Do we need African Canadian philosophy? This question, which I will try to answer in the following article, may seem a bit odd. Some might think that a more appropriate question would be: “Is there such a thing as African Canadian philosophy?” In other words, one might think that, before or even instead of talking about whether it is something we need, it would make sense to ask whether this unfamiliar term corresponds to something that actually exists or is at least capable of existing. On the other hand, though, some might see the question as odd from another angle. From this second position, it is not necessary for us to ask whether African Canadian philosophy exists or can exist, and it is equally unnecessary to dignify the question of whether it is needed with a response—what we ought to do is simply do it, and do it well. From this point of view, the best general question to ask, if we have to ask one at all, would be something along the lines of: “What might be the most fruitful approach to doing good work in African Canadian philosophy?”
While I will, as I said, pursue the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophy, it is useful to ask what might push people in the direction of these two alternative questions. One reason to think we should ask whether or not African Canadian philosophy exists is that it might seem as if it is hard to know whether we need something if we have yet to decide whether we already have it. This is an understandable concern that counts more as a demand for clarification than as a rejection of my question, and it is a concern to which I will eventually return in order to address it. But another reason that someone might say the real question is whether there is or can be such a thing as African Canadian philosophy is because that person might be inclined to think the answer to the question of whether we need it is an obvious “no”. Such a person might think that we should be automatically suspicious of this sort of attempt to attach race or ethnicity to the idea of doing philosophy. From this point of view, philosophy, understood as the practice of asking and trying to answer the most fundamental questions we as human beings have about the world and ourselves, should be seen as a pursuit we undertake in our capacity as rational beings, not as people of this or that background. Indeed, the exotic concept of African Canadian philosophy might seem like a case of multiculturalism gone too far. If Canadians of African descent would like to philosophize, one might say, let them do so, but if what they are doing is or has the pretence of being “African Canadian” in some distinctive way then either they are not doing philosophy or they are doing it in a way that necessarily fails to represent philosophy at its best, at its purest—that is to say, at its most universal.
And yet, as I noted, some might alternatively think it best to bypass the question of whether African Canadian philosophy exists because they are convinced that what we really need to do is turn our attention to the task of actually doing it. Someone who takes this position might dislike my question about whether we need African Canadian philosophy because he or she thinks the obvious answer is: “Sure we do.” Such a person might be willing to admit that we do not need bad African Canadian philosophy (although he or she may even be willing to argue for the utility of this as a starting point). The claim that we do not need any African Canadian philosophy at all, though, is likely to be seen not merely as incorrect but as offensive and not worthy of treatment as a serious position. Why should we countenance the idea that we have no reason to expect African Canadians to produce philosophy of distinct and eminent value? Asking whether we need African Canadian philosophy sounds suspiciously like asking whether African Canadians have anything worthwhile to contribute on an intellectual level, and treating this as an open question doubtlessly encourages those who would have us consider the possibility that black people are by nature intellectually deficient.Footnote 1
I have now outlined two positions according to which the question which gives this article its title has a perfectly obvious answer, thus negating the usefulness of asking the question. To those who think the answer is an obvious “no, we do not need African Canadian philosophy,” I have nothing to say upfront to dissuade them of this view. If their dismissal of the idea does indeed happen to be rooted in the racist belief that black people are too intellectually deficient to do philosophy then I have nothing to say to them at all. If, however, that is not the case—that is, if they have no doubt that black people can be good philosophers and their dismissal of the idea is rooted instead in their conception of how philosophy relates or does not relate to racial and ethnic identities—then it is in the course of what follows that I hope to provide them with reasons to think differently about the matter.
With regard to those who think the answer is an obvious “yes”, on the other hand, I do wish to say something right away about why treating this as an open question need not be seen as having the offensive implications it might seem to have at first glance. I am interested here in the question of the value of work in professional philosophy. Even putting aside the fact that people outside the academy engage in forms of critical inquiry that could arguably be called “philosophy” all the time, it should not be automatically assumed that philosophy as a field of professional research stands among the best venues within the academy for penetrating intellectual work by and about African Canadians. Thus, the question I am asking is not “do we need African Canadian thought?” and it should certainly not be assumed to imply the insulting question: “Are African Canadians capable of thought?” What is at issue, rather, is whether it is vitally important that, among the many ways in which African Canadian thought can be produced and encountered, there be a subfield of the discipline of philosophy labelled “African Canadian philosophy.” The person inclined to think the answer is an obvious “yes” should recognize that it is possible to ask not only whether African Canadians are capable of contributing to philosophy, but also whether philosophy, as the institutionalized discipline that it is, can and would provide a rewarding vehicle for the development of African Canadian ideas. We should be asking ourselves, in other words, not just about whether philosophy needs African Canadians, but about whether African Canadians need philosophy, or whether it would in fact be unsuited to the demands of knowledge production most relevant to the community.
This last point brings me to the final preliminary issue to be clarified before I begin in earnest to address the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophy—namely, the issue of who “we” are. One might reasonably suspect that the answer to my question must depend on whose needs I have in mind. We can ask whether African Canadians need African Canadian philosophy, whether the philosophical community needs it, whether the Canadian academy or Canada as a whole needs it, whether the world needs it. All I can say for now is that I am interested in all of these constituencies, and so I will try to specify who the relevant “we” or “we’s” are as my discussion proceeds. It will proceed, by the way, as follows: I will refine the question—“do we need African Canadian philosophy?”—and seek to answer it in the affirmative by posing and seeking to answer five related questions, each of which can be seen as a sort of alternative version of the main question. They are:
(1) Do we need African Canadian philosophers?
