation’s sports policy between 1957 and 1960 had briefly favoured decentralising Soviet football and strengthening football teams across the Soviet Union. The primary aim of this shift in policy – influenced by the Central Committee – was to widen the talent pool for the Soviet National Football Team (the Sbornaia). Sports officials in Moscow expected this decentralisation of Soviet football to strengthen the Sbornaia without jeopardising the position of the Moscow teams at the vanguard of Soviet football. However, these changes elevated football in the non-Russian Soviet republics, especially Ukrainian football, to within touching distance of the best Muscovite clubs.
Between 1957 and 1960, the Ukrainian Football Federation had arguably attained the greatest increase in privileges and powers of all fifteen Soviet republics (also known as union republics) that comprised the Soviet Union. This shift had resulted in Dynamo Kyiv, Ukraine’s flagship team, contributing players to various Sbornaia teams for the first time and the formation of new (unofficial) Ukrainian national teams. In addition, Ukraine became the first and only non-Russian republic to govern its own second division (Klass B) league. Thanks to this independent Klass B and the addition of another Ukrainian club (Avangard Kharkiv) to Soviet football’s first division (Klass A), among other changes, the level of Ukrainian football rose dramatically in a short period of time. This elevated status of Ukrainian football heightened expectations of more autonomy and concessions. This might explain why Ukrainian sports officials believed that the petition for FIFA membership was a logical next step and why the Ukrainian Football Federation reacted with such anger when Soviet sports officials moved to reassert direct control.
The Soviet Football Federation and Sports Committee functionaries in Moscow never documented the rationale for the ‘re-Muscovisation’ of Soviet football, but the evidence suggests that Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet First Secretary between 1953 and 1964, played a direct role in this shift. This, coupled with Dynamo Kyiv’s impressive showings in Klass A in 1960 and 1961, jolted the Soviet Sports Committee and Football Federation into action. These All-Union sports organisations reduced the number of teams from the non-Russian Soviet republics in Klass A, advocated for more Moscow-based players in the Sbornaia and coerced the best All-Union Soviet talent to transfer to Moscow clubs.
In response to these developments, Kuznetsov and other Ukrainian sports officials pushed back. They insisted on independence from the Soviet Football Federation in Ukrainian football matters, as well as establishing Ukraine’s own Klass A and access to competitive and official international football matches. Furthermore, they often cited England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which were part of the United Kingdom but possessed their own independent football leagues and international football representation, as the model for the Soviet Union to emulate. Although Ukrainian sports officials prioritised these changes in the name of sporting improvements, their endeavours inadvertently pushed the question of Ukraine’s political independence further than any other Ukrainian institution had dared after the Second World War. This démarche would mark the first attempt by a republic-level institution to gain international recognition and representation independently from the Soviet Union. Seeking parity with and separation from All-Union institutions carried inevitable political overtones because, up to that point, only the Soviet Football Federation could form its own FIFA-recognised national team and a Klass A championship.
Though the Ukrainian Football Federation tested the boundaries of self-governance between 1959 and 1965, this fact has never featured prominently in the narrative concerning Ukraine’s independence from the Soviet Union and Russia. Serhii Plokhy, for example, has argued that the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe sparked Ukraine’s independence movement, in part because it led Mikhail Gorbachev to insist on glasnostʹ (transparency) and liberalisation.Footnote 5 Andreas Kappeler and Zenon Kohut, among others, have noted that Ukraine was tightly controlled by the Soviet centre, thereby resulting in the republic being one of the last to join the independence movements before the Soviet collapse.Footnote 6 The few sports studies concerned with the role of sports in the struggle for national independence have focused on fan protests and sports officials’ resistance to central authority in the 1980s and 1990s.Footnote 7 For example, historian Manuel Veth has explained that in 1990 Ukrainian politicians hoped to use sports to encourage political separation from the Soviet Union.Footnote 8 At a time when Putin consistently questions and challenges Ukraine’s statehood, my article illustrates that following the Second World War, the first steps towards Ukrainian independence occurred much earlier and through the unlikeliest of platforms.
This study also reveals how the Ukrainian Football Federation challenged, with some success and few repercussions, Russian cultural imperialism. Historian Robert Hornsby concluded that Khrushchev curtailed the grimmest parts of Stalin’s nationality policies, but the authorities were still keen to preserve the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic’s (Russia) leading position in the Soviet Union.Footnote 9 Though the extent of Moscow’ control over Ukraine has been debated, scholars of Ukrainian culture do acknowledge that near the end of Khruschev’s reign, All-Union institutions attempted to recentralise power in Moscow after Khrushchev’s previous decentralisation. However, in several spheres, Ukrainian officials fought back against the new limits imposed on them. Ukrainian scholar Yuri Slezkine has demonstrated that when the Ministry of Education forced more Russian language study in schools, Khrushchev’s elevation of the Ukrainian elite emboldened them to vigorously oppose the change.Footnote 10 In a similar vein, research by V.V. Soloshenko and Serhy Yekelchyk on the ‘Sixtiers’ (shistdesiatnyky), a Ukrainian intellectual movement that strove to revive Ukrainian culture, has shown how the Sixtiers fought renewed Russification post-1959 through Ukrainian-language publications and cultural initiatives.Footnote 11 My study shows how football was a much safer and more successful space in which to confront Soviet authority. After all, the Ukrainian Football Federation won its desired international representation in club football and replaced Moscow football teams with their own at the pinnacle of Soviet football, whereas Soviet authorities defeated the Sixtiers by arresting and persecuting its members.Footnote 12
I have relied primarily upon three archives for this article: TsDAVO, GARF and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI).Footnote 13 In GARF and RGANI, I found many key Sports Committee, Football Federation and Central Committee documents that explained why these organisations shifted sports policy from one extreme to the other. In TsDAVO I located a plethora of yet-unexamined files from the Ukrainian Football Federation and Dynamo Kyiv that shone a light on the Ukrainian sports officials’ demands. In addition to these archival materials, I also consulted little-known interviews and memoirs of Soviet football players and coaches, as well as biographies and newspaper articles (from the Soviet and post-Soviet period). These participant accounts are crucial because Soviet bureaucrats, especially politicians, preferred to give oral, rather than written, directives. Thus, the rationale behind certain policy decisions made by sports officials can only be explained by recourse to these non-archival sources.
