There is a palpable malaise in American medicine as clinical practice veers off its moorings, swept along by a new commercialism that is displacing medical professionalism and its attendant moral obligations. Although the sociology of this phenomenon is complex and multifactorial, I argue that this move toward medical commercialism was accelerated by the abortive efforts of the Clinton Administration's Health Security Act.1
Health Security Act. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994.
This transformation has already changed the daily practice of medicine. Where professional obligation was once the norm that guided practice, market forces now hold increasing sway, turning patients into consumers and doctors into providers. Hospital governance is ever more modeled on corporate models.2
Fins JJ. What hospital trustees can learn from ethics committees: Pragmatism, ethics and the governance of health care organizations. In: Jennings B, Gray BH, Sharpe VA, Fleischman AR, eds. The Ethics of Hospital Trustees. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; 2004:237–53.
The Marketplace of Discourse
Although the Clinton plan was laudable in its attempt to provide universal access to healthcare, it departed from more traditional measures of other entitlement programs by turning to the private sector for help with and justification for healthcare reform. An early articulation of the President's Proposal circulated on September 16, 1993, by the Bureau of National Affairs' Health Law Reporter confirms this point. The opening line of the proposal is not about the ethical imperative of providing care for all or about improving the nation's health. Such ethically or medically based mandates are not the initial focus. Instead it is a comment about costs. “Health care costs are rising faster than other sectors of the economy—Precipitous growth in health care costs robs workers of wages, fuels the growth of the federal budget deficit” and lastly “puts affordable health care out of reach for millions of Americans.”
Only after the document points to the economic consequences of high healthcare costs on jobs and the federal deficit does it arrive at its impact on the availability of care for all. This is more than a rhetorical objection. A review of the proposal's objectives and methodology will suggest that it was founded on economic premises. It was not clinically centered. This is apparent whether one looked to the use of market forces of managed care that sought to drive costs down through competition or the labeling of patients as consumers and physicians as providers.
It would be mistake to view this as merely a question of rhetoric. Here the deliberate use of this rhetoric frames this proposal for universal access in business terms. The cognitive scientist and linguist George Lakoff has recently described how the deliberate use of language frames “shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames is to change all of this. Reframing is social change” (p. xv).3
Lakoff G. Don't Think of an Elephant. White River Junction, Vt.: Chelesa Green Publishing Company; 2004.
Instead of founding the plan on the Rawlsian obligation to the least well-off who were without the protection of health insurance, and in this way resonate with the principle of beneficence, the plan's justification was based on economic objectives and the necessity to address macroeconomic concerns. This reliance on an economic justification distanced the initiative from the clinic.
Although these macroeconomic motivations were never actually in conflict with beneficence, the failure to ground the program in the language of beneficence and distributive justice led to the development of operational strategies—like Ira Magaziner's managed competition. Such approaches introduced a new vocabulary into the clinical encounter, which has only served to further aggravate the inequities, which the Health Security Act had sought to redress.4
Contrast this vision of government with the statement in the Health and Human Services Hubert H. Humphrey Building: “The moral test of a government is how that government treats those who are in the dawn of life—the children; the twilight of life—the elderly; and the shadows of life—the sick, the needy and the handicapped.”
A decade later the Act's legacy is a worsening of the access question and the rise of market forces, which has not helped—but rather hindered—the just distribution of care.5
Powers M. Managed care: How economic incentive reforms went wrong. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1997;7(4):353–60; Budetti PP. 10 years beyond the Health Security Act failure: Subsequent developments and persistent problems. JAMA 2004;292(16):2000–6.
We should not be Fabian utopians and imagine a healthcare system devoid of financial considerations. Commerce and professionalism have long coexisted in medicine to the betterment of both clinical practice and medical research.6
McArthur JH, Moore FD. The two cultures and the health care revolution. Commerce and professionalism in medical care. JAMA 1997;277(12):985–9; Fins JJ, Schachter M. Investigators, industry and the heuristic device. Ethics, patent law and clinical innovation. Accounting Research 2001;8(3):219–33.
Fins JJ. The hidden costs of market-based health care reform. Hastings Center Report 1992;22(3):6.
Clinton B. The Clinton health care plan. New England Journal of Medicine 1992;327(11):804–7.
At a policy level, it could be argued that the Clinton Administration's reliance on market-based reform contributed to the failure of that initiative. Instead of reflecting on what our goals and priorities might be and then considering how the healthcare system might be reconfigured to achieve them, we focused on financing. The consequence was that the debate was superficial and illusory. Resorting to economic discourse obscured more complicated and contentious issues that were, in fact, morally challenging and politically divisive.9
Blekin GS. The technocratic wish: Making sense and finding power in the “managed” medical marketplace. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 1997;22(2):509–32.
