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Paul's Place in a First-Century Revival of the Discourse of “Equality”*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2017

L. L. Welborn
L. L. Welborn*
Affiliation:
Fordham University
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In 2 Corinthians 8, Paul appeals to the principle of “equality” (ἰσότης) in order to encourage the Corinthians to contribute to the collection for the poor in Jerusalem. What is this “equality” of which Paul speaks and to which he exhorts his readers? Is it a principle of fairness, an equitable balance between the “haves” and the “have-nots” that might find expression in spirited generosity and charitable initiatives? Or is it “a regulative principle of mutual assistance,” which sets in motion a process of equalization between those who have surplus and those who have need? Or does Paul intend something more radical, more democratic? Is Paul asserting that all believers in Christ Jesus are “equal” and on this basis (ἐξ ἰσότητος) should engage in redistributive action, “so that there may be equality” (ὅπως γένηται ἰσότης)?

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Articles
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Harvard Theological Review , Volume 110 , Issue 4 , October 2017 , pp. 541 - 562
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Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 2017 

I

In 2 Corinthians 8, Paul appeals to the principle of “equality” (ἰσότης) in order to encourage the Corinthians to contribute to the collection for the poor in Jerusalem.Footnote 1 What is this “equality” of which Paul speaks and to which he exhorts his readers? Is it a principle of fairness,Footnote 2 an equitable balance between the “haves” and the “have-nots” that might find expression in spirited generosity and charitable initiatives?Footnote 3 Or is it “a regulative principle of mutual assistance,”Footnote 4 which sets in motion a process of equalization between those who have surplus and those who have need?Footnote 5 Or does Paul intend something more radical, more democratic? Is Paul asserting that all believers in Christ Jesus are “equal” and on this basis (ἐξ ἰσότητος) should engage in redistributive action, “so that there may be equality” (ὅπως γένηται ἰσότης)?

Progress toward an understanding of Paul's notion of “equality” begins with the discovery of the provenance of the concept. On this point there is little disagreement. It has long been recognized by Pauline scholars that the source of Paul's idea of “equality” is not the Septuagint, where the term ἰσότης appears only twice (Job 36:29; Zech 4:7) and without a Hebrew equivalent,Footnote 6 but the Greek world,Footnote 7 where thinking about “equality” developed in a variety of contexts (mathematics, music, law, cosmology) but especially in politics.Footnote 8

As a political ideal, “equality” (τὸ ἴσον, ἰσονοµία, ἰσότης) had its origin in fifth-century BCE Athens, where, alongside “freedom” (ἐλευθερία), it was the fundamental principle of Greek democracy.Footnote 9 Yet, it is surprisingly difficult to say precisely in what “equality” consisted for the supporters of democracy because of two reasons. First, there survive no “positive” explanations of what the Greek democrats meant by the concept.Footnote 10 All of the political philosophers whose works we possess were critics of popular rule in various degrees.Footnote 11 The democratic notion of “equality” can only be tentatively reconstructed from scattered allusions and most of these in the criticisms of opponents.Footnote 12 Second, the term “equality” was appropriated by the oligarchs, once the democratic revolutions of the fifth century had made “equality” “the loveliest name of all,” as Herodotus puts it,Footnote 13 and invested with new meaning.Footnote 14 The intellectual supporters of oligarchy argued that “true” equality must be proportional in recognition of the differences in the worth of individuals.Footnote 15 Thus, the history of “equality” is a long and contested one. Any attempt to understand what Paul meant by “equality” must come to grips with this history.

The discourse of “equality” revived in the first century CE, for reasons that we must seek to comprehend. A treatise “On Equality” (περὶ ἰσότητος) makes up a substantial portion of Philo's writing, “Who is the Heir of Divine Things.”Footnote 16 Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom praise “equality” as the gift of the gods and the highest civic virtue.Footnote 17 A fragmentary essay on government, wrongly attributed to Plutarch, criticizes “equality” as a democratic excess.Footnote 18 It is hardly surprising that elite authors such as these conceived of “equality” as proportional, assigning shares to each individual “according to deserts.” But there are signs of ferment and re-thinking. A handful of philosophers whose fragments are preserved by Stobaeus—Ps.-Archytas, Ps.-Ecphantus, Diotogenes, and Sthenidas—discuss “equality” in contexts that are critical of oligarchy.Footnote 19 Where does Paul's appeal to the principle of “equality” belong in the first-century revival of this idea?

II

Before we undertake a detailed analysis of Paul and his contemporaries on the subject of “equality,” we may venture a suggestion about the underlying, material cause of the revival of the discourse of “equality” in the first century CE—namely, the growth of inequality between the classes. Among Roman economic historians, there is an emerging consensus that the degree of inequality grew in the early Empire,Footnote 20 despite an increase in aggregate production,Footnote 21 according to a principle known to economists as “the declining marginal product of labor.”Footnote 22 That is, an increase in population, such as the Roman Empire experienced in this period, resulted in a scarcity of land and resources relative to labor:Footnote 23 the landowning elite enjoyed an increase in wealth from higher rents, while rural tenants and urban wage-laborers became progressively poorer.Footnote 24 Moreover, landowners in the provinces “were able to benefit from the privileges offered by empire and introduce a more intensive exploitation of land and people to sustain lifestyles with conspicuous consumption in the imperial mode.”Footnote 25 The result was an enormous gap between the rich and the poor.Footnote 26 Walter Scheidel estimates that a large percentage of all assets were concentrated in the top 3 to 5 percent of the population,Footnote 27 while a segment somewhere between 6 and 12 percent enjoyed “middling” incomes.Footnote 28 Scheidel concludes that “the concentration of resources at the top led to deprivation and impoverishment of the general population.”Footnote 29

Symptomatic of the increase in inequality were the numerous and widespread outbreaks of political disturbances (στάσεις) attested for the cities of Greece and Asia Minor in the first and second centuries—from Ephesus to Sardis to Smyrna, Rhodes, Tarsus, Nicaea, Prusa, and Sparta,Footnote 30 suggesting to scholars such as Arjan Zuiderhoek “that we are dealing with a pattern rather than a string of isolated events.”Footnote 31 For instance, eight of the letters of Apollonius of Tyana to the residents of Sardis deal with the problem of civil strife—“an endless war,” as Apollonius laments, fought by opposed groups and classes.Footnote 32 Several of the discourses urging civic concord (ὁµόνοια) by Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides have as their occasion a conflict between the council (βουλή), which represented the interests of the upper class, and the assembly (ἐκκλησία) of the lower class citizens, the δ µος.Footnote 33 In some cases, class conflict is explicitly mentioned: for example, in Dio Chrysostom's address to the Tarsians, he appeals on behalf of the impoverished “linen-workers,” who had been excluded from the city's assemblies, that they should be enrolled as citizens.Footnote 34

