This edited volume addresses an increasingly prominent issue in investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) in Asia – how allegations of corruption shape both legal argumentation and arbitral outcomes. While earlier scholarship has examined corruption in ISDS, most discussions have focused on disputes in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa, with Asian experiences appearing only in passing comparison. This volume therefore fills a clear gap by examining how corruption is constructed, invoked, and contested within Asia-related arbitration. It begins with a question that is both legally complex and politically sensitive: When an investor is implicated in bribery or other unlawful conduct, should treaty protection still apply, particularly in situations where state officials may also have facilitated or benefited from the same acts?

The book is organised into three parts. Part I situates corruption within the political economy of foreign investment in Asia, showing that its effects depend on variations in governance capacity and patterns of state and business interaction. Part II forms the analytical core of the volume. It outlines three approaches that arbitral tribunals have employed when dealing with corruption in investor–state disputes: a zero-tolerance approach that excludes tainted investments from treaty protection; an admissibility-based approach that preserves jurisdiction but limits the claims available to the investor; and more context-sensitive assessments at the merits or damages stage. Part III then applies these insights to country studies, including China, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea, demonstrating how domestic regulatory structures and political priorities shape the framing and legal treatment of corruption allegations. Taken together, the three parts show that doctrinal divergence in investment arbitration reflects deeper institutional diversity across the region.

A key strength of the volume focus on institutional and regulatory context. Rather than treating corruption as a purely legal issue, the contributors connect arbitral reasoning to broader governance environments and administrative practices. This interdisciplinary approach offers a more grounded understanding of how corruption claims arise and why states and tribunals respond differently. It also highlights regional variation that is often obscured in comparative investment law scholarship.

There are, however, areas where the book could have expanded its analysis further. Several significant jurisdictions, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam, do not appear in the country chapters, despite their growing relevance to regional investment flows and arbitration practices. Including these jurisdictions would have broadened the comparative scope of the volume. Additionally, while the discussion of arbitral reasoning is detailed, the evolution of treaty drafting in Asia – including the incorporation of legality clauses and provisions on counterclaims – could have been analysed in a more systematic manner. Finally, although the concluding chapter raises the question of whether Asian states may shape broader ISDS reform, the connection to ongoing multilateral discussions would benefit from further elaboration.

Despite these limitations, this book represents a timely and valuable contribution. It will be of interest to scholars examining the relationship between investment law and governance, practitioners handling disputes involving allegations of corruption, and policymakers engaged in treaty negotiations and reforms. By documenting how corruption is framed and contested across Asian jurisdictions, the volume clarifies both recurring challenges and potential pathways towards more coherent and contextually informed approaches in future ISDS practices.