American Homicide is an ambitious and forceful examination of America's “homicide problem.” As Randolph Roth (a professor of history at Ohio State University) points out, the homicide rate in the United States averaged nine per 100,000 persons per year between 1965 and 1992, and while the rate then dipped to six per 100,000 per year in the mid-90s, it started going up again in 2004. The next most homicidal affluent democracy, Canada, averaged just above two homicides per 100,000 per year in the post–World War II period (3–4). Why is the United States the most homicidal among the first-world democracies? Other historians have proposed answers to this question—immigration, the frontier experience, patriarchal culture, slavery, honor, gun culture (10–13)—and one of the most compelling aspects of Roth's argument is that he does not seek to refute these explanations but rather to mark them as mere proximate causes of America's soaring homicide rate. Roth uncovers instead what lies behind these symptomatic manifestations: a feeling of alienation on the part of men that is rooted not in objective conditions (such as poverty) but in their subjective feelings and beliefs about their country and their government. Homicide rates rise, Roth claims, in times of political instability—when men feel that they cannot trust their government and that their interests are not represented, and when their patriotism and sense of connectedness to their fellow citizens falter. America's homicide problem, then, is a result of a failed polity, of the nation's inability to coalesce, to convince all of its citizens that they are represented and respected. The feeling of disaffection, powerlessness, and hopelessness that these failures of nation building engender in American men propels them to violence—although they are almost always unaware of the political origins of their murderous impulses and actions.
Drawing on a variety of sources (from newspaper articles to court records to letters and diaries), Roth identifies significant changes in the homicide rate from the colonial period forward. While Roth does track his argument to the present, his focus is on the nation's inception through the end of the nineteenth century, a time, he argues, when the modern pattern of homicide was set. As he maps changes in the homicide rate onto the political landscape, he demonstrates convincingly that the rate fell during moments of national cohesion and rose in times of social and political volatility, times in which men's feelings of alienation and frustration were likewise high.
For much of the colonial period, America was, surprisingly, one of the least homicidal societies in the Western world. Homicide rates dropped among European Americans in the last quarter of the seventeenth century and remained low for about eighty years, until the revolutionary crisis of the 1760s and 1770s. According to Roth, colonists' relative peaceableness can be attributed to the fact that they formed a mostly cohesive group, though they were drawn together not just by patriotism and a sense that the colonial government served their interests, but also by hatred and fear—“fear of Indians and slaves, hatred of the French” (63). This paradoxical dynamic recurs in Roth's analysis: a strong sense of solidarity binding one group, including bonds built through fear, hatred, and the oppression of others, can actually lower the homicide rate—but, one wonders, at what cost? And Roth acknowledges those costs. For instance, King Philip's War (1675–76) was, according to Roth, “the most important factor in the decline of homicide in New England” (66), and yet the numbers of Native American men, women, and children who were killed in order to secure that decline were staggering (67). Presumably the thousands of Native Americans killed were casualties of war, not victims of homicide, though the line between the two often seems blurry.
Given Roth's argument about the deleterious effects of political instability on the homicide rate, it is not surprising to find that the rate rose before and during the Revolution; fell as the United States formed a successful republic (there were scant homicides in the early decades of the nineteenth century); “exploded” in the late 1840s and 1850s (299) as immigrants began arriving en masse, as war was declared with Mexico, and as tensions over slavery escalated; remained high during the tumultuous Reconstruction years; subsided in the late 1870s and early 1880s as a stable government seemed as if it might prevail; and then jumped again in the late 1880s and 1890s—never really to go down except briefly during the middle of the twentieth century, largely owing to the efforts of Roosevelt's administration during the Depression and the national unity created by the Cold War.
