This essay explores gender scholarship about how state architectures affect women's politics. A rapidly growing literature addresses the effects of vertical and horizontal power divisions in federations. While just one in five states is a federation, federations govern 40% of the world's population (Watts Reference Watts2008). Globalization and neoliberal ideology foster regionalization, devolution, and increased influence by international agencies, and so more people experience multilevel governance (MLG) in unitary states, too. Hence, feminist scholars now increasingly consider the impact of state architectures. The field's core idea is that while socioeconomic and ideological forces shape gender/power relations, governments and movements respond from within specific state architectures. Related debates involve how institutional designs shape opportunity structures, and how feminists respond to federal diversity.

In federations, political authority is divided vertically between two (rarely three) hierarchically organized governments with constitutionally specified powers. A key debate is whether federations' common characteristic—multiple sites and points of access to government—obstructs or enhances women's political opportunities. Multilevel governance designates polities such as the European Union with three to five nonhierarchical governance levels. MLG also signifies multilevel polities generally, with federations as one type. State architecture designates vertical and horizontal power allocations. Research questions concern the constraints that state architectures impose on social movements and policymaking, and how the number of decision-making sites, and parliamentary (fused power) versus congressional (separated power) systems, affect women's ability to influence policymaking. Unlike previous comparative projects, feminist federalism/MLG scholarship includes meso-level and international governance, added to nation-state governments (Haussman, Sawer, and Vickers Reference Haussman, Sawer and Vickers2010).

What can studying the effects of state architectures offer feminist political science? To begin with, focusing on the impact of state institutions takes feminists beyond the ignoring or rejecting of states on ideological grounds and helps them identify which institutions are most open to their participation. In regime change such as democratization, it provides knowledge of how state institutions and parties work so that women's movements can craft strategies to attain inclusion, rights, and “women-friendly” policies. If feminists understand the logic of institutional and architectural change, they can promote new elements such as Canada's Charter of Rights when constitutional change occurs, or use devolution as in Scotland to advance women's electoral inclusion. Understanding how different types of states work and how state structures constrain and facilitate policy development and implementation also enriches feminist analysis. Focusing on state architectures opens up new dimensions of politics to feminist scrutiny.

Mainstream federalism studies operate in isolated subfields based on whether federalism is treated as an independent, dependent, or intervening variable. There is no dominant canon, and so feminists can borrow concepts or not as they choose, and can develop generalizations in which gender is foundational. Since most feminist theory has little to say about how specific states work, gender scholars tend to draw on feminist institutionalism (Krook and Mackay Reference Krook and Mackay2011). Erk (Reference Erk2006) identifies four potential dimensions of federalism studies: i) institutional design and development, ii) relations with democracy, iii) management of spatial diversity, and iv) public policymaking. In the following discussion, these dimensions are used as a starting point, but the essay also highlights the different questions that motivate feminist research. The final section considers normative questions about whether majority-culture feminists should promote centralization of decision making if minority feminists favor autonomy for their regional government .

Institutional Design and Development

A major focus of federalism studies is how institutional design shapes and constrains the ways in which governments work. Written constitutions provide the basis, but such workings involve practices, informal institutions (see the essay by Banaszak and Weldon), unintended processes, and unexpected veto points that research must identify. But federal and nonfederal dimensions intertwine, creating unique institutional combinations (see Franceschet's essay). So how “federalism” works is always contingent, and studies of its impact on women's politics generally focus on the historical combinations that evolved in specific federations. Especially in “old” federations, the structures, practices and ideas that achieve federalism are deeply fused with other governance institutions. For example, Chappell (Reference Chappell2002), Vickers (Reference Vickers2010), and Mahon and Collier (Reference Mahon, Collier, Haussman, Sawer and Vickers2010) show that federalism fused with a parliamentary system advances women's equality (assuming a “women-friendly” party is in power) better than when federalism is combined with a congressional system, which also divides power vertically. Studies of “federalism's” impact usually involve thick descriptions of federal/nonfederal combinations, limiting generalization, especially limiting the number of cases.

