I can think of several reasons why economic historians might be interested in the origins of and the early history of the American life insurance industry. One is supply. How was the innovation of life insurance made into a viable, sustainable, and profitable product? How did the industry conceptualize its risk and deal with adverse selection? How did the companies guarantee their longevity? Another is demand. Why did the financial innovation of life insurance appeal to customers in the years before the Civil War? Which marketing strategies were effective? Who purchased these policies? Then there is the issue of financial intermediation. How did the companies decide what classes of assets to purchase? To whom did they lend? Did those investments help propel the American economy as it expanded into manufacturing, developed a transportation network, and built cities?
Sharon Ann Murphy, an associate professor of history at Providence College, has engaged in extensive archival research and written a highly readable book detailing the rise of the American insurance industry up to and through the Civil War. She explicitly addresses the first two of the three dimensions of this development and makes passing reference to the third. Those familiar with the literature will find her analysis important and provocative.
Hitherto the major issue dealt with in the literature has been the unpopularity of life insurance before 1843, the industry's dramatic expansion over the next decade, followed by its near stagnation in the 1850s. Three explanations have been offered. The majority view, championed by J. Owen Stalson in his classic 1942 book, Marketing Life Insurance: Its History in America (Harvard University Press), is that the takeoff was due to the ascendency of the mutual company and the eclipse of the proprietary (stock) company around 1843. The mutual companies were easier to start since they required less capital. They distributed their annual profits directly to policyholders rather than to stockholders, and engaged in innovative marketing techniques. An older point of view is that the industry was held in check by the panic of 1837, which caused a number of companies to fail, and by the subsequent six- year period of distress, which damped consumer demand for policies. With economic recovery beginning in 1843, the industry grew rapidly. (For an example of this line of argument, see Marquis James, Biography of a Business: 1772–1942, Insurance Company of North America. Indianoplis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1942: 127–30). A third suggestion was made by Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer. She argues that the mid- 1840s burst of interest in life insurance was caused by a retreat of fundamentalist religious thinkers who condemned life insurance as undermining a trust in God (Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United States. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
In Murphy‘s view, an explanation of the “revolution of 1843” (the phrase is Stalson's) is unnecessary. The notion that the insurance was unpopular before the mid-1840s “completely ignores the dynamism of the pre-1843 industry” (p. 7). Murphy bolsters this claim with both statistical and archival evidence. Her statistical data comes from Stalson himself. Murphy‘s innovation involves graphing the data on insurance in force on a logarithmic scale as opposed to an arithmetic scale (p. 5) [Stalson's data is reproduced in Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, editors, Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Time to the Present, Millennial Edition, five volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006: Series Cj715]. Her transformation produces a time-series plot that increases “steadily during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, with no monumental shift at any point in the 1840s” (p. 7). Murphy's archival evidence pertains largely to the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company which enjoyed great success in the 1830s (pp. 14–15).
The persuasiveness of Murphy‘s log transformation is undermined by the fact that the 25 percent annual growth rate between 1825 and 1840 was calculated from a very small base. There was only $200,000 worth of insurance in force in 1825 representing probably less than 250 policies in total. By 1840 insurance in force had grown to $4.7 million, a sum representing less than 5,000 policies. The explosive growth of the late 1840s so frequently commented on by previous authors resulted in an astonishing 45 percent annual rate of growth between 1845 and 1850 as insurance in force jumped by more than sixfold from $14.5 million to $97.1 million (the original data was presented only for years ending in zero and five). The archival evidence also seems too weak to dismiss the notion that “something momentous took place in American life insurance beginning in 1843” [Stalson, p. 666]. The success of the New York Life and Trust, which Murphy credits to the skillful leadership of the Bank's first President, William Bard (pp. 13–15), is not the same as success of the entire industry. Murphy reports that there were only four insurance companies that had issued a significant number of policies in existence in 1830 (p. 4). These were joined by 16 new companies before 1843. However seven of these did not survive beyond 4 years, another died after six years. Four of the new startups issued only negligible amounts of insurance. The remaining four had sold less than $1 million in policies by 1840 (Appendix A.1: 301–02). New York Life and Trust, her exemplar of pre-1843 dynamism, “accounted for more than half of all policy sales by 1840” (p. 5). It seems to me that one can agree with Murphy that Bard pioneered the business model and “revolutioniz[ed] the way life insurance companies operated in the United States” (p. 14) and also agree with Stalson that there was a monumental break in trend around 1843.
