The idea that there is a difference between moral thought and moral action has bedeviled the study of moral development and decision making for years (Blasi Reference Blasi1980). At the core of the debate is the idea that individuals make very different decisions, and oftentimes show very different sensibilities, when they are judging others who have engaged in some type of transgression versus when they themselves are actively involved in an ambiguous social problem. Are these observed differences representative of some qualitative difference between moral thought and moral action, or is the difference the result of the same basic decision-making process adjusting to two very different situations and perspectives? (For example, it is a common theme in ethnography that actually being in the situation changes your perspective of the situation; Malinowski Reference Malinowski1922.)
In his target article, Knobe never really addresses a possible division between moral thought and moral action in any overt way, relying primarily on judgment/decision-making scenarios describing the actions of a social agent to make his case that generalized judgments precede and serve as context for moral intuitions. What Knobe adds to the equation in his complex analysis of moral competencies is the idea that our intuitions concerning the intentions of an agent (and therefore the possible moral culpability of the agent) are deeply affected by primary, dynamic judgments of the generalized situation/dilemma faced by the agent – what Knobe refers to as “moral considerations.”
We feel Knobe's thesis makes sense but leaves open two critical questions related to the moral thought/moral action dilemma. The first is: Where do these initial moral judgments that serve as context for intuition and further decision-making come from? Establishing an initial, complex moral judgment as the originating point of moral intuitions and decision-making in a sense begs the question of what is driving moral decision processes. The second question we are left with is: What, if any, role would this continuum play in the moral actions of the individual? Do we use the same type of default system when we are making socially ambiguous decisions that might directly affect us and/or those around us? (For example, are there pre-judged lines that we will not cross?)
We have made the argument (Kang & Glassman Reference Kang and Glassman2010) that moral thought, including the type of moral judgments Knobe describes, is actually a form of what Bourdieu (Reference Bourdieu and Richardson1986) refers to as cultural capital, while moral action is a form of social capital (Portes Reference Portes1998). The motivation and goal (Glassman Reference Glassman1996) of cultural capital is to signal to those around you that you are a member in good standing of the social group. It is a short-hand for the types of social interactions that allow individuals to establish affiliation through community standards. Moral judgments are one of the easiest forms of cultural capital to use to establish group membership, whether it is gossip around a community pool or the establishment of a common enemy, villain, and/or scapegoat.
We suggest that the primary moral judgment that Knobe describes is made in the service of cultural capital, and that it is more about signaling and establishing membership in a given community than “about controllability, about recency, about statistical frequency” (sect. 5.1, para. 5). The default position of what is acceptable for the businessman in Knobe's scenario example would change dramatically based on whether you were trying to signal membership and affiliation in the Chamber of Commerce or in the Sierra Club.
The setting of a continuum and establishing of a default is a form of cultural capital, and if we are on target in our thesis (Kang & Glassman Reference Kang and Glassman2010), it would all but disappear when individuals are engaged in collective moral action. In moral action, individuals are less concerned with establishing a signal/symbol system for long-term group maintenance and belonging than in coming together as a group to solve a critical problem. In moral action, the focus is almost completely on the problem at hand, rather than on who should be included (and excluded) from the working group. The action is integrated with the specifics of the problem to be solved, and as the common problem dissipates, so, too, does the motivation behind the group (Putnam Reference Putnam2001).
We see two reasons why there is little to be gained by using the primary moral judgments of generalized situations in moral action. The first is that group membership is malleable in problem solving, and placement in the group is dependent on abilities. The second reason is that problems are dynamic and shifting, and individuals who are taking action might have to continuously abandon or change their default point based on circumstances. To take a crude example, a person with a specific default position on sharing of community resources might take a very different view if he or she is placed in charge of such resources. (For example, how would the individuals in Knobe's academic example change if they found themselves being denied access to pens when they needed them? Or if their salary were dependent on maintaining a supply of pens?)
We take the real-world example of the recent British Petroleum (BP) oil spill to illustrate our point, similar to Knobe's businessman who does not care about risks to the environment. Suppose, before the spill occurred, people were asked about the intentions of the president of BP if he said the company could engage in deep water drilling without harming the environment: There would be a wide array of responses, directly based on the primary judgments Knobe discussed, but judgments used to signal community belonging. If you asked an officer in an environmental group, he or she might have set the default point for acceptable action so that the greater part of the continuum led to intuitions of morally bad intentions (e.g., being willing to drill at all, or not actively investing in sustainable energy). If you asked a politician from the Gulf Region, he or she might have set a default position with far more of the continuum devoted to a neutral position (e.g., drilling could occur as long as there were minimal safety precautions) in order to signal kinship with the oil-dependent community.
After the spill, many members of the two groups have acted together in attempting to stop the spill and reclaim the Gulf. Intuitions about good or bad intentions and the moral judgments that led to them have become secondary or even irrelevant for many working in this group, and it is considered bad form to bring them up. Ties have been established based on the need to solve the immediate problem. Once the problem has diminished, or retreats into the background, the social group will dissipate and moral judgments as cultural capital will move to the fore again. It represents a cycle of moral thought as cultural capital and moral action as social capital.