Muscovite Recentralisation in Football
During Nikita Khrushchev’s final years in power, Soviet officials pushed to recentralise power in Moscow and elevate Russia’s standing in the Soviet Union. Benjamin Tromly’s work on Soviet universities has revealed how the efforts to defeat Stalinism through culture facilitated cultural nationalism. Tromly has claimed that in Russia in the early 1960s, a new Russophile movement displaced the universalistic Thaw.Footnote 14 Other scholars, such as Yitzhak Brudny, contend that the Thaw’s contradictory and shifting policy ended up giving birth to Russian nationalism even earlier.Footnote 15 For example, when Stalin died, Russia recovered Russian institutions that had been abolished earlier. By 1956, Russia’s Central Committee had established its own newspaper with the word ‘Russia’ in the title, Sovetskaia Rossiia, the first such occurrence in the Soviet Union in decades.Footnote 16 Not only was the education system Russified (again) in Ukraine, but Russian immigrants displaced many Ukrainians in positions of influence in government and society.Footnote 17
This recentralisation also occurred in other areas. Many of Khrushchev’s administrative reorganisations after the 1961 Party Congress aimed to centralise economic matters under the Party’s control.Footnote 18 Khrushchev dismantled the regional governance system, splitting the regional (obkom) Communist parties into industrial and agricultural cadres. This re-organisation threatened the informal patronage networks of many Party members by introducing new institutions that created confusion concerning which tasks belonged to whom.Footnote 19 Khrushchev also asserted greater control over Soviet culture, with a notable spike in pressure on cultural freedom in the non-Russian republics coming between late 1962 and up until Khrushchev’s overthrow in 1964. During these years the Soviet regime suffered several setbacks that would eventually lead to Khrushchev’s ousting: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the agricultural failures of the Virgin Land’s experiment, the Novocherkassk Uprising and the political rift with Mao’s China, among others. With Khrushchev desperate to stave off challenges from conservative Party members, who had never approved of de-Stalinisation and the Thaw, he reversed many of his remaining liberal cultural allowances and the more open criticism of the Soviet system that he had championed after the 1956 Secret Speech against Stalin’s legacy.Footnote 20 In December 1962, at the infamous ‘Manezh’ exhibit, he lampooned several painters who had gone too far with their artistic experimentation.Footnote 21 Pravda subsequently instigated an official campaign against formalism and abstractionism, demanding punishment for the artists involved in the exhibit.Footnote 22 Richard Gillies has argued that Khrushchev’s push to homogenise and centralise ‘almost all aspects of culture, politics and society’ resulted in increased oversight throughout the Soviet Union, a development that also held true for football.Footnote 23
In Soviet football, city, regional, republic and All-Union governments, ministries and industries acted as powerful team patrons, akin to modern sports owners but with far greater political stakes. As Robert Edelman and Jennifer Parks have illustrated, these stakeholders funded clubs, controlled staff and utilised football as a battleground for institutional supremacy and prestige throughout the Soviet period.Footnote 24 For example, the Ministry of Internal Affairs ran numerous Dinamo teams, the Ministry of Railways funded the Lokomotiv teams and the AMO automotive plant owned Torpedo Moscow. Much like contemporary sports team owners, these Soviet institutions paid for team expenses and recruited administrators and staff. They also micro-managed sporting affairs outside of their official remit, such as when high-ranking officials (upon occasion) barged into the clubs’ dressing room during half-time and forced lineup changes. The most significant All-Union institutions also ran numerous subsidiary clubs throughout the country for the benefit of one flagship team, which was often located in Moscow. Since Moscow was the economic and political centre of the Soviet Union, it naturally had the wealth and political clout to support the finest Soviet clubs. This fact, and sports officials’ preference for building the national team on the basis of the best couple of Soviet clubs, meant that Moscow-based players featured prominently in the Soviet national team.Footnote 25
Though officials never formally articulated why Moscow clubs had to be the best in the Soviet Union and the fulcrum for the national team, an alleged quote attributed to Stalin’s infamous secret police chief and the honorary president of the Dinamo Sports Society, Lavrenti Beria, offers possible insight into why Moscow clubs were traditionally favoured. In 1940 two Dinamo Tbilisi players, Boris Paichaże and Paioz Jejelava, asked Beria for assistance with equipment and improving training facilities for the Tbilisi team. According to Kote Maxaraże, the Georgian sports commentator and a friend of Paichaże, an unforgettable exchange ensued:
- Beria: In what place are you now [in the league table]?
- The players: In second, and if the referees were more objective, we could be in first.
- Beria: And who is in first?
- The players: The [Dinamo] Moscow club . . .
