If there might have been any doubt about the project into which B.'s new book fits, the Scriptores iuris Romani, it must be said that this is a good book. The matter is fascinating: Paul's libri decretorum and imperiales sententiae, recently the subject of E. Daalder's impressive monograph (De rechtspraakverzamelingen van Julius Paulus [2018]). The structure of the book is clear and straightforward: B. examines the historical and legal context in a substantial introduction, provides the fragments, translating them into Italian, and presents a commentary on the texts. The volume ends with a bibliography and indexes.
The special interest of Paul's legal works lies in the fact that the fragments are judicial accounts of cases brought before the emperor, in which the jurist reports the travails of the decision, the alternative between established law and innovations, and the role of equity. While Daalder's book is focused on the figure of the princeps iudex, B.'s work departs from more complex premises, evocative of an anguished age. It is in this period that Paul's personality is defined: lawyer, consultant, writer, more detached than Papinian and Ulpian from political events, yet he too fell victim to the totalitarianism of Elagabalus. However, Paul managed to see out the reign of Alexander Severus and to rejoin the imperial council. It is precisely the consilium where much of the stories that Paul recounts, in his two works considered by B., took place (the relationship between the fragments reported in the Digesta as belonging to the libri decretorum and those handed down as imperiales sententiae in cognitionibus prolatae has been a major theme for critics). The accounts occasionally contain a description of the facts and also of the judge who referred the trial to imperial cognition. Sometimes the result is a maxim, isolated or reported within the handling of the case. Perhaps the most interesting part of Paul's works is the argument among the jurists in the consilium, and between them and the emperor, as to who has the final decision. Paul is a loyal representative of the opinions that grew stronger over time, while Septimius Severus often modified the ius constitutum. The question of the balance between tradition and innovation is a central point for B. (cf. B., Ius controversum e processo [2012], pp. 97–212).
Other topics of great interest are the intertwining of cognitory matter and the interpretation based on formulaic concepts, the relevance of cases in which the fiscus is involved, and the prosopographical data emerging from the fragments. All these elements are aspects of Paul's time and of the development of the Roman order.
I turn to some criticism, beginning with the translation, aware that this is a general note on the series rather than a comment on B.'s work. Although the translation of passages that are studied is always necessary, it is not necessary to publish it: it must serve for interpretation, especially in a cultural context in which various translation projects are carried out, into different languages. While the overall translations of Roman legal works are consciously aimed at a wider audience than specialists, I do not believe that this book, albeit valuable, can reach even the educated but non-Classicist reader. In short: if the ancient text is explained and interpreted, in a scholarly book the translation into a modern language is unnecessary.
The first issue is the translation of priores tutores in D. 4.4.38pr (I decr., fr. 3 B.), with ‘tutori sopra indicati’, which refers to the first part of the fragment. However, it seems clear to me that this is not an internal reference to the first part of the text, but rather an allusion to guardians who had been replaced later (for some reason that we do not know); it may suffice to refer to the careful article by M. Di Mario (TSDP 7 [2014], esp. n. 134). Here, too, as in several cases highlighted by B., the text has been reworked, and a piece of the original has probably been lost. B. is fully aware of the problems of the textual tradition, but the ‘interpolationists’ are enemies, whom he refers to in order to reject their opinions. B. prefers to leave the translated text in its crudeness, which does not always make sense. Of course, interpolationism, with its excesses and often naive justifications for cuts (and additions), is outdated, not so the history of problems.
In the current context of studies on Roman law, attentive to the phenomena of multicultural intertwining in the ancient world, some more consideration could have been given to fr. 20, D. 36.1.76(74)pr, II decr., from which emerges the use of Greek in a will that would seem to anticipate the famous decision of Alexander Severus (SB I 5294), which followed the Constitutio Antoniniana, that allowed that use. This is to be understood considering the commonly accepted dating of the works in question, chronologically assigned to the principate of Septimius Severus.
While interesting problems are encountered on every page, I would like to highlight, for its peculiarity, the case of the will of Pactumeius Androstenes, fr. 15, transmitted in D. 28.5.93(92), II decr., where the interpretation lacks due attention to the position of filia patroni of the heir established in the first testament and favoured by the prince: it is possible to assume that she had acted with a request for bonorum possessio, not only because of the first testament, but also by virtue of patronal rights, or she could have received the adsignatio of the freedman from her father (and this could be the reason why the freedman instituted the daughter and not the former dominus).
Fragment 25, in D. 40.5.38 (III decr.), is ‘ein eindrucksvoller Text’ (D. Nörr, in: Studi in onore di Cesare Sanfilippo 3 [1986], p. 532). The problem brought to the attention of the prince arises from the fact that the testator made a will quod perfectum non erat. Here, too, the translation ‘imperfetto’ is not wrong (though perhaps I would have translated ‘incompleto’), but it implies an explanation (of the nullity of the act) that is not given in the translation section, but only in the commentary. The biggest problem comes later. The de cuius who nihil ab intestato petisset is very strange, the Italian rendering is not comprehensible (‘nulla avesse chiesto in relazione all'eredità senza testamento’). Petere ab intestato means acting to obtain the inheritance without a will, but it refers to the heirs or potential bonorum possessores, not to the de cuius. Here again we are perhaps faced with a clumsy cut.
The best part of B.'s work is his ability to bring into dialogue political history, carefully reread (cf. B., AUPA 63 [2020], 19–84), with the fragments exhibited in the two works examined. B. succeeds in vividly portraying the atmosphere, the clashes and meetings that took place in the consilium of Septimius Severus, a prince who devoted energy to the judiciary and to the reorientation of various themes of Roman private law. The reflections on pp. 45–54, delving into the reasons for Paul's opinions and the prince's decisions are very instructive. A look at the critique of law, highlighted as important also for ancient law by Nörr (Rechtskritik in der römischen Antike [1974], p. 127), would have been useful in this analysis. Looking at the case-solving routine, in the best occurrence we get an inside view of the activities of the council, with a description of the contradictions in the arguments and the choices made to reach the decision; in the worst case we are left with the maxim, the very gist of the judgment.
In terms of references one misses A. Berger's encyclopaedic entry (RE 10.1 [1918], cc. 690–752) and M. Kaser's famous handbooks on Roman private law for the exegesis of the texts. Among the qualities of the book, it has been edited with care. On the other hand, I am rather unsympathetic to the layout of the critical apparatus of the fragments, which does not allow for rapid or precise identification of the point discussed in footnotes, lacking any cross-reference markers.
