Jonathan Sanford's book is a splendid example of careful scholarship and deep insight. His surface goal is a survey of the contemporary virtue ethics movement, inspired by Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 challenge to the reigning ethical theories of deontology and utilitarianism proposing a reexamination of the concept of virtue as articulated, in exemplary fashion, by Aristotle. This opens the door to a more fundamental goal, which is to provide a series of arguments explaining the contemporary need for and defense of an Aristotelian philosophical psychology and teleology. Anscombe is Sanford's cover, but as she herself admits, she does not provide the defense.
Sanford's survey of contemporary writers claiming to present virtue ethics as a moral theory is comprehensive, perceptive, and pointed. Each author has strengths and weaknesses, and Sanford is generally fair in his analysis. In particular, he focuses on the difficulties arising from the separation of the “moral” as a category from the unity of a human life; in short, he articulates the troubles that arise when one identifies the virtues as traits to be chosen or overridden as circumstances seem to require. It is these concerns that lead him to identify contemporary virtue ethics as more modern than virtuous, sharing with both deontology and consequentialism the priority of some form of choice over character with both deontology and consequentialism.
A fundamental problem with the first section of the book in particular is that Sanford focuses his argument on “mainstream virtue ethics,” and the question, “Does mainstream virtue ethics present a coherent virtue theory?” His answer is no, because he finds that in general the collection of writers defending the position provides neither a cohesive moral theory nor a comprehensive moral theory. His manner of argument makes sense in addressing individual authors, which he does quite well. But it is a curious endeavor to expect the collection of individual authors to cohere in providing a consistent theory. Authors typically stand on their own, not as a collective. A great deal of conflicting insight is lost along with theoretical coherence if Plato and Aristotle are treated as providing a Greek theory of moral virtue. Sanford addresses this objection at several points, and relies heavily on the reality that much of contemporary virtue ethics has been in response to Anscombe's article, calling her at one point the “grandmother” of the movement. But this respect for Anscombe's timely influence only reinforces the concern that mainstream virtue ethics is a movement, not a coherent theory.
The second half of the book is Sanford's effort to encourage a closer look at Aristotle's understanding of virtue as the excellence of a set of functions, and consequently the necessary unity and focus of a virtuous human life. Here, he is strongly influenced by Alasdair MacIntyre, as they both share an effort to defend the central tenets of Aristotle's psychology and teleology. He also suggests ten principles that capture the core of Aristotle's ethics, the neglect of which establishes a range by which contemporary virtues ethicists stray from Aristotle. The list is a good one, and a very neat summary for those teaching Aristotle's ethics to undergraduates. In his list, Sanford is sensitive to the interdependency of ethics and politics in the older community-building sense. Unfortunately, this sensitivity leads him to reverse the order of importance of justice and friendship, a sacrifice of Aristotle's clarity about the importance of the unity of character in relationships over the balance of distributed goods.
Overall, Before Virtue is a solid, well-researched, and clearly presented work of scholarship. In particular, there is much to be learned about Aristotle's ethics, including the efforts to modernize it, and the solid reasons for understanding Aristotle as a powerful alternative to discussions of deontology and utilitarianism.