Beria’s face changed, he stood up abruptly and retorted: ‘Get out of here. You are in second place after Moscow, ahead of all other Soviet republics, and still unhappy! Moscow is Moscow, it should always be the first!’Footnote 26
Consequently, the Sbornaia reflected Moscow football’s pre-eminence. At the 1952 Olympics, the team’s first competitive international tournament, 70 per cent of the players came from teams located in Moscow. At the next Olympics in 1956, that number jumped to 100 per cent, before remaining above 65 per cent at international tournaments up until 1966.Footnote 27 At the club level, Muscovite players won numerous honours, even when statistics suggested otherwise. In both 1960 and 1962, the Soviet newspaper Trud, which awarded the prize for Klass A’s top scorer, retroactively changed the rules of the competition to ensure that the winner played for a Muscovite team even though players from the Soviet periphery had scored more goals.Footnote 28
However, Moscow’s domination would not last forever. In 1961, Dynamo Kyiv became the first non-Moscow team to win Klass A since the Soviet league’s inception in 1936.Footnote 29 Nevertheless, Dynamo’s accomplishments between 1960 and 1962 (finishing second, first and fifth in Klass A respectively) did not translate into greater representation in the Soviet national team. While previous Soviet domestic champions became the core of the Sbornaia, only a handful of Dynamo Kyiv players participated with the national team in friendly matches, while no Ukraine-based player featured in the qualifying matches for the 1962 World Cup.Footnote 30 At the tournament in Chile, only Dynamo Kyiv’s Viktor Kanevsʹkyi would play in two of the Sbornaia’s four games.Footnote 31 Moscow clubs remained the Sbornaia’s core.
Viktor Serebrianikov, one of the few Ukrainian-based players to make it into the Sbornaia’s squad, ruefully remembered how ‘Moscow’ looked down upon Ukrainians as malorosiiani (little Russians).Footnote 32 He recalled how before his debut with the Sbornaia’s youth team in 1959, Andrei Starostin, the national team’s head administrator, poked fun at his ‘provincialism’ and asked him if he had the money for a haircut because he was representing the Sbornaia and not a ‘gypsy camp’.Footnote 33 This perceived discrimination against the Soviet ‘provinces’ was seconded by Dynamo Kyiv’s Oleh Makarov, who was frustrated by his lack of opportunities to represent the Sbornaia in the 1950s and 1960s. In an interview with Bulʹvar Gordona in 2004, his wife recalled, ‘I think he had a bitter residue in his soul. Moscow then was ahead of everyone. And what is Kyiv for her? A province.’Footnote 34 This tension went further than sports. As political scientists Marina Glaser and Ivan Krivushin noted, Khrushchev’s reforms had benefited the Soviet periphery, but many outside of Moscow resented that the capital received the vast majority of the new privileges, such as affordable accommodation (‘Khrushchevka’ apartment buildings), sufficient food, consumer goods and other benefits.Footnote 35 As for Serebrianikov, he still managed to shine for the Sbornaia’s youth team and scored twice on his debut, resulting in Moscow’s Central Sports Club of the Army (TsSKA), the main army team, invoking the Soviet’s mandatory military service to try to recruit him from his employer, the Ukrainian team Metallurg.Footnote 36
This attempted transfer from Metallurg to TsSKA was part of a wider strategy to strengthen Moscow clubs at the expense of all other Soviet teams. Traditionally, Soviet mandatory military service allowed the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to compel regional and republic teams to ‘donate’ their best players to both these organisations’ teams. The finest talent went to their Moscow flagship teams, TsSKA and Dinamo Moscow respectively. Then, on 31 January 1961, Andrei Starostin informed the delegates at the All-Union Methodological Meeting on Football of new rules: ‘For the purpose of the Soviet national team’s high-quality preparation, the Soviet Football Federation has the right to transfer a Sbornaia player, with his consent, from one Klass A team to another Klass A team.’Footnote 37 The Federation wielded this new prerogative to bring the best players from across the Soviet Union to Moscow clubs, with or without their consent.Footnote 38 For example, the Football Federation forced Stanislav Stadnik, from the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic’s Pakhtakor, to relocate to Dinamo Moscow in 1961 ‘to help the Sbornaia’ under the new regulations, notwithstanding the efforts of unnamed ‘local organisations’ to keep their star man in Tashkent.Footnote 39 FC Rostov’s Aleksei Esʹkov was lucky to escape after unidentified individuals kidnapped him from Rostov’s training camp in Kudepsta in order to bring him to Moscow.Footnote 40 In a separate episode, another Rostov player and the Sbornaia’s star striker in the early 1960s, Viktor Ponedelʹnik, recalled how ‘two officers with machine guns arrived in Rostov and forced us onto the plane’ in order to compel Ponedelʹnik to move to TsSKA.Footnote 41 Though Ponedelʹnik eventually escaped TsSKA’s clutches thanks to his father’s connections to Mikhail Sholokhov, the famed writer, archival documents demonstrate that the Central Committee usually sided with the Ministry of Defence and other patrons of Muscovite teams in these numerous transfer disputes, forcing the players to relocate.Footnote 42
Government officials even pressured coaches to keep Moscow clubs and players at the vanguard of Soviet football and the Sbornaia. At the 1962 World Cup, goalkeeper Lev Yashin, Dinamo Moscow and the Soviet Union’s most famous football player, performed poorly in the national team’s second group game against Colombia, infamously conceding a tame corner kick in a 4–4 draw.Footnote 43 After the Colombia debacle, the coach, Gavriil Kachalin, had wanted to drop Yashin. In an interview with Akselʹ Vartanian in 1984, Sergei Kotrikadze, Yashin’s back-up at the tournament, recalled that the Sbornaia’s coaches had told him he would be playing in place of Yashin in the next match against Uruguay. However, even in this straightforward matter, the team’s management needed to ask for permission from the Central Committee, which rebuked the request.Footnote 44 Due to the lack of written directives, one can only speculate at the Central Committee’s reasons for sticking with Yashin. However, a strong cultural preference for Moscow goalkeepers in Russian society and Yashin’s fame may shine a light on why Kotrikadze, a Dinamo Tbilisi player and Georgian, never played.Footnote 45
