The US policy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq has been the subject of a few studies, including a two-volume work by this writer. Through these works, much is known about the policy, particularly its origin and evolution. Any new study of the subject matter must therefore go beyond what is already known and add something original. Unfortunately, Alex Edwards’ book not only does not add anything novel to the existing literature, it leaves out much of what is already known. Below, I summarize my own findings before reviewing Edwards’ book.
The expression “dual containment” was made popular during the Clinton Administration and was used widely thereafter. But it never became clear what was meant by “containment” of Iran and Iraq. Different individuals had different understandings of the term. Some used it in the sense of keeping the two countries militarily, economically, and politically in check. Others used it to mean bringing about “regime change.” A few, such as the neoconservative allies of Israel, appear to have had a more sinister view: seeing the two countries economically ruined, militarily shattered, and politically disintegrated.
The policy of dual containment originated in the Carter Administration, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the end of a symbiotic relation between the Shah and the United States. The so-called hostage crisis set off an overtly hostile policy by the United States toward Iran, including the freezing of Iranian assets. But soon the hostility morphed into the policy of containment of Iran and Iraq. This included, among other things, giving Saddam Husayn the green light to invade Iran while the Israelis were selling arms to Iran with the full knowledge of the United States.
The dual containment policy became more overt and intense under the Reagan Administration. Though the United States often blatantly supported Saddam Husayn in the war and went as far as engaging Iran on his behest, it took measures to assure that Husayn would not be victorious either. Giving false information to both sides and selling arms to Iran, mostly with the help of the Israelis in the so-called Iran-Contra affair, were examples of this double role that the Reagan Administration played in the Iran–Iraq War. After the war, the United States and Israel concentrated primarily on containing Iraq.
Following the first US invasion of Iraq, and the temporary containment of Saddam Husayn, Iran became the main target of containment by means of sanctions. During the Clinton Administration the Israeli lobby groups, especially the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its think tank affiliate the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), became the main architects of US foreign policy toward Iran and underwriters of sanctions. It was in this period that Martin Indyk, the former head of WINEP and subsequently the national security advisor to President Clinton, claimed to have devised the policy of dual containment.
The containment of Iraq, as well as Iran, became more intense with the election of George W. Bush and the takeover of the Middle East policymaking process by the neoconservatives. Individuals affiliated with the Israeli lobby groups, such as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle (both on the Board of Advisors of WINEP), and David Wurmser, became instrumental in turning the policy of dual containment into the policy of “dual rollback.” Iraq was targeted for invasion and it was hoped that Iran would be contained thereafter by means of more severe unilateral and multilateral sanctions and, if necessary, military actions by the United States, Israel, or both. Israeli leaders, however, were more interested in targeting Iran rather than Iraq. But they ultimately settled for the neoconservative policy, hoping that after Iraq they could push Iran to the top of the United States’ “to do list,” to use Ariel Sharon's words.
The containment of Iran continued in the first term of the Obama Administration under the policy of “tough diplomacy,” a policy designed mostly by those associated with the Israeli lobby groups, particularly WINEP's former cofounder and director Dennis Ross. The policy was intended to impose draconian sanctions on Iran in hopes of paralyzing the country's economy, turning the Iranians against their own government and creating the necessary environment for military actions against Iran. Yet, despite the severe sanctions imposed, the Iranian economy did not collapse and the environment necessary for a US–Israeli attack did not materialize. With the departure of a number of Israeli lobbyists from the second Obama Administration and the replacement of the hawkish Hillary Clinton by John Kerry, the tough diplomacy policy was abandoned and, after a long process of negotiations, a comprehensive agreement was reached on the disputed Iranian nuclear activities between Iran and the P5+1 (the four members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany). As this review is being written, the fate of the agreement remains unclear, since Israel and its surrogates in the United States are campaigning massively against it.
Alex Edwards’ book, as stated earlier, not only does not add anything to the above narrative, it detracts from it. The period he considers is 1991–2000. But it is not at all clear why this period is chosen. The year 1991 was when Operation Desert Storm commenced, but it was not the beginning of the dual containment policy. As stated earlier, the origin of the policy goes back to the Carter Administration. Furthermore, much of the action against Iran and Iraq—such as the second invasion of Iraq and the intensification of sanctions against Iran—occurred after 2000. Strangely enough, Edwards tries in his conclusion to draw lessons from his analysis for future relations between the United States and Iran, even though he has not touched upon one of the most significant periods in the history of the US–Iran relationship: from 2002, when Iran was accused of not reporting some nuclear facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency, to 2013, when a short term agreement between the P5+1 and Iran was reached.
Even the period under consideration by Edward does not receive comprehensive analysis. Setting aside the introduction and the conclusion, the book has six chapters. The first two deal with very general material concerning the United States and the Persian Gulf, material that is usually covered in an introductory textbook on the Middle East. Here important details concerning the dual containment policy are left out. For example, there is no mention of Iran's claim that the United States gave Saddam Husayn the green light to invade Iran, or that some individuals in the Reagan Administration hoped to see Iran and Iraq bleed one another to death in their eight-year war. The Iran-Contra affair is seen merely as an anomaly, rather than part and parcel of dual containment, and US support for Saddam Husayn is referred to as a “tilt.”
This leaves only four short chapters to deal with the dual containment policy. And here the big elephant in the room, i.e., Israel and its lobby groups, is mostly ignored. It is only in Chapter 7 that the “pro-Israel lobby” takes center stage, and here it appears only in the form of AIPAC. Steve Rosen, former AIPAC official, is interviewed, apparently to lend credibility to the analysis, without mentioning the fact that Rosen was indicted in 2005 for violations of the US Espionage Act. This, and similar interviews, cannot shed light on how Israel has been operating in crafting US foreign policy toward Iran. Instead, the author could have interviewed a few journalists who follow critically the activities of Israel and its lobby groups, such as Jim Lobe and Eli Clifton.
The author's neglect of the power of Israel and its lobby groups in making US policy toward Iran is not without reason. The book, which is based on a PhD thesis, is written within the bounds of thinkable thought and common jargon. For example, countries such as Iran are viewed by the author as “rogue states” that are ruled by “regimes.” They are perceived as “threats” to “US interest.” Israeli lobby groups, such as AIPAC, are said to be not an “all-powerful force” in determining US policy toward Iran (p. 124), and these lobby groups are regarded as providing “useful research and assistance” to the legislators (p. 129). The critics of Israeli lobby groups are seen as failing to adopt a proper “theoretical framework” and their claims require “serious scrutiny” (p. 2).
Unfortunately, Edwards provides no serious scrutiny of previous works. Instead, he gives us a work that is mired in scholastic exercises, such as finding the right theoretical framework and methodology, looking at different “stands” in Islam, and explaining congressional and executive roles in determining US foreign policy. The dual containment policy that resulted in at least hundreds of thousands of casualties, devastated Iraq, and nearly ruined Iran's economy, deserves more serious examination.