III

We do not know the occasion of Philo's writing “Who is the Heir of Divine Things,” but the general circumstances of life for Jews and Greeks in Alexandria in the first century are reasonably well known.Footnote 35 In short, the evidence does not suggest that Jews enjoyed equality of rights as citizens of the Greek polis.Footnote 36 In his political tract “On the Embassy to Gaius,” Philo records the declaration of Flaccus, the governor of Egypt: that the Jews of Alexandria were “foreigners and aliens” in a city where they had resided for hundreds of years.Footnote 37 Claudius's letter to the Alexandrians advises that the Jews should “enjoy what is their own in a city which is not their own.”Footnote 38 Within the Jewish community itself, there were conspicuous social and economic disparities, such as that between the opulent Alexander the Alabarch, brother of Philo, who gilded the gates of the Jerusalem temple, and the indigent lunatic Carabas, who was hounded into the gymnasium by a Greek mob and cruelly mocked.Footnote 39

In the treatise περὶ ἰσότητος that makes up a substantial portion of “Who is the Heir of Divine Things,”Footnote 40 Philo asserts that God alone is able to produce equality. Commenting on Gen 15:10 (“He divided them in the middle”), Philo embarks upon a lengthy discussion of the subject of “equal portions.” Philo explains: “No man can divide anything into equal sections with exactitude. . .. No created thing is found to produce equality (ἰσότητος δὲ οὐδὲν γενητὸν αἴτιον), if tested by the unprejudiced standard of truth.”Footnote 41 Rather, “God alone is exact in judgment and alone is able to divide things in such a way that no section is greater or less than another by even the smallest difference, and each portion can partake of the upmost and extreme equality (τ ς δ᾿ ἀνωτάτω καὶ ἄκρας ἰσότητος μεταλαχε ν ἰσχ σαι).”Footnote 42

Philo shows himself to be fully conversant with the philosophers’ theory of two kinds of equality and comes down firmly on the side of geometric proportion: “The idea of equality is a necessary one and that which is proportional, according to which the few are regarded as equal to the many” (ἀναγκαία δέ ἐστιν ἰσότητος ἰδέα καὶ ἡ διὰ ἀναλογίας, καθ᾿ ἣν τὰ ὀλίγα το ς πολλο ς ἴσα νενόμισται).Footnote 43 Moreover, Philo affirms that proportional equality is the law of nature: “In respect to proportional equality, all things are equal, even the small things and the great things in the whole world. For those who have most carefully examined the facts of nature say that the four elements are proportionately equal and that the whole world received and retains its frame through being compounded according to proportion, which assigned an equal measure to each of its parts.”Footnote 44

In illustration of God's equitable administration of the cosmos, Philo references the miraculous provision of “manna” in the wilderness and even cites the text of Exod 16:18, the very passage adduced by Paul as a paradigm of “equality” in 2 Cor 8:15: “Further, the heavenly food of the soul, which is wisdom, which Moses calls ‘manna,’ the divine word distributes in equal portions to all who will use it, taking care above all things to maintain equality (πεφροντικὼς διαφερόντως ἰσότητος). And Moses bears witness to this when he says, ‘The one who had much did not have too much, and the one who had little did not have too little,’ since they all used the marvelous and highly-prized standard of proportion (ἡνίκα τ τ ς ἀναλογίας ἐχρήσαντο θαυμαστ καὶ περιμαχήτῳ μέτρῳ).”Footnote 45

Philo's treatment of “equality” obviously focuses upon the ordering work of God the creator, with only a passing reference to the employment of proportionate equality by cities in times of crisis.Footnote 46 In the context of first-century Alexandria, where tensions between Jews and Greeks reached a flash-point during the Caligula crisis,Footnote 47 Philo's presentation of the God of Israel as the creator of equality serves an apologetic purpose. In keeping with this purpose, Philo insists that Moses, the lawgiver of the Jews, was the foremost exponent of equality: “And if there is anyone who has been a eulogist of equality, that man is Moses (ἰσότητος δὲ εἰ καί τις ἄλλος ἐπαινέτης γέγονε Μωυσ ς), first by always and everywhere singing the praises of justice, of which equality is the special property. . . and then by censuring injustice, the maker of inequality in its most hateful form. Inequality is the mother of twin wars, foreign and civil, just as its opposite, equality, is the mother of peace.”Footnote 48 But if Philo's treatment of “equality” serves primarily as an apology for Judaism, his thought nevertheless has much in common with upper class Greek writers of the period, who likewise emphasize the will of God and the lesson of nature in praising proportional equality, as we shall see.

In Plutarch's Table-Talk, a group of symposiasts endorse the idea that God is the architect of geometrical equality. The conversation begins with a reference to Plato: “Diogenianus said: ‘Since our discourse is about the gods, shall we, especially on his own birthday, admit Plato to the conference and enquire upon what account he says (supposing it to be his sentence) that God always plays the geometer (ἀεὶ γεωμετρε ν τὸν θεόν).’”Footnote 49 Following speculation about what Plato may have meant by the saying, Florus argues that oligarchy and monarchy are most in accordance with the will of God: “For Lycurgus, I suppose you know, banished out of Sparta the arithmetical proportion, as being democratic and suited to the mob (τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν, ὡς δημοκρατικὴν καὶ ὀχλικὴν ο σαν) and introduced the geometrical proportion as suitable to moderate oligarchy and lawful monarchy (ἐπεισήγαγε δὲ τὴν γεωμετρικὴν, ὀλιγαρχίᾳ σώφρονι καὶ βασιλείᾳ νομίμῃ πρέπουσαν); for the former gives an equal share (τὸ ἴσον) by number (ἀριθμ ), but the latter by proportion according to worth (λόγῳ τὸ κατʼ ἀξίαν). It does not mix everything together, but in it there is a clear separation of the deserving and the undeserving, not by lot or weight, but according to virtue. The same proportion, God introduces in affairs, which is called justice and retribution (ταύτην ὁ θεὸς ἐπάγει τὴν ἀναλογίαν το ς πράγμασι δίκην καὶ νέμεσιν προσαγορευομένην), and which teaches us to account that which is just equal, but not that which is equal just (διδάσκουσαν ἡμ ς τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ ἴσον δε ν ποιε σθαι δίκαιον). For that equality which the many pursue, being the greatest of all injustices, God takes away, as much as possible, and maintains that proportion which respects every man's worth, geometrically defining it according to reason and law (ἣν γάρ οἱ πολλοὶ διώκουσιν ἰσότητα, πασ ν ἀδικι ν ο σαν μεγίστην, ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρ ν, ὡς ἀνυστὸν ἐστι, τὸ κατ᾿ ἀξίαν διαφυλάττει, γεωμετρικ ς τ κατὰ λόγον καὶ κατὰ νόμον ὀριζόμενος).”Footnote 50