In Soviet football, the goalkeeper was considered the team’s most essential member.Footnote 46 Historians Dietrich Schulze-Marmeling and Mike O’Mahony have explained how, in the Soviet Union, the goalkeeper was regarded as the main protector of Soviet honour and the last line of defence against foreign invaders.Footnote 47 In Russia and Moscow, this celebration went as far back as the 1920s, to Iurii Olesha’s 1927 novel, Envy.Footnote 48 The novel portrays a football match where the Moscow goalkeeper, Volodia Makarov, triumphs against his German adversary, Getze. Makarov exemplified the new Soviet Man, who defends the Soviet border against a decadent Western team.Footnote 49 Later, the author, Lev Kassilʹ, raised the profile of goalkeepers still further in his popular book (and 1936 film) Vratarʹ. In the book, a Moscow factory football team recruits a young man, Anton Kandidov, to be their goalie after admiring his reflexes when catching watermelons for his day job. Through playing the sport, the goalkeeper transforms into an ideal Soviet citizen by saying no to luxury, parties, alcohol and individualism while saying yes to collectivism, modernisation and impersonating the yet-to-be born Lionel Messi by running the length of the pitch to score against the Western capitalists.Footnote 50
Soviet journalists had invested years in characterising Yashin as Moscow and the Soviet Union’s pre-eminent football star and as a model Soviet citizen.Footnote 51 He was a Communist Party member and Order of Lenin recipient, who was morally strong, drank little and participated in Soviet politics. Newspapers were also careful to characterise him as a leader who brought sporting glory to the Soviet Union.Footnote 52 The Soviet media even airbrushed his only vice, an addiction to smoking, notwithstanding a Soviet policy that banned smoking for athletes.Footnote 53 At the World Cup, the main Soviet sports newspaper, Sovetskii sport, published a telling photo that illustrated Yashin and Muscovite football’s importance before a crucial match against Chile in the quarter-finals. In the photo, Yashin is in the centre, surveying the horizon on a docked boat, with Dynamo Kyiv’s Kanevsʹkyi shunted to the background under him.Footnote 54 A poignant picture, it highlighted Moscow’s place and the non-Russian republics’ secondary role in Soviet football. Thus, Yashin’s carefully crafted status and the goalkeeper’s importance in Moscow and Russia rendered it impossible for the Central Committee to replace him with a less well-known Georgian player on the biggest stage in sports. Moscow’s star goalkeeper had to be central to any Soviet victory.Footnote 55
The Ukrainian Football Federation and (Football) Independence
A 1958 report to the Central Committee by Nikolai Romanov, the head of the Sports Committee, observed that the 1958 World Cup disappointment – in reality a decent quarter-final finish – had pushed (unidentified) Soviet politicians to increase the pressure on sports organisations to include more players and teams from the Soviet republics in the elite levels of Soviet football.Footnote 56 Then, in their 1959 report to the Central Committee concerning future plans for Soviet football, the Sports Committee explained that the small number of teams in Klass A hurt the sport and the Sbornaia’s development. It argued that a new league was necessary because the (unspecified) lessons from the 1958 World Cup loss ‘had not been learned’ and both the Soviet Olympic football team and the Moscow clubs continued to lose in international matches.Footnote 57
According to the then head of the Football Federation, Valentin Granatkin, the ‘bosses’ (the Central Committee) pushed through these changes with the aim of expanding the Soviet republic’s representation in elite football. The Central Committee determined that Klass A’s twelve teams would be increased to twenty-two teams, with the permanent representation of twelve republics (instead of the previous four republics) for the 1960 season.Footnote 58 When privately discussing this reform with the Soviet journalist Lev Filatov in 1989, Granatkin summarised the struggle between the Football Federation and unidentified governmental officials that shaped football:
The league had to be expanded. I suggested little by little and on a sporting basis, but do ‘they’ [Soviet state and Party officials] listen? ‘There is no sporting principle, representation of the republics is the principle!’ At the same time, I was accused of being apolitical.Footnote 59
Since the Federation included many former coaches and players among its staff, the Federation’s officials understood the game and the dangers of arbitrary interventions ‘from above’. However, the Central Committee selected politically loyal bureaucrats for the top jobs in the Sports Committee, which ultimately outranked the Football Federation and controlled much of Soviet football policy. Many of these individuals lacked knowledge of sports and the qualifications to administer sports.Footnote 60 Several high-ranking sports officials, including the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) vice-president, Konstantin Andrianov, and the two longest serving chairmen for the Sports Committee, Nikolai Romanov and Sergei Pavlov, came directly from the Komsomol, the Communist Party’s communist youth wing.Footnote 61 Operating within a centralised, state-controlled framework of committees, federations and sports schools, these functionaries strove to implement the Party’s athletic and ideological training regimes.Footnote 62 Under the sway of the Central Committee, the Sports Committee closely followed Khrushchev’s fluctuating policies in the 1960s.
