The current comeback of Cicero as a philosophical figure raises a paradox. What makes Cicero's philosophy particularly interesting — as many contributors to this volume stress, editors included — is its embeddedness in a political context, that of the crumbling Roman Republic. The rising scholarly interest in Cicero's philosophy is guided by political concerns that also oriented Cicero's philosophical activity: we want to learn from Cicero how philosophy helps one mitigate, solve or survive political crisis. Cicero's philosophising was always subject to political constraints — as the prologue to book 1 of De Re Publica, for instance, eloquently testifies. This subjection of philosophy to political imperatives was a self-conscious part of Cicero's philosophy; the paradox lies in the fact that it is that very theorising that we — in our great and many political predicaments — find philosophically interesting. The question becomes that of the right standpoint to approach Cicero's philosophy: should we take him (seriously) as a philosophising statesman, or sever ‘Cicero the philosopher’ from the statesman?
The volume under review remains officially agnostic on that question: we lack a methodological discussion of how philosophy as practised by Cicero can best be approached. But the volume's centre of gravity lies closer to the first option. Thomas Bénatouïl's introduction argues that Cicero wrote philosophical works ‘in their own right’ (2) — and the first to spring to B.'s mind are Cicero's political writings. B. commends Cicero's speeches and letters for their practical dimension: they show philosophy being put to political use. Even Cicero's epistemology — a domain in which he is usually taken to be at his most theoretical — is framed by Roman political values: according to Cicero, Academic philosophy is the only Hellenistic school to give the right kind of libertas to its adherents. In order to take both that embeddedness and that practical orientation not as weaknesses, but as strengths of Cicero's philosophising, we need to ‘widen and diversify our practice and notion of philosophy’ (6). ‘Practice’ comes here before ‘notion’.
The absence of a methodological discussion in the introduction might come from the co-existence, within the collection, of two different tacks. The first group, by far the more numerous, gathers those contributions that stress the practical orientation of Cicero's philosophical activity. The Ciceronian practice of philosophy is explored by Claudia Moatti in her contextual study (ch. 1). She shows how Cicero served both philosophy — when he argued that doing philosophy was part of the mos maiorum since the beginning of the third century b.c.e. (10) — and the Roman Republic — by seeing Greek theory as providing ‘tools to deal with the crisis’ (15). When the crisis could not be dealt with any more — under Caesar — Cicero turned to doing politics by other means, i.e. by writing dialogues and treatises. Moatti's picture of Ciceronian philosophy is matched by Catherine Steel's portrait of ‘philosophy in Cicero's speeches’ (ch. 4). Pro Murena and In Pisonem, Steel argues, do not condemn philosophy at all; they simply reject bad philosophising, any way of doing philosophy that is inimical to a healthy Republican life — be it Stoic intransigence or Epicurean retreat. Clara Auvray-Assayas (ch. 8) also takes Cicero's natural philosophy to serve the city: the physics of the Somnium Scipionis is clearly ‘analogical’ (122 n. 11), giving a cosmological background to Scipio's political principles. In ch. 9, Elisabeth Begemann sees Cicero as taking his cue, in matters related to determinism and divination, from the social practices of praise and blame — ‘a move that reflects his commitment to the Republic’ (140). Such a commitment is grounded in Cicero's theory of human sociability: Raphael Woolf shows how Cicero takes compatibility with the practical necessities of Roman political life as his touchstone for judging Hellenistic moral theories (ch. 11). Gretchen Reydams-Schils touches on the same issues in ch. 12, while Jed Atkins offers (in ch. 15) a convincing interpretation of De Officiis: Cicero prioritises duties to the Republic over cosmopolitan obligations because ‘the res publica promotes, in an especially unique and valuable way, human sociability, the natural end of all forms of human fellowship’ (246). It is Cicero's defense of human sociability that drew to him the attention of eighteenth-century philosophers, as Daniel Kapust shows in ch. 17; and it is, in Martha Nussbaum's words (284, ch. 18) Cicero's ‘heroic commitment to the Roman Republic’ that, ‘far from undercutting his claim to philosophize about it, actually infuses his writings with a special depth and urgency’, thus claiming the attention of the twenty-first century.
Most of the chapters of the volume thus take Cicero's philosophy to be intrinsically political: sometimes in its topics (as with Walter Nicgorski's attempt to offer a definition of ‘Cicero's Republicanism’ in ch. 14), at least in its goals. Even Sophie Aubert-Baillot's contribution on ‘philosophy in Cicero's letters’ (ch. 3) shows how Cicero ‘anchor[s] philosophy in practice’ (48). As to Carlos Lévy, his study of Cicero's role in coining a Latin philosophical vocabulary (ch. 5) stresses the ‘compatibility between Greek wisdom and Roman national tradition, mos maiorum’ (72). Sean McConnell insists, if not on the political relevance of the Tusculan Disputations, at least on the therapeutical import of the work (ch. 10); Gary Remer shows how Cicero ranks philosophical schools according to their capacity to produce the perfect orator, who is also the perfect statesman (ch. 13).
But Cicero's corpus can be interpreted differently. This may be due to the span of Cicero's career: as Malcolm Schofield argues, Cicero became less and less of a politically minded Platonist as Rome sank in crisis (ch. 6). It may also have to do with the interpreter's agenda: Isabelle Bouton-Touboulic shows in ch. 16 how Augustine saw Cicero sometimes as a defender of political engagement, but most often as a philosopher of mind and knowledge (though the pre-410 Augustine thinks Cicero secretly adheres to Plato's metaphysics, while the post-410 Augustine sees Cicero as steadfastly holding on to epoche). That view of Cicero as a ‘radical skeptic’ is convincingly defended by Tobias Reinhardt in his account of ‘Cicero's Academic Skepticism’ (ch. 7 — one wonders about the relevance of the appellation ‘Skepticism’). Cicero, Reinhardt argues, was committed to suspension of judgment, which did not prevent him from holding views. The approach taken by Charles Brittain and Peter Osorio in ch. 2 (‘The Ciceronian Dialogue’) is even more radical: in their view, the aim of Cicero's dialogues (not only in the years 45 and 44) was ‘for the reader to become a good critic of philosophical disputes’ (25). Cicero does defend views in his dialogues, but without trying to ‘capture [the] belief’ of the reader (42). The Cicero that is being presented here seeks to hone the dialectical skills of his readers, not to direct their political activity. Cicero dons here the garb, not of the Roman statesman, but of the Oxford colleague.
The volume will enrich the reader, if only for the well-argued, original theses that are defended in each of the chapters. But the volume's merit is also to give an overview of the (at least two) different approaches that can be used to assess ‘Cicero's philosophy’. That he had one should now count as proved — in part thanks to this book.
