Less than half of the world's countries can be considered democracies today by any popular definition or measure. The remaining half can be placed along the autocratic continuum. While some of these states have slid into autocracy only recently, many others have been entrenched authoritarian regimes for some time. Much ink has been spilled in recent years to explain the durability of authoritarian governments. Despite the diversity of views on the sources of authoritarian persistence, most scholars agree that neither repression nor economic stability or cooptation are sufficient underpinnings of nondemocratic regimes. Both democratic and authoritarian political systems must attain a degree of legitimacy and public support to ensure their persistence. Alexander Dukalskis's The Authoritarian Public Sphere is a timely contribution to this line of argument.
According to Dukalskis, authoritarian regimes that dominate, manipulate, and control the public and private space where political discussion takes place entrench their power by influencing the ways in which their citizens think and talk about politics (2–4). The authoritarian public sphere is crammed with the legitimating messages crafted by authoritarian governments. Authoritarian state infrastructure—media, schools, political parties, legislation, and online control—is used to diffuse the authoritarian content. State repression plays a role in policing the boundaries of the authoritarian public sphere but a regime's legitimating claims can reify authoritarian power even if people do not fully believe in their content and even if punishment is not assured for deviation (26–29).
To enable the comparison of authoritarian legitimation across contexts and cases, Dukalskis proposes a framework of six elements of authoritarian legitimating messages. These elements are: (1) concealment of undesirable information from public discussion; (2) framing of issues and events so that they appear consistent with the regime's ideology; (3) blaming others for all wrongs; (4) inevitability of a ruling power to stay strong and unified; (5) mythologizing the regime in events and figures of the past; and (6) promised land elements directing the population toward a better future (15–16 and chap. 3). This framework is assessed on empirical materials—extensive interview data, field research, and secondary sources—from three case studies: North Korea, Burma, and China (chap. 4), and probed on secondary evidence from South Korea (1961–1979), Cuba after the Cold War, and contemporary Iran (chap. 6).
While the proposed framework is unquestionably useful for comparative analysis of authoritarian legitimation, it falls short as a theory explaining the persistence of authoritarian regimes. It assists in addressing questions about the content and strategies of authoritarian legitimation, but not about what makes some authoritarian governments more successful in generating a belief in their legitimacy, and why some authoritarian regimes are more effective in the use of legitimating strategies for entrenching their rule. The difference between the content and strategies of legitimation and their impact follows from a crucial distinction between legitimation claims, or what an authoritarian government says about its right to rule, and legitimacy itself, or the capacity of the regime to instill a belief that it is the “right” rule for the people (14). The book recognizes this distinction and accepts that all governments make claims to legitimation but not every government succeeds in generating the legitimacy belief. However, it does not connect legitimating messages to authoritarian legitimacy in a comprehensive manner or suggest ways in which different elements of the legitimating messages amplify or weaken the authoritarian government's effort to legitimate its rule. The framework developed in the book offers a good starting point for beginning to think theoretically about a number of important questions concerning the impact of authoritarian legitimation: What bearing do complementarities and contradictions in legitimating messages have on the authoritarian regime's ability to exercise control over the authoritarian public sphere? What is more important for the durability of an authoritarian government: to forestall the emergence of critiques of the regime or to secure the public's consent and zealous belief? How do the discourses and strategies of legitimation interact with other elements of the authoritarian public sphere, including repressive policies and the authoritarian state infrastructure?
It should be acknowledged, however, that the book's primary goal is to show how authoritarian regimes legitimate their power and marginalize critical voices. Dukalskis is careful not to draw causal linkages between legitimating messages and durability of the examined authoritarian cases. Yet the book's narrative is sprinkled with statements about the ways in which the authoritarian public sphere augments and contributes to the resilience of authoritarian regimes (see, e.g., 141). This suggests that the author, too, is deeply interested in advancing our understanding of the ways in which authoritarian legitimation assists in the durability of authoritarian regimes. To be fair to Dukalskis, many scholars of authoritarian studies have grappled with a similar issue: attempting to connect the legitimation claims and strategies to the resilience of authoritarian governments in a comprehensive and theoretically rigorous way. Some of the challenges with establishing such a connection are methodological in nature. Discussed at length in the monograph, they have to do with the empirical difficulties of distinguishing between the influence of belief and force in an authoritarian context. The theoretical lacuna that has recently begun to be filled has to do with the disciplinary confines of comparative political theory and the lack of theoretical cross-fertilization with other disciplines that could provide important theoretical insights on the micro-processes of discursive persuasion.
Dukalskis's book is notable for yet another important observation: authoritarian public spheres are not completely immune to some form of dissent. In each case study considered in the book, there have been physical or social sites with the potential to provide space to counter the states’ dominant narratives. Although less systematically examined and untheorized, these context-specific sites of potential counternarratives are considered in the monograph. They include the shadow economy in North Korea, independent journalism in Burma, and the Internet in China.
Dukalskis's Authoritarian Public Sphere is part of the Routledge Studies in Comparative Asian Politics series, and students of Asian politics will benefit from reading this volume. But it will be of interest to the much broader readership of anyone interested in political legitimacy and legitimation. Although the author draws a sharp contrast between the democratic and the authoritarian public space, the framework of legitimating messages developed in the book allows for important parallels to be drawn between the strategies of democratic and authoritarian legitimation.