(2) Do we need philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience?
(3) Do we already have African Canadian philosophy?
(4) Can anybody do African Canadian philosophy?
(5) What will African Canadian philosophy do for us?
1. Do We Need African Canadian Philosophers?
I suggested above that one reason someone who thinks the answer to my question is an obvious “no” might heap scorn on the idea of African Canadian philosophy is the assumption that this must mean some kind of distinctive approach to philosophy. One can imagine someone rejecting the idea on the basis that to treat it as viable opens the floodgates, inviting every possibly distinct group to claim the need for their own philosophy. There will need to be Somali Danish philosophy, Albanian Australian philosophy, second generation Pakistani Abu Dhabian philosophy. From the point of view of the person rejecting the idea on this basis, the endless popping up of such categories would not enrich philosophy but debase it, turning it into a series of shallow cultural descriptions rather than a critical investigation into the meaning of truth, knowledge, goodness, and other such timeless and universally important concepts.
But what if this person is wrong to assume that the term “African Canadian philosophy” must indicate discussion of something other than the classic themes treated by the great Western philosophers? What if all it means is philosophy that happens to be done by African Canadians? Under this definition, a Haitian-Canadian from Montreal writing about the issues addressed in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason would be no less and perhaps even more representative of African Canadian philosophy than a Jamaican-Canadian from Toronto writing about the significance of being black in Canada today.
Now, if it is the case that any time philosophy of any kind is done by an African Canadian, it counts as African Canadian philosophy, then the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophy can be understood simply as the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophers—that is, African Canadians who devote themselves to doing philosophy. So do we? We must be careful once again to see why this question might be worth asking. We have already dismissed as unworthy of engagement those who would reject the idea of African Canadian philosophy because they do not expect black people to be capable of philosophical excellence. Consequently, if the only reason to answer “no” to the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophers were likewise the view that African Canadians are unlikely to do philosophy well, the question would not be an interesting one and the answer would obviously be “yes”.
This, however, need not be the only reason to answer “no”. One might say, “no, we do not need African Canadian philosophers because we do not need philosophers of any particular background.” The point here would not be that we do not need philosophers, for one might believe that it is a vitally important part of the human experience that we engage with the tough questions about the nature of reality, the contours of human knowledge, and the challenge of living a good life that philosophers specialize in raising. One might believe, though, that it does not matter whether the people playing this vital role are black, white, yellow, red, or purple. Note that someone who answers in this way, unconvinced of the need for African Canadian philosophers but convinced of the need for philosophers in general, is answering with either the largest “we” possible in mind—that is, “we” meaning the world—or, on a smaller scale, that subset of the world’s people consisting of philosophers. The philosopher’s point, in the latter case, would be that it is inconsequential to the level of achievement in our field whether many of us are African Canadian or few of us are—all that matters is how well we perform our distinctive tasks of clarifying issues and offering good arguments.
But what about the standpoint of African Canadians, the “we” made up of the black population of Canada? Someone approaching the question from this standpoint might say we need African Canadians to do many things—we need more of them in politics, more of them in business, more doctors, lawyers, scientists, and engineers. We need to increase our numbers in these and other fields because we are, in this country, as elsewhere in the West and in the world as a whole, disproportionately in a disadvantaged state and greater representation in these fields is part of changing that.Footnote 2 But is philosophy among the fields whose demographics we need to focus our energies on changing? Certainly we need greater representation in the academy. And yet, while it seems clear enough that we need, to give two examples, historians who can tell the story of our presence in this country and sociologists who can measure our status and progress in this society, is it clear what we need philosophers for?
Someone who doubts that we need philosophers may see the field as simply of no use, because it is a discipline full of abstraction and attempts to solve conceptual puzzles that do not connect in any meaningful way to the pressing problems of being black in a majority-white society. Alternatively, the field might be perceived not merely as useless but as psychologically harmful, because of the way philosophers often see themselves as practitioners of a discipline at the heart of the grand Western tradition, as masters of a mode of thinking supposedly born in ancient Greece and symbolizing ever since the world-changing freedom and rationality of the West. In other words, the Eurocentrism associated with philosophy might be seen as making investment in it more of a hindrance than a help or even something neutral from the perspective of those dedicated to the affirmation and empowerment of people of African descent.
There are a number of reasons, then, to see the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophers as contentious rather than as having an obvious answer. It also matters that we are not asking whether there is anything wrong with an African Canadian becoming a philosopher. From the standpoint of the not obviously racist philosopher who says “no, we do not need African Canadian philosophers,” it would not necessarily be a problem if all of a sudden most or even all philosophers in Canada were African Canadian. But it would likewise not be a problem if no philosophers were. From the standpoint of the African Canadian activist saying “no”, at least in the case of one willing to grant the possibility that not all philosophers are irredeemably Eurocentric, it is clear that any young people in the community who happen to want to be philosophers should be encouraged to follow their dreams, just as we should not see anything wrong with our young people choosing to pursue interests they may have in Chinese literature, geology, or opera singing. What is unnecessary, from both of these standpoints, is any special effort to get young African Canadians interested in philosophy, so that they might perhaps choose it as a career.