In late 1962, just as Khrushchev tightened control over Soviet culture following the Manezh scandal, the Soviet Sports Committee discarded the 1960 reforms, which had assured each Soviet republic (except for the Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics) a team in Klass A. The Sports Committee’s chairman, Iurii Mashin, claimed that the non-Russian Soviet republics had progressed so much that they did not require their former advantages anymore, that is, permanent representation in the first division.Footnote 63 For the 1963 season the Football Federation reduced Klass A to twenty teams from twenty-two, with only nine republics represented instead of twelve. By 1965, those numbers had fallen to seventeen teams with only six republics.Footnote 64 The weaker teams were relegated into the new ‘second group’ of Klass A, which became the Soviet second division, while Klass B transformed into the third division. Mashin claimed in his letter to the Central Committee that the Sports Committee divided Klass A to make room for more regional and republic teams, but in reality the new system made it harder for many teams from the Soviet republics to build on their improvements in the preceding two years since their teams dropped down the divisions.Footnote 65
As for the Sbornaia, Kachalin’s dismissal after the quarter-final exit from the 1962 World Cup opened the door for a new head coach, Konstantin Beskov, who reversed the Sbornaia’s modest inclusion of more clubs outside of Moscow. Beskov re-established Moscow clubs as the Sbornaia’s undisputed pillar for the Sbornaia at the expense of the non-Muscovite teams.Footnote 66 His first training camp with the Sbornaia proved to be a last stop in the international careers for a host of stalwarts. According to Viktor Serebrianikov, Beskov told the Dynamo Kyiv players at this first training camp that ‘you are [from] a village – you are nobodies’.Footnote 67 Beskov then put his charges through his paces and unjustly found fault with the Dinamo Tbilisi’s Georgian trio, Mixeil Mesxi, Givi Čʻoxeli and Slava Metreveli.Footnote 68
Although Serebrianikov was ultimately kicked off the team, which raises questions about his impartiality, Beskov certainly appeared keen to rid the Sbornaia of players playing outside of Russia.Footnote 69 In a 1963 interview for Sportivnyi igry, Beskov lambasted Metreveli and Mesxi, claiming that they were passive and ‘non-inventive’ players, a profound insult for Georgian players, given the wide esteem for creativity in Georgian football.Footnote 70 Beskov probably knew that his decision to rarely call upon the two players for the Sbornaia was unpopular, which is why he went to such unusual lengths to publicly single them out for criticism. In contrast to Beskov’s assessment, Soviet journalists had anointed Metreveli and Mesxi the two best wingers in the Football Federation’s 1962 list of the thirty-three best Soviet players. Moreover, both players continued to excel in 1963.Footnote 71
Aside from these two individuals, the wider exclusion of players based outside of Moscow made little sense from a sports perspective: the republic teams’ improving results in the Klass A and Soviet Cup – the second-most important domestic trophy in the country – competitions were beginning to outstrip Muscovite clubs’ achievements. On top of Kyiv’s 1961 triumph, Ukrainian clubs won three Soviet Cups between 1961 and 1964, while Dinamo Tbilisi won the 1964 Klass A.Footnote 72 According to precedent, such successes should have resulted in more opportunities for these clubs’ players with the Sbornaia, not fewer. However, Dinamo Tbilisi and Dynamo Kyiv’s small contingent practically disappeared from the Sbornaia. Dynamo Kyiv was only represented by three Kyivites, who played in one unofficial match each for Beskov’s team over two years.Footnote 73
These players’ limited role in the Sbornaia disenchanted not only the players but also sports bureaucrats in Ukraine, as highlighted on 4 July 1963 at the Ukrainian Football Federation’s plenum. At the plenum, Ukrainian officials and coaches voiced frustration at their republic’s poor representation. The Ukrainian coach Volodymyr Greber railed against Moscow’s recent exclusion of Ukrainian players from the youth Sbornaia teams despite Ukrainian teams’ stellar performances in domestic competitions for youngsters.Footnote 74 Anton Idzkovs′kyi, who became the Ukrainian Football Federation’s new leader in 1963, complained that the Sbornaia was nothing more than Moscow’s national team.Footnote 75 At the end of the session, Vladimir Moshkarin, then a Secretary for the Soviet Football Federation, was forced to justify why Beskov had continued to call up underperforming Moscow-based players, specifically Lev Yashin, Valentin Ivanov and Igorʹ Netto.Footnote 76
The grievances about the Sbornaia were part of wider complaints against the Soviet Football Federation. At that same plenum in 1963, a member of the Ukrainian Football Federation’s Presidium from Kharkiv, comrade Mʹnev, took issue with Moscow limiting the number of Ukrainian teams in Klass A and not allowing Ukrainian referees to preside over matches in Ukraine.Footnote 77 The Klass A constraints may explain why already in 1962 Kuznetsov had stated in public that Ukraine wanted to have its own Klass A.Footnote 78 The other big issue for the Ukrainian Football Federation was the Soviet Football Federation’s interference in decisions concerning Ukrainian football. The deputy chairman for the Ukrainian Football Federation, Volodymyr Oratovskyi, protested that the Soviet Football Federation had taken away creative initiatives from the Soviet republics by concentrating all football decisions in Moscow. He called for diminishing the Soviet Football Federation’s authority, arguing that each republic should be able to shape its own football policy.Footnote 79 Greber seconded Oratovskyi’s objections to overreach by the Soviet Football Federation. He told the audience that
Now I want to touch on the work of our [Ukrainian Football] Federation and the All-Union Federation. I understand the complexity of the [Ukrainian] Federation’s work. The Federation is a public body that attracts a large group of senior comrades. These comrades spend time and effort resolving issues. . . . And suddenly all their decisions are cancelled by a single call [from Moscow] and everything goes upside down, and this happens very often.Footnote 80
In response to this All-Union interference, the Ukrainian Football Federation started to push for more separation from not only the All-Union federations but also Russian specialists. Oratovskyi urged Dynamo Kyiv to lessen its dependence on Moscow coaches and recruit within Ukraine.Footnote 81 Samuel Khavchin, the Ukrainian Football Federation’s former president, agreed and then castigated Russian coaches and players recruited to work in Ukraine for only wanting to live temporarily in hotels in the republic. Khavchin asked the audience ‘from where will the [Ukrainian] patriotism come from?’Footnote 82
The Ukrainian Football Federation’s vexation with its forcibly diminished status in Soviet football and the All-Union sports federations’ interventions culminated in Kuznetsov’s 1962 public bid for a separate national team and FIFA affiliation, as well as a Ukrainian Klass A.Footnote 83 Despite Kuznetsov’s assurances to the contrary, it is doubtful that the Soviet Football Federation had agreed to such radical ideas, considering the silence of Russian sources on this matter. With the announcement, Kuznetsov tried to apply public pressure on the Soviet Football Federation to grant the Ukrainian Football Federation’s wishes.
