David Carter claims that historians have seen the civil rights movement as reaching a high-water mark with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and, thereafter, the struggle became dissipated, unfocussed and radical. Historians have used this “tragic narrative” (24) of a post-1965 America to heap criticism on President Lyndon Johnson's civil rights record, particularly with the race riots that erupted during his administration, to create a figure brought down by increasing attention to the Vietnam conflict and by his own titanic personality issues. Carter's premise, therefore, is to restructure our thoughts on Johnson's tenure as President to give us a world where LBJ wished to push a radical civil rights agenda into educational and employment opportunities and to fundamentally alter the US as a democratic and fair society, and that this vision of a Great Society was not inevitably leading toward collapse.
The problem is that Carter argues against his own hypothesis and details the decline of the Johnson administration that holds traditional memory. LBJ did become distracted by the Vietnam conflict and he did become convinced that the establishment was out to get him, his paranoia particularly centered round Robert Kennedy (120–21). However, that should not detract from the fact that Carter has written a brilliantly fascinating history of the Johnson administration and that his book is brimming with political detail.
Carter's argument begins with LBJ's radical speech in 1965 at Howard University when he declared that civil rights should be measured in “equal results” rather than in equal rights and opportunities (4). This was an attempt at changing civil rights protest into practical politicking which was achievable through the Voting Rights Act and by black leaders, such as Martin Luther King and Roy Wilkins, directing the enfranchised African American bloc (54). Yet with the city riots that extended throughout LBJ's presidency, it became apparent that there was a segment of the black population that was “unrepresented by the ‘moderate’ civil rights leadership” with whom LBJ had been accustomed to working (166) and that the increasing “bunker mentality” of the White House led to an inability to reach out to radical black leaders in urban areas. Consequently, LBJ had lost interest in civil rights by 1966 (167). Indeed, LBJ became trapped in a failed politics. His administration was seen as rewarding rioters when it turned its attention to one ravaged American city after another and LBJ came to see this urban unrest, especially Watts in 1965, as a “collective political” betrayal by the black population, exclaiming, “How could they do that to me after I had given them so much?” (170).
Carter's work is meticulous in detail and covers the drama from one set piece to another and is highly recommended, despite the story completing a traditional historiographical arc (which its intention was to overturn). Curiously, in the introduction to the text, Carter claims that “Samuel Beckett is arguably more reliable than Shakespeare” for historical accounts (xv). I disagree. LBJ is pure Shakespearean tragedy.
