This new work on the core issue of nuclear proliferation is somewhat unique in its focus and organization. Most of the works on this subject have a virtually standard organization involving a country-by-country breakdown of the most recent and most likely proliferators (India, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc.), according to their motives (why they want to go nuclear) and their capacity to do so, either by themselves or with the help of existing nuclear powers. The focus of these works is, therefore, on what often is called “horizontal proliferation,” having to do with the addition of extra members to the “nuclear club.” Regarding the Cold War superpowers, the United States and former USSR, there has been a largely separate literature devoted to “vertical proliferation,” and associated arms control measures and possibilities, in the context of nuclear deterrence theories and concepts. The uniqueness of Nathan Busch's book is that he combines these two genres, treating various aspects of the nuclear programs of the long-existent large nuclear powers, as well as the emerging nuclear programs of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and so on as an integrated subject.

Busch begins his detailed and lengthy analysis with a review of the contrasting views of what he calls the “optimists” and “pessimists,” those who think nuclear proliferation is on balance a good thing, an instrument of peace and stability, and those who dread the further spread of nuclear weapons, a debate earlier formalized in a book that constituted a debate between Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan. Busch points out that several scholars other than Waltz, that is, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, William Riker, Martin van Creveld, and John Mearsheimer, have made the “optimist” arguments. But he may exaggerate the weight of these arguments, as almost all other writers in the field are very much on the “pessimist” side of the debate; that is, the debate is highly asymmetric.

The guts of No End in Sight consists of a very detailed country-by-country review of the nuclear programs of the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, and under the rubric of “newly proliferating states,” the “axis of evil” triangle of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Britain, France, and Israel are largely ignored, of which more below. For each of the countries covered, there is a full review of their existing nuclear arsenals, their nuclear production facilities, the mix and effectiveness of delivery systems, the role of extant arms control arrangements, command and control, and (a particular focus of this work) what the author refers to as MPC&A (fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting). Related to the latter, there is also a focus throughout the cases on accidental use (subsuming accidental detonation and accidental launch), unauthorized use, and inadvertent use, categories that elsewhere are not adequately separated out.

In the case of the United States, there is extensive discussion of command, control, communications, and intelligence, the implications of the several extant arms control arrangements (the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties, etc.), the current U.S. nuclear order of battle, nuclear weapons storage and deployment, and under the heading of C3I, launch on warning (LOW), early warning systems, command and control systems, risks of accidental use and detonation, organizational and security issues, and so on. MPC&A is a constant focus, seeming to represent the author's primary research interest feeding into the book. A similar spread of subjects is covered for Russia. This book is a good place to go to get a look at how the two Cold War superpowers have reduced and reorganized their nuclear arsenals since 1990 in relation to their mutual arms control arrangements. Also very useful is the material on Russia's ballistic missile early warning radars, which shows how the Russians are still dependent on access to radars in nearby Ukraine, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, earlier also in Latvia. The data presentation on Russia's nuclear arsenals, its early warning radars and satellites, and its command and control system is interesting, excellent, and, for the academic literature, perhaps unique. For China, there is an equally thorough review of its nuclear facilities, delivery systems, and early warning systems. For each of the three leading nuclear powers, there is also discussion of past incidents involving nuclear accidents in the context of MPC&A.

The chapter on India and Pakistan is particularly useful, an area dubbed by the author “the most dangerous place on earth.” He discusses the history of the several points in the last 20 years when these two countries came close to the brink of nuclear war: the Indian Operation Brasstacks in 1986–87, the 1990 Kashmir crisis, the Kargil crisis in 1999, and the renewed tensions after September 11, 2001, when the United States had to defuse a crisis while obtaining Pakistani support for its operations in Afghanistan. The author characterizes the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan as one of “unstable deterrence,” by comparison with the earlier U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship. There is an excellent rundown of the structures of the two nations' nuclear facilities and delivery systems, somewhat reliant on the recent publications of the Carnegie Endowment. Finally, there is a comprehensive coverage of the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, both of which are shown to be moving toward the possession of nuclear weapons via both the U-235 (gas centrifuges) and Pu-239 (nuclear reactors plus plutonium reprocessing facilities) routes. For Iran, for instance, now perhaps the primary focus of U.S. proliferation concerns, the ominous connection between the Natanz centrifuge operation and the long-range missiles acquired from North Korea, which can reach to Israel, is highlighted. There is a concluding chapter with policy recommendations that, like the remainder of the book, is very much focused on issues of command and control, accidental use, and safeguard controls over nuclear materials in the existing nuclear powers.

In what is a generally fine and very useful book, a few areas might have deserved greater attention. Despite the lack of good information, the Israeli nuclear program might have been given greater coverage, if only because the nuclear programs of Iran and Pakistan are referenced to it as “Islamic bomb” programs constituting a counterdeterrent to that of Israel. And although these matters have only recently come to public prominence, much more attention might have been paid to the chain effects and international interactions involving the French, Israeli, Iraqi, Pakistani, Libyan, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear programs. The recent flood of press reports has detailed the skein that has run from the A. Q. Khan operation in stealing centrifuge technology from the Urenco plant in the Netherlands, and, in turn, the transfer of centrifuge technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. The French role in both the Israeli and Iraqi nuclear programs needs highlighting. In short, this book might have used a little more focus on deliberate country-to-country nuclear technology transfers in order to supplement the focus on internal controls of nuclear materials, deemed sincere if sometimes flawed by the authors and others. That said, this is a rich and interesting review of the nuclear spread menace as it is now currently unfolding.