Although the All-Union Football Federation may have been caught unawares by Ukrainian demands for an independent Klass A, it must have had some inklings of Kuznetsov’s FIFA intentions because he was merely taking public an idea that the Ukrainian Football Federation’s representatives had advocated at the 1959 and 1961 plenums for the Soviet Football Federation. Kuznetsov’s deputy chairman, Oratovskyi, had pointed out at the 1959 plenum that
It has long been necessary for at least some of our republics to be represented by their teams on the international arena . . . But in order to take part in these competitions, they must be members of FIFA and the Union of European Football Associations [UEFA]. Unfortunately, there are nations with only 300 or even 150,000 people with very weak football and these states are recognised as members of FIFA. They have their national teams in the international arena. However, Ukraine, the largest state in Europe, with forty-two million inhabitants, is deprived of this ability [to field a national team] since it is not a member of FIFA. Just as Ukraine is a member of the UN, the UN’s international Labor Organisation and other international organisations, it can and should be a member of FIFA and the UEFA in terms of its football. The same applies to Belarus, Georgia and other Soviet republics. For example, Great Britain, as is well known, competes in the World Cup with four teams: England – five million, Scotland – five million, Wales – 1,040 thousand and Northern Ireland – 1,040 thousand. Ukraine, with a population of forty-two million, is deprived of this opportunity.Footnote 84
As Oratovskyi emphasised, the primary reason for this separation was that the Ukrainian Football Federation wanted more Ukrainian representation in international football and access to competitive international football matches at a time when the only Soviet team to play in such matches was the Sbornaia. Teams from across the Soviet Union already played unofficial matches (i.e., not recognised by FIFA/UEFA) abroad during Khrushchev’s reign, but these uncompetitive ‘friendlies’ did not satisfy Oratovskyi. Furthermore, Oratovskyi was indignant that the Sbornaia’s players came almost exclusively from Moscow at the expense of the other Soviet republics, thereby robbing them of the competition that was essential for Ukraine to better its football:
The long history of our football shows that the Soviet national team was always composed primarily of the strongest Soviet Union teams, particularly the Moscow teams. Sometimes, two players from other republics were added to the squad. At the 1958 championship, only Ukraine participated in the championship; this year [1959], Ukraine was not represented at all. The policy of the non-participation of national teams of the Soviet republics in the international arena is a passive, incorrect policy; it does not benefit our football and instead harms it. International football encounters contribute to the growth of football. Without a competitive foundation of an international nature, [Ukrainian] football cannot grow fully and comprehensively. The admission of some of our republics to the FIFA and UEFA corresponds to the policy of peaceful coexistence pursued by the Soviet government, the expansion of cultural ties with all countries and a wide exchange of various cultural and sports delegations.Footnote 85
Another factor that may have played a part in Oratovskyi’s demands in 1959 for a FIFA-recognised Ukrainian national team was that in late 1958, the Soviet and Ukrainian Central Committee had sent a Ukrainian national team (composed primarily of Dynamo Kyiv players) to tour Sudan, Ethiopia and the United Arab Republic to strengthen political and cultural ties. Though Oratovskyi makes no mention of this tour, the first Soviet Ukrainian national team to play abroad since 1935 probably spurred him to conclude that now was the time to advocate for an official national team, as well as FIFA and UEFA membership.Footnote 86 In any case, after agitating for an internationally recognised Ukrainian team in 1959, he repeated his demand in 1961. Oratovskyi raised the stakes by submitting a formal written request to the Football Federation’s chairman and FIFA vice-president, Valentin Granatkin, who publicly acknowledged receiving this document concerning Ukraine’s desire to be a member of FIFA and UEFA.Footnote 87 Oratovskyi was, however, careful to portray this FIFA and UEFA affiliation as beneficial to the Soviet Union, emphasising how the Soviet Union would gain more votes and influence at both these organisations thanks to having more representatives.Footnote 88 This was a clever move because it was exactly what Soviet officials had intended when they forwarded Ukraine and Belarus’s candidacy for the UN and even, allegedly, IOC membership.Footnote 89 Notwithstanding this pressure from the Ukrainian Football Federation, Oratovskyi’s complaints remained outside of the Soviet press and public view until Kuznetsov took this idea of FIFA membership public in 1962.
Despite Ukrainian insistence, Moscow sports officials did not grant Kuznetsov and Oratovskyi’s wish. However, it appears that the Soviet Football Federation tried, to some extent, to accommodate requests for international football since Ukraine, Russia and other republics were represented in a handful of games by new national teams from 1959 onwards. Though information on the matches and whether pressure from the republics played a part in the creation of these teams is scarce, it is certain that these low-profile teams were comprised exclusively of inferior players from Klass B and competed rarely, often against other Soviet republics or weak foreign teams in friendly matches.Footnote 90 For instance, in 1964 Ukraine’s sports-monthly, Fizkulʹtura i sport, proudly praised the Ukrainian national team (of Klass B players) for beating its Russian equivalent in their annual ‘traditional’ match before reminding all Ukrainian football functionaries, players and coaches that they carry the ‘flag of Ukraine’.Footnote 91 However, the various Ukrainian national teams did not satisfy the Ukrainian Football Federation’s demands. Crucially, FIFA did not recognise these teams, which meant they could not play in competitive matches.
