In the field of political science, a book entitled Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts by David Engerman (Oxford University Press, 2009) illuminates relationships between Soviet academics and the ups and downs of the Soviet empire. One of the assumptions of the discussion is that because the field of political science has close relations with foreign policy, national security and the dynamics of international relations, the prosperity of the field depends on the importance of the country of focus. It is, therefore, not surprising that Soviet studies have been on the decline while China studies have increased, particularly in the areas of foreign policy and national security issues.
The Military Lens by Christopher Twomey exemplifies these developments. Twomey skilfully applies existing theories to develop a framework to analyse military relations between China and the United States. The book provides a theoretical framework, “doctrinal differences,” to analyse deterrence failure in US–China relations. The book's first two chapters are devoted to the construction of this theory, which has two hypotheses: the “doctrinal difference misperception” hypothesis (DDM), and the “doctrinal differences escalation” hypothesis (DDE). The author elaborates on his framework, emphasizing that “differences between the two sides' theories of military doctrine will make it more difficult for each to interpret the other's signals and to assess the overall balance correctly” (p. 10). These differences may lead to “misperception, miscommunication, and miscalculation” (p. 232) and could become a source of escalation of military confrontation.
To demonstrate the usefulness of his theory, Twomey conducts case studies of Sino–US relations in the 1950s. Three chapters centre on the Korean War, and one chapter is devoted to the confrontations in the Taiwan Strait. Through detailed investigation, the author tries to answer the following questions: why did China's effort to deter the US across the 38th parallel on the Korea peninsula fail? What was the causal factor of China's willingness to cross the Yalu River and enter the war? How and why did China decide to postpone its offensive campaign against Taiwan in the 1950s? The author also tries to extend his theory by looking at the Middle East, with a case study of the Arab–Israeli War in 1973. By doing this, the book's theory extends beyond China studies and makes a general contribution to military security studies.
In the final chapter, the book analyses the present dangers in the Taiwan Strait. Twomey argues that the danger of military confrontation between China and the US lies in the fact that the two powers have different military lenses. The US theory of victory, for example, increasingly emphasizes “technologies such as precision-guided munitions, space-based intelligence gathering, electronic warfare, information warfare, stealth [etc.]” (p. 237). In the event of conflict, Americans would “go on the offensive with overwhelming force aimed at the adversary's key centers of gravity” (p. 240). The Chinese doctrine stands in sharp contrast to the American doctrine. China, for example, is engaged in an effort to “develop asymmetric strategies that might be used in a coercive manner to counter current American conventional dominance.”
One of Twomey's conclusions regarding policy implications is that coercion is “very, very difficult” (p. 236), primarily due to the difference in doctrinal lenses. More troublesome is that the gap between America and “its potential adversaries” is “likely to widen” (p. 237). The author has three policy recommendations to remedy this situation. First, Americans should tailor their signals to fit others' perceptual frameworks for communication purposes. Second, leaders should have a “red-team” strategy. Finally, Americans should further develop military-to-military exchanges with other powers, including China.
Twomey is able to apply his theory to existing empirical data. The most important contribution of this book is that it provides a new perspective for us to analyse the most difficult period of US–China relations, the Cold War era. The author makes a great point: US policy makers should not take for granted that China understands their international intentions. If both sides do not work toward mutual understanding, the potential for conflict will persist. Fortunately, leaders in Washington understand this. President Obama's proposed “100,000 Strong Initiative” (sending 100,000 American students to study in China within the next four years) is a positive move, and will help avoid these misperceptions.
The use of case studies reasonably demonstrates Twomey's theory. For example, he offers an account of the Indian Ambassador Panikkar's function as a messenger between Beijing and Washington. Against conventional wisdom, the author asserts that the message did get through to American leaders. However, there are also a few less convincing cases. For example, the author analyses why the US did not prepare for a large-scale Chinese intervention in the Korean War. He quotes General MacArthur, saying “Only 50–60,000 [Chinese troops] could be gotten across the Yalu River” (p. 97) to shed light on the differences between the Chinese and American doctrines. This could be due to a number of reasons apart from doctrinal differences, such as imperfect information. The author appears too eager to use his theory to explain conflicts between the US and China. Twomey's theory is important and useful, but there could be multiple causes behind certain factors.
Another interesting example the author uses is the remarks of two Chinese generals about Chinese retaliation if the US were to become involved with the Taiwan Strait conflict (p. 247). Twomey assumes that China may use nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but it is not clear if this is a general change in China's military policy. Considering the increasing “freedom” for Chinese generals to make public statements, and considering that US military generals have also made comments regarding potential retaliation, the comments of the two Chinese generals should be used cautiously to exemplify a change in Chinese military doctrine.
Despite these minor discrepancies, this book is a timely addition to existing scholarship. It fills a void in scholarly works regarding international conflict, and provides a useful theoretical framework. It is ideal for graduate seminars and a worthwhile read for scholars in the fields of international relations and Asian studies. The field of Chinese studies continues to grow, and I am confident that we will see more of this kind of theoretically informed empirical study in the years to come.