Instead, we were told to put our faith in the market. From the early interest in managed competition, which emerged from the Jackson Hole Group, to the later emphasis on managed care, we were told of the efficiency that might be gleaned through competition and economies of scale. Proponents of market-based reform promised reduced waste, decreased costs, improved quality, and affordable universal access through consolidations, mergers and acquisitions, and other strategies borrowed from their cousins in the corporate world. As Washington Post national correspondent John F. Harris put it:
The prophets of managed competition believed they could execute what to skeptics looked like an act of levitation. Market incentives would bring health care costs down for government and business alike; the savings would be captured to provide subsidies to bring down the number of uninisured to zero. Thus, the two most pressing problems in health care—rising cost and inadequate access—would be solved in one swoop.10
Harris JF. The Survivor, Bill Clinton in the White House. New York: Random House; 2005, at p. 113.
Ironic sentiments in the wake of Enron and MCI.
A great opportunity was lost for meaningful and thoughtful reflection on healthcare reform and why we need it. In addition, a lot of time and effort was expended on things like hospital mergers without the success that was hoped for when those relationships were first envisioned.11
Kastor JA. Mergers of Teaching Hospitals in Boston, New York, and Northern California. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; 2001.
Even more fundamentally we might have been able to overcome the self-interest, epitomized by the Harry and Louise commercials—and begun to talk about our common solidarity with each other in shared community.12
Etzioni A, Cassel C, Dougherty C, Evarts CM, Griffith J, Nelson JL, et al. Core values in health care reform: A communitarian approach. Health Care Management 1994;1(1):115–23.
If a homeless person encountered in the public square has drug-resistant tuberculosis, it is not just his problem; it is a communal concern. But beyond the impact of the health of others on one's individual health, there is a corrosive quality to community when we fail to think of others and the covenant that binds fates together. If the debate had taken that turn, would we not be more profitably engaged in asking what it means to care than deliberating about managed care?
In the Clinic
Perhaps most critically we would have come to appreciate that, at a fundamental level, a market approach to healthcare is both an economic and ethical misconstrual of the nature of medical practice. The drama that gets played out at the bedside between doctor and patient must be understood through the particulars of a diagnosis and treatments as well as personalities and preferences. To try to understand the relationship of a doctor and patient from afar with the blunt perspective of macroeconomics as a guide is to lose the nuance of what uniquely happens when a sick person seeks the counsel of a professional trained to help and comfort.
The details of this encounter cannot be captured by a macroeconomic appraisal that seeks to standardize human experience. Patients are not widgets, and the model of care is not the factory room floor. The particulars of each doctor–patient encounter communicate expectations and confer responsibilities that transcend the realm of economics. Here, these details speak of the ethical obligations we have to each other and about medical professionalism, a moral and learned profession that has a unique role to play in civil society, as an advocate for the well-being of individual patients and reforms that will improve the collective public health.
But this changes when doctors cease being professionals and become businessmen, open total body imaging centers, or hawk cosmetics on infomercials. I say this because professionals place the interests of those they serve above their own. We call this a fiduciary or trust relationship, harkening back to the fiduciary who were entrusted by Roman soldiers to disinterestedly look after the warriors' home and hearth while they were off defending the empire. This is an ancient term, to be sure, but one that describes an age-old dimension of the trust relationship on which the doctor–patient relationship depends. When a patient consults a physician, he or she is there to benefit from professionalism—wisdom, competence, and compassion—all harnessed to serve needs defined through a mutual collaboration. An ideal to be sure, one that is not always achievable or available to patients, but certainly an aspirational one to which we should strive.
When I was a student that was the ideal. It was what we hoped to realize. Today the role model is different. The image of the selfless doctor is anachronistic, quaint, and economically unfeasible when the push is on what is called “through-put,” pushing patient volumes through the system to generate revenues, a quality–quantity trade-off, which almost certainly has had negative consequences for the quality of care, given and received.
It is dangerous when the commanding motivation for the act of healing is economic and not ethical. Notions of self-sacrifice and charity, which are not in one's economic self-interest, but which are part and parcel of practice, become anachronistic and discouraged. But they are oftentimes an essential ingredient in the healing act and the fabric of the profession. Why else would physicians take time out of their revenue-generating activities to teach the next generation of students, engage in peer review, or mentor a postdoc. All of these activities occur on the economic margin and are generally not in one's selfish economic interest. They transcend the market and a part of a patient–physician covenant, which is not marked by the meeting of minimal expectations but by exceeding narrow self-interest.13
Crawshaw R, Rogers DE, Pellegrino ED, Bulger RJ, Lundberg GD, Bristow LR, et al. Patient–physician covenant. JAMA 1995;273(19):1553.
Viewing the practice of medicine through the prism of markets, although it might engender efficiencies, may also create distortions in care that in the long run will be more costly. In fact there is a genuine possibility that commercialism will make matters worse as massive healthcare monopolies are created in its wake. Although this strategy is designed to weed out small and inefficient institutions, one cannot help but recall what a similar precipitous strategy of mergers and takeovers did to America's airline industry. Like American medicine, our aviation industry was once an unchallenged leader. It would be a shame if we dismantled our current healthcare system on a similar “wing and a prayer.”