I wish to argue, however, that we do need African Canadian philosophers. Some of the reasons why I hold this position have to do with how I think incoming African Canadians would be likely to change the ways in which philosophy is done, but for the purposes of setting aside what I have already suggested is a separate discussion concerning distinctive content, I will make my present argument on the assumption that African Canadians would not do things differently. We should be imagining, then, an influx of African Canadians into philosophy, all of whom have very traditional interests: they are epistemologists, metaphysicians, logicians, philosophers of language, philosophers of mind, philosophers of science, philosophers of religion, ethicists, political philosophers, aestheticians, historians of philosophy, etc., and while, as good philosophers, they bring new ideas to the table, these ideas fit squarely into the mainstream of the Western tradition, lacking any inflection that might be unmistakably associated with their racial identity or their ethnic backgrounds.
Why would this be a welcome and useful development worth seeking to bring about? Let us first note that it would be a very striking development, and that this would be the case even if the influx was very small in relation to the total number of philosophers in Canada. It would be striking because, at present, people of African descent are close to being completely absent in the field. In fact, I do not know of any university other than my own, Dalhousie, where there is a black tenure-track or tenured faculty member of the philosophy department.Footnote 3 As for people in non-tenure-track positions (past the Ph.D stage), I knew of one quite recently, but he left to take a tenure-track job in South Africa in 2012.Footnote 4 Now, it is hard to obtain official numbers about this type of thing, and thus there may be people who have made it under my radar. Let us consider for now, however, the possibility that there are indeed only two professional philosophers at Canadian universities who self-identify as black: myself and my colleague here at Dalhousie, Françoise Baylis, who has written about her experiences as someone who self-identifies as black but is generally perceived on the basis of her appearance to be white.Footnote 5 This would make me currently the only visibly, self-identified black philosopher working at a Canadian university. We are, to put it lightly, severely underrepresented in the field, even relative to the fact that we are only 2.5% of the country’s population as a whole.Footnote 6
Philosophy in Canada is, in this way, like philosophy elsewhere in the Western world—overwhelmingly white, and particularly devoid of black people (it is worth mentioning here the striking case of South Africa, a majority black country whose racial demographics among philosophers are not all that different from Canada’s!). Speaking as a Canadian and as a philosopher, I believe we need African Canadian philosophers because the current lack of representation of black people in the field reflects badly on Canadian society in general and on the philosophical community in particular. By this, I do not mean that we have reason to think there is a consciously orchestrated conspiracy to keep black people out of philosophy in Canada. My point is simply that, given the history and present-day issues of black people in this country and in the West and the world as a whole, it is generally not unreasonable to suspect that our absence in positions associated with high accomplishment can be linked in some way with the past or present operation or continuing effects of systemic racism. In light of this, even if we charitably assume that there is currently no hostility whatsoever to our presence in philosophy on the part of philosophers, university administrators, and others involved in the management of higher education, it nevertheless reflects badly upon this society and upon this profession when our absence in the field is simply accepted, ignored, and naturalized.
Thus, insofar as ending racism and redressing its effects are worthy causes, it seems to me that we have ample motivation to desire and seek better representation of black people in philosophy in Canada. This is especially the case if we are truly invested in this idea of philosophy as universal. At present, philosophy does not appear universal—it appears, rather, to be the province, first and foremost, of white men. And just as it is reasonable to think that sexism has had much to do with the traditional dearth of women in philosophy and that current efforts to achieve more gender balance in the profession are laudable for their opposition to the myth that philosophizing is a male enterprise, I believe efforts to bring more people of colour into philosophy are crucial if philosophy is to present itself convincingly and without self-deception as a human enterprise, as opposed to an activity reserved for a select and privileged portion of humanity.
This argument for the need for African Canadian philosophers on the grounds that their absence is reflective of our society’s historical and present racism can, I think, be seen as compelling not just for those invested in philosophy but also for those viewing the situation from the African Canadian perspective. Note, however, that the argument remains somewhat incomplete from this perspective, as it does not tell us what is special about philosophy. African Canadians can be seen as underrepresented in many fields. Are there any reasons we should see our absence in philosophy as a particularly pressing problem? What is the value of philosophy for African Canadians, especially if we do not make the assumption that African Canadian philosophers will write about matters of particular relevance to African Canadian life? There are, I think, two ways in which we can see participation in philosophy at the professional level as important to the advancement of the community.
The first involves the symbolic value of philosophy. It is often said that most of the major academic disciplines that we now take for granted, from the natural and social sciences to the humanities, are originally spinoffs from philosophy, of which they were once considered a part. When this is noted with the intent to praise philosophy, the effect is to suggest that philosophy is in some sense the paradigm intellectual pursuit, the discipline whose quest for knowledge is what is at stake and what has ultimately motivated research in all disciplines. Certainly the etymological meaning of the term “philosophy”—“love of wisdom”—reinforces this notion, and it would seem relevant to explaining why would-be professionals in all disciplines seek to gain the title: “Doctor of Philosophy.” What does it mean, then, for black people to be shut out or to shut themselves out of a discipline with this symbolic power? It means, I think, that we remain fundamentally alienated from academia. And insofar as philosophers also often represent, in the popular imagination, the deepest of deep thinkers, those who push the power of the mind as far as it can go by tackling the most difficult questions, the absence of black people in philosophy also serves to reinforce the stereotypes that persist concerning our intellectual limitations.
The second reason for thinking that we, as a community, need African Canadian philosophers involves not the symbolic but the substantive value of philosophy. Simply put, philosophy itself is valuable. To a degree that distinguishes the discipline from others, philosophers specialize not so much in building up a very clearly delineated body of knowledge but rather in cultivating a certain set of widely applicable skills. To engage in philosophy is to learn, first and foremost, how to evaluate arguments and how to think carefully and creatively about the meaning and implications of concepts we might take for granted on an everyday basis. The kinds of self-awareness, precision, and boldness in thought that philosophy champions are useful, and were there to be more African Canadian philosophers, then through their ability to attract and serve as role models for African Canadian students and through their presence and participation in the general life of the African Canadian community, the community could be seen to benefit from the virtues of this intellectual activity.
