A half century ago this reviewer concluded that by 1750 the Royal Navy had acquired the essential administrative foundation on which its subsequent success was based. During the remainder of the century, the only truly important innovations were copper sheathing of hulls, carronade, and the corps of marines, which came permanently under Admiralty control in April 1755. Obviously, the first two of these stemmed from new technology. Why and how the marines developed so significantly during the second half of the eighteenth century is therefore an interesting subject.

This book, which deals with the period between 1755 and 1802 (when they were named the Royal Marines) presents a diffuse answer. Although the author frequently uses phrases like “more and more,” “ever growing,” “increasingly,” and even “began to mature” (204) to describe the progress of change, it is very difficult to trace this progress because he presents his evidence by ranging over the whole forty-seven-year period without concern for chronology.

Zerbe regularly uses the term “doctrine,” but it is not appropriate. Any definition of military doctrine must allow that it is a set of principles, promulgated by authorities or prominently influential persons, which are accepted as being relevant to current and future circumstances. He claims that, in the absence of official instructions, private manuals had “a dramatic impact” on the way marines were employed during sea engagements, but his “strong evidence” of this (168) is not apparent.

The use of marines in amphibious operations (an important subject) was not guided by “doctrine” during the post-1755 decades. Sometimes the role of the army or choice of force commander was predetermined at Whitehall. Sometimes the landing force, at least initially, was composed of marines alone, often in instances where the admiral in command had to decide whether to use marines (and perhaps sailors too) or forgo an opportunity. (Zerbe makes no mention of how often and effectively sailors assisted land forces in far-flung amphibious operations by hauling guns and supplies.) During this half century flexibility remained necessary; doctrine would probably have been counterproductive. Another important subject is the role of marines in combat at sea. Zerbe's discussion of when marines were assigned below to assist gun crews and when they were stationed topside with muskets and bayonets is quite good. Yet in one respect it is puzzling. He claims that Brian Lavery (Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organisation, 1793–1815 [London, 1989], p. 145) has misunderstood the role of marines in boarding actions (165), but ten pages later he appears to support Lavery's point by drawing on his Navy Records Society volume (Shipboard Life and Organisation, 1731–1815 [Aldershot, 1998]) to point out that marines were placed with the final boarding party, after parties of sailors had opened the way. (Zerbe and Lavery do not disagree on the use of marines in repelling boarders.)

By consulting pamphlets and other semipopular sources, Zerbe finds that many people— journalists, naval officers, and members of Parliament—spoke of the marines as a “most useful corps.” He effectively explains how at a time of hurried mobilization they were especially useful —ready to be ordered from their dockyard barracks to go aboard immediately and capable of assisting in loading and rigging. It took time for landmen who might do these things to be recruited and organized. Zerbe makes no mention of volunteer landmen, but the navy accepted thousands of them, and their growing numbers may partly account for why the Admiralty gradually ceased to urge that any marines who were willing should be trained up as seamen. Marines were particularly useful in preventing newly recruited seamen, especially impressed men, from deserting while ships fitting out were still close to shore. And of course marines could be detached to accomplish errands on shore without running away. Anyone who is aware of the difficulties the Admiralty faced in getting a fleet manned can readily understand why it wanted a detachment of marines aboard every ship in commission. At one point Zerbe states: “The primary concern of the Admiralty . . . was the need for Marine presence in any rapid mobilisation of the fleet” (210). Undoubtedly he is right. He also explores, quite interestingly, the role of marines in stifling incipient mutinies.

Although he recognizes that marines were much valued as military police, he probably should have put more weight on this. Their role as security guards may help to explain an interesting fact he has uncovered: during the forty-seven-year period, nearly “83% of all [marine] recruits in the Chatham Division . . . were born in England.” Only 9 percent were Irish, 4 percent Scottish, and there were practically no foreigners. By comparison, at Trafalgar 78 percent of marines were English, whereas only 58 percent of Royal Navy seamen were (88, 91). It seems logical to suppose that the navy wished to avoid having non-Englishmen as potential enforcers of discipline over its valued seamen. And perhaps one reason why the eighteenth-century public preferred the marines to the army—though this is speculative—is that marines did not come among them as riot police.

Although he explains their roles as military police, Zerbe's explanation of the public's relatively favorable opinion of marines inclines toward presenting the heroic aspect of their service. This is not improper, and it serves to counterbalance some of the dismissive comments about marines found in N. A. M. Rodger's important book, The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (London, 1986).