Upon the conclusion of the speech of Florus, Plutarch reports: “This exposition we applauded!”Footnote 51 Evidently Plutarch himself joined in the applause. As one of the richest and most influential men in Greece,Footnote 52 Plutarch may well have endorsed the oligarchic version of “equality.” In his political writings, Plutarch expresses admiration for the old Spartan aristocracy and disapproval of the young men of his own day who “court the mob, deliver harangues, and arouse factions.”Footnote 53 But there is an extremity to the formulation of the oligarchic principle in the Table-Talk, despite the convivial occasion, that surpasses anything in earlier Greek literature. Plato deplores the disorder of democratic society but nowhere describes the equality that the majority pursue as “the greatest of all injustices,” as Plutarch does.Footnote 54 Plato praises proportional equality as “the judgment of Zeus” but does not contend, as Plutarch does, that God destroys democratic equality as far as possible.Footnote 55 The dictum “the just is equal but not the equal just” is an ideological double bind that makes it impossible for the common man, without some special ἀξία, to achieve equality. To account for this extreme formulation, I think we must posit the presence in Plutarch's thought of the values and attitudes of his Roman masters.Footnote 56 As Plutarch reminded a young friend who planned to enter public life, “You are a subject in a state controlled by proconsuls. . .. You see the boots of Roman soldiers just above your head.”Footnote 57

Whatever Plutarch's own view of equality may have been, his Life of Solon provides access to traditions in which the meaning of “equality” continued to be debated. In his account of how Solon intervened in a perilous situation for Athens caused by an enormous disparity between the rich and the poor,Footnote 58 Plutarch reports a statement that Solon made prior to his election as archon, to the effect that “equality does not create war” (τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιε ).Footnote 59 Plutarch states that this utterance “pleased both those with property and those without; for the former expected to have equality based upon worth and excellence (ἀξία καὶ ἀρετή), the latter equality based upon measure and count (μέτρον καὶ ἀριθμός).”Footnote 60 Plutarch's description of the contrasting expectations awakened by Solon's statement is clearly a later interpretation, since the theory of proportional equality was an invention of the philosophers of the fourth century BCE.Footnote 61 Closer to the political views of Solon's own day is an observation by Phanias of Lesbos, a commentator on Aristotle, who wrote that “Solon played a trick upon both parties in order to save the city, and secretly promised to the poor the distribution of land, which they desired, and to the rich, validation of their securities.”Footnote 62

Elsewhere, Plutarch preserves a rather different interpretation of Solon's remark: “When Solon, speaking of the principles of government, said that ‘equality does not create sedition’ (ἰσότης στάσιν οὐ ποιε ), this was thought (ἔδοξεν) to be too much in favor of the rabble (λίαν ὀχλικός), in introducing arithmetical and democratic proportion instead of the excellent geometric proportion (ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ δημοκρατικὴν ἐπεισάγων ἀναλογίαν ἀντὶ τ ς καλ ς γεωμετρικ ς).”Footnote 63 Unfortunately, Plutarch does not name the source of this tradition, but it is a noteworthy departure from the portrait of Solon as a shrewd politician in the Life and even further removed from Isocrates's dream of the Solonian constitution as an aristocracy.Footnote 64 Whoever Plutarch is quoting here blames Solon for establishing a radical democracy that appealed to the mob.

A similarly critical view of democratic equality is expressed in a fragmentary address on government that somehow found its way into the Plutarchean corpus.Footnote 65 The speaker invites his audience to consider what is the best form of government—monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy. The sharpest criticism is reserved for “democracy which breeds anarchy and equality which breeds excess” (δημοκρατία δ᾿ ἀναρχίαν, ἰσότης δ᾿ ἀμετρίαν).Footnote 66 The speaker concludes: “If a man were given a choice among governments, he would follow Plato's advice and choose none other than monarchy, the only one which is able to sustain the highest note of virtue.”Footnote 67 The democratic politician, by contrast, is controlled by the mob which he pretends to lead—a flame that threatens to burn him up.Footnote 68

In his discourse “On Covetousness,” Dio Chrysostom praises “equality” (ἰσότης) as the life-sustaining counterpoise to “greed” or destructive “over-reaching” (πλεονεξία). Dio quotes rather fully the speech of Jocasta in Euripides's Phoenician Women, in which Ἰσότης is represented as a personified deity who “binds friends to friends, cities to cities, allies to allies.”Footnote 69 “Nature gave men the law of equal rights,” Jocasta continues, as a protection against greed, “which sets the lesser against the greater and arouses hate.”Footnote 70 Dio comments upon this passage: “thus the law requires men to honor equality (τὸ ἴσον), and this establishes a common bond of friendship and peace for all toward one another.”Footnote 71 Dio then offers a rather free paraphrase of the rest of Jocasta's speech: “The poet then says that there is no over-reaching among the divine beings; and on account of this they remain indestructible and ageless, each single one keeping its own proper position night and day through all the seasons; for if they were not so ordered, none of them would be able to survive.”Footnote 72 Dio, the author of several discourses on civic concord, conceives of “equality” as a kind of homeostasis that embraces the entire cosmos, human and divine. If the gods themselves do not change their positions, then artisans and shopkeepers should be content with their situations with the anonymity of work and reproduction. Dio implies that the claim of “equality” by the common people would be a destructive over-reach, an instance of political covetousness.

A group of neo-Pythagorean philosophers (Ps.-Ecphantus, Diotogenes and Sthenidas), who may be plausibly dated to the first century CE,Footnote 73 attribute the creation of equality to the ideal king who in his care for the social order is like God.Footnote 74 In a tractate “On Kingship” attributed to Ecphantus, the ideal king embodies the virtues (justice, liberality, self-restraint, wisdom) that make possible the distribution of equality to all: “In so far as he [the king] has a sacred and divine mentality, he will cause all good things, but nothing that is evil. And he will clearly be just (δίκαιος), one who is liberal (κοινωνικός) to all; for liberality (κοινωνία) consists in equality (ἰσότης), and while in the distribution of equality (ἀποδιανομὴ ἰσότητος) justice plays the most important part, yet liberality also has its share, for it is not possible to be unjust, while giving a share of equality (οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν ἄδικον μὲν μεν, μεταδιδόμεν δὲ ἰσότητος), or to give a share of equality, while not being liberal (ἢ μεταδιδόμεν μὲν ἰσότητος, μὴ κοινωνικὸν δὲ μεν).”Footnote 75 It need hardly be said that the ascription of such attributes and capacities to an ideal king is characteristic of an era of autocracy. But the crystalized instruction that Ps.-Ecphantus offers the king is not mere sycophancy.Footnote 76 The author wishes to persuade the sovereign that a truly virtuous ruler will be “liberal” (κοινωνικός), as well as “just” (δίκαιος). It is “equality” (ἰσότης) that binds justice and liberality together, a conflation elegantly conveyed by the syntax of the argument. Equality is to be achieved through “distribution” (ἀποδιανομή), a “giving of shares” (µεταδίδωµι). What this involves is not specified. Did the author intend something other than the benevolence of the emperor as supreme patron? In any case, the latter term, µεταδίδωµι, has a history of usage in political philosophy and rhetoric, where it denoted the equal share of civic rights given to each citizenFootnote 77 and even the share in the constitution given to the multitude.Footnote 78

The most intriguing discussion of equality among this group of philosophers is that preserved in a fragmentary text that Stobaeus attributes to Archytas, but whose real author is unknown.Footnote 79 The writer offers a surprising revision of the old theory of proportional equality. Despite certain mathematical obscurities, the author's political views are clear, and the passage is worth quoting in full:

Wherefore some make justice aristocratic, some democratic, and some oligarchic. Aristocratic justice is according to the sub-contrary mean; for this proportion distributes greater ratios to greater and less to less. Democratic justice is according to geometric proportion; for in this the ratios of greater and smaller amounts are equal (ἴσοι). Oligarchic and tyrannic justice is according to the arithmetic proportion; for this is the opposite of the sub-contrary, since it distributes greater ratios to less and less to greater. These, then, are the forms (ἰδέαι) of the distributions, but the actualizations are seen in constitutions and households: for rewards and punishments and offices are either distributed equally (ἐξ ἴσω) to greater and less, or unequally (ἐξ ἀνίσω) through superiority in virtue or wealth or power. That which distributes equally is democratic (τὸ μὲν ν ἐξ ἴσω δημοκρατικόν), but that which distributes unequally is aristocratic or oligarchic (τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνίσω ἀριστοκρατικὸν ἤ ὀλιγαρχικόν).Footnote 80

In this new interpretation of the old theory, everything has been turned upside down. The “excellent” geometric proportion, by which Plato and others had justified a graded society of increasing privilege, is now assigned to the democrats, while the simple arithmetic proportion, by which the equality of shopkeepers and artisans was trivialized, is now the property of the oligarchs. But this heterodox theory is more than a mere change of labels. By calling democracy the geometric proportion, Ps.-Archytas implies that all persons of whatever status should have a share of power. By designating oligarchy the arithmetic proportion, Ps.-Archytas asserts that the wealthy few are actually the men of least value. Some interpreters of this fragment have suggested that the author believed that aristocracy is the most desirable form of government, because it is mentioned first and because it is characterized by a “harmonic” (sub-contrary) proportion that distributes the most to the best.Footnote 81 But in the application of the theory to “constitutions and households,” only the democratic idea is said to “distribute equally”; aristocracy and oligarchy distribute unequally. In any case, oligarchy comes last: worst of all is the rule of the few.

In what context might such an ideological critique of oligarchy have emerged? To find this, we must look for evidence of a response to the growth of inequality—that is, resistance to the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few during the first two centuries.Footnote 82 We may posit that at the bottom of the conflicts between the assembly (δ μος) and the council (βουλή), so frequently attested for the cities of the early Empire, lay an attempt by ordinary citizens to retain or regain some measure of control over the affairs of their communities.Footnote 83 When oligarchic excesses and abuses of power could no longer be tolerated, social tensions erupted in violence. For example, at Aspendus in Pamphylia, a riot was provoked by an artificially induced food shortage, as related in the Life of Apollonius: “the rich men had shut up all the grain and were holding it for export from the country.”Footnote 84 The anger of the crowd reached such a pitch that Apollonius was barely able to restrain the mob from burning a local magistrate alive and looting the estates of the rich.Footnote 85 Similarly, at Prusa, during a food shortage, people suspected speculative hoarding; public fury mounted to such a height that a mob carrying stones and firebrands advanced upon the house of Dio and another man and were only turned back by fear of retaliation from the well-armed slaves of the rich.Footnote 86

IV

Inequality is the context of Paul's appeal to the Corinthians for partnership in the collection. Paul speaks explicitly of disparity—of the “abundance” (περίσσευμα) of the Corinthians and the “lack” (ὑστέρημα) of the saints in Jerusalem (2 Cor 8:14). That the surplus and the deficiency are material in nature is clear, not only from the context of Paul's remarks in 2 Corinthians 8Footnote 87 but also from a later summary reflection upon the outcome of the collection in Romans 15:27, where Paul refers to the “material things” (σαρκικοί) in which the Achaians have been of service to the Jerusalem saints.Footnote 88 I see no reason to believe that Paul's account of the Corinthians’ abundance is rhetorical exaggeration. Through all stages of the Corinthian correspondence, Paul anticipates the crucial role that the Corinthians will play in the success of the collection on account of their greater wealth. At the earliest mention of the collection project in 1 Cor 16:1–4, Paul adds to the instructions for accumulating monies a promissory incentive: “if [the collection] is sufficiently large” (ἐὰν δὲ ἄξιον ), he himself will convey it to Jerusalem.Footnote 89 In 2 Cor 8:20, Paul seeks to reassure the Corinthians about the security of “the large sum of money” (ἁδρότης) that they are entrusting to his administration.Footnote 90

To be sure, not all of the Corinthians enjoyed an abundance of material things. The majority of Christ believers at Corint h were poor, perhaps very poor. According to Paul, only a few were educated, wealthy, and well-born; the rest were “foolish,” “weak,” and “lowborn,” “despised,” “non-entities” (1 Cor 1:26–28).Footnote 91 But a few believers, such as Crispus, the former synagogue president (Acts 18:8),Footnote 92 and Gaius, “the host of the whole ἐκκλησία” (Rom 16:23),Footnote 93 were persons of more than modest surplus resources. In fact, the evidence suggests that inequality was greater in the ἐκκλησία at Corinth than in other Pauline assemblies.Footnote 94 When the believers at Corinth gathered to eat their communal meal, the “Lord's Supper,” Paul says that some were “hungry,” while others were “satiated” (1 Cor 11:21). Paul was outraged at the inequity in the distribution of food and drink, which resulted in the “humiliation” of “the have nots” (οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες) (1 Cor 11:22).Footnote 95 Paul's description of the hunger of “the have nots” suggests that some in the community were living below the subsistence level;Footnote 96 for these poor members of the Corinthian body, the communal meal was evidently a vital source of nourishment. Indeed, Paul states that “many have become weak and sick, and some have even died,” on account of the failure of the Corinthians to discern the needs of the body of Christ (1 Cor 11:29–30).

Some exegetical observations must precede a comparison of Paul's concept of “equality” in 2 Cor 8 with the ideas of the philosophers examined above. The challenge of the text in which Paul speaks of “equality” is its telegraphic style, well captured by the preliminary observation of Hans Windisch on 2 Cor 8:13–14: “Kurz, prägnant und anakoluth ist der Gedanke gefasst.”Footnote 97 Consequently, commentators routinely suggest a number of terms that must be mentally supplied to fill out what is missing in the expression of Paul's thought: Windisch himself adds the finite verb γένοιτο or γένηται to the end of verse 13;Footnote 98 Victor Furnish supplies the participle συνλέξας to complete the Pauline version of the Exodus citation in verse 15;Footnote 99 while Hans Lietzmann prefers the participle ἔχων.Footnote 100

More problematic than the anacolutha is the syntax of verse 13. Specifically, how is the crucial, final phrase of verse 13, ἀλλ᾿ ἐξ ἰσότητος, to be construed? Most translators and interpreters attempt to circumvent the obstacle by attaching ἀλλ᾿ ἐξ ἰσότητος to verse 14.Footnote 101 But, as Windisch observes, this expedient destroys the rhythm of the sentence and leaves verse 13 truncated.Footnote 102 Nor does verse 14 gain clarity by the addition of the phrase; on the contrary, verse 14 becomes unwieldy and muddled, with the key term ἰσότης now appearing twice, clumsily, in the same sentence.Footnote 103 Consequently, recent commentators construe ἀλλ᾿ ἐξ ἰσότητος with the two preceding phrases of verse 13, supplying the verb γένηται to complete the sentence.Footnote 104