Patients, like the aviation workers who were displaced by those mergers, will find themselves similarly displaced by market forces. As institutions jockey for position, patients are having to make choices between relationships with their long-standing physicians (also known as generic “providers”) and the managed care network in which they are now “members.” Consider the absurdity that took place in my own practice several years ago when an elderly patient of mine had to make this unwelcome choice when her adult day care program was incorporated into a managed care network to which I did not belong.14
Fins JJ. Vowing to care. Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 2002;23(1):54–7.
I sought to remedy what seemed to be an injustice by appealing to the various “managers” who held my patient's fate in their hands, but to no avail. (My initial appeal to a physician medical director had to be handled by someone higher up in the organization.) On “uncompensated” time, I tried to work out the solution that would satisfy the patient's desire to remain in my care and receive the excellent services provided by the adult day care program in the company of her friends. Whereas a well-placed phone call between physicians might have fixed this problem several years ago, these efforts were rebuffed by managers, who somehow knew what was in my patient's “best interest.” After a bit of heartbreak, the patient and her family decided to look for a new daily care program that would accommodate someone who was out of plan. After completing a complete history and physical and several hundred dollars of testing to demonstrate that my patient had enough clinical needs to qualify for enrollment, but was still well enough to participate, we sent in the application materials to a number of programs.
Several months later I received some forms to complete updating her medical status and medications. The materials came from her original program and I thought that it was simply a bureaucratic snafu. As far as I knew she was in a new program to which she had applied, so I asked the patient's daughter about what had happened. She told me my patient was once again back in her old day care program. The new program that had accepted her was the old program under a new corporate name. Someone profited from that juggling of corporate entities, but it wasn't my patient or her family. They were victims of market forces that induced unnecessary costs and forced them to endure months of uncertainty. In the end the “efficiency” of the market placed them exactly back where they had started, all in the name of progress. Years later the story remains instructive and cautionary.
Professing the Future
Kenneth M. Ludmerer, in his magisterial history of the rise of 20th century American medicine Time to Heal, laments that scientific successes of the past century are imperiled by the contractions the market will effect on organized medicine's scientific enterprise.15
Ludmerer KM. Time to Heal. New York: Oxford University Press; 1999.
Moriber Katz S. Medical education and managed care: Keeping pace. Journal of the American Geriatric Society 1998;46(3):381–4.
Medical education has already been especially vulnerable to commercial forces. Across the nation, hospitals, medical schools, and medical centers have realigned themselves to respond to these market forces. One medical school with a long and independent history was even taken over by a managed care network in a maneuver that could fairly be described as a hostile takeover. Programs are prioritized based not on scientific merit or clinical need but their ability to wrest market share of lucrative patients eager for costly procedures. As early as 1999, Ludmerer worried about these trends and observed the threat to academic medicine and medical education:
At academic health centers, a money standard has started to replace a university standard. The financial well-being of academic health centers and the continued generous compensation of medical school faculty have been the winners; education and research, the losers. Americans will not wake up tomorrow to find their teaching hospitals and medical schools gone. However, an insidious process has already begun that has been transforming teaching hospitals into community hospitals and university medical schools into proprietary schools.17
See note 15, Ludmerer 1999:383.
Since Ludmerer made these observations, the fiscal health of academic medical centers has begun to accelerate the devaluation of scholarship and research he feared. This has led to the not-so-subtle transformation of great centers of medical learning into hypertrophied community hospitals able to provide the prevailing standard of care, but less equipped to expand the frontiers of medical knowledge.
Although some commentators have pointed to the need for a resurgent professionalism to counter these forces in institutional life and medical education,18
Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. Professionalism and justice: Ethical management guidelines for leaders of academic medical centers. Academic Medicine 2002;77(1):45–7; Relman AS. Education to defend professional values in the new corporate age. Academic Medicine 1998;73(12):1229–33.
What becomes of the young student's idealism when the cultures of medicine and business clash?19
See note 18, Relman 1998:1229–33.
Fins JJ. Professional Responsibility: A perspective on the Bell Commission Reforms. Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 1991;67(4):359–64.
Let me close with some clarifications: My remarks are not meant to suggest that money was never in medicine. Money and market forces have always been in the mix. But as Arnold Relman has indicated in his introduction to this collection of essays:
Medicine never in its history totally rejected the seductions of financial gain, but until fairly recently most young physicians entered their profession with the primary intention to be of service to their patients…. Financial ambition did not trump professional ethics, as it increasingly seems to do now.21
Relman AS. The problem of commercialization in medicine. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2007;16:375–6.
The difference now is that where commercialism in medicine was once tempered ably by the social mission of voluntary hospitals and the professionalism of dedicated practitioners,22
Stevens R. In Sickness and Wealth. New York: Basic Books; 1989.
