The stated aim of this book is “to gain a better understanding of Kim Jong-un as a leader by explaining his survival strategy” (p. 1). In Kim Jong-un's Strategy for Survival, David W. Shin focuses on the foreign policy motivations and actions of Kim Jong-un since he became leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly known as North Korea), in 2011.

There is a gap in the literature for a serious analytical study of North Korea's strategic principles, policies, constraints, and opportunities. We have yet to see a professionally conducted, sustained piece of scholarly analysis of North Korea's international relations utilizing the various approaches available to strategic studies scholars—whether this be Clausewitzian or constructivist, Foucauldian or feminist. This book does not, however, engage with the rich field of strategic studies and does not use the heuristic concept of the state to provide analytical focus. Instead, it focuses on the psychology of Kim Jong-un as the key and only relevant factor explaining North Korea's international behavior. The use of the personal pronouns “he” and “his” throughout the book to refer to actions—which in other analyses would be understood as the output of state, party, and government—reinforces that for Shin, it is the individual that matters. The book is best understood, therefore, as part of a genre of writing on North Korea, which includes a number of recent publications, in which the analytical focus is on Kim Jong-un, the individual.

The introduction draws on Joseph Nye's well-known account of smart power to offer a self-generated analytical matrix, consisting of twenty-six components to “assess Kim Jong-un's survival strategy” (p. 9). The intention is to use this framework to analyze the four cases that make up the empirical focus of this book. These are “deployment of long-range missiles to strike the United States (2013)”; “landmine incident in the DMZ (2015)”; “nuclear ICBM crisis (2017)”; and “diplomatic charm offensive (2018–2020)” (p. 10). The empirical material presented in each case study chapter does not systematically follow the framework set out in the introduction, but the concluding section of each chapter presents a discursive overview of the material that refers back to the framework developed by Shin.

Part one of the book comprises three chapters: “Madness, Brinkmanship and Madman Theory,” “The Ambitious Third Son as Natural Heir to His Grandfather,” and “North Korea's Totalitarianism: Balancing Terror with Co-option.” Part two of the book consists of five chapters: “Kim Jong-un's Understanding of the Security Environment in 2012,” “New Byungjin Line and Kim Jong-un's Successful Nuclear ICBM Gambit,” “August 2015 Landmine Incident: Limited War of Legitimacy,” “Nuclear Crisis in 2017 with a ‘Madman’ and Perfecting Kim's Nuclear ICBMs,” and “Kim Jong-un's Charm Offensive and Diplomatic Stalemate with the United States.” The themes and conclusion of the book are that Kim Jong-un is not mad, and that the United States should “consider negotiating in good faith with Kim Jong-un to see if common ground can be found to reduce tensions, mitigate the risk of military clashes, and build mutual trust, confidence and respect” (p. 379).

Like other recent publications that purport to offer insights about Kim Jong-un, this volume compensates for a weak evidence base by relying heavily on secondary sources, opinion pieces, unsubstantiated claims, generalizations beyond the scope of the available data, and speculation. The potential added value is the use of North Korean News Agency (KCNA) statements, providing a reminder that we have a lot more information about the DPRK than conventional wisdom assumes. KCNA statement are used, however, both uncritically and somewhat oddly, at times as if they represented Kim Jong-un's unmediated personal thoughts. The idiosyncratic use of KCNA sources reflects a larger stylistic weakness, which is the unqualified and unsubstantiated imputation of motive to various protagonists, particularly Kim Jong-un.

Methodological problems throughout the book diminish its empirical and analytical usefulness. These include the systematic elision of Shin's opinion with exposition of the argument, the frequent use of quotes without citations, and the somewhat unruly syntax. The frequent resort to adverbial generalizations such as “probably” and “most likely” and verbal constructions such “may have” signals a lack of analytical rigor.

The overall intent of the research is to be commended; given the failure of existing policies to prevent the escalating nuclearisaton of the DPRK and the human catastrophe that another Korean War would entail, it is time for the United States to enter into serious negotiations with the DPRK. Poor execution, however, means that it is difficult to ascertain an audience for the book. The lack of scholarly rigor implies that the book will struggle to find its way into university syllabi in Korean studies. The subject matter is too narrow, empirically and analytically, to provide a resource for strategic studies and international relations scholars. The bibliography does not open fresh research paths for curious doctoral students, and the writing is probably a little too ponderous and difficult to follow to inspire interest from a general readership.