The struggle of interpreters with the syntax of the passage has the virtue of making clear that the source of the conundrum lies deeper—namely, at the level of Paul's thought. What is the point of the twofold usage of the word ἰσότης—first in the prepositional phrase ἐξ ἰσότητος and then in the purpose clause ὅπως γένηται ἰσότης? Specifically, what is the force of the preposition ἐκ (ἐξ), “out of,” “on the basis of”? No one has puzzled more deeply over the phrase ἐξ ἰσότητος here than Dieter Georgi: “After the preceding verses, the reader expects a statement concerning the purpose and goal of the giving, not the ground on which it is to be performed.”Footnote 105 Georgi observes that this surprising turn in Paul's argument is usually ignored by commentators, and the exegetical difficulty circumvented, by avoiding the translation of ἐκ as “out of.”Footnote 106 So, for instance, Lietzmann translates: “nach Maßgabe von Gleichheit,”Footnote 107 Windisch renders: “nach dem Maßstab von Gleichheit,”Footnote 108 and Furnish paraphrases: “it is a matter of equality.”Footnote 109 But Georgi insists that this moment in Paul's thought cannot be evaded, and that the full force of the preposition ἐκ must be confronted: “Instead of entering upon the expected argument over the ‘measure’ and the ‘purpose’ of the collection, Paul refers back to its ground.”Footnote 110 “Ἰσότης,” Georgi observes, “denoted primarily the legal equality of all citizens, realized in the democratic order of Greek cities.”Footnote 111 Georgi then follows the logic of Paul's unexpected reference to the ground of equality to its conclusion: “the ideological foundation of the collection would then be legal and political equality. In other words, it must spring from ἰσότης in the true Greek sense.”Footnote 112

Having reached this point, Georgi draws back. He fears that such a straightforwardly political interpretation would compromise the dialectical character of Paul's theology. “It seems hardly plausible,” Georgi reflects, “that Paul meant to recommend some kind of legal equity as the ground and premise for the collection; this kind of mere formalism would hardly correspond to Paul's usual argument.”Footnote 113 In order to preserve the theological dimension of Paul's thought, Georgi proposes that Paul, like Philo, saw ἰσότης as a divine force and that “Paul's expression ἐξ ἰσότητος is practically interchangeable with ‘ἐκ θεο ’ or ‘ἐκ χάριτος.’”Footnote 114 In other words, by appealing to “equality,” Paul wished to refer to the divine source of giving and receiving.Footnote 115 Georgi summarizes: “The main point Paul clearly wishes to make is that the constant and all-encompassing movement of grace, which is and makes both righteous and equal, dwells permanently in its divine origin.”Footnote 116

Georgi's conclusion about the meaning of the phrase ἐξ ἰσότητος in 2 Cor 8:13 is implausible and unconvincing, as several subsequent interpreters have judged.Footnote 117 C. K. Barrett reminds us of the obvious: the context of Paul's reference to “equality” is a concrete, financial collection, not mystical speculation on the divine order of the cosmos, as in Philo.Footnote 118 Moreover, the premise upon which Georgi's argument turns—that there is a contradiction between the political and the theological, between the equality that is predicated of persons and the equality that resides in God—is flawed and unnecessary. Worst of all, the flight of “equality” to the heavenly realm in Georgi's conclusion jettisons his original insight into the most striking feature of Paul's argument in 2 Cor 8:13–14: namely, the double occurrence of the word ἰσότης, first in a prepositional phrase that refers to the ground of the collection and then in a purpose clause that designates the goal.Footnote 119 This twofold usage of the term ἰσότης describes a mundane motion from source to outcome, from presupposition to conclusion.

Let us dwell for a moment with Georgi's original insight and draw out the implications. Georgi is rightly critical of the tendency of interpreters to avoid a literal translation of the preposition ἐκ as “out of” or “on the basis of.” The effect of the interpreters’ circumlocutions is to elide Paul's reference to equality as the basis or ground of the collection and to substitute a reference to equality as a measure or norm. But attention to the context of Paul's initial reference to ἰσότης permits us to make an additional inference. In the first two clauses of verse 13, Paul speaks of “others” (ἄλλοι)—that is, the Jerusalem saints—for whom the collection will be a “relief” and of “you” (ὑμε ς)—that is, the Corinthian believers—for whom the collection may represent a “hardship.” That the reference to “equality” as the ground of the collection is introduced in this way implies that the “equality” of which Paul speaks is an equality between persons. As we have seen, Georgi glimpses this possibility and then recoils. On what basis Paul posits the equality of Christ believers remains to be determined, but we may regard the inference as established. We shall return to this inference when we complete our comparison of Paul with other first-century thinkers of “equality.”

A second, less complicated exegetical observation may be made about Paul's use of ἰσότης in verse 14 to designate the goal of the collection: “At the present time, your abundance [should be] for their lack, in order that their abundance may also be for your lack, so that there may be equality.” The sentence begins without a connecting particle and continues in the same epigrammatic style as verse 13, so that, again, interpreters are obliged to supply what is missing in the expression of Paul's thought.Footnote 120 Commentators puzzle over the sense in which Paul speaks of the “abundance” of the Jerusalem saints supplying the “lack” of the Corinthian believers in the second clause of the verse. Did Paul really envision a future situation in which the material want of the Corinthians would be alleviated by a contribution from the church in Jerusalem?Footnote 121 Or does Paul use these terms metaphorically, anticipating the argument he will later make in Rom 15:27 about the “spiritual blessings” that the Jerusalem saints have bestowed upon Gentile believers who, in turn, assist them with “material things”?Footnote 122 Or is verse 14 simply a formal statement of the principle of reciprocity, without a detailed plan for what its operation might entail in the future?Footnote 123 However one decides in this matter, it is clear that in both parts of the sentence Paul formulates an antithesis that can only be resolved through an equitable distribution of resources.Footnote 124 In the relationship that Paul seeks to establish between Christ believers of different social classes, “equality” is the goal of redistributive action.

