In its original French version, A World Beyond Politics? was entitled Cours familier de philosophie politique. The title alluded to a famous work on literature by Alphonse de Lamartine. As for its “course” character, the book originated in lectures that Manent gave at l'Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris. He took the opportunity “to freely elaborate … a kind of studied portrait (tableau raisonné) of the contemporary world.” “Not,” to be sure, “the details of events of which the newspapers are full, but the principal articulations according to which our world is organized and moves.”
We now have it in a handsome English rendition, thanks to the efforts of Marc LePain and Princeton University Press. The translation is generally accurate, although it sacrifices a bit of Manent's precision, not to mention his eloquence. But it is trustworthy. While the French original first appeared in 2001, just after September 11, the 2006 English version in no way is dated, which testifies to the basic solidity of Manent's framework and the correctness of his analyses. Manent, moreover, added a preface to the American edition to update matters.
The French title most importantly indicates Manent's perspective, that of political philosophy. His way of political philosophizing is one we do not much see here in America. It is political philosophizing in a grand and original style. Its grandeur and its originality are quite different, though, from those of, say, John Rawls. Manent primarily describes and analyses what is, rather than developing institutions and policies from our purportedly shared moral intuitions and values. This does not preclude evaluation on Manent's part, but it is evaluation with distinctively political criteria. He is a political philosopher in an emphatic sense: he focuses upon “the political” (le politique), and his normative commitments revolve around what he calls the “political nature” of human beings, “the political condition of humanity,” and the specific work of politics as such.
For those who resonate with originality, the book is a prime specimen of a distinct conception and practice of philosophizing. He both attentively considers revealing “phenomena” and locates them in fundamental structural “statics and dynamics.” Acutely aware of the complexity of things, his thought is dialectical and equitable; it thus especially challenges partisans and extremists. For those who are distrustful of too much originality, Manent respectfully engages with masters from Plato and Aristotle to Raymond Aron, Claude Lefort, and Leo Strauss. An earlier reviewer noted Manent's deft use of “the art of citation.” Reading Manent is tantamount to a guided tour through the masterworks of political philosophy and social theory.
All of this citation and attendant exegesis has a purpose, that of understanding the contemporary scene, with an especial focus upon western democracies. He does so in the context of the shaping forces and events of the twentieth century. Because this aim is so demanding, wide-ranging learning of yet another sort is also brought to bear. Manent artfully locates the present within a series of illuminating pasts. Some are standard— contemporary liberal democracy contrasts with ancient direct democracy; some are unusual for American audiences—Americans have not known the old regime or absolute monarchy, for example. They add up to a tour d'horizon of Western civilization and European history in their major political and spiritual articulations and junctures. In this connection, one of Manent's chief contributions to political philosophy occurs: the notion of “political form.”
Political forms—there are basically three: the city, the nation, and the empire—are “frameworks” of significant thought and action. They are the significant results of human beings “putting things in common.” The quickest way to distinguish a political form is to note that the ancient city and the modern nation hosted various regimes; they were the sites of a variety of forms of governing authority. But they also differ significantly from one another. They merit study in their own right. They especially need to be thematized today, as contemporary European democracy more and more seeks to do without its traditional political form, the nation-state. In its European Union gigantism, it apparently eschews any definite form.
The range of topics Manent considers is very impressive. They include the twin “spiritual authorities” of democratic societies, modern science in the theoretical realm and a distinctive form of liberty, “modern liberty,” in the practical (Introduction); the nature and leading characteristics of the contemporary liberal democratic regime in Western Europe (chapters 1–3); the nation as a distinctive form of political community, European democracy's long time “presupposition,” and its ambiguous place in the current debate over the nature of European union (chapters 4–6); the wars and totalitarianisms of the twentieth century (chapters 7, 14–15); commerce, communications, and globalization (chapter 8); modern individualism, including the discourse and reality of rights, and its remarkable and pernicious twin, “the religion of humanity” (chapters 9–11); the human body and sexual division in democratic society (chapters 12–13); and finally the widely envisaged “empires” of international law, human rights, and human dignity pursued by proponents of democratic humanitarianism in Europe and elsewhere (chapters 16–18). The book can be conveniently divided into three main parts.
