The meaning, consequences, and moral status of the Enlightenment have long inspired intense and polemical scholarly clashes. One might think that little more could be said on the subject. With The Enlightenment: History of an Idea, Vincenzo Ferrone demonstrates that this is not the case. The book, a collection of lectures originally given at the Collège de France, along with a new afterword, offers a novel and provocative interpretation of the Enlightenment that effectively challenges scholars of the movement to rethink their own understandings of the intellectual turmoil and upheaval of the eighteenth century. Ferrone argues that, ever since Hegel, interpretations of the Enlightenment have been “caught between history and philosophy,” yielding a hopelessly muddled “conceptual Centaur” that often bears little resemblance to the genuine object (xii). Ferrone aims to pry apart this Centaur so as “to defend this noble legacy” from philosophical disrepute (xiv). Doing this requires resituating the Enlightenment in its own historical context, releasing it from any teleological association with the French Revolution, and, perhaps most notably, rediscovering the late Enlightenment of the 1770s and 1780s and its signature personalities: Raynal, Beaumarchais, Lessing, Paine, Goethe, and so on.
Part 1 offers a whirlwind tour of “the philosophers' Enlightenment”—the nefarious Centaur birthed by Hegel and later taken up by Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Michel Foucault, and even Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI). Ferrone provides a particularly harsh denunciation of Horkheimer and Adorno, whom he charges with essentially discarding the real historical Enlightenment entirely and replacing it with a decontextualized, apocalyptic, overdrawn philosophical project “whose sole intent was the pursuit of technological dominion over nature, and not the pursuit of truth” (32). Careful readers of Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as the other “philosophers” with whom Ferrone engages, may well find that he does to them, and to so-called postmodern philosophy, exactly what he accuses them of doing to the Enlightenment: provides an overdrawn and superficial caricature of a far more complex and nuanced body of thought. Accordingly, he accuses the largely unnamed practitioners of postmodernism of harboring “so extreme a nihilism that its proponents deny the existence of any kind of factual truth and perpetuate the law of the strongest, being once again inspired to see the will to power as the sole and ultimate truth and the explanation for the very essence of man” (64). And it is true that the rapid tour of two centuries of philosophical critique of the Enlightenment that culminates in a brusque and brief dismissal of postmodernism is not the book's greatest strength. After all, Ferrone writes to recover the historical Enlightenment, and accordingly, it is in part 2 of the book, “The Historians' Enlightenment,” that his original interpretation of the Enlightenment truly emerges and sheds new light on seemingly well-trodden ground.
Ferrone's historical Enlightenment sounds familiar at first glance: “What we now call modernity was turning out to be mostly a work in progress, a fascinating laboratory with no absolute certainties” (109). The idea of the Enlightenment as the intellectual birth of modernity is not a new one, and Ferrone's thesis recalls those of Peter Gay and Ferrone's own teacher Franco Venturi. However, Ferrone does effectively reframe this idea against a host of other historical interpretations, many of which he sees as either falling victim to the Centaur or positioning the Enlightenment simply as a stepping stone to the French Revolution. He is especially critical of Jonathan Israel's story of a radical, atheistic, Spinozist Enlightenment. Instead, he suggests that the defining trait of the Enlightenment was its humanism: “What needs to be studied as the truly defining trait of the Enlightenment style of thought is, therefore, not only critical reason in its various historical metamorphoses, but first and foremost man's brave and unbiased reflection on man: in short we must shift the emphasis from ‘critical reason’ to man as the defining factor” (96). The book's great virtue and contribution lies in how Ferrone develops this theme in the context of the often ignored late Enlightenment. His discussion of the two crucial features of the late Enlightenment—the growing politicization of the Republic of Letters and an intellectual commitment to what he calls neonaturalism—proves fascinating. The latter he defines as “a dynamic concept of nature that existed firmly anchored in time and overflowing with vital energy” (143). This concept allows him to draw unexpected and illuminating connections between new ideas in aesthetics, politics, and science. He makes a very strong case that scholars of the Enlightenment should pay much closer attention to this period. This is a particularly important point for political theorists to heed, as their Enlightenment all too often stops short of the 1780s.
Of course, Ferrone's ultimate desire to vindicate a triumphalist story of the Enlightenment as a heroic intellectual step toward human freedom and self-government will not sit well with those who have done painstaking work to illuminate some of the darker intellectual currents of this period. Indeed, he does underplay the racist, sexist, and imperialist tendencies of many Enlightenment thinkers and offers a too easy celebration of alleged Enlightenment universalism. This is especially notable when he cites Kant as an example of the kind of universalism “that could guarantee the rights of every human being on earth, without distinctions or favoritism,” without noting Kant's own explicitly racist hierarchy of human beings (8). One might also question Ferrone's inclusion of Rousseau in the pantheon of Enlightenment thinkers, given Rousseau's famous denunciations of the philosophes and pessimistic history of mankind's development. Finally, in seeking to identify a single “defining trait” of a movement that spanned numerous countries and decades, Ferrone may himself revive the very Centaur that he seeks to slay. Yet any attempt to vindicate or denounce the Enlightenment in one fell swoop will inevitably (and rightly) provoke such responses. A more fruitful reading of Ferrone's book should focus on his erudite reconstruction of the unique contributions of the late Enlightenment, a period that certainly deserves greater scholarly attention.