I would describe this benefit, by the way, as both private and public in scope. By “private,” I mean to refer to the personal lives of individuals within the community. The type of critical thinking that philosophy cultivates can be useful to African Canadians, as to people of any background, as individuals going about their lives, processing information, engaging peers in dialogue, pondering life’s mysteries, and figuring out what they think about things. As a public benefit, though, I mean to suggest that philosophy can be relevant to the community as a community—that is, relevant to thinking through the issues African Canadians face collectively in light of the historical and social realities that make being black in Canada a unique experience. Discussing this type of benefit, however, leads me to my second question.
2. Do We Need Philosophy Focused on the African Canadian Experience?
The public benefit as I have just described it so far is indirect. The community benefits from the thinking of African Canadian philosophers not because these philosophers, in their work as philosophers, apply their skills to the task of thinking through the community’s issues but rather because these philosophers promote habits and methods of thought in the community that can in turn be productively applied to the task of thinking through the community’s issues. Perhaps we can even say that the people doing the applying may include philosophers who have simply taken their philosopher hats off and who are engaging with the community in their capacity as fellow community members. But if we imagine that to be an African Canadian philosopher is simply to be a philosopher who happens to be African Canadian and that the work of African Canadian philosophers will not differ in any marked way from the work of their non-black colleagues, then it is going to be the case that the philosophical efforts of African Canadians will have no direct relevance to the particular concerns of the African Canadian community.
Perhaps this is not a problem. After all, even if we think academia should have something to say about the concerns of the community, it might come more naturally to other disciplines to be directly relevant, which reminds us once more that philosophy should never be seen as the only game in town. That being said, however, I wish to argue that it doesn’t have to be this way. Philosophy too can be seen as directly beneficially relevant once we accept that valuable philosophical work can be done exploring the African Canadian experience and investigating the various issues that arise from this experience. Accepting this, African Canadian philosophers who are committed to the advancement of their community can view philosophy as a site of struggle and view their work in the field as efforts in the struggle on the community’s behalf.
Consequently, to return to the matter of how to understand the question that this article seeks to answer, asking whether we need African Canadian philosophy does not have to mean asking only whether we need African Canadian philosophers—it can also mean asking whether we need philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience, and to this second question, as to the first, I say “yes.” But, as before, it is important to think about how much of a challenge to the status quo this new version of the question represents. Questions about what we need are not simply questions about what is possible, and so asking whether we need philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience is not the same as asking whether it is possible that someone might do good work in philosophy in which the African Canadian experience is a central theme. If this latter question appears at all controversial, further reflection should show that the answer is a very straightforward “yes.”
Think, first, of the fact that philosophy thrives on useful examples. Just as Québecois separatism and language politics have at times served as useful examples for political philosophers interested in issues of nationalism and secession, it should not be hard to imagine someone using an issue from the African Canadian experience as an illustration or a test case in a discussion of some other subject.Footnote 7 Someone might, for example, draw on the story of the destruction of Africville, Nova Scotia, in a philosophical discussion of repairing past wrongs, raising questions about how people can be compensated for the type of wrong involved in the loss of a community.Footnote 8 But if it seems as if this might count more as philosophy mentioning rather than focusing on the African Canadian experience, let us now imagine someone who works on a question like “what does it mean to be African Canadian?” To assume right off the bat that this is a question of deep philosophical significance is perhaps too much to ask. What should not be too hard, however, is refraining from assuming the opposite, that is, that the question has no philosophical significance. We philosophers, who as a matter of fact excel in finding mystery where most would not, really ought to be open-minded enough to wait and see what dilemmas or conceptual challenges someone may have found in a question like this, and so I cannot see a reason to think one might sensibly answer “no” to the query of whether it is possible that someone might do good philosophy that happens to focus on the African Canadian experience.
To ask whether we need philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience, however, is to go beyond accepting the possibility that it can be done. It is to ask whether there ought to be a concentrated effort to build up a literature and thus establish a new tradition of work in philosophy, to develop a new area in which philosophers can specialize, called “African Canadian philosophy.” There are reasons to think the answer to this question is not obviously “yes.” Let us look at one that has already been raised: the worry about proliferation. How could it be that each possible racial, ethnic, or geographic grouping in the world deserves to develop its own specialized area of philosophy?
I think there are more and less reasonable versions of this concern. The less reasonable version would have us accept non-proliferation as a value in itself and therefore shut down possible avenues of research before even investigating them, and I have already suggested that this kind of close-mindedness is unbefitting of philosophers. But here is a more reasonable version: think of the idea of Canadian philosophy, not in the sense of work produced by philosophers in Canada, but in the sense of a specialized area of research with distinctive themes. What is it? Many will draw a blank, because many have never even heard of such a thing. Certainly it is the case that there are very few philosophers in Canada who claim such a subject as a primary area of expertise.Footnote 9 Does this suggest that Canadian philosophers have failed in some way, that they have not succeeded as philosophers? While there may be some nationalistic Canadians who would think the answer must be “yes,” most Canadian philosophers would, I think, disagree. But what then explains this strangeness of the notion of Canadian philosophy, especially given the fact that Canadian literature and Canadian history—to name just two examples—are, by contrast, thriving areas of academic research?
