Israel, Egypt and India are part of a group of jurisdictions which do not have a unified system of family law. Rather, a system of ‘personal status’ or ‘personal law’ applies, whereby individuals are subject to state-enforced religious family laws which impact upon their human rights. Human Rights under State-enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt and India opens with three stories which exemplify the issues faced by individuals living in the three countries examined in this book. The first concerned a Hindu couple who married in 1977. Six years later the husband married another Hindu woman; they converted to Islam and remarried a year later because the law in India prohibits polygamy for Hindus but allows it for Muslims. The bigamy charge, which was instigated by the first wife as she opposed the second marriage, was dismissed on appeal as the second Hindu marriage and the remarriage under Muslim law were not valid. The first wife had no cause of action despite the factual existence of the second marriage. The second case involved Sergeant Nikolai Rappaport, a Russian immigrant to Israel, who was killed fighting in southern Lebanon. He could not be buried in a Jewish cemetery in Israel because, according to Jewish law enforced in Israel, he was not regarded as a Jew as his mother was not Jewish. The final story concerned an Orthodox Copt woman married to an Orthodox Copt man in Egypt. For almost ten years, she was unable to divorce her husband because of the Coptic Orthodox family laws that the court was required to apply. However, Egyptian law provided for the application of sharia law where spouses belonged to different sects. The wife thus transferred to the Syrian Orthodox Church in order to obtain a divorce under Islamic law and the right to remarry. In all three cases, the existence of state-enforced religious laws had an adverse impact upon the rights and freedoms of (at least one of) the individuals concerned.

The three countries examined in this text were selected because they have a similar historical background: they all inherited a personal law system from their colonial or imperial predecessors. But, on gaining independence, each adopted different models of state-enforced religious law, which are outlined in Chapter 2. Israel, which is considered in detail in Chapter 4, inherited a ‘fragmented confessional’ personal law system, which means that state-recognised religious communities had the authority to apply religious laws in matters of personal status, such as marriage and divorce. Rabbinical courts applied halakha to Jews, sharia courts applied Islamic law to Muslims and ecclesiastical courts applied canon laws to Christians. This system remains in place today. Egypt (the subject of Chapter 5) also inherited a ‘fragmented confessional’ system but on independence adopted a ‘unified confessional’ model, which means that religious laws are applied by civil judges in the civil courts, as religious courts were abolished in 1955. A unified confessional model was in place when India gained independence in 1947. Nehru's government aspired to ‘complete normative unification’, which would replace religious laws with uniform civil laws. As explained in Chapter 6, however, this was only partially successful; as a result, India has retained a ‘unified semi-confessional’ system.

The text poses several important questions, such as why Egypt and Israel have different systems when they inherited similar ones, and why India aimed to achieve complete normative unification. It also considers whether any of the models adopted better protect human rights in the field of family matters, concluding that each form of personal status system affects the rights and liberties of individuals in a similar way (see Chapter 3). In all three jurisdictions, state-enforced religious laws have a detrimental impact on women in relation to marriage, divorce, maintenance and inheritance. In Israel, those people whose Jewish status is disputed (such as Sergeant Rappaport) are also adversely affected, while in Egypt secular dissidents are affected by state-enforced religious law. In India, the application of religious laws is theoretically consensual as citizens can opt to take advantage of the civil law, but the author warns that in practice this option is of limited significance (p 203).

As the author points out in the introduction, the book not only examines the impact of state-enforced religious law on individuals’ human rights but also considers the response of those affected. For example, as explained above, the Egyptian woman changed religious sects in order avoid the application of Coptic Orthodox law, which restricted her ability to divorce. Similarly, individuals in Israel will travel abroad in order to contract inter-religious marriages, which are forbidden by state-enforced Jewish law.

The book also identifies the strategies employed by individuals and interest groups to ‘renegotiate and remake the personal status systems through their interactions with state-sanctioned religious laws and institutions’ (p 18). For example, an equality group in Israel secured legislative change to ensure that women were awarded a fair level of maintenance in the civil family courts. Because they were at risk of losing clients to the civil family courts, Israeli sharia courts initiated their own reform to improve the position of Muslim women.

As the author points out in the introductory chapter, approximately one-third of the world's population lives under a plural legal system (p 3). The experiences of individuals and pressure groups in Israel, Egypt and India can provide valuable lessons to those living in other plural legal systems and those who act on their behalf (p 13). These lessons are summarised in the concluding chapter, which is written with policy-makers and human rights defenders in mind. For example, the author recommends: partnering with hermeneutic communities; adopting a multi-pronged strategy; raising awareness of rights under religious and secular law; making religious authorities accountable; linking legal empowerment to socio-economic development; and campaigning for the inclusion of women and minorities in religious courts and other decision-making bodies. But the book is not only relevant to policy-makers and human rights defenders: it is valuable to anyone who has an interest in comparative family law, religious law and human rights.