The first seven chapters form the first unit. Throughout these chapters, Manent finds a fundamental fact and process at work in Europe today. It consists in the increasing empowerment of the modern individual and the corresponding erosion or eclipse of norms and authorities—especially the state—outside and above him. The same is happening to binding communal ties other than those to which the sovereign individual freely consents. This is occurring at all levels of the individual's existence; it informs high human attachments such as religion and intimate ones such as marriage and the family.
The “spiritual authorities” of the age and the current version of the democratic regime conspire to emphasize “personal autonomy.” Science, for example, says there are no rationally ascertainable norms or values to guide human choice, while liberty à la moderne declares man “the sovereign author of the human world.”
The contemporary democratic regime receives from Manent a remarkable analysis, informed by a lifetime of study of previous analysts. Montesquieu, for example, helps in the understanding of the nature of “representation” and the function of parties in the modern liberal order, while Tocqueville penetrated to the central “affect” of democracy, “the sentiment of human resemblance.” Adapting a formula of Adam Ferguson, Manent calls modern democracy an “organization of separations.” Six separations characterize and constitute the modern regime of liberty. The church was, and is, separated from the state; the state itself consists in separated powers. Similarly, the state is distinct from civil society. To join the two, representative institutions were invented or reworked; “representation” is the mechanism that distinguishes and connects representatives and their constituencies. The classical “division of labor” in the economic order has much expanded over time, so much so that Manent renames it a “proliferation of professions.” As tasks and personnel become specialized, that is, separated from one another, new professions are created to reconnect and mediate between them! This illustrates the power of the principle of separation in the regime: it is invoked to address the problems it generates.
The final distinction, between “facts” and “values,” entered in stages, starting with philosophers and sociologists at the turn-of-the twentieth century. This distinction is science's badge of “objectivity” and honor. It centrally forms the ordinary citizen's public moral catechism. More dubiously, it is a distinction that relieves human reason of the burden and adventure of dialectically sorting through various claims concerning the human good. À chacun ses valeurs.
In its emphasis upon the individual's rights and “democratic values” such as tolerance and respect, the current democratic regime in Europe is less-and-less democratic “in the original and proper sense” of the term. Dèmos-kratos (or kratia) was the self-government of a sovereign people. Democracy à l'Européenne contemporaine increasingly “radically separate[s] democracy from the peoples among which it is distributed.” Bureaucratic “governance” replaces the instruments and practices of democratic self-government. Parts two and especially three of Manent's inquiry seek to better understand and assess this process.
He emphasizes three general causes. Contemporary democratic humanitarianism and its operational pacifism are very uncomfortable with the nation-state. The nation-state is widely blamed in Europe for the catastrophes of the first two world wars, charged and found guilty of chauvinistic belligerency. It is widely seen as a great divider and war-maker. In the view of many, it must be scrapped or, like Gulliver, strictly bound to multilateral coalitions and international organs.
Globalization seems to be a worldwide process that individual sovereign states are incapable of addressing, must less mastering. Better to have international agencies regulate its processes. Commerce and communications bid fair to establish a truly global humanitarian “network.”
The “hyperpoliticization” of life effected by the two totalitarianisms of the previous century led many Europeans to the opposite extreme, the dream and desire of a postpolitical world. In such a world democratic norms and values would reign sovereignly and immediately, that is, without the “mediation” of political entities and their characteristic activities, including the independent exercise of military means. In particular the long-time European political form, the nation-state, must be relegated to history's dustbin.