A final exegetical observation relates to the Pauline form of the citation of Exod 16:18 in verse 15. Commentators generally assert that Paul quotes the Greek version of Exod 16:18 “almost verbatim.”Footnote 125 But closer attention to the subtle changes that Paul makes in the Septuagint text reveals that Paul's interest in this text is not entirely consistent with the point of the biblical story.Footnote 126 The Septuagint text reads: “οὐκ ἐπλεόνασεν ὁ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ὁ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐκ ἠλαττόνησεν.”Footnote 127 Paul reverses the order of the subject and verb in the first clause and changes τὸ ἔλαττον to τὸ ὀλίγον in the second clause: “ὁ τὸ πολὺ οὐκ ἐπλεόνασεν, καὶ ὁ τὸ ὀλίγον οὐκ ἠλαττόνησεν.”Footnote 128 The effect of these changes is to destroy the chiastic structure of the Septuagint text, a structure that linguistically mirrors the miracle of divine equalization, and to emphasize the inequality of the parties, by the absolute contrast between “the one who has much” and “the one who has little.” Paul's linear sentence serves to advocate equality between persons of different resources through redistributive action. The novelty of Paul's conception of the way in which the divine objective is realized in human action becomes clear through comparison with Philo, who also cites Exod 16:18 in his treatise on equality. Philo cites the Exodus passage as an example of the perfectly equitable distribution accomplished by the divine λόγος.Footnote 129 Paul, by contrast, does not quote the verse as an illustration of providential distribution but rather as a paradigm of the equality that human beings can achieve through redistributive action.Footnote 130

We may now seek to ascertain Paul's place among the first-century thinkers of “equality.” First, we note the total absence in Paul of the idea of proportional equality.Footnote 131 This is a surprising development, since, as we have seen, the theory of proportional equality, in some form or other, dominates the thought of all first-century writers who venture to discuss equality, even those who, like Ps.-Archytas, are critical of oligarchy. It is difficult to imagine that the absence of the idea of proportional equality in Paul is accidental. Paul lived and worked in urban contexts, in big cities like Ephesus, through which diverse intellectual currents coursed.Footnote 132 Moreover, the educational level on display in Paul's letters is relatively high.Footnote 133 That the idea of proportional equality had found its way into Hellenistic Jewish circles and was thought not to be incompatible with the wisdom of Scripture, is demonstrated by Philo's essay “Who is the Heir of Divine Things.” I conclude that the absence of the idea of proportional equality in Paul is intentional: that is, Paul did not seek to conceptualize the relationship between Christ believers in terms of proportion—whether geometric, arithmetic, or harmonic.

Second, Paul's notion of “equality” is significantly more “democratic” than the concepts of his contemporaries. This is an inference from our exegesis of the phrase ἐξ ἰσότητος in 2 Cor 8:13: accordingly, the collection for the poor, which involves a redistribution of resources, is justified by Paul on the ground of the equality of all Christ believers. To be sure, Paul is fully aware of the existing inequalities between Christ believers: the saints in Jerusalem suffer “lack,” while the believers in Corinth enjoy “abundance.” Nevertheless, Paul posits the “equality” of Christ believers as the ground of the collection. This assertion of “equality” as a presupposition within a society of unequals is the essence of the democratic revolution in its original form. As the philosopher Jacques Rancière has recently observed about the emergence of democracy in fifth-century BCE Athens: “It is the intrication of equality within inequality that the democratic scandal makes manifest.”Footnote 134 Somehow this old democratic idea has re-emerged in Paul.

But how has the democratic idea re-emerged and on what basis? The basis of democratic equality in fifth-century Athens was autochthony: simply by being born in Athens, once enslavement for debt had been abolished, any free man born of Athenian parents, any artisan or shopkeeper whatsoever, was counted as “equal” before the law and in politics.Footnote 135 But for Paul, the basis of the equality of believers in Christ was evidently theological or, more precisely, christological. Just before Paul appeals to the principle of “equality,” he reminds the Corinthians: “You know the generous act of our Lord Jesus Christ, that on account of you, he became poor (ἐπτώχευσεν), although he was rich, so that by his poverty (πτωχεία) you might become rich” (2 Cor 8:9).Footnote 136 From members of early Christ groups, Paul inherited a belief in a deity who voluntarily impoverished himself, who abandoned plentitude (cf. Phil 2:6–8),Footnote 137 and by his self-emptying enriched all who believe, opening up a space of human equality.

Finally, Paul extends the idea of equality into the socio-economic sphere, making “equality” the goal of relations between those who enjoy “abundance” and those who suffer “lack.” This extension of equality into the economic sphere is the most surprising aspect of Paul's application of the concept. Mogens Hansen summarizes the consensus opinion of ancient historians: “The concept of equality was purely political and did not spread to the social and economic sphere of society.”Footnote 138 To be sure, a few ancient orators lamented the threat that class differences posed to the principle of equality before the law.Footnote 139 Aristotle mentions one thinker, Phaleas of Chalcedon, who proposed “the equalization of possessions,” observing that this idea was “unique” to Phaleas.Footnote 140 But, in general, there was little precedent in the Greco-Roman world for Paul's attempt to establish a relationship between persons of different social classes, the goal of which was to achieve equality. The parallels to Paul's extension of the idea adduced by Windisch and other commentators are not relevant.Footnote 141 Thus, according to Xenophon, the great king Cyrus “accepted that of which givers had abundance, and gave in return that of which he saw that they were in need.”Footnote 142 Plutarch rehearses the legend that the Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus established a society in which “there was neither greed nor want, but equality in well-being.”Footnote 143 But there is no genuine point of comparison between the efforts of a king or a lawgiver to equalize the distribution of resources and Paul's attempt to create a structure for direct exchange between persons of different social classes.

If there is virtually no precedent in the Greco-Roman world for Paul's extension of the principle of “equality” into the economic sphere, then we must look to the inner logic of Paul's theology for the source of this development—to Paul's belief in a God who had voluntarily impoverished himself (2 Cor 8:9). In this respect, the contrast between Paul and the other first-century thinkers of “equality” seems absolute. Philo's God is able to produce equality by exact divisions because of his complete justice and changeless perfection.Footnote 144 Plutarch's divine geometer maintains the proportion that respects every man's worth because his divine reason permits no change in the law.Footnote 145 Dio Chrysostom's divine beings preserve cosmic equilibrium because they are indestructible and immutable.Footnote 146

Paul's extension of the principle of “equality” into the sphere of economic relations between Christ believers builds upon and develops egalitarian and democratic impulses that were already at work in the earliest Christian communities,Footnote 147 empowering the voices of the poor, slaves, and women in the discourse of the assemblies.Footnote 148 We shall only take the measure of the importance of this development when we have located Paul's argument for “equality” as the ground and goal of human relations at that moment in ancient history when the immutability of the divine was shattered, when the voluntary self-impoverishment of the divine opened a space for human beings to achieve “equality.”

Footnotes

*

Dieter Georgi zum Gedächtnis. Translations are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

References

1 On the appeal to “equality” in Paul's collection for the poor, see esp. Georgi, Dieter, Remembering the Poor: The History of Paul's Collection for Jerusalem (Nashville: Abingdon, 1992) 80–91 Google Scholar; Vassiliadis, Petros, “The Collection Revisited,” Deltion Biblikon Meleton 11 (1992) 42–48 Google Scholar; Horrell, David, “Paul's Collection: Resources for a Materialist Theology,” Epworth Review 22 (1995) 74–83 Google Scholar; Friesen, Steven J., “Paul and Economics: The Jerusalem Collection as an Alternative to Patronage” in Paul Unbound: Other Perspectives on the Apostle (ed. Given, Mark D.; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010) 27–54 Google Scholar; Ogereau, Julien, “The Jerusalem Collection as κοινωνία: Paul's Global Politics of Socio-Economic Equality and Solidarity,” NTS 58 (2012) 360–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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49 Plutarch, Quaest. conv., 8.2.1 (Mor. 719B).

