Molloy’s new book provides stimulating reading. It has the merit of engaging with the standing of Kant’s views in contemporary international relations theory in a comprehensive way and in a manner which brings into consideration Kant’s philosophy as a whole. Yet, it also presents a consistent critique of Kant’s position which, while I ultimately find it misleading, does serve to shed light on some significant features of Kant’s thought. Among the intriguing topics touched on in the space of five chapters, a conclusion and an epilogue are: Kant’s ‘unholy view of human beings’; how the Critique of the Power of Judgment prepares the ground for Toward Perpetual Peace; Kant’s approach to the problem of international politics; Kant’s theological anthropology; ‘the all unifying Church triumphant’; Kant’s belief in the possibility of salvation; and finally how Kant matches up to contemporary cosmopolitanism.

Stated most concisely, Molloy’s critique of Kant is that he is a political theologian. Molloy borrows the term from the work of the controversial German jurist, Carl Schmitt (p. 23). Schmitt deploys the term ‘political theology’ in seeking to argue that all the major political theories up to his time had relied upon theological premises. In one sense, Molloy shares Schmitt’s purpose in this book in seeking to unmask Kant’s hidden political theology. Put simply, Molloy’s view is that Kant’s doctrine of international relations (illegitimately but perhaps understandably) relies upon a belief in God. Molloy analyses Toward Perpetual Peace, and especially the First Supplement on the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace, to demonstrate how Kant’s conclusions rely on a providential view of history where a divine being directs humankind in an ultimately successful way through the use of a hidden hand. In taking this line of argument, however, I do not think that Molloy fully clarifies his understanding of Kant’s philosophy of religion and its connection with the political philosophy.

Molloy’s criticism is broadly analogous to those criticisms in some accounts of Kant’s ethical theory which suggest that, despite protestations on Kant’s part, in the end he makes utilitarian assumptions. Since Kant declares there is an interest of reason in assuming that doing our duty and realizing happiness (the highest good) will coincide, the utilitarian claims that this is simply an indirect way of following a utilitarian ethic. Christian Garve makes this assumption when he objects to Kant’s system in the late 1790s, a view to which Kant deeply objects as he believes the whole structure of his practical philosophy has been misinterpreted in presenting it in this way. There are no natural ontological assumptions about God in Kant’s critical system. The idea of God arises only in our practical-teleological reflections about human existence. Molloy is aware that God within Kant’s system is a practical idea, a postulate of practical reason, but I think Molloy provides an incomplete account of the importance of this postulate. For the existence of God, which Molloy regards as fundamental to Kant’s system, seems often to be taken ambiguously in the traditional sense of an existent, empirical being. Kant does not present a Christian account of politics but rather one that may be regarded as compatible with a highly idiosyncratic moral interpretation of Christian belief. Christian doctrine is hollowed out to match up with a progressive cosmopolitan understanding of history.

Arguably, Molloy also does not fully acknowledge the significance of practical philosophy in Kant’s system. For Kant thinking about international relations brings us into the realm of international right. The doctrine of right is an integral part of Kant’s moral philosophy. It has an empirical or anthropological dimension, but this has to fit in with a firm intellectual basis which cannot be determined by considerations of anthropology and circumstance. Molloy fails to see Kant’s international relations as a moral system. The author’s preferred way of dealing with it appears to be to regard it as a theologically motivated prophecy. This is very odd, since the author’s praiseworthy aversion to the use of Kant in twenty-first century cosmopolitan thought is attributable to the absolutely indubitable belief that there is a deep metaphysical hinterland to Kant’s international relations theory which is not comprehended by liberal cosmopolitanism. The author regards this profound metaphysical hinterland as interesting and highly significant but also as an ultimately unreliable guide for us now as it represents an illegitimate theodicy (chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). However, such an approach empties Kant’s theory of its principal focus: the judgement of a deficient present against the standard of a humanity that is always capable of improvement. Molloy fails to see that the moral ideal of a realm of ends conditions the ultimate goal of Kant’s philosophy of international right, rather than a factual assumption of God’s existence. Instead of accepting Kant’s assurance that he is grounding his theology in morality, Molloy takes the view, which I regard as wrongheaded, that the theology is always the conditioning presence.

