Compared to the recent eruption of violence in other parts of the world, East Asia as a region appears relatively stable. However, authors Evelyn Goh and Steve Chan in their respective books remind readers that order and stability in Asia should not be taken for granted. Scholars and policymakers looking for answers about the future of Asia and the prospect of peace, stability, or violence will find new arguments which refreshingly break from conventional realist, liberal, and constructivist interpretations of Asian security. To their credit, the authors eschew stale debates about U.S.-China relations and the balance of power politics in favor of a more nuanced approach to regional analysis which takes into account the relationship between great and lesser powers.

Although both books touch on themes of order, stability, and transformation in Asia, the specific aims of the two books differ. In The Struggle for Order, Goh seeks to advance a new conceptual framework for thinking about order transitions and the “renegotiation of order [as] a more interactive, contested process” (p. 12). Meanwhile, Chan’s Enduring Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific challenges the pessimism surrounding Asia’s future by arguing that regional rivalries have been diminishing rather than increasing as the logic of economics trump the logic of politics and nationalism.

The Struggle for Order is steeped in the tradition of the English School. For Goh, international order is defined as “norm-governed interactions produced by a social compact among members of the regional society of states” (p. 202). Differentiating from power transition theory, which focuses on relative shifts in capabilities, an order transition “involves significant alterations in the common goals and values, rules of the game, and social structures of international society” (p. 16). Order transition is therefore accompanied by “mutual adjustment and negotiation between the incumbent hegemon, the challenger, and surrounding states about key aspects of the international order” (p. 19).

Following the introductory chapter, Goh sets out to analyze negotiation and contestation over new normative structures in post-Cold Asia across four core themes: (1) institutional bargains and the role of bilateral and multilateral institutions in Asia; (2) authority and public goods provision, particularly in the area of regional conflict management; (3) regionalism and community; and (4) collective memory revision which reflect broader normative processes of order and justice. Each of the above issues is closely examined in four separate chapters. Ultimately, the process of contestation and renegotiation in post-Cold War Asia along these dimensions has resulted in the creation of a “layered hierarchical order” (p. 209). The United States sits at the top of this order. But underneath U.S. hegemony exists another hierarchical social structure comprised of major and secondary regional powers.

Conceptually, Goh’s argument is best played out in the chapters on institutional bargains (Chapter 2) and economic regionalism (Chapter 4), respectively. Chapter 2 especially stands out with Goh’s astute observations of the legitimation and renegotiation of power via regional institutions. For instance, U.S. alliance partners in Asia continue to “harness U.S. preponderance” through the hub-and-spokes system, even as new multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) become “sites for negotiating new regional order” (p. 29). Through these new institutions, actors such as the United States, China, Japan, and ASEAN determine how best to channel and constrain unequal power and the changing hierarchy of power. More broadly, Goh elucidates the relationship between institutions and regional order, differentiating her “social compact” model of institutions from John Ikenberry’s (After Victory, 2001) notion of constitutional order (p. 32).

In contrast to the discussion on institutional bargaining, chapter five on the collective memory regime and regional disputes involving Japan fit awkwardly with the rest of Goh’s otherwise cohesive framework. Although the chapter itself presents an interesting proposition about order and justice, the awkwardness partly stems from the focus on Japan and the country’s unique position within order transition as a major power in competition with, but also partly subordinate to China. Such minor flaws notwithstanding, in the concluding chapter, Goh masterfully weaves together the rich discussions on renegotiation and contestation across the four themes to explicate her vision of East Asia’s regional order. Goh describes a layered hierarchal order which legitimates U.S. hegemony at the top, but also permits great powers such as China and Japan to command a degree of authority in the region.

Steve Chan’s Enduring Rivalries in the Asia-Pacific is a different type of book from The Struggle for Order. In contrast to the broad, more abstract theoretical questions Goh wrestles with concerning systemic order, Chan’s book hones in on a narrower empirical puzzle about rivalries, why they endure, and how they dissolve. The timing of Chan’s book could not be better. Recent maritime disputes, rising tensions in the South China Seas, and pessimistic forecasts pertaining to U.S.-China relations all point towards conflict in Asia. It would be an easy sell to predict the continuation of existing rivalries in Asia. Yet contrary to the book’s somewhat misleading title, Chan presents a persuasive, clear argument why Asian governments will exercise greater restraint than in the past. In a memorable line from the preface, Chan eloquently writes: “Although the spirit of Camelot has yet to pervade Asia, the ghost of Hobbes has been banished to a remarkable extent since the Cold War” (p. x).