50 Ibid., 8.2.2 (Mor. 719C).

51 Ibid., 8.2.3 (Mor. 719D).

52 Plutarch's circle of friends included the consular L. Mestrius Florus, Q. Sosius Senecio, and C. Minicius Fundanus. According to the Suda, Plutarch received the ornamenta consularia from Trajan, and was made procurator of imperial estates in Achaia under Hadrian. Cf. Jones, C. P., Plutarch and Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) 29 Google Scholar; Lamberton, Robert, Plutarch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) 12 Google Scholar.

53 Plutarch, An seni, 26 (Mor. 796E).

54 See Plato's entertaining account of the inversion of all relationships by democratic “equality” in Rep. 8, 562d–563d.

55 Plato, Leges, 6, 757b.

56 Plutarch's anxiety about his powerful Roman friends is palpable in an essay such as Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum (Mor. 776A–779C).

57 Plutarch, Praec. ger. rei publ., 17 (Mor. 813E).

58 Plutarch, Sol., 13.

59 Ibid., 14.

60 Ibid., 14.

61 Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes, 277–80; Harvey, “Two Kinds of Equality,” 104–20.

62 Plutarch, Sol., 14.

63 Plutarch, Frat. Amor., 12 (Mor. 484B).

64 Isocrates, Areopagiticus, 20–22.

65 Fowler, H. N., Plutarch's Moralia X (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969) 303 Google Scholar: “Few scholars now believe that the author is Plutarch, though who the writer was is not known.”

66 Ps.-Plutarch, Un. rep. dom., 3 (Mor. 827A).

67 Ibid., 4 (Mor. 827B); the translation is that of Fowler, Plutarch's Moralia X, 309, 311.

68 Ps.-Plutarch, Un. rep. dom., 4 (Mor. 827C).

69 Dio Chrysostom, Or., 17.9, quoting Euripides, Phoen., 536–37.

70 Dio Chrysostom, Or., 17.9, citing Euripides, Phoen., 538–40.

71 Dio Chrysostom, Or., 17.10.

72 Ibid., 17.11.

73 See the arguments for a 1st cent. CE date for these authors in Harvey, “Two Kinds of Equality,” 126 n. 89, 132–33 n. 116.

74 Goodenough, “The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” 52–102; Delatte, Les Traités de la Royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogéne et Sthenidas, 241–52.

75 Ps.-Ecphantus, frag., 4 in Stobaeus 4.7.66. Greek text in Delatte, Les Traités de la Royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogéne et Sthenidas, 35–37. The translation modifies that of Thesleff, Holger, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Åbo: Åbo Akademie, 1965) 83 Google Scholar, 18–84, 8. See also Sthenidas in Stobaeus 4.7.63: the ideal king, like God, is a natural lawgiver, dispensing justice equally to all (νομοθέτας πέφυκε π σιν ἐπίσας).

76 Cf. Blumenfeld, Bruno, The Political Paul: Justice, Democracy and Kingship in a Hellenistic Framework (London: T & T Clark, 2003) 191–92Google Scholar, 228–30.

77 E.g., Herodotus, 7.150; Lysias, 25.3.

78 Aristotle, Pol., 5.5.9, 1306a25.

79 Ps.-Archytas, frag., 4 in Stobaeus 4.1.137. The most thorough discussion is that of Armand Delatte, Essai sur la Politique Pythagoricienne (Liège: H. Vaillant-Carmanne, 1922) 71–124; see further, Blumenfeld, The Political Paul, 124–39. The date and authorship of the fragments are in dispute. Goodenough (“The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship,” 55–102) considers the treatise a work of the 2nd–1st cents. BCE by an anonymous author. Sinclair, T. A. (A History of Greek Political Thought [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951] 293, 301)Google Scholar regards the Ps.-Archytas fragments as imperial productions. Thesleff (The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Perod, 35) attributes the work to an anonymous writer of the late Hellenistic period. Harvey (“Two Kinds of Equality,” 126 n. 89, 133 n. 116) suggests a date in the 1st cent. CE, on the basis of parallels with Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom; followed by Balch, David, “Neopythagorean Moralists and New Testament Household Codes,” ANRW II.26.1 (1992) 380–411, at 388Google Scholar.

80 Stobaeus, 4.1.137 = Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, 33.30–34.14.

81 Harvey, “Two Kinds of Equality,” 125; Blumenfeld, The Political Paul, 129–30.

82 Zuiderhoek, Arjan, “The Concentration of Wealth and Power,” in The Politics of Munificence in the Roman Empire: Citizens, Elites and Benefactors (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 53–70 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

83 Zuiderhoek, The Politics of Munificence in the Roman Empire, 68.

84 Philostratus, Vit. Apol., 1.15.

85 Ibid., 1.15.

86 Dio Chrysostom, Or., 46.2, 12–13, 16; see the discussion of this incident in Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom, 19–25. See also Or., 47.19 and 48.9 for instances of anger at the bouleutic elite for monopolizing public funds; see Salmeri, “Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor,” 73.

87 Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 43 n. 15, 68.

88 On σαρκικοί as “material things” in Rom 15:27, without the negative connotation attached to the term elsewhere in Paul, see Jewett, Robert, Romans: A Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007) 931 Google Scholar. See the discussion of the relationship between 2 Cor 8:14 and Rom 15:26–27 in Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 259–60; Georgi, Remembering the Poor, 62–67; Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 68–69; Downs, David J., The Offering of the Gentiles: Paul's Collection for Jerusalem in its Chronological, Cultural, and Cultic Contexts (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008) 131–34Google Scholar.

89 Weiss, Johannes, Der erste Korintherbrief (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910) 382 Google Scholar.

90 Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 77, observing that ἁδρότης is a terminus technicus.

91 Weiss, Der erste Korintherbrief, 36–37; Theissen, Gerd, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 70–73 Google Scholar. On the poverty of the majority of the Corinthian Christians, see Friesen, Steven J., “Prospects for a Demography of the Pauline Mission: Corinth among the Churches,” in Urban Religion in Roman Corinth (ed. Schowalter, Daniel N. and Friesen, Steven J.; Harvard Theological Studies 53; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) 351–70Google Scholar, esp. 367.

92 Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, 73–75; Meeks, Wayne A., The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) 57 Google Scholar. On the social status of ἀρχισυνάγωγοι, see Rajak, Tessa and Noy, David, “Archisynagogoi: Office, Title and Social Status in the Greco-Jewish Synagogue,” JRS 83 (1993) 75–93 Google Scholar.

93 Theissen, The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, 55, 89; Meeks, The First Urban Christians, 57, 221 n. 7; Lampe, Peter, “Paul, Patrons and Clients,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World (ed. Sampley, J. Paul; Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003) 496 Google Scholar, observing that Gaius of Corinth is the only person in early Christianity of whom it is said that he hosted all the believers of a given city in his house as a central meeting place; Friesen, Steven J., “Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-called New Consensus,” JSNT 26 (2004) 323–61Google Scholar, at 356, acknowledging that Gaius must have had “a larger house than others, which makes him perhaps the wealthiest person we know of from Paul's assemblies.”