The answer, one might say, is that Canadian philosophers already productively contribute to a distinctive tradition of philosophy without contributing to something called Canadian philosophy because Canada is a part of the West, and so it is natural enough that Canadian philosophers tend to see themselves as simply participating in the tradition of Western philosophy. Two morals can be drawn from this answer: firstly, that not every part of the world needs its own philosophy, because as long as there are longstanding traditions within which it is natural enough for people to participate, there is no need to found a new tradition. Secondly, once we note that we apparently do not need Canadian philosophy, how much more obvious must it be that we do not need African Canadian philosophy? This comparison might, for some, be the ultimate proof that philosophy is by nature not given to this kind of endless group-based subdivision, that the situation is not the same as in English and history (where, perhaps, specializations centered around African Canadians might be more appropriate).
This, as I say, is a more reasonable version of the worry about proliferation. My response will have two parts, one of which concerns the “African” in “African Canadian” and the other the “Canadian” part. Let me begin by granting, for the purposes of my first point, that it is normal and sensible that we speak only rarely of “Canadian philosophy” as a distinctive area of research because it is normal that Canadian philosophers generally participate in Western philosophy. If one thinks that this gives us good reason to see “African Canadian philosophy” as an even more extraneous category, the line of reasoning likely goes something like this: it makes sense in the context of philosophy to think of Canadians primarily as a part of a larger whole (namely, the West); African Canadians are but a part of that part; thus, it makes even more sense to think of African Canadians in this context as subsumed by the larger category. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is too quick to treat African Canadians as Westerners no different from any other Westerners, and thus as no different from people of European descent. Such treatment is manifestly misguided, as for reasons related to ancestry, appearance, culture, and historical experiences, African Canadians are usefully classified not merely within the category of the West but also within the global category of people of African descent, a meaningful category that overlaps with the West but which is neither co-extensive with it nor reducible to an aspect of it.
What does this mean for their participation within a larger philosophical tradition? It means that just as naturally as they may see themselves as prepared by their cultural and historical context to contribute to Western philosophy, African Canadians may see themselves as particularly apt to contribute to the tradition of Africana philosophy, which can similarly be seen as overlapping with and entangled in Western philosophy, but which also points beyond the West to a history of African ideas largely unrelated to European traditions, and to an orientation within the space of the West made distinct both by this African heritage and by the experiences of subjugation common to people of African descent in the modern world. The term “Africana philosophy” itself is a very recent invention, gaining currency only in the early 1990s, but the scope of material that can either be classified as Africana philosophy or at least seen as primary source material for its distinctive patterns of research is broad, going back in terms of written material to ancient Egyptian thought and including oral traditions of ancient vintage as well.Footnote 10 With respect to its existence as a self-conscious institutional enterprise, Africana philosophy is the result of a series of developments in the second half of the 20th century: first, the development by Africans trained at European or African universities of a field called African philosophy, starting in the 1950s; secondly, the development by African Americans, following their entry into the profession in the US, of the field of African American philosophy, which takes off especially in the 1970s; and finally, most recently, starting in the past decade, efforts by academics in or from the Caribbean to develop a field called Afro-Caribbean philosophy.Footnote 11
In saying we need philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience, I am arguing that there is this larger conversation—the continuously emerging conversation known as Africana philosophy—that African Canadian philosophers can and should join. It would therefore do injustice to my argument to suppose that it implies that every possible racial, ethnic, or geographic grouping deserves their own area of philosophy, as my argument has a historical and discursive specificity that such a misreading would ignore. Lewis Gordon, in his book An Introduction to Africana Philosophy, writes:
Africana philosophy in North America and Europe is primarily a tale of struggles in the United States and Britain. Although there is a contingent whose academic credentials were acquired at Canadian universities, no Africana philosophical movement has developed there.Footnote 12
African Canadian philosophy is therefore a conspicuous absence. Canada is a place which, as Gordon notes, has helped, repeatedly, to generate people who do Africana philosophy but which has continuously failed to become a place in which and about which Africana philosophy is done. We should see the inception and flourishing of African Canadian philosophy as essential to the further development of Africana philosophy, just as we should hope for and look forward to increasing contributions by philosophers of African descent from all over Europe, from Latin America, and from other such currently underrepresented areas.
I would, by the way, encourage philosophers to deal productively with the diversity of the black world by continuing to contribute to this larger tradition in large part through the cultivation of more localized traditions that can be fit underneath the Africana umbrella. This brings me to my second point, which is about the importance of the “Canadian” part of the term “African Canadian.” In order to make this point, I will cease granting the sensibleness of thinking that there is not really any such thing as Canadian philosophy and that nothing of the sort is needed. It is true that in core, so-called “theoretical” areas of philosophy like epistemology, Canada is not famous for having invented any traditions that might be mentioned alongside British empiricism, German idealism, American pragmatism, etc. In social and political philosophy, however, Canada has made undeniably important contributions that I would argue do amount to something like a distinct tradition treating distinctively Canadian themes.
