Leslie Anderson has written an ambitious, audacious book. She asks how nations can democratize without strong support from civil society. Her answer: institutions—in particular, the executive branch—can take the lead. Anderson places her argument within the theoretical framework of Theda Skocpol’s “polity-oriented approach,” which “allows us to see inside the polity in a detailed fashion” (p. 7). Anderson’s argument is a pathbreaking corrective to the conventional wisdom that Latin American institutions are weak.

Particularly innovative is Anderson’s comparative perspective. Throughout, the author makes comparisons between Argentina during its first two post-1983 democratic governments and the United States during its first democratic administrations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as well as subsequently. In particular, she compares the use of presidential power in Argentina and the United States. Indeed, one chapter is dedicated to an illuminating comparison of presidential decrees in Argentina and executive orders in the United States. She further extends her comparisons to numerous other Latin American countries.

A major contribution of the book is its insights about institutional design. Of course, scholars overwhelmingly prefer parliamentary to presidential systems. But, as Anderson indicates, Latin American nations have followed the example of the United States and chosen presidential systems. She points out that presidential systems do vary; in Argentina, the presidency has greater formal power and is more likely to initiate legislation, while the legislature usually takes a back seat. Accordingly, although scholars fear executive–legislative gridlock under presidentialism, Anderson shows that it was rare, and that overall in Argentina, presidentialism was “adequate” (p. 234).

Linked to the author’s insights about parliamentary versus presidential systems are her nuanced reflections about presidential power. Very innovatively, she frames these reflections through the debates among the U.S. Founding Fathers and the roles of U.S. Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt during periods of crisis. Anderson argues that strong presidents who push their authority to the limits of the law and even beyond can be necessary for the resolution of a crisis—but, at the same time, they increase the risk of abuse of power. To her credit, she does not provide an easy resolution of this dilemma.

At the substantive core of the book, in Parts II and III, are in-depth analyses of several policies of Argentina’s first democratic government under Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89) and its second under Carlos Menem (1989–1999). These analyses are enriched by Anderson’s numerous interviews with key Argentine policymakers. She emphasizes the enormity of the challenges faced by both governments: in Argentina, threats of military coups and financial crises, and in the United States, the Civil War and the Great Depression. Accordingly, she perceives both Alfonsín and Menem more favorably than most scholars do. For Anderson, both presidents enabled Argentina’s democracy not only to survive but also to improve.

In her first chapter about the Alfonsín government, Anderson assesses its human rights policy and efforts at civilian control of the military. Scholars concur that this policy was critical to democratization in Argentina, and her analysis is very valuable. She describes how Alfonsín, the legislature, and the judiciary cooperated and “reached an unusual level of accomplishment in addressing the crimes of the past” (p. 75). However, after the government responded to three military coup attempts by ending trials of military officers, human rights groups “became strident and undiplomatic, seeking vengeance rather than resolution” (p. 70). It was the “institutions of the state” that “primarily supported democracy” (p. 76).

In the second chapter about the Alfonsín government, Anderson explores its efforts at labor reform and privatization. With respect to labor reform, four years of effort culminated in a law that opened union elections considerably. But the government’s privatization effort failed. Throughout, Anderson emphasizes that authoritarian enclaves posed serious challenges to democratic leadership. Specifically, the Peronist Party, which held control over Argentina’s labor unions and also Argentina’s indirectly elected Senate, posed serious challenges to Alfonsín; the Peronist Party’s legislative leaders watered down labor reform and blocked privatization.

Three chapters are devoted to the Menem government. First, Anderson describes Menem’s privatization efforts. She shows how, during Menem’s first term, the Peronist leadership reversed its previous opposition to privatization and moved ahead with legislative support. When accusations of corruption erupted, Menem circumvented the judiciary’s attempts at oversight. During his second term, concerns mounted and his initiatives lost legislative support; Menem circumvented the legislature.

Next, Anderson describes Menem’s labor reform. She shows that his reform went much further than Alfonsín’s, not because of Menem’s success with the legislature but because of Peronism’s corporate relationship with the unions. Menem’s Ministry of Labor could insist upon reform but also engage the unions in dialogue; “the iron fist wore a velvet glove” (p. 162). The government reduced the power of the unions by transferring responsibility for many social services from the unions to the state and enabling companies to move workers to new positions. The longer-term result was a reduction in the power of union bosses and progress toward a welfare state, “considered by some to be the highest form of democracy” (p. 177).

