Despite moves toward greater transparency in recent years, central banks have traditionally been opaque. This is especially true of the Federal Reserve. Until recently, the Fed operated without explicit targets for policy, needing only to comply with its vague, dual mandate. As a result, a number of researchers have tried to analyze the decision-making process within the Federal Reserve by estimating policy reaction functions (e.g., John Taylor, “A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules.” In Monetary Policy Rules, John B. Taylor (ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). More comprehensive accounts of policy have used this evidence in conjunction with other sources, such as transcripts and minutes from Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings (Robert Hetzel, The Monetary Policy of the Federal Reserve: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Allan Meltzer, A History of the Federal Reserve, volume 2, book 2: 1970–1986. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
In Deliberating American Monetary Policy, Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey adds to this literature by systematically analyzing nine years of FOMC transcripts (1979, 1980, 1981, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1998, and 1999) and the transcripts of congressional committee hearings on monetary policy using textual analysis. This analysis uses a statistical approach to analyze the distribution of words in the body of a text. Specifically, textual analysis software allows one to classify together statements that contain similar words. The software provides the researcher with important words, sentences (or sentence fragments) that serve as the basis for interpreting what is important in the text. In the context of monetary policy, these classifications can possibly draw attention to topics and issues important in the deliberation of policy.
The use of textual analysis is important because it can potentially fill the gaps that exist in the complementary work previously listed. For example, estimates of policy reaction functions can potentially identify changes in policy. However, these estimates cannot explain why the policy change occurred. Also, individual readings of FOMC transcripts are potentially subjective.
The book's most interesting findings are in relation to the Volcker disinflation. It is widely recognized in the literature that monetary policy changed significantly under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker. This literature is less clear on how Volcker managed to persuade members of the FOMC to change policy. Based on previous work, Schonhardt-Bailey identifies three possible hypotheses to explain why there was such a marked change in monetary policy under Volcker. The first hypothesis is that Volcker convinced members of the FOMC of the importance of money. The second hypothesis is that Volcker convinced members of the FOMC that the long-run Phillips curve was vertical. The third hypothesis is that Volcker emphasized the need for a credible commitment to policy. This hypothesis relates to the time consistency argument of Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott. This hypothesis suggests that the importance of the shift in policy was to shape public expectations of inflation by committing not only to lower inflation now, but to lower inflation in the future as well.
Schonhardt-Bailey does not find any evidence that the FOMC justified its change in policy in terms of a change in an economic model. She also finds little evidence that the FOMC's change in policy represented a shift to traditional monetarist doctrine. In fact, Schonhardt-Bailey finds evidence that the use of targets for monetary aggregates was a cover for allowing the federal funds rate to rise significantly without the political repercussions that might result from directly targeting a high rate. The Federal Reserve appears, however, to have become more cognizant of the need to signal credible commitment to a policy of lower inflation. This confirms the claims of Hetzel (2008) that the Fed's most significant policy change was in its commitment not just to reducing inflation, but also to lowering inflation expectations.
Schonhardt-Bailey also sees a tonal shift in the interactions between Fed chairmen and Congress, beginning with the appointment of Paul Volcker. After Volcker's appointment, the Fed advocated for low inflation for its own sake. Also, the nature of questions directed at the Federal Reserve Chairman by Congress changed noticeably. Recent criticism of the Fed from Congress has tended to be about issues of transparency and accountability whereas during the 1970s, criticism was largely about policy itself.
More generally, the most substantive finding is that, from 1979 to 1999, policy deliberations shifted away from strategy and toward emphasis by the FOMC on economic conditions in the United States. Schonhardt-Bailey attributes this to Alan Greenspan's reputation for being a data-dependent decision-maker and the relative success of policy after the Volcker disinflation. It is unclear, however, whether this is the correct conclusion to draw. The analysis only includes nine years of observation. The period of the Volcker disinflation might simply have been an outlier. It is difficult to assess these claims without more data. In this respect, one wishes, perhaps, that the analysis comprised the entirety of the period from 1979–1999 rather than just the nine years chosen for analysis. Nonetheless, this does provide an interesting topic for future research.
Also, it is interesting to note that in the latter Greenspan years evidence appeared of increased reliance on model-based arguments. However, Greenspan's arguments were primarily concerned with productivity whereas other voting members emphasized different issues. Despite their disparate interests, the voting members still seemed to coalesce around the same path for policy without endorsing each other's views. One wonders whether this is the result of luck (i.e., small macroeconomic shocks), whether FOMC members saw little reason to dissent from proposed or adopted policies, or whether they really had broadly similar views on the macroeconomy as Schonhardt-Bailey suggests.
This book is one of the most systematic analyses of recent Federal Reserve decision-making in the literature. For those unfamiliar with textual analysis, the evidence presented in the book might appear to emerge from a black box. Those readers should read the author's relatively short, online technical appendix before beginning the chapters of analysis. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in the book is a complement to existing research and is an important contribution for those interested in the evolution of policymaking at the Federal Reserve.