Canadian philosophers, most prominently Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, but including a number of others as well, have been at the forefront and the centre of debates in social and political philosophy surrounding the idea and practice of multiculturalism.Footnote 13 This is not at all surprising considering Canada’s place among Western nations as the country that has entrenched multiculturalism as an official policy and celebrated it as a distinguishing characteristic more than any other. Canada’s unique political experience has, through the voices of Canadian philosophers, deeply informed debates about multiculturalism, such that non-Canadians who enter the debate very often find themselves having to address Canadian examples that have come up in the works of people like Kymlicka, Taylor, and the others.Footnote 14
It should be easy to guess the analogy I wish to make: the unique experiences of African Canadians can and should inform research and debate within Africana philosophy and philosophy generally, especially social and political philosophy. To give an example that is, in fact, just a natural extension of the analogy, the black experience in Canada is one that is shaped in important ways by the public discourse and official policy of multiculturalism. I fully expect and, indeed, plan to help make it the case that African Canadian philosophy will be the site of new and interesting perspectives on what multiculturalism means for people of African descent. To what extent does multiculturalism as a policy make black life here better? To what extent does it serve as a distraction from efforts to combat racism? Evaluative and normative questions of this sort are the type of compelling philosophical issues that African Canadian philosophers are well-placed to explore, and thus it is not merely the sociological fact that we can delineate them as a group but the theoretical promise of their philosophical insights that makes it the case that we need philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience.
At this point, however, some knowledgeable people might raise my third question...
3. Do We Already Have African Canadian Philosophy?
In the work I plan to do on the issue of multiculturalism, it will be important that I position myself in relation to previous efforts by African Canadian thinkers to address the issue. One significant work that I have had students read in multiple courses of mine is the Tobagonian-Canadian poet M. NourbeSe Philip’s piece, originally published in the Toronto Star in 1990, “Why Multiculturalism Can’t End Racism.” Philip argues in this strongly-worded little essay that multiculturalism in Canada is a “fancy... piece of window dressing” that is not capable of addressing the inequalities affecting the lives of people of colour in this country, as it presents us with a happy image of equalized cultures without forcing us to deal with the history of racial hierarchy that is foundational to Canada and the West in general.Footnote 15 She concludes that:
unless it is steeped in a clearly articulated policy of anti-racism, multiculturalism will, at best, merely continue as a mechanism whereby immigrants indulge their nostalgic love for their countries.
At worst, it will, as it sometimes does, unwittingly perpetuate racism by muddying waters between anti-racism and multiculturalism. It is not uncommon to read material from various government departments that use these words interchangeably so as to suggest that multiculturalism is synonymous with anti-racism. It is not. It will never be.Footnote 16
A very different treatment of multiculturalism can be found in Cecil Foster’s 2005 book Where Race Does Not Matter: The New Spirit of Modernity. The Barbadian-Canadian writer extols multiculturalism as “Canada’s gift and, ultimately, its legacy to the world.”Footnote 17 It is, in his view, “the hope that all humanity—with its differences and diversity—can look to a future in which every individual will be treated as someone of value and worth, as part of a community of his or her choosing, and ultimately as part of the only race that matters, the human race.”Footnote 18
The contrasting and clashing positions articulated by Philip and Foster clearly suggest that the debate on the meaning and value of multiculturalism from the African Canadian perspective does not need to be inaugurated—it is already here. There is also no need to await the initiation of discussion on the topic of what it means to be African Canadian, for we already have the seminal musings of people like Rinaldo Walcott and George Elliott Clarke. Walcott’s 1997 book Black Like Who? Writing Black Canada and Clarke’s 2002 book Odysseys Home: Mapping African-Canadian Literature are indispensable texts, each in their own way, for anyone interested in theorizing about African Canadian identity.Footnote 19 As their titles indicate, these books approach the question of what it means to be black in Canada from the standpoint of literary criticism. But does the fact that they approach the matter in this way make their insights any less philosophical, any less an example of raising and trying to answer in a critical fashion fundamental questions about the nature of social identity?
One begins to wonder, especially when surveying some of the exciting work that has emerged in the last few decades, whether it might not be plausible to answer “no” to the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophy on the grounds that we do not need what we already have. In addition to Philip, Foster, Walcott, and Clarke, we can point to useful and sophisticated meditations on the distinctive issues and experiences of African Canadians by figures like Dionne Brand, Althea Prince, Lawrence Hill, Joseph Mensah, Wayde Compton, and—to name two colleagues of mine here at Dalhousie—Anthony Stewart and the new James Robinson Johnston Chair of Black Canadian Studies, Afua Cooper.Footnote 20 It is also worthwhile to return, at this point, to the case of Foster, whose most recent book is called Blackness and Modernity: The Colour of Humanity and the Quest for Freedom. This book is uniquely significant for our purposes, as it is the first (and, to date, the only) contribution to the study of African Canadian life that is also self-consciously a work in philosophy. Hugely ambitious, it offers us a “phenomenological study of Blackness” (using the term “phenomenology,” by the way, in the Hegelian sense!) and relates the resulting notion of “Blackness” to the special moment in the development of Western modernity that is Canadian multiculturalism.Footnote 21
And yet, Foster, who is currently a professor of sociology at Guelph, has never been affiliated with a philosophy department, and neither have any of the other figures I have mentioned. Is this a problem? “No,” some might say. Perhaps it would be nice if scholars engaged in exploring the African Canadian experience were more common in philosophy departments, but this should not be seen as a need. If work of this type is important then what we need is for it to flourish wherever it can, and if it can only flourish outside philosophy departments then so be it. Worrying about what is or is not going on within the artificial borders of the different disciplines can only be a distraction from producing the work.
I have a good deal of sympathy for this position. Certainly I do not believe that work in African Canadian philosophy needs to, in all contexts, be narrowly construed as only that work which is produced by people affiliated with philosophy departments. I do, however, believe that work of this latter type—that is, work by people trained in and working in philosophy departments—is needed. I believe, as I have already argued, that we need to encourage African Canadians to enter the profession of philosophy and I have said that those who do should consider participating in the needed effort to build up a tradition of philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience. I would certainly agree that, in doing so, they ought to see themselves as part of a collective project that goes beyond philosophy narrowly construed, a trans-disciplinary effort to illuminate the complexities of this experience and contribute to improving black lives. But it is a worthy task to participate in this larger effort partly through striving to change the profession of philosophy, for at least three reasons.