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The idea that there is a difference between moral thought and moral action has bedeviled the study of moral development and decision making for years (Blasi Reference Blasi1980). At the core of the debate is the idea that individuals make very different decisions, and oftentimes show very different sensibilities, when they are judging others who have engaged in some type of transgression versus when they themselves are actively involved in an ambiguous social problem. Are these observed differences representative of some qualitative difference between moral thought and moral action, or is the difference the result of the same basic decision-making process adjusting to two very different situations and perspectives? (For example, it is a common theme in ethnography that actually being in the situation changes your perspective of the situation; Malinowski Reference Malinowski1922.)
In his target article, Knobe never really addresses a possible division between moral thought and moral action in any overt way, relying primarily on judgment/decision-making scenarios describing the actions of a social agent to make his case that generalized judgments precede and serve as context for moral intuitions. What Knobe adds to the equation in his complex analysis of moral competencies is the idea that our intuitions concerning the intentions of an agent (and therefore the possible moral culpability of the agent) are deeply affected by primary, dynamic judgments of the generalized situation/dilemma faced by the agent – what Knobe refers to as “moral considerations.”
We feel Knobe's thesis makes sense but leaves open two critical questions related to the moral thought/moral action dilemma. The first is: Where do these initial moral judgments that serve as context for intuition and further decision-making come from? Establishing an initial, complex moral judgment as the originating point of moral intuitions and decision-making in a sense begs the question of what is driving moral decision processes. The second question we are left with is: What, if any, role would this continuum play in the moral actions of the individual? Do we use the same type of default system when we are making socially ambiguous decisions that might directly affect us and/or those around us? (For example, are there pre-judged lines that we will not cross?)
We have made the argument (Kang & Glassman Reference Kang and Glassman2010) that moral thought, including the type of moral judgments Knobe describes, is actually a form of what Bourdieu (Reference Bourdieu and Richardson1986) refers to as cultural capital, while moral action is a form of social capital (Portes Reference Portes1998). The motivation and goal (Glassman Reference Glassman1996) of cultural capital is to signal to those around you that you are a member in good standing of the social group. It is a short-hand for the types of social interactions that allow individuals to establish affiliation through community standards. Moral judgments are one of the easiest forms of cultural capital to use to establish group membership, whether it is gossip around a community pool or the establishment of a common enemy, villain, and/or scapegoat.
We suggest that the primary moral judgment that Knobe describes is made in the service of cultural capital, and that it is more about signaling and establishing membership in a given community than “about controllability, about recency, about statistical frequency” (sect. 5.1, para. 5). The default position of what is acceptable for the businessman in Knobe's scenario example would change dramatically based on whether you were trying to signal membership and affiliation in the Chamber of Commerce or in the Sierra Club.
The setting of a continuum and establishing of a default is a form of cultural capital, and if we are on target in our thesis (Kang & Glassman Reference Kang and Glassman2010), it would all but disappear when individuals are engaged in collective moral action. In moral action, individuals are less concerned with establishing a signal/symbol system for long-term group maintenance and belonging than in coming together as a group to solve a critical problem. In moral action, the focus is almost completely on the problem at hand, rather than on who should be included (and excluded) from the working group. The action is integrated with the specifics of the problem to be solved, and as the common problem dissipates, so, too, does the motivation behind the group (Putnam Reference Putnam2001).
We see two reasons why there is little to be gained by using the primary moral judgments of generalized situations in moral action. The first is that group membership is malleable in problem solving, and placement in the group is dependent on abilities. The second reason is that problems are dynamic and shifting, and individuals who are taking action might have to continuously abandon or change their default point based on circumstances. To take a crude example, a person with a specific default position on sharing of community resources might take a very different view if he or she is placed in charge of such resources. (For example, how would the individuals in Knobe's academic example change if they found themselves being denied access to pens when they needed them? Or if their salary were dependent on maintaining a supply of pens?)
We take the real-world example of the recent British Petroleum (BP) oil spill to illustrate our point, similar to Knobe's businessman who does not care about risks to the environment. Suppose, before the spill occurred, people were asked about the intentions of the president of BP if he said the company could engage in deep water drilling without harming the environment: There would be a wide array of responses, directly based on the primary judgments Knobe discussed, but judgments used to signal community belonging. If you asked an officer in an environmental group, he or she might have set the default point for acceptable action so that the greater part of the continuum led to intuitions of morally bad intentions (e.g., being willing to drill at all, or not actively investing in sustainable energy). If you asked a politician from the Gulf Region, he or she might have set a default position with far more of the continuum devoted to a neutral position (e.g., drilling could occur as long as there were minimal safety precautions) in order to signal kinship with the oil-dependent community.
After the spill, many members of the two groups have acted together in attempting to stop the spill and reclaim the Gulf. Intuitions about good or bad intentions and the moral judgments that led to them have become secondary or even irrelevant for many working in this group, and it is considered bad form to bring them up. Ties have been established based on the need to solve the immediate problem. Once the problem has diminished, or retreats into the background, the social group will dissipate and moral judgments as cultural capital will move to the fore again. It represents a cycle of moral thought as cultural capital and moral action as social capital.