Another alternative involves stripping away nonfederal aspects of these combinations to focus on how women's politics are affected by federalism's defining characteristics—vertical power divisions and multiple governance sites. Several feminist scholars (Haussman Reference Haussman2005; Vickers Reference Vickers2010, Reference Vickers, Krook and Mackay2011) observe that the number of decision-making sites facing a women's movement affects whether the fact of having access to multiple sites (federalism per se) is an advantage. One testable hypothesis is that, beyond a threshold, women's movements experience a “federalism advantage” if they face fewer sites. On the basis of a unitary/federal comparison, Bashevkin (Reference Bashevkin1998) finds that federalism per se offers women's movements an advantage in defending and advancing equality gains in a conservative era. Gray (Reference Gray, Haussman, Sawer and Vickers2010, 33) notes a new challenge to this generalization, however, as the federal/unitary dichotomy is eroded by centralization in federations and decentralization in unitary states. Emerging work conceptualizes a continuum with devolving (e.g., Scotland/UK; see the essay by Kenny and Mackay) and federalizing (e.g., Belgium) states as intermediate types (Celis, Meier, and Wauters Reference Celis, Meier and Wauters2010).

Early feminist texts focused on women's negative experiences in federations, but since 1990, they have also explored conditions that produce a “federalism advantage” for women's movements (Vickers Reference Vickers, Krook and Mackay2011). Current scholarship focuses on shaping and constraining effects of the multiple sites of governance created by vertical and horizontal power divisions. But this approach of stripping away all historical context is uncommon as yet. Most feminist scholars explore the impact of combinations of federalism and other characteristics, including the nature of the court and legal system, especially regarding judicial review; the degree of fragmentation of the party system; the way in which meso-level governments are represented federally; electoral and voting system impacts; the effect of direct democracy; institutional age and the gender norms embedded as a result; the difficulties of constitutional change; whether intergovernmental relations are open or closed, competitive or cooperative; the influence of international agencies; and the ability of federal governments to bind meso-level governments when they sign and ratify treaties.Footnote ¹

Democracy and Democratization

A key mainstream debate is whether federalism promotes or obstructs democracy. The concepts of democracy used generally are gender blind and ignore both women's experiences of exclusion from full citizenship in old federations, long after manhood suffrage was established, and their continued marginalization in formal politics. Although organized women have influenced how some new federations are structured, most feminists consider small, unitary states in which women and men became citizens together the most women-friendly democracies, as measured by women's presence in government and public policy outcomes. One thesis is that in spatially large countries, democracy is only possible through federalism that provides government in smaller, meso-level states. Although many feminists favor grassroots activism, they tend to be suspicious of meso-level governments, believing them more easily captured by conservatives interests. But central governments are thought to be influenced by more progressive forces (Goetz Reference Goetz2008; Haussman, Sawer, and Vickers Reference Haussman, Sawer and Vickers2010).

Some feminists think that federalism promotes democracy for women. Simms (Reference Simms and Kelly2001) claims that it gave Australian women more opportunities to develop democratic citizenship, although meso-level governments excluded most Aboriginal people from citizenship long after white women were enfranchised. MacDonald and Mills (Reference MacDonald, Mills, Haussman, Sawer and Vickers2010, 189) claim that Latin American feminists are more skeptical of “the ‘democracy’ school of federalism” because of its association in the region with authoritarianism and neo-liberalism. The “democracy” school also ignores women's negative experiences in electoral democracies (Burgess and Gagnon Reference Burgess and Gagnon2010). But even in liberal democracies, having the vote is not sufficient to ensure that organized women will be able to hold governments accountable for implementing any women-friendly policies they adopt or treaties they sign. Systematic analyses are needed of women's involvement in large-scale processes, such as democratization, to identify which factors give them and their organizations the clout needed to influence institutional restructuring, and retain that clout after democracy is established.

Accommodating Diversity/Managing Conflict

While institutionalists assume that state architectures determine how a society organizes and expresses its political interests, some federalism scholars reverse the causal arrow. They claim that societies divided by spatially organized cultural diversities (ethnic, linguistic, race, religion) adopt federalism to accommodate or manage the conflicts they produce. In symmetrical federations, with no spatial cleavages, meso-level states have the same powers. In asymmetrical federations, with spatial cleavages, meso-level states' powers vary. Spatially dispersed, majority-culture and nonspatial minority feminists want the federal government to protect their rights and provide social programs, fearing that otherwise they will vary from place to place. This reflects women's limited geographic mobility: everything from men's higher salaries to family child care keeps women from moving to a better jurisdiction as mainstream scholars theorize that (male) citizens can do in federations.