Firstly, it is important that we not simply accept a world in which professional philosophy remains silent on the issues arising from the African Canadian experience, given that this thematic absence can be linked to our demographic absence as a situation reflective of prior and persisting social exclusion and present-day apathy about our inclusion. Secondly, it is to be expected and it ought to be encouraged that those of us African Canadians who happen to already appreciate the discipline of philosophy for what it is will feel invested in making this home more inviting from the African Canadian perspective. Finally, despite the ample room for contributions by people of any disciplinary background to what we might call African Canadian philosophy in the broad sense, we should not underestimate the usefully unique impact that training and professionalization in philosophy can have. Just as I see African Canadian professional philosophers as well-positioned to contribute in innovative ways to Africana philosophy, I believe they bring distinctive resources to the table—types of reasoning, forms of argumentation, modes of analysis, etc.—that will greatly enrich the emerging interdisciplinary project of African Canadian or Black Canadian Studies.
Of course, my confidence that African Canadian philosophers will be able to play an important role in the development of African Canadian Studies is dependent upon my confidence that our numbers in philosophy will rise. One might reasonably question the apparent implication here that philosophy will have to remain irrelevant to African Canadian Studies until there are Canadians of African descent willing to step forward and force this change. This leads to me to my fourth and penultimate question.
4. Can Anybody Do African Canadian Philosophy?
If I am a white philosopher who happens to be convinced that we need African Canadian philosophy not just in the sense that we need African Canadian philosophers but also in the sense that we need philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience, what is stopping me from helping to change things by focusing on the African Canadian experience in my own research? Must we interpret the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophy as irrelevant to the research projects of non-black philosophers? Or can we accept with open arms all who wish to contribute?
This is a good opportunity for me to clarify my view by making some subtle but necessary distinctions. First, contrary to the definition considered in the first section of this article, I do not think we should see all work in philosophy by people of African descent in or from Canada as “African Canadian philosophy.” To be an African Canadian philosopher, therefore, does not automatically mean doing African Canadian philosophy. My reason for holding this view is that I think there ought to be something informative about a label that seems suggestive of a distinct genre of philosophy, and if an African Canadian philosopher publishes an article on, say, the mind-body problem and does not at any point bring into play ideas or examples that can be said to be related in some sense to her racial or ethnic background then I do not see what we gain by calling this African Canadian philosophy. It is philosophy of mind in the Western tradition, and that classification seems sufficient.
I therefore believe that when we talk about African Canadian philosophy, we should at least primarily have in mind philosophy that is somehow distinctively African Canadian. Notice, however, that to speak of philosophy that is somehow distinctively African Canadian is not exactly the same as speaking of philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience. Imagine that the aforementioned article on the mind-body problem happens to introduce some new way of thinking about the matter. Now imagine that, for some reason or other, this approach is taken up by a number of other philosophers, all or most of whom happen to also be African Canadian. In this case, even if it is hard to explain why that approach appealed particularly to African Canadians, I believe we have ample reason to describe it as an African Canadian tradition within the philosophy of mind and thus as African Canadian philosophy.Footnote 22 That being said, we cannot imagine in advance what kinds of distinctive traditions in this sense might pop up in the future and thus philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience must for now remain the standard case when talking about philosophy that is distinctively African Canadian.
Assuming that we have established that being an African Canadian philosopher is not sufficient for doing African Canadian philosophy, we must now ask: is it necessary? It is at this point that I think we need to expose a certain ambiguity in talk of doing this or that type of philosophy, especially when speaking of types that are grounded in particular times, spaces, or experiences. There is nothing strange, I would admit, in saying that my colleague and friend Eli Diamond does ancient Greek philosophy. But he is not himself an ancient Greek philosopher and thus, more importantly, he cannot be considered a primary source of ancient Greek philosophy. Likewise, if my work happened to revolve around the ideas of people like Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze, that by itself would not mean that I could count myself among those who create French philosophy. Rather, I would be someone who studies French philosophy, a scholar of French philosophy. Thus, I think we should distinguish between doing a type of philosophy classified by reference to a social identity in the sense of producing it and doing it in the sense of working on it. I would say that only African Canadian philosophers can produce African Canadian philosophy, but philosophers of any identity or background can work on it.
It may be wondered, though, whether the hypothetical white philosopher with whom I began, that is, someone who is interested in doing philosophy focused on the African Canadian experience, should be seen as similar to people who are primarily interested not in ancient Greek and French experiences but rather in the approaches to thinking about particular topics that can be found in the works of ancient Greek and French thinkers. I presume that worrying about this difference is compatible with granting the aptness of the distinction between “producing” and “working on” at least for those cases where a non-African Canadian is engaged in studying philosophical debates carried on by African Canadian thinkers. We can therefore speak of those who work on African Canadian philosophy in the sense that they study from a philosophical angle things like the differing views of Walcott and Clarke.
I would go further and argue, however, that it is still not worth calling something a project in African Canadian philosophy if it does not, in some way, reflect the emergence of philosophy from within the African Canadian experience. An article on the issues raised by the destruction of Africville by a white political philosopher might best be described merely as political philosophy in the Western tradition if it does not investigate the reflective positions on the significance of Africville that have come from within the African Nova Scotian community.Footnote 23 It thus seems proper to me to take people who are not African Canadian to be doing African Canadian philosophy only when their work aims in some measure to highlight and illuminate what can be regarded in some sense as the production of philosophy by African Canadians.
