Environmental conservation and social justice are often presented as competing policy goals. Yet some countries reconcile them better than others. Why is this? How do societies negotiate the apparent tensions between environmental conservation and social justice? Democracy in the Woods, by Prakash Kashwan, addresses these important questions by comparing how forest land rights conflicts in India, Tanzania, and Mexico have been shaped over time by the evolution of forest property regimes, with varying outcomes for forest-dependent peasants.

India, Tanzania, and Mexico present an interesting puzzle. In the early twentieth century, peasants in all three countries had few if any forest land rights. Over the course of the century, forest conservation greatly expanded in all three countries in response to global demands. Yet protected forests were governed by very different “forestland regimes” (institutions of territorial control). Centralized, state-controlled regimes developed in India and Tanzania, where peasants’ land rights were effectively ignored. By contrast, much of Mexico’s forests are largely community controlled. Consequently, “Mexican peasants enjoy a far greater security of forest and land rights than do their counterparts in India and Tanzania” (p. 3). Why did Mexico more effectively combine environmental conservation and social justice? And why did the democratic governments in India and Tanzania ignore populist pressures by forest-dependent communities?

Kashwan consciously eschews parsimony in favor of a comprehensive explanation that incorporates a myriad of factors operating at multiple levels of analysis (micro, meso, macro) across different time periods (colonial, post-independence, contemporary). A partial list of explanatory factors includes pre-colonial land tenure patterns, the framing of land rights by colonial powers, states’ development goals, the legacy of colonial and post-independence forestland regimes, variation in forest agencies’ exercise of power, the goals and strategies of national political leaders, the strength of social mobilization by peasant groups, power relations in local communities, national political party systems, corporatist structures, and international incentives for conservation. The purpose of this comprehensive survey of explanatory factors is to separate out “the effects of path dependence from contemporary institutional structures that shape policy-making, for determining the political and economic factors that affect the motivations and aspirations of main actors, and for analyzing the extent to which peasant groups’ interests are represented in the political and policy processes” (p. 213).

Given the book’s complex goals, Kashwan dismisses using a single theory and instead presents a framework for organizing his analysis: the Political Economy of Institutions Framework. Chapter 1 presents the framework by applying it to the evolution of forestland regimes in India, Tanzania, and Mexico from the colonial period to the modern day. According to the framework, the historical legacies of colonialism and state development agendas after independence shaped the forestland regimes initially created. However, to understand the evolution of forestland regimes over time, one must analyze the contestation that occurs among competing interest groups (particularly between state and society) at both the national and subnational levels, as well as the balance of power among them. This explains what formal rules were adopted and whether they were implemented or ignored. A key factor determining the outcome of this contestation is the strength of “political intermediation mechanisms”—processes and relationships (formal and informal) that help citizens directly engage political elites in the policy processes. Intermediation mechanisms at the national level shaped formal legal and institutional change, while intermediation mechanisms at the local level influenced policy implementation.

The book is organized into three parts that examine the evolution of forestland regimes across three time periods. Part 1 traces the origin and evolution of distinct forestland regimes created during the colonial era and examines the factors shaping their evolution after independence. It shows how a variety of political and economic factors produced highly centralized, state-run forestland regimes in India and Tanzania, but undermined the creation of a strong forestland regime in Mexico. After independence, the Indian and Tanzanian governments maintained strong, centralized control over forests, while in Mexico, landed elites’ continued power forced the government to engage in large-scale redistribution of forestlands, expanding community control. Part 1 also shows how international conservation groups incentivized national political elites in all three countries to expand forest conservation. Whether or not this came at the expense of forest-dependent groups depended on the institutional legacies of previous regimes and “the nature of political engagement between a country’s elite and its peasant groups” (p. 209). Important factors shaping this engagement included power differences among various groups, inter-elite competition, the strength of peasant mobilization, political party systems, and corporatist peasant organizations.

In Part 2, Kashwan uses political ethnography to analyze the micropolitics of forestland reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s. He shows how variation in national-level political contexts, the bargaining power of peasant groups, and the nature of peasant engagement in the process explain why land rights were effectively implemented in Mexico, but effectively ignored by the state in India and Tanzania. Part 3 looks more closely at the interaction of international and national politics. It examines whether international incentives to protect peasant land rights influence contemporary national programs for forest-based carbon emissions reductions in a way that provides additional benefits for forest-dependent people. Kashwan finds that international incentives had little effect. National governments negotiated their way out of enacting meaningful land tenure reforms and agreed only to nonbinding commitments which, based on past experience, are likely to be ignored.

The book’s main policy contribution is to suggest that strong, centralized, state control of forests may lead to greater forest conservation, but will likely come via unjust policies that victimize marginalized, forest-dependent groups. Environmental conservation and social justice can both be achieved, but only if peasants’ forest and land rights are protected in practice. This will not occur simply by passing laws recognizing land rights. Where historically produced inequalities exist, national and local elites will use their power to exclude marginal groups and to subvert land rights. Socially just environmental conservation can only come through inclusive processes. These will only occur when political elites are forced to create structures of political intermediation that allow forest-dependent groups to engage directly in the policy process.

Democracy in the Woods also makes an important contribution to the literature on institutional change. Kashwan uses forestland institutions as a focal point for analyzing the interaction among multiple factors operating at different levels of analysis across time. This novel approach allows him to develop a convincing argument that, while emphasizing the legacies of institutions, is not overly structural. Kashwan incorporates structure and agency into his analysis in a way that is reminiscent of Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory. While previous institutions structure subsequent competition among competing interests, they cannot by themselves predict future outcomes. Explaining outcomes requires analyzing various actors’ power relationships and strategic use of formal and informal rules. Kashwan shows, for example, that conflicting land rights laws did not emerge through an unconscious process of institutional layering. Rather, they are the intended product of political elites’ strategic use of institutional ambiguities to achieve their goals. In sum, the book is an important contribution to the emerging body of work seeking to bridge the gap between historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism.

Arguably, the book’s most impressive feature is its incredible level of detail. Virtually every aspect of forestland conflicts in India, Tanzania, and Mexico is thoroughly documented. However, this strength is also one of the book’s main weaknesses. The political economy of institutions framework often gets lost in the detail. Part of the problem is that Chapter 1’s presentation of the framework does not clearly articulate the specific components of the framework and the relationships among them. Consequently, it is often difficult to evaluate whether and how case details presented in subsequent chapters fit within the framework. The book makes a passing reference to what the framework would predict in a particular scenario (e.g., p. 168), but this is disconnected from the theoretical discussion of the framework. Statements about the framework’s ability to make predictions imply there are hypotheses which can be tested. Yet the book never articulates a complete list of hypotheses or their predictions. This makes it hard to evaluate whether or not particular case study details support the framework, as well as how one might apply the framework to other cases.

Nevertheless, Democracy in the Woods provides a convincing explanation of why forestland regimes vary across the three cases. Its ability to incorporate a multitude of explanatory factors operating at multiple levels of analysis across time is truly impressive. It is a must read for scholars interested in how international, national, and subnational forces interact to shape local environmental outcomes. Perhaps most important, it provides valuable insight into how a more just form of sustainable development might be achieved.