On 4 July 1963, at the plenum for the Ukrainian Football Federation, Oratovskyi repeated yet again his demand that Ukraine should become a FIFA member and underlined the importance of this membership for Ukrainian football’s advancement because it would enable Ukrainian football’s access to official competitions.
It [Ukraine] can and should [be a FIFA member]. Not only would we [Ukrainian football] not lose, but we would gain. They say our clubs play against foreign teams. True, but friendly matches are not the kind that count as official matches; there is a big difference between the two. Our [Ukrainian] football players need experience, no lecture, no good stories and no films can replace direct and practical participation in regular international competitions.Footnote 92
Oratovskyi once more stated that Ukraine and other Soviet republics needed FIFA membership and independent national teams, while again drawing parallels between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.Footnote 93 But the Soviet Football Federation and All-Union newspapers never publicly commented on Oratovskyi and Kuznetsov’s demands, and the Federation axed the Soviet republics’ unofficial national teams in 1964 according to Aleksandr Starostin and former Soviet referee Mykola Balakin.Footnote 94
Ukrainian journalist-historian Anatolii Kolomietsʹ has hypothesised that the demands for more independence in domestic Ukrainian football and an official national team led to unidentified All-Union bureaucrats firing Kuznetsov in 1963 (he was actually demoted to chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Dynamo Council).Footnote 95 Whatever the truth about the connection between Kuznetsov’s dismissal and the Ukrainian Football Federation’s demands, the campaign for FIFA membership did not disappear in 1963, while other sports officials kept their job. On 16 January 1965, at the Ukrainian Football Federation plenum, another Football Federation administrator, simply denoted as comrade Klatovskyi, rehashed Oratovskyi’s main arguments in favour of FIFA and UEFA recognition, but proposed that Ukrainian sports functionaries side-step the Soviet sports federations and bring this issue directly to FIFA and UEFA.
The third question I would like to address is one raised several years ago, but which has yet to receive an answer. It’s time for at least some of our republics – I am talking about Ukraine in this case – to raise the issue with FIFA and UEFA members so that the national team of a republic with a population of forty-five million can compete in official international games. I am deeply convinced that such a solution is consistent with the policies of our Party and state. Our country is well known on the international stage, it plays a dominant role. And if we make progress in football, expanding this horizon by bringing in not only the All-Union team, but also some of our large republics, this will not be a detriment to our football, but only a benefit.Footnote 96
From the perspective of the Soviet regime, it is likely that Ukraine’s proposed affiliation with FIFA and UEFA would have emboldened calls for greater political independence and even, conceivably, statehood down the line. This might explain why in public All-Union press and official communications were silent on the matter. This would also clarify why Oratovskyi and Klatovskyi were careful to assuage the fears of the Soviet Football Federation by insisting that membership with FIFA and UEFA fitted with Soviet governmental and sports policy, as well as benefiting Soviet football.
Outside of the Soviet Union, non-sovereign entities – that is, territories or colonies that are not politically independent, such as Greenland, Hong Kong and Kosovo – have regarded the joining of international sports federations, such as FIFA and the IOC, as bolstering a path to statehood.Footnote 97 As a result, the governments of these states actively engage with their national football federation’s efforts to join international sports federations.Footnote 98 Through football and other global sports, these non-sovereign entities hope to showcase their national symbols to a world audience.Footnote 99 For example, historian Allen Guttmann has illustrated how most African countries struggling for independence in the 1960s sought to join international sports organisations as a way to build international legitimacy in their efforts to gain full sovereignty.Footnote 100 More recently, Ryan Gauthier has highlighted how Kosovo has won de facto statehood from Serbia through its quest to join various international sports federations.Footnote 101 This political independence was not something the Ukrainian Football Federation coveted, at least not publicly. However, its officials did hope that joining these international sports organisations, and obtaining an independent Klass A, would lead to the Ukrainian Football Federation’s increased authority over its local football affairs, better Ukrainian international representation and improved sporting development.