94 Welborn, L. L., “Inequality in Roman Corinth: Evidence from Diverse Sources Evaluated by a Neo-Ricardian Model,” in The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth (ed. Harrison, James R. and Welborn, L. L.; Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016) 189–243 Google Scholar.

95 Meeks, The First Urban Christians, 68: “the phrase οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες is to be taken absolutely, ‘the have-nots,’ that is the poor.”

96 Cf. Friesen, “Poverty in Pauline Studies,” 349.

97 Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 257.

98 Ibid., 258.

99 Furnish, Victor Paul, II Corinthians (Garden City: Doubleday, 1984) 408 Google Scholar.

100 Lietzmann, Hans, An die Korinther I/II (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1949) 137 Google Scholar.

101 E.g., the NRSV; Barrett, C. K., The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (New York: Haper & Row, 1973) 226 Google Scholar.

102 Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 257.

103 Georgi, Remembering the Poor, 87–88.

104 E.g., Furnish, II Corinthians, 407–408; Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 37, 68.

105 Georgi, Remembering the Poor, 87. Emphasis in original.

106 Ibid., 87.

107 Lietzmann, An die Korinther I/II, 137.

108 Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 258 n.1.

109 Furnish, II Corinthians, 399, 407; similarly, Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 37, 67.

110 Georgi, Remembering the Poor, 88. Emphasis in original.

111 Ibid., 85; similarly, Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 67–68.

112 Georgi, Remembering the Poor, 88.

113 Ibid., 88.

114 Ibid., 88–89.

115 Ibid., 89.

116 Ibid., 89.

117 E.g., Furnish, II Corinthians, 407

118 Barrett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 226–27.

119 Georgi, Remembering the Poor, 84–85.

120 Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 258; Furnish, II Corinthians, 408; Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 68 n. 237.

121 Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 260.

122 Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 68.

123 Furnish, II Corinthians, 419.

124 Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 258–59; Horrell, David G., Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics (London: T & T Clark, 2005) 239–40Google Scholar.

125 E.g., Furnish, II Corinthians, 420; Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 69.

126 Similarly, Barrett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 227; Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 240; Barclay, “Manna and the Circulation of Grace,” 411–13, 419.

127 Brooke, Alan E. and McLean, Norman, The Old Testament in Greek, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1906) 208 Google Scholar; Wevers, John W., Septuaginta: Vetus Testamentum Graecum Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum Gottingensis editum II.1: Exodus (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991) 55 Google Scholar.

128 Cf. Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 259.

129 Philo, Her., 191.

130 Similarly, Horrell, Solidarity and Difference, 239–40; Barclay, “Manna and the Circulation of Grace,” 411–13, 419.

131 Some commentators infer an endorsement of the principle of proportionality from Paul's sententious observation in 2 Cor 8:12 that a gift is “acceptable according to what one has, not what one does not have” (καθὸ ἐὰν ἔχῃ εὐπρόσδεκτος, οὐ καθὸ οὐκ ἔχει): so, Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 257; Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 66. But this realistic acknowledgement of limitations is remote from the philosophers’ theory of proportional equality.

132 Trebilco, Paul, The Early Christians in Ephesus from Paul to Ignatius (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007)Google Scholar; Harrison, James R. and Welborn, L. L., The First Urban Churches 3: Ephesus (Atlanta: SBL Press, forthcoming 2017)Google Scholar.

133 Malherbe, Abraham J., Social Aspects of Early Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 29–59 Google Scholar; Hock, Ronald F., “Paul and Greco-Roman Education,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World (ed. Sampley, J. Paul; Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 2003) 198–227 Google Scholar.

134 Rancière, Jacques, Hatred of Democracy (trans. Corcoran, Steve; London: Verso, 2014) 48 Google Scholar; idem, Dis-agreement: Politics and Philosophy (trans. Julie Rose; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 1–19.

135 Ober, Josiah, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) 261–66Google Scholar.

136 On Jesus's “poverty” in 2 Cor 8:9, see Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 252–53; Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9, 62; Barclay, “Manna and the Circulation of Grace,” 420–21.

137 It is widely recognized the Phil 2:6–11 is a pre-Pauline hymn: Lohmeyer, Ernst, Kyrios Jesus: Eine Untersuchung zu Phil. 2.5–11 (Heidelberg: Winter, 1961)Google Scholar; Günther Bornkamm, “On Understanding the Christ Hymn: Phil. 2:6–11,” in idem, Early Christian Experience (trans. Paul Hammer; New York: Harper & Row, 1969) 112–22. Likewise, Gal 3:28, with its egalitarian vision of the new identity “in Christ,” has been shown to be a pre-Pauline baptismal formula: see Betz, Hans Dieter, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979) 181–85Google Scholar. Thus, Paul develops his argument for equality between Christ believers upon the basis of a deposit of pre-Pauline tradition that was markedly egalitarian.

138 Hansen, M. H., “Democracy, Athenian,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary (ed. Hornblower, Simon and Spawforth, Antony; 4th ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 435 Google Scholar.

139 Demosthenes, Or., 21.112, with the comments of Stählin, “ἴσος, ἰσότης, κτλ.,” 346 n. 19; Vassiliadis, “Equality and Justice in Classical Antiquity and in Paul,” 54. See also Lysias, 12.35.

140 Aristotle, Pol., 2.4.7, 1266b–1267a; 2.9.8, 1274b9–10.

141 Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 259; Furnish, II Corinthians, 407–8, 419–20. The account of the sharing of possessions among the followers of Jesus in Jerusalem in Acts 2:44–45 and 4:36–37 does not qualify as a “precedent” to Paul, contra Hengel, Martin, Property and Riches in the Early Church (London: SCM Press, 1974) 31–34 Google Scholar, since Acts dates to the 2nd cent.: see Pervo, Richard I., Acts: A Commentary on the Book of Acts (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009) 88–91 Google Scholar.

142 Xenophon, Cyr., 8.6.23.

143 Plutarch, Lyc., 24.

144 Philo, Her., 143.

145 Plutarch, Quaest. conv., 8.2.1–2 (Mor. 719B).

146 Dio Chrysostom, Or., 17.11.

147 See esp. Kittredge, Cynthia, “Rethinking Authorship in the Letters of Paul: Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza's Model of Pauline Theology,” in Walk in the Ways of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (ed. Matthews, Shelly, Kittredge, Cynthia Briggs, and Johnson-DeBaufre, Melanie; Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003) 318–33Google Scholar.

148 See esp. Miller, Anna C., Corinthian Democracy: Democratic Discourse in 1 Corinthians (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2015)Google Scholar, who emphasizes the importance of the democratic discourse of the ekklēsia in the Greek cities of the Roman East as an inspiration for early Christian assemblies and for Paul. Miller's findings converge with the thesis argued here. Note esp. Miller's discussion of the place of Jocasta and Euripides's Phoenician Women in the progymnasmata prescribed for school children in the 1st cent. CE.