Restraint and rivalry abatement in Asia rests on multiple conjoining factors. However, Chan’s thesis primarily builds on two related explanations: the increasing salience of economic interdependence in Asia, and the “depolarization” of the region. Regarding the former, Chan notes that Asian governments have emphasized economic development and relied on strong economic performance to maintain domestic legitimacy. Thus, “when many countries in a region pursue a similar strategy of emphasizing economic performance and interdependence, they create a synergistic effect that restrains interstate tension and rivalry” (p. xii).

The complex interdependence thesis has already been explored by a number of other Asian experts who might be labeled as regional optimists (in contrast to the regional pessimists occupying the realist camp). If the crux of Chan’s book rested solely on this argument, Enduring Rivalries would add little value to our understanding of the region. However, tied together with Chan’s second observation about the bifurcation of military and economic influence in the region and the shift towards depolarization, Chan establishes a novel framework for thinking about enduring rivalries. According to Chan, states have begun to hedge between Beijing and Washington and are less inclined to lean in one direction when aligning their foreign policy (p. 20). Such “cross-cutting allegiances dampen rivalry intensification and spillover” (p. 103). Put differently, the prospect of “chain-ganging” in which allied states are dragged into unwanted conflicts has “receded considerably” in the Asia-Pacific (p. xiv). Coincidentally, such behavior might fit within Goh’s layered hierarchy framework.

Chan’s book fully engages the quantitative and qualitative literature on rivalries (see Chapter 3) and is a must read for anyone working in this research program. Readers new to the rivalry literature will also be caught up to speed by studying Chan’s work. The book is also an easier read than Goh’s The Struggle for Order. This is partly due to Chan’s clear thesis and straightforward writing style. It is also a result of Chan’s effort in providing just the right amount of empirical evidence to support his theoretical claims. Although some questions might be raised about the quality of the source and presentation of the data in chapter three (for instance, the data on territorial disputes in Table 3 or the presentation of trade data from the CIA in Table 5), credit should be given to Chan for providing multiple pieces of evidence pointing to greater interdependence and reduced conflict.

Overall, Chan builds a persuasive argument for rivalry abatement. Nevertheless, skeptics will question whether the author remains dismissive of the power of nationalism or overstates the logic of interdependence in Asia. In fairness, Chan does mention in several instances that territorial disputes and anti-foreign protests will still recur (pp. 25, 182). But given potential instability and a high degree of uncertainty in the domestic politics of important regional actors (i.e. China), it is not unreasonable to believe that the “occasional setbacks” Chan refers to (p. xi) would significantly and adversely impact interstate relations. This would set East Asia on a course different from Chan’s prediction of gradual rivalry abatement. As Jessica Chen Weiss (Powerful Patriots, 2014) recently argued, allowing nationalist, anti-foreign protests to fester makes it increasingly difficult for states to make diplomatic compromises.

Likewise, in recent years, several scholars have undermined the economic interdependence thesis by qualifying the level of intraregional trade and financial flows. As John Ravenhill notes, after an initial spurt in the 1990s, intraregional trade has not significantly increased in Asia (“East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado About Nothing,” 2009, p. 231). Chan’s argument could be strengthened by better engaging the literature on East Asian regionalism – both its proponents and critics – and critically reflecting on the relationship between economics and politics.

Of the two books, The Struggle for Order makes the bigger theoretical claim. Yet, Goh ends with a rather non-controversial empirical finding. Few would dispute her claim that a layered hierarchy has emerged in East Asia. In contrast, Chan’s book, while not as theoretically ambitious as Goh’s enterprise, concludes with an empirical finding which may raise a few curious eyebrows and hence leave a lasting impression. Given the recent uptick in nationalist hatred in Asia, it is paradoxically the prediction of reduced rivalry, not increased conflict, which will stir debate among scholars and policymakers.

Both books provide major contributions to our understanding of East Asian international relations while weighing in on important theoretical debates in the field. Without needing to justify either the value of area studies or international relations theory, the authors elegantly ingrate social science rigor with area studies knowledge. Taken together, the books present a cautiously optimistic vision of Asia’s future and provide a glimmer of hope that East Asia’s regional order will look different from its conflicted past.