Ukraine would not obtain FIFA or UEFA membership, but the Sports Committee finally answered Ukrainian calls for competitive international matches and representation. In August 1965, the Soviets finally entered UEFA’s official European club competitions, starting with the Cup Winners’ Cup and then joining the European Cup a year later.Footnote 102 Although national teams were not permitted to play in these tournaments, it did allow Dynamo Kyiv, in effect the Ukrainian national team, and other clubs from the Soviet republics to finally access competitive international matches. When explaining why the Central Committee should finally authorise its football clubs to enter these tournaments, after years of stalling due to concerns about Soviet clubs’ ability to win the competitions, the Sports Committee’s chairman, Iurii Mashin, never mentioned Oratovskyi or other sports functionaries from the Soviet republics. He did, however, employ Oratovskyi’s line of reasoning for why the Soviets should participate: ‘In order for Soviet football players to gain experience in playing in the most important international tournaments and improve the level of the play, the Sports Committee considers it appropriate to register for the Cup Winners’ Cup.’Footnote 103 The Central Committee obliged and Dynamo Kyiv, coincidentally or by design, became the first Soviet representative in the Cup Winners’ Cup, due to its victory in the 1964 Soviet Cup.Footnote 104
This turn of events, coupled with Dynamo Kyiv and other non-Muscovite teams’ reintegration into the Sbornaia in late 1964 following Beskov’s departure, seems to have satisfied the Ukrainian Football Federation. Now that Ukrainian clubs and players had access to competitive international tournaments, the Federation ended its petitions for a FIFA-affiliated Ukrainian national team in 1965. At the 1966 World Cup, Dynamo Kyiv was already the Sbornaia’s main fulcrum under the team’s new coach, Nikolai Morozov, due to Dynamo Kyiv’s impressive performances – Dynamo won the domestic championship for three years running between 1966 and 1968 – and Morozov’s openness to experimenting with a wider pool of players than his predecessors.Footnote 105 In the remainder of the Soviet era, as Dynamo Kyiv became the most successful team in the history of Soviet football, the Sbornaia would increasingly be centred around Dynamo Kyiv’s players and coaches.Footnote 106 Even other smaller Ukrainian teams, from Luhansk, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk, among others, sent players to the national team for the first time. The Ukrainian zenith was reached in the mid-1970s when Dynamo Kyiv’s players and coaches, incredibly, doubled as the Sbornaia and won the Cup Winners’ Cup (1975).Footnote 107
Ukrainian Football Deprioritises the Soviet Project
The events between 1959 and 1965 that I have analysed in this article bring to light the Ukrainian Football Federation’s increasing frustration with its vassalage to the Soviet Football Federation and the lack of representation of Ukraine-based players in the Sbornaia. This state of affairs stemmed from Khrushchev’s recentralisation of Soviet political, economic and cultural authority in Moscow, which deliberately reversed his previous decentralisation of power in the mid- to late 1950s. Since sports policy was ultimately set by the state, the All-Union sports officials also recentralised sporting power in Moscow. Through bureaucratic coercion and selective player transfers, they attempted to restore Moscow clubs as the embodiment of Soviet athletic excellence and as the main representatives of the Soviet Union on the international stage.
However, these policies alienated the Ukrainian Football Federation’s officials, who began to articulate new claims of international representation and self-governance. The Ukrainian functionaries were disgruntled by their players’ exclusion from the Sbornaia, Ukrainian teams’ lack of access to competitive international tournaments and their diminished control over local football matters. Interestingly, the demands for an official Ukrainian national team and more independence in local Ukrainian football affairs were reactions to recent shifts in All-Union sports policy, instead of a long-term goal for the Ukrainian Football Federation. Yes, Oratovskyi mentioned the need for Ukrainian representation abroad, but his original preference was for representation in the Sbornaia, which, to his disappointment, was not forthcoming. Ukrainian demands grew as the Soviet Football Federation tightened its control. The Ukrainian entreaties only disappeared once the Sbornaia reintegrated players representing teams from the Soviet republics, the Sports Committee enabled Dynamo Kyiv to play in competitive international tournaments and Dynamo Kyiv began winning multiple trophies from 1964 onwards.
Moreover, the inclusion of Dynamo Kyiv in European competitions ultimately offered an avenue for a Ukrainian national team, in all but name, to showcase Ukrainian symbols and elevate Ukrainian prestige in the international arena. In fact, after Soviet clubs were included in these tournaments and players from the Soviet periphery reintegrated into the Sbornaia, the Ukrainian sports figures’ previous irritation at the scant representation in the Soviet national team quickly turned into exasperation at being forced to provide so many players for the Sbornaia. The Ukrainian Football Federation and its coaches bitterly complained as early as 1967 that the Sbornaia called upon too many players from Dynamo Kyiv, making it difficult for Dynamo to win titles.Footnote 108 In 1968 the newspaper Komsomolʹskaia pravda published alleged letters, written by regular Soviet citizens and famous athletes, condemning Fedir Medvidʹ and Iozhef Sabo’s lack of commitment to the ‘Soviet flag’ – that is, the two players prioritised playing for Dynamo Kyiv instead of the Sbornaia – while also attacking the Kyiv press for daring to defend its two athletes. Both athletes were banned from the national team.Footnote 109 These episodes highlight how limits to Ukrainian participation in the upper echelons of Soviet football pre-1965 led to local Ukrainian priorities and victories taking ever greater precedence over duty to the Soviet Union for Ukrainian sports figures, foreshadowing wider apathy to the Soviet project in later years.
Thus, the effort to restore Moscow’s primacy in Soviet football ended up accelerating its decline and antagonising the Soviet republics from participating in Soviet football’s national centrepiece, the Sbornaia. Furthermore, Moscow’s officials inadvertently empowered regional actors who would transform Soviet football’s geography of power. What began as an administrative campaign to protect the centre’s prestige resulted in the first open assertion of quasi-independence in sports by a Soviet republic – a dynamic that would only intensify in the decades to come as Ukrainian football became the finest in the Soviet Union. Nikolai Kuznetsov’s unexpected speech in 1962 and the Ukrainian Football Federation’s efforts to gain FIFA/UEFA membership and wider independence, though only partially successful, offered a striking example of how institutional competition in sports could spill into questions of political representation and independence. With the return of Cold War–style politics, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the extreme politicisation of sports in Russia and Ukraine, the history of these two countries’ relationship is ever more relevant to a nuanced understanding of the complex tensions underpinning current events.
Acknowledgements
I want to thank Ricardo Zohn-Muldoon, Francine Hirsch, David McDonald, Brandon Bloch, Erik Scott and Kathryn Ciancia, as well as the editors and anonymous reviewers at Contemporary European History for their excellent insight and suggestions. I am also grateful to the University of Wisconsin–Madison, the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, the U.S. State Department, the New York Public Library, the Leibniz Institute for European History, Bridge Research Network, the University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, the North American Society for Sport History, the European Committee for Sports History and the Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies for their financial support throughout my research.