Anderson then addresses Menem’s efforts at the reform of Argentina’s educational system. The effort at reform of the K–12 educational system failed; the legislature took the lead but produced an unsatisfactory law that was adamantly opposed by the teachers’ unions. By contrast, the effort to increase Argentines’ access to higher education succeeded. The Ministry of Education accredited a considerable number of private colleges, increasing the number of seats available for students and expanding student choice. The ministry also oversaw the establishment of community colleges and the expansion of vocational training.

Although Anderson makes many fascinating comparisons across countries and centuries, the book would have been yet stronger if it had encompassed a broader range of policies and civil-society actors. As just indicated, four of the five substantive chapters focus on types of pro-market reforms. Concomitantly in these chapters, “civil society” is first and foremost workers’ and teachers’ unions. It is not surprising that these unions resisted the government’s reforms. (It could even be argued that Argentina’s unions, dominated by the Peronist Party, were not autonomous of the government and not “civil society.”)

What about other policies and other civil-society groups? For example, Anderson might have analyzed Argentina’s 1994 electoral reform. This reform allowed immediate presidential reelection, shortened the presidential term from six to four years, and established direct rather than indirect election of Argentina’s Senate.

Further, what about political parties? Parties are an important institution, and Anderson is concerned about Argentina’s “loss of a two-party system” and trend toward “competition between factions of Peronism” (p. 239). But she does not describe in any detail the demise of the Radical Party or her unusual classification of President Mauricio Macri’s Cambiemos as a “personalistic coalition including both Peronists and Radicals” (p. 239).

At the core of the substantive chapters is the argument that a “strong leader” was necessary to resolve crises. While Anderson acknowledges that Menem abused power, she emphasizes that he was far from a dictator. For the author, Menem was “capable, determined, and daring, a combination Argentina desperately needed in 1989” (p. 151); he succeeded in “placing the economy on a stable economic footing” (p. 178) and making the economy “functional” (p. 235).

This argument raises many questions. First, was it not possible to achieve market reform without significantly abusing power? Making comparisons between Menem and Roosevelt during the Great Depression (pp. 151–55) and several Latin American leaders who achieved reform but abused power yet more seriously, Anderson says no. But did not Brazil’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso achieve market reform with little abuse of power? Indeed, might not Alfonsín have achieved at least some reform if he had enjoyed a legislative majority in the Senate?

Further, might it not have been easier for Menem to have achieved reform without abuses than for Roosevelt? As Anderson points out, the Argentine presidency is more powerful than the U.S. presidency (pp. 232–33). And, further, in the argument of Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz (“Comparative Perspectives on Inequality and the Quality of Democracy in the United States,” Perspectives on Politics 9(4), 2011), the U.S. presidential system stands out for its exceptional number of “veto players” and exceptional degree of inequality of representation in the upper house.

A second question is the relationship between the end of market reform and the means of abuse of power. This question is important for Anderson; for example, she states that the “nondemocratic thrust of [traditional Peronism] was perpetually at odds with the democratic purpose of [U.S.-style presidentialism]; the result was a contradictory, paradoxical process” (p. 177). But her conclusion is that the paradoxical process “still created a desirable end [i.e., democracy]” (pp. 177–78). This bottom line—that the end did justify the means—is questionable. Can privatization be advantageous for democracy when the process was not transparent and punctuated by corruption? Is not the relationship between the market and democracy very complex? And what is democracy, exactly? In such indices of levels of democracy as Freedom House and the Varieties of Democracy Project, Argentina’s democracy eroded somewhat under Menem.

Yet a third question is Anderson’s description of Menem’s market reforms as successful. In 2001-02, Argentina was wracked by another severe financial crisis, and yet it is not analyzed in the book. The author acknowledges the problems of the government’s convertibility policy, but does not discuss the economic effects of corruption, the dramatic increase in international loans, or executive largesse at the provincial level.

Despite these concerns, Democratization by Institutions is a major achievement. Institutions do matter, and Anderson’s argument about the potential contribution of presidential power to democratization is novel, bold, and important. Her comparisons between presidential systems in Argentina and the United States are unique and open intriguing avenues for long-overdue cross-national research among the countries of one hemisphere.