Comparing symmetrical Australia with asymmetrical Canada, Chappell (Reference Chappell2002) shows how the absence of spatial cleavages let Australian feminists develop women's policy agencies to promote gender equality within meso- and federal-level states. But in asymmetrical federations, contestation over power sharing can open up political space for feminist activism. Sawer and Vickers (Reference Sawer and Vickers2001) show that constitutional politics was more open to feminist activism in asymmetrical Canada when movements could piggyback onto existing contestation by Quebec and also become part of the federal government's competitive response. Feminists want decisions made by the government they think will favor them, and structure their activism accordingly. But in asymmetrical federations, there may be multiple movements pursuing common or different goals. Majority-culture women in Canada look to the federal government, whereas Quebec's women favor their meso-level government. Chappell (Reference Chappell2002) concludes that, provided their goals fit with those of “their” government, such spatial-minority feminists can gain from decentralization.Footnote ² But majority and nonspatial minority feminists are disadvantaged (Mahon and Collier, Reference Mahon, Collier, Haussman, Sawer and Vickers2010). The policy contagion theorized by mainstream federalism scholars does not work with feminist goals if conservatives capture meso-level governments (Haussman Reference Haussman2005). Indeed, consider the case of Canada, in which the Quebec government introduced a $5-a-day child-care program with universal access, probably because the other provinces saw such women-friendly policies as part of Quebec's efforts to win women to its nationalist agenda.

Policymaking and Implementation

Scholars consider whether federalism's multiple levels inhibit or enhance governments' responsiveness to citizens in policymaking. For example, does having access to smaller governments “close to home” increase women's influence on policymaking? A key mainstream debate is whether experimentation among and between multiple governments results in better policies or if this is outweighed by multiple legislatures and bureaucracies' costs, coordination failures, overlaps, and loss of economies of scale. But these issues are not yet the focus of feminist policy research. Feminists have so far been more concerned with if and how federal mechanisms can be operated to achieve women-friendly outcomes in a policymaking system so opaque, resource expensive, and prone to buck passing that outsiders with little power cannot hope to hold governments accountable (Grace Reference Grace, Krook and Mackay2011; Vickers Reference Vickers, Brown and Hiebert1994).

Federalism's impact on policymaking depends on the type of policy. The type of federation also matters, especially if legislation occurs at both levels or just at the federal level. Controversial policies and policies important to governments and/or activists encourage veto players to use federations' divided authority allocations to obstruct policy adoption and implementation. Multiple sites can be an advantage in getting women-friendly policies adopted, especially if feminists can “forum shop” for supportive governments. But divided authority obstructs implementation, especially if state capacity is weak or if conservative meso-level governments resist. Divided authority is mediated in each federation by variables, such as the number of sites and the degree of integration of party systems and bureaucracies.

Comparing the development of gay/lesbian rights in Canada and the United States, Smith (Reference Smith2008) shows how specific divisions of powers affect outcomes and that policy areas are centralized or decentralized. She concludes that gay/lesbian rights were advanced earlier and more easily in Canada because the federal government controls criminal law, marriage, and policing. The U.S. federal government could “nationalize” such issues, as with civil rights and women's suffrage, but hostile counter-movements, state-level “direct democracy” campaigns, a fragmented legal system, and a conservative Supreme Court limit federal action. Federalism can have different effects on an issue depending on how other institutions are configured.

Normative Questions

Mainstream federalism studies involve a strong normative element, with supporters of limited government favoring fragmentation of central government power, advocates of asymmetrical federalism praising its conflict management capacity, and defenders of liberal democracy rejecting other types of federation as “inauthentic.” But the costs to marginalized groups are ignored. Underlying feminist scholarship is a normative disapproval of federalism's negative impacts on women and their struggle for equality. Considering unitary states more women -friendly, many demand that federal governments assume responsibility for their issues. Hence, a key normative theme is whether majority feminists will accommodate spatial-minority feminists' desire for “their” meso-level government to control key policy areas. An additional concern is whether majority feminists will, through litigation or agitation, promote “nationalization” of issues to enhance the rights of politically unpopular (e.g., racial, sexual, religious) minorities.