This is the great “illusion” that Manent powerfully critiques in the last three chapters of the work. An illusion is a “representation of reality, tied to a desire.” “Humanity is already virtually unified” is its great presupposition. The specifics of the “vision” of what Humanity will be when all significant “collective differences” are overcome indicate the necessary and sufficient means to its realization. An order of international law and human rights, an empire de droit, with attendant legal bodies and human rights advocates is one major aspect. It has its clerisy, with lower and higher ranks. Judges, NGOs, and academics will be busy at work articulating the fundamental entailments of democratic humanitarian morality.
This morality is a mélange of rights, dignity, and “absolute respect” for identities or differences. The rights are ever expanding, dignity is construed in terms of radical human autonomy, and the contemporary version of “absolute respect” is intended to fill the gap in the previous understanding of respect, in which the individual's humanity was acknowledged, but his thoughts, choices, and character were considered fair game for consideration and critique. Now respect must encompass the person, his choices, and his identities. Compassion, commerce, and communications complete the picture of material and moral ties between and among all human beings.
In this new order of things, war is replaced with humanitarian interventions and police actions, and identities and life-style choices are justified by an understanding of human autonomy that recognizes no norms but human equality and personal desire. This moral order will be implemented by sovereign judges when benighted popular assemblies are slow to do their duty. Manent learnedly traces the transition in modern thought and practice from “the sovereign as judge” (Hobbes) to “the judge as sovereign.” A quintessential democratic passion (Tocqueville first analyzed it), the desire for immediacy, for immediate recognition of our common humanity, fuels this legal “paradigm shift.” It is held by many that it is judges, instead of the specifically political branches, who are best positioned to protect—to immediately enforce—the fundamental norms of democracy, human rights.
Against this humanitarian project, Manent critically applies a variety of criteria, including its departures from liberal-democratic constitutionalism. Americans who adhere to such constitutionalism will be cheered by the French philosopher's arguments, while proponents of living constitutions will not. Mainly, though, his criteria revolve around the human relationship to truth and certain clear truths concerning man's political nature and mankind's political condition.
To begin with, there is a Socratic element to his thinking. Manent finds a good deal of democratic complacency and dogmatism on the European scene in connection with its twin moral poles, the autonomous individual and humanitarianism. They exercise an adverse influence upon the natural human impulse to ask questions and to give reasons for one's thoughts, character, and commitments. Manent pointedly denies that “absolute” respect for all identities or differences is humanly possible. His examples of different sexual orientations and differing religious opinions or commitments are telling. Respect of the sort demanded today would require the lobotomization of human beings; in truth it effects the strident and sullen hypocrisies of political correctness. Respect for persons is one thing, to be compelled “morally” and legally not to wonder about or direct pointed questions to the rich variety of human characteristics and opinions, quite another.
“Putting speeches and actions in common,” an Aristotelian expression from the Nicomachean Ethics, helps sum up the nature and work of politics. To realize our nature, to exercise our faculties as rational and free creatures, we need the stage that political community and the seriousness that political life provide. The universality implicit in human nature can only be realized in particular political communities. Their variety, their deep and manifest differences, however, exhibit the limitations of each particular articulation of the universal. The fact of political plurality and the rivalry between “political bodies” with differing “moral and material interests” constantly challenge complacent and false autarchies, including European humanitarianism.
Manent is more than a neo-Aristotelian, though; too much important and philosophically interesting “political life and political history” has occurred since Athens and Sparta, not to mention Alexander. He has arrived at his own formulations concerning the unique tasks and humanizing contributions of politics. I will end with a particularly eloquent passage. The interested reader will find many more in A World beyond Politics?
Politics (le politique) holds together the different aspects of human life, individual and social. A political form, a political regime, is a certain way—always partial, to be sure, and even repressive in some measure, but a certain way of holding together the different aspects of human life. Politics allows the different experiences to communicate with one another, and it obliges them to do so, each time in keeping with the form and the regime. This is why I called politics the great mediation or the mediation of mediations: it prohibits any experience from pretending to absolute validity, it inhibits it from overrunning the social field and individual consciousness, it obliges it to coexist and to communicate with the other human experiences. In this sense politics are the guardian of the wealth and the complexity of human life.