I should make it clear, though, that not only is the distinction between producing and working on African Canadian philosophy not meant to be at all disparaging to those who do the latter, but it is also compatible with recognizing that it will in some cases be the scholars, rather than the primary sources, whose ideas push the field forward, sparking new debates or shedding new light on old ones. In fact, I can already point to what I see as a model for this type of innovative contribution: Will Kymlicka’s under-appreciated 1998 essay, “A Crossroads in Race Relations.” The essay focuses first on African Americans, but Kymlicka then turns to a comparative discussion of African Canadians, noting differences that result from Canada’s black population being majority immigrant but grappling as well with similarities that he sees as resulting from the experience of anti-black racism. He claims that, in light of the problem of racism, there are “serious concerns about the future of the Black community in Canada” and he considers what strategies might be appropriate for addressing these concerns.Footnote 24 While there are, I think, some problems with the essay (including the way its immigrant focus minimizes the experiences of longstanding black communities in Canada), I believe its thoughtful exploration of the African Canadian situation makes it a work of foundational importance for African Canadian philosophy.Footnote 25 My argument that we need African Canadian philosophy should therefore be understood as an argument that we need both those who will produce African Canadian philosophy and those who will work on it, despite not being African Canadian.
5. What Will African Canadian Philosophy Do for Us?
I raise this last version of the question of whether we need African Canadian philosophy as a means of summing up. Canada is a unique and interesting space within which to think about race and culture in the modern world, given its colonization by the French, its conquest by the English, and the subsequent relations between these two so-called founding peoples; the struggles of its First Nations for survival, autonomy, and respect; the ethnic and later racial diversification of the country through immigration; its shift from being influenced most by the mother country across the ocean to being influenced most by the superpower to the south; and its attempt to define an identity on the global stage as a Western power invested in peace and development.
People of African descent have been entering, shaping, and being shaped by this space for over 400 years. They have come as explorers, like Mathieu Da Costa, who learned Mi’kmaq and was able to serve as a bridge between Europeans and Aboriginals in the early 17th century. They have come as slaves, a fact that many Canadians still do not recognize, but which has been treated most recently and brilliantly in Afua Cooper’s 2006 book The Hanging of Angélique: The Untold Story of Canadian Slavery and the Burning of Old Montréal.Footnote 26 They have also come, in greater numbers, fleeing from slavery in what is now the US, whether as loyalists following the Revolutionary War, as refugees following the War of 1812, as fugitives traveling the Underground Railroad, or as emigrants fearing the Fugitive Slave Act. Finally, and in the greatest numbers, they have arrived as immigrants seeking opportunity and refugees seeking safety, especially after changes in the 1960s to what had been a consciously and intentionally racist immigration policy.Footnote 27 Initially coming almost exclusively from the Caribbean, the past few decades have also seen ever rising numbers of immigrants and refugees from Africa.
What we have, then, in the African Canadian population is a very diverse collection of people, some with deep roots here and many more of recent immigrant background, a people scattered across the country though mostly concentrated in urban settings like Toronto, Montreal, Halifax, and Ottawa. Their perspectives are shaped by the historical, cultural, and political characteristics of a wide variety of places: the parts of the world they or their ancestors came here from, this country itself, the region of the country in which they live, and finally other places like the US, whose large and influential African-descended population offers a more prominent and perhaps more stable and linear model of what it means to be black in North America.
In light of the variety that is Canada and the variety within variety that is Canada’s black population, there will be those who find it funny to talk as I often have of an African Canadian community. Surely, there are at best a number of communities, and surely there is therefore no such thing as the African Canadian experience—there are only varying communal and individual experiences. Such a person might also claim that there is no single set of issues facing African Canadians, but rather varying sets of issues, determined by varying locales and demographics.
What works out quite well for my argument, though, is that even if all of this multiplicity and complexity complicates and threatens the idea of unity among African Canadians, it thereby also shows just how much there is for us as philosophers to consider, question, problematize, and argue about concerning the divergent and conflicting dimensions of racial and cultural identity among black people in this country. The growing field of philosophy of race is bound to benefit from work exploring this unique space, along with (as I have already argued) the still-in-formation field of Africana philosophy and the well-established area of social and political philosophy. This work will benefit not only philosophy but also discussions of race and culture in the academy as a whole, especially those disciplines that have already begun to contribute to the formation of African Canadian Studies. Insofar as philosophers can sometimes clarify matters in helpful ways, there is also reason to think that this work can benefit Canadian society as a whole, impacting and shaping public discourse and social policy. And given this shrinking world of ours and the way that problems of diversity and integration are shared across the West and beyond, there is furthermore reason to think that this work can have a useful impact not only upon the “we” that is Canada but also the “we” that is the world.
Lastly, I believe that this work can benefit us, the “us” made up of African Canadians, by being a new and powerful source of reflective self-consciousness. At present, so many of us remain so unsure of what it really means to be both black and Canadian, and what it might mean to be proud of being both, and whether it is possible and right to feel equally at home in both identities—not to mention how all this relates to our other forms of ethnic and national identification. It is not my expectation that the doing of philosophy will enable us to hammer out some straightforward and totally unified identity, and there is reason to think we should not want it to do that in any case. I do, however, think that philosophy can help us grasp and plumb the depths of our multiplicity and consider more carefully the perhaps underestimated extent and value of our unity. For this reason, and for all the others that I have considered over the course of this article, I believe that we need African Canadian philosophy.Footnote 28