As economic historians know too well, one observer‘s takeoff is another's steady rate of growth. Leaving that debate aside, we can turn to her analysis. Murphy is most successful when discussing the development of a business model that proved successful, sustainable, and capable of rapid growth. She has mined the archives of several prominent insurance companies, particularly the records of the Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company (founded 1818, creased writing life insurance in 1867), the New York Life Insurance and Trust Company (founded 1830, ceased writing life insurance in 1865), and the Baltimore Life Insurance Company (chartered in 1830, closed 1867) and that “insider's perspective” proved particularly useful for examining the supply question. The first four chapters, grouped as Part I, “The Creation of the Industry,” trace the beginnings of the life insurance market from the 1830s and continuing throughout the antebellum period. Topics dealt with in Chapter 1 include the adoption and revision of statistical life tables, the setting of prices based on those calculations, and the growing understanding of factors other than age that affected mortality. Chapter 2 discusses the development of the agency system for marketing insurance and avoiding adverse selection. Chapter 3 takes up the problem of moral hazard and insurance fraud. Chapter 4 discusses the early tangled efforts by the state governments to regulate the industry both to prevent failures that would involve default of outstanding policies and to protect consumers from potential abuses of corporate power.
In Part II, “Reaching Out to the Middle Class,” Murphy puts forth her own explanation for the growing popularity of life insurance, the rise of a middle-class, nonagricultural, wage-earning population. In Chapter 5, she focuses on the threat that premature death of the male wage earner posed to the decedent‘s wife and children. People living on farms or in small towns were largely self-sufficient in food, clothing, and shelter. After the death of the household head, the land remained and could be worked by the remaining family members, or rented out or sold. Neighbors could be relied upon for help. The effectiveness of these informal insurance schemes meant that formal insurance wasn't a priority. But for those living in larger urban areas and dependent upon the head‘s employment, the proceeds of an insurance policy might mean the difference between destitution and a more comfortable old age. Chapter 6 discusses the marketing approaches designed to appeal to the middle class, the design of payment schedules, life insurance as loan collateral, surrender values, and competition between mutual life insurance companies and savings banks. Chapter 7 breaks from the focus on the Northeast with a clear-eyed and important look at the practice of insuring the lives of slaves. Here Murphy relies on the records of the Baltimore Life Insurance Company which is the “largest known extant source on slave insurance policies” (p. 375). In Chapter 8, she takes up the theological literature to reject Zelizer's argument that fundamentalists thought that insurance was “acting in defiance of Providence.” She criticizes Zelizer for a “thin source base” (p. 210) and challenges her contentions about the grip of fundamentalist theology with a detailed analysis of sermons and the religious press. She also documents the frequent purchases of life insurance by ministers.
Part III, “Cooperation, Competition, and the Quest for Security,” completes the book. Chapter 9 considers the creation of the American Life Underwriters' Convention in 1859. Chapter 10 explores how the insurance industry dealt with the challenges posed by the Civil War. Chapter 11 makes a quick overview of post-Civil War developments. Unfortunately, Murphy gives little attention to the situation in the 1850s when the industry, according to Stalson, all but stagnated. It should also be noted that Murphy ends her chronicle with the end of the Civil War just before the industry experienced a dramatic reinvention and renewed rapid growth, driven by the introduction of Tontine insurance (see Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, “Tontine Insurance and the Armstrong Investigation: A Case of Stifled Innovation, 1868–1905.” The Journal of Economic History 47, no. 2 (June 1987): 379–90).