Roth identifies the moments when the homicide rate in the United States “truly diverged from rates elsewhere in the Western world” (299) and assumed its enduring, exceptional character. He argues that rates went up to their high level, more or less finally, in the late 1840s and 1850s (299), as immigrants started arriving in America in large numbers and as economic hardship set in and men began realizing that they would most likely have to work for others for the rest of their lives. Another definitive decade was the 1890s, in which rates again surged among men of all races—not least, as in the 1840s and 50s, because of mass immigration. It was in this decade, moreover, that the rate of homicide among African Americans for the first time surpassed that of whites (387). Indeed, rates of homicide among minorities began to escalate wherever they faced discrimination—among Chinese and Hispanics in California, for instance. As divisions widened between all Americans—native and immigrant, white, black, Native American, Hispanic, Asian—the homicide rate rose and stayed high. And here we have perhaps the “ultimate cause” of America's high homicide rate (438): the seemingly unbridgeable rifts among Americans, and the feelings shared by many that the government simply has not, does not, and will not act in their interests.
As Roth offers his particular explanation of why America has a homicide problem, it is crucial to bear in mind that he is making the case for the remote causes of homicide, not for individual motives. The causes he adduces, moreover, are inherent in political and economic conditions, virtually never in the mind of any particular killer. And while he writes eloquently about political conditions in different times and regions of the United States, and then describes both instances of homicide and aggregate rates that correlate with those conditions, he leaves much to be inferred in the space between the political landscape and individual men's acts of violence. That inferential gap is spanned by men's subjective feelings about their government—the linchpin of Roth's argument. Roth uses terms that presumably describe the emotions of men—disaffection, alienation, frustration, powerlessness—but he does not (and for the most part cannot) demonstrate that particular men who killed actually experienced a loss of faith in their elected leaders. His method necessarily involves conjecturing state of mind from the state of the times (fewer landmarks named after national heroes, for instance, equates to alienated men prone to violence). Roth marks this inevitable absence, asserting that even as men remained “unaware that their behavior had any connection with political conflict or strain on the social hierarchy,” they nonetheless bore the “impress of broader social and political forces” (312).
This fundamental claim—that killers bear the impress of their political era—is a generative one (as all good arguments are), calling for further scholarship. It should inspire local historical studies, for instance, which explore the details of particular crimes and which attempt to excavate the remote causes of violence (embedded in particular times and places), as well as the motives of killers. Can we find evidence of political disaffection in particular cases? Can we explicitly link political context and individual acts of homicide? Since Roth's study is inevitably shaped by his discipline (“History holds the key,” he writes [3]), his work also calls for collaborations with psychiatrists, philosophers, sociologists, and criminologist—all of whom can help illuminate the ways in which failures of government, alienation, and loss of hope in one's political and economic future can trigger, in some men and not others, the will to take a life.
American Homicide also calls for more scholarship specifically on women who kill, and on the role of gender in shaping murderers. Obviously, women make up a very small proportion of those who kill, and Roth both does and does not take them into account. It is clear that they do not fit within his framework—that they kill for reasons other than the political instability, distrust of government, and lack of patriotism that drive men. But Roth's attempts to explain women's homicides seem fleeting and unsatisfactory, consigning women to a separate realm of unmediated emotion: he writes at one point that women typically killed because they “flew into jealous rages” (288) and at another moment that they “killed for more personal reasons” (325). This raises the question why women are not driven by the same causes as men; after all, women have been more consistently disenfranchised, more alienated from politics, than white men, so why aren't they more homicidal? Clearly gender plays a huge role in who does and does not commit murder and Roth's few references to “misogyny” do not really explain why men are mostly the killers and women more likely to be the victims.
In the end, though, the correlations Roth draws between political conditions and rates of murder are compelling and confront the reader with several larger implications. American Homicide insistently promotes the view that humans are driven by forces of which they are unaware, a claim that is necessarily in tension with a criminal justice system founded on the notion of absolute free will. Roth's book also makes it clear that restoring confidence in the United States government—convincing people that it actually represents the interests of all—involves higher stakes than even the much-lamented pervasive cynicism of its citizens. People's lives are at stake.