So, while the author delivers deep insights into Kant’s theory of politics and international relations and gives an accurate and lively account of many of its most striking principles, I find that he nonetheless fails to appreciate the theory in its own terms. Even so, I greatly valued the critique of contemporary cosmopolitan interpretations of Kant (pp. 165–75). Often, as the author suggests, these interpretations too readily imply the moral superiority of Western liberalism. The author must also be congratulated for situating the account of perpetual peace within the context of the philosophical system as a whole. Also of great merit is the emphasis on the influence of the Critique of the Power of Judgement upon Kant’s doctrine of international relations (chapter 2). Kant’s understanding of history has to be situated within the context of his final critical work. But I have nonetheless to flag the irresponsibility of belittling Kant’s contribution by putting it in the framework of the ideas of a juridical thinker such as Carl Schmitt who has no time for civil society, no regard for the rule of law and ultimately rests everything on power. In such a mélange Kant’s commitment to freedom is lost sight of, and a dreary future of continuous political instability and wars is indirectly endorsed. For Kant we should each regard ourselves as both subjects and potential citizens through a united general will in contributing to the political debates of our times. Political progress has to be the work of empirical human beings in the here-and-now, and not solely the second-hand effects of the will of a divine being. Of course, to bring about an ultimate perpetual peace we are not to see it as the act of one single individual nor a single people nor time; rather, to prevent such hubris we have to regard this final act of synthesis as the equivalent of a divine act of grace.

Ultimately, Molloy also wants to repel Kantian objections to the chill realism which largely dominates international relations thinking by endorsing a post-modernist picture of international relations which is seemingly unmitigated chaos. However timely and brilliant is the analysis of Kant’s texts, what can we say of a political science that wants to displace Kant’s anthropological realism and moral purpose with the scepticism of Nietzsche, the existential amoralism of Heidegger and the ruthless positivism of Carl Schmitt who reduces all political sovereignty to force? One can only hope that the power of Kant’s analysis – which despite everything is on display in the author’s narrative – will drown out the nihilist caveat the author seems to regard as his most important message.

Molloy sees Kant’s thinking on international relations as determined by his theological ideas. Admittedly, theological ideas play a part in Kant’s thoughts on international relations but this takes place only via morality or, as Kant puts it, practical reason. There is a strong hint in Molloy’s discussion that this tincture of theology found in Kant’s theorizing implies that the whole analysis of politics and international relations is vitiated or, at least, and less alarmingly, poses serious questions for those who seek to invoke Kant’s analysis in today’s context. If readers are left with this impression, that would be a mistake. For in his philosophy Kant addresses systematically some of the major questions that must always concern international theorists. Two such questions stand out.

1. 1. What can we know about human beings, human interactions and so society and international relations? Kant undertakes a very thorough empirical examination of the human being in his anthropology and his essays on history. As Molloy points out, the picture of the human race that emerges from this factual perspective is not very flattering. A large part of Molloy’s book is devoted to expounding the results of this anthropological investigation. What stands out for Molloy about Kant is his realism or, put more bluntly, his unmasking of the stark depravity (p. 105) of the human race.

2. 2. But Kant is not only a realist about the human being’s empirical condition, he also – and equally significantly – addresses the question of how we ought to act. This question takes us to a different place from the empirical, observed, world (though of course this experience cannot be ignored), namely, to an intellectual or intelligible dimension. Kant also asks in looking at international relations how should we as potentially free beings address our conditions and our shortcomings – both at the personal and social level and at the international level? Here we are in the sphere of the maxims we should adopt in acting. Here Kant also addresses key questions for international relations. What are the appropriate relations between prudence and morality; morality and right; law and politics? These lead to the further key questions of what kind of society and system of relations are most conducive to peace? Kant’s answers to these questions (as with his anthropological research) are not determined by any theological views. They are thoroughly and independently explored for their own sake. Such social arrangements and values have to be investigated by any scholarly enterprise in international relations.

Molloy inadvertently depicts Kant as an enthusiastic theologian who subordinates his account of international politics to an unshakeable belief in the existence of God. But this puts the cart before the horse. Belief does not come on the scene as the sole generator of Kant’s philosophical system (unless we are to depict that belief – in a manner that would be otiose for Kant – as an uncompromising commitment to the pursuit of truth). What generates the system is Kant’s enquiry into what we can know, what ought we to do and what we may hope. The question of knowledge (as with all philosophy in the early modern period) is of foremost significance. Only after determining what we can know does Kant move on to what we should do. And the conclusions concerning what we should do shape our interpretations of history and politics.

So that readers may judge I allow Molloy to have the last word about the key themes of Kant’s international relations: