International organizations (IOs) are typically seen as forces for good in world politics. As interdependence has grown, IOs have become the favored vehicle for tackling cross-border problems, such as climate change, financial crises, and trade protectionism. They offer much-needed fora for collective decision making, develop new norms regulating public and private behavior, channel resources into ambitious policy programs, and hold actors responsible for violations of joint rules. But there is a darker side to IOs as well. As shown in research and illustrated in politics, they can also be organizationally inefficient, politically deadlocked, financially corrupt, ideologically biased, and generally poorly performing. Yet the list does not end there.

In this book, Gisela Hirschmann directs our attention to violations of fundamental human rights by the very IOs intended to secure their protection. Particularly egregious examples exist in the area of peace operations, where IO-mandated peacekeepers and contracted private military companies have exploited women and children, tortured prisoners, and killed civilians. Less extreme, but no less lamentable, examples can be found in areas such as economic governance and global health, where citizens’ economic and social rights have been trampled on.

These infringements form the backdrop of Hirschmann’s study, which focuses on how IOs can be held accountable for violations of human rights. Hirschmann directs our attention to a novel form of accountability in global governance, which she refers to as “pluralist accountability” and which others have sought to capture using terms like “external accountability” and “stakeholder accountability.” Such accountability has become increasingly prominent as classic vertical forms of accountability, whereby principals hold agents accountable, rarely are available or feasible in an increasingly complex world of global governance. Instead, third parties take it on themselves to hold IOs and their implementing partners accountable “from below,” using innovative legal avenues.

Hirschmann’s book offers the first systematic examination of this phenomenon. Guided by an ambition to identify the conditions under which pluralist accountability arises, the book develops the concept, theorizes factors shaping the emergence of such accountability, and examines a broad range of positive and negative cases in the area of human rights. The core argument is that pluralist accountability emerges as a way to hold IOs and their implementing agents accountable when two necessary conditions are in place. The first condition targets the motivation of third parties to act as accountability holders. According to the argument, this motivation will be stronger in a competitive environment, where potential accountability holders, such as NGOs, compete for resources and have an incentive to distinguish themselves from each other through profiling. The second condition targets the acceptance of third parties as accountability holders. Here, Hirschmann argues that IOs and their implementing agents are more likely to recognize third parties as legitimate accountability holders when they are committed to human rights norms and therefore are vulnerable to accusations that they violate such norms.

The book explores the explanatory power of this logic in five empirical chapters. The first three chapters focus on UN-mandated peacekeeping operations, each chapter examining one positive and one negative case of when pluralist accountability emerged in response to IO-related violations of human rights. The first chapter examines pluralist accountability in response to violations of the human rights of detainees in Afghanistan. Chapter 2 analyzes pluralist accountability in response to human trafficking in Bosnia, and the third chapter studies pluralist accountability in response to detentions in Kosovo. To demonstrate that the book’s framework may also help explain variation in the emergence of pluralist accountability in other areas than peacekeeping, Hirschmann offers two additional empirical chapters. The first one focuses on pluralist accountability in response to human rights violations arising from EU economic measures, and the second examines pluralist accountability in the context of global health and WHO-mandated vaccinations.

Hirschmann’s book is a very important addition to the existing literature on global governance. It forces us to think anew not only about the normative status of IOs in world politics but also about the ways in which accountability can be organized in global governance. The book is very nicely positioned at the intersection of three prominent developments that are typically explored in separate literatures: chains of delegation from member states to IOs to implementing agents, growing attention to accountability as a principle of good governance, and the increasing involvement of nonstate actors in global governance. The book successfully brings these developments together to help us better understand when and why pluralist accountability, as a novel phenomenon in world politics, emerges in response to violations by IOs and their agents. The theory is attractively parsimonious and the empirical demonstration of its applicability impressive, rich, and broad.

Yet the book also raises a number of questions about pluralist accountability, pointing to a fruitful agenda for future research. A first question concerns the relationship between vertical and pluralist accountability. Is the emergence of pluralist accountability really independent from the availability and effectiveness of vertical accountability, as the book suggests? Or could access to effective vertical accountability, whereby member states hold IOs accountable, and IOs hold implementing agents accountable, be a third condition shaping the likelihood of pluralist accountability? Hirschmann argues that pluralist accountability develops independently of preexisting accountability mechanisms, which challenges common assumptions that institutional development in global governance is demand driven. It also suggests that accountability in global governance, as a result, may be subject to unnecessary duplication and competition, rather than functional complementarities.

A second question pertains to the potential for pluralist accountability in domains other than human rights. Is there something specific about human rights violations that makes pluralist accountability particularly likely in this area and reduces the likelihood that we will see similar types of accountability emerging in response to IO actions in other fields? The concept of pluralist accountability does not per se assume that the actions IOs and implementing agents are held accountable for are human rights violations. In theory, IOs could be held accountable by external actors for policy mishaps in a whole range of areas in which individual rights are less pronounced or nonexistent. Yet all cases in the book focus on human rights violations, and it appears likely that pluralist accountability is greatly facilitated by there being clearly recognized rights that external actors can invoke as they seek to hold IOs and implementing agents accountable. In other areas, external actors may be left with naming and shaming as a weaker tool for pressuring IOs to live up to their standards.

Finally, the book invites a systematic analysis of the consequences of accountability. In particular, how does it affect the perceived legitimacy of IOs if they are not properly held accountable for their actions, and what are the consequences of such accountability for the effectiveness of IOs in tackling the problems that motivated their creation? The book makes a case for why pluralist accountability is normatively desirable: it involves a broader range of societal actors in the protection of rights in global governance. Yet normative attractiveness need not translate into legitimacy and effectiveness. Fortunately, a growing line of research suggests that IO designs that provide for accountability mechanisms and involve nonstate actors positively influence people’s perceptions of IO legitimacy. And although Hirschmann’s book does not aim to deliver a verdict on the effectiveness of pluralist accountability, it does suggest that such mechanisms, under favorable conditions, can help ensure desirable IO performance.