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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2005
By now, only those who rarely read are likely not to know that all nations are, in Benedict Anderson's celebrated phrase, “imagined communities.” Frontier Fictions takes up Anderson's challenge, but rather than simply applying his theory to Iran, it focuses on the notion of territory, an aspect neglected by him and everyone else writing on nationalism. Under the Qajars, land—and, especially, the loss of land—caused Iranians to imagine themselves a community, and the frontier marked the friction and fluctuation that gave identity its edge.
Frontier Fictions presents this thesis in six substantive chapters covering the period between the early 19th century, when Iran lost a good deal of land to Russia, and 1946, when Iran's territorial sovereignty was restored after four years of British and Russian occupation. The author has mined an impressive array of archival and published sources to buttress her claim that, throughout the Qajar period, Iranians grew intensely nostalgic about their loss of land. The first two chapters document efforts to come to terms with that loss. Faced with military defeat, intellectuals reached back to pre–Islamic times to find greatness in the feats of Iran's ancient heroes. A desire to integrate the country underlay the various travels of Nasir al-Din Shah throughout his realm. Journals began to tout connections between the new science of geography and notions of progress, economic prosperity, and diplomatic advantage; in the 20th century, fundamental visions of the state underwent transformation as geography and cartography became integrated into the curriculum of some schools.
Chapter 3, covering 1897–1906, examines how a preoccupation with the nation's resources and achieving self-sufficiency prompted Qajar officials to encourage indigenous industry. Chapter 4, which covers the constitutional period of 1905–11, describes the new heights of patriotic pride that marked the transition of Iran from the king's property to the home of its citizens. Chapter 5 discusses the infamous 1919 Anglo-Persian Accord, which shattered optimistic illusions of territorial integrity, and circumstances surrounding the rise of Reza Khan. Chapter 6 addresses Iran's precarious disunity in the period 1921–26, when Reza Shah was busy consolidating his rule. This period saw the adoption of various educational reforms designed to instill a sense of patriotism and the mobilization of women for the nation. The period following Reza Shah's coronation is covered in Chapter 7. Here the author discusses how textbooks distilled a historical narrative that weighed former dynasties and rulers on their patriotic valor and success in preserving the country's territorial unity. Land and language increasingly became synonymous as nationalism grew in stridency. Even as Reza Shah insisted on the name “Iran” abroad, he focused on the Persian language and culture as a way of distinguishing Iran's inhabitants from Turks, Arabs, and Kurds.
This study raises important questions regarding how age-old anxieties about territory have shaped modern Iranian nationalist discourse. It is innovative in the ways it looks for the roots of self-awareness in internal processes and developments without denying foreign patterns and models of inspiration. It also does a marvelous job of showing the unity of purpose that inspired leading constitutionalists in the early 20th century. Yet it also suffers from some lapses and blind spots.
One problem involves the term “nationalism.” Beyond asserting that land has unduly been omitted as a factor, Kashani-Sabet does little to analyze—rather than describe—the indigenous manifest destiny that Iranians felt around the long-standing notion of Iranzamin. Tracing the genealogy of this term requires covering the long gap between its use by the Il-Khanids and its application in Qajar times. Affirmative rather than exploratory in her reiteration that land was the essential ingredient of Iran's national consciousness, the author gives little thought to the degree to which we can speak of active consciousness and how this bears on the shifting meaning of land. Reclaiming lost land was a principal goal for policymakers, but does that reflect nationalism or simply the natural instinct of rulers—anywhere and at all times? As the author herself points out, “A monarch with no land, or kingdom, was akin to a people with no country” (p. 23).
Another question concerns representativeness. Nasir al-Din Shah wrote various travel accounts, but were they really meant for public consumption? Whom did the other authors cited represent? It is not at all clear that Shirazis, Tehranis, Bakhtiaris, and others thought of themselves as Iranians first. The author recognizes that the nationalist rhetoric was mainly confined to elite circles but nonetheless presents a history in which “Iranians” or the members of the “homeland” often take the place of specific and well-defined actors and agents. Another problem concerns the image that Iranians have long had of their country as a natural miracle bountifully dispensing wealth. The image permeates this study, yet the author fails to explore the origins and consequences of this overblown national pride and does not seem to realize that one of its corollaries, a preoccupation with autarky, long preceded Qajar times (and, for that matter, did not die with the dynasty).
This failure is felt most keenly when it comes to behavior toward foreigners. Students of 19th-century Iranian history must be struck by the dissonance between the effusive rhetoric of national pride and the widespread reality of elite pandering to foreign influence peddling. This book makes no attempt to disentangle that paradox. “Iranians ardently expressed their love for a homeland that supported their new civil society” (p. 142), but it was not uncommon for Qajar politicians to openly favor foreign intrusion to promote economic dynamism or offset other foreigners. Many collaborated with the British and the Russians for political and personal gain. The famous distinction between dawlat, the state and its representatives, and mellat, the nation and people, might have been used to differentiate between those who were selling out the country and those who decried this practice. Some who wrote in the last years of the 19th century showed an awareness of the corrosive effect of modern European norms on traditional Iranian values. Yet most indulged in nostalgic lamentations about their country's lost grandeur and glory, blaming the Arab invasion and introduction of Islam rather than engaging in a critical assessment of the invasion at hand.
Frontier Fictions represents a significant step in the direction of a sophisticated discussion of the emergence and nature of Iranian nationalism, but it is only a first one.