A hammer can be described as something that helps to drive nails into walls or to crack nuts. But that description does not imply that at some stage of the past, people had been hitting nails with nuts and cracking nuts with nails, waiting only for the hammer to be invented. Precisely this type of argument, however, starts almost all texts about money. It is asserted that money evolved because people got tired of the inconveniences of the direct exchange of nuts for nails (or other things). Presenting the object of explanation as an evolutionary solution to a problem that may never have had much relevance in history looks like a cheap trick. All those who are uncomfortable with this procedure should welcome Fayazmanesh's book, as it attempts to dispel the myths of the origins of money in the difficulties of barter.
The aim of the book is to contribute to the construction of a “realistic” evolutionary theory of money that takes the medieval economy as a point of departure, because this was an era in which monetary and direct exchange existed side by side. But, as Fayazmanesh puts it, “before any reconstruction begins some demolition and removal of old debris must take place” (p. 3). Accordingly, his study is an attempt to refute various folktales concerning money and exchange, as well as concepts of “the equation of exchange” that can be traced back to Aristotle. Fayazmanesh tracks them down, chapter by chapter, in the writings of the medieval scholastics, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras, and Don Patinkin. Chapter 2 starts with Aristotle, who is criticized for postulating an “equality of exchange” which, according to Fayazmanesh, is “flawed and incompatible with the facts of the real monetary world” (p. 20), because both monetary exchange and barter lack reflexivity, an essential property of equality and equivalence, and because ancient markets are characterized “by swindle and inequality” (p. 20).
In chapter 3, a key part of the book, Fayazmanesh extends this characterization to the medieval economy. He argues that the scholastic writings about the origins of markets and money and about equality and justice in exchange were “wrong headed” (p. 39). Their “concept of ‘just price’ made no sense at all in the light of the reality of the medieval market practices” (p. 44). The latter were more accurately captured by the merchant manuals in the tradition of Fibonacci's Liber Abaci (1202), the so-called abacus manuscripts. To Fayazmanesh, the “rules of barter” in those manuals indicate “the prevalence and importance of direct exchange in the medieval and renaissance periods” (p. 33). His explanation for the prevalence of barter is twofold: It was “not only not difficult . . . but it was also actually preferred to cash transaction because in barter an arithmetically astute merchant could make more profit than what the usual markup pricing would allow” (p. 42).
In chapter 4, Smith and other classical thinkers are accused of uncritical adoption of “the Aristotelian method of constructing a theory of exchange without any reference to the reality of the marketplace” (p. 62). In chapter 5, Marx is singled out for having made some sense of the equation of exchange by defining it as representing an exchange of congealed labor (which is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive). But even Marx is found guilty of using, in the opening chapters of Capital, the Aristotelian fabrication of a barter history of money. In chapter 6, Fayazmanesh draws attention to the big gaps that exist between Jevons's explanation of the emergence of money from the difficulties of barter, and the moneyless “scientific concepts of exchange” of Jevons and Walras. In chapter 7, Fayazmanesh suggests to replace “the equation of exchange” by “the matrix of exchange,” a concept borrowed from Robert Clower and extended to include both barter and monetary relations. Referring to the medieval economy, Fayazmanesh argues that the matrix could be useful to deal with the question why “an economy in which barter played a prominent role and was actually preferred to monetary exchange eventually [gave] rise to a [purely] monetary economy,” but he also states that answering such a question is beyond the scope of the book (p. 127).
That is a pity. If Fayazmanesh had attempted to explain why barter has largely disappeared, he might have seen the need to strengthen his demolition efforts by more convincing arguments and evidence. As it stands, his book does not succeed in refuting the Aristotelian constructions. It lets them survive or even corroborates some of them. To see this, it should be noted that Fayazmanesh deems those constructions to be “unrealistic” in three senses: They are “simply untrue or extremely unlikely” or they “do not refer to anything actual” (p. 8). The verdict “simply untrue” may be operationalized in terms of logical inconsistency. Fayazmanesh's critique of various versions of the equation of exchange works along these lines, arguing that exchange is not equal because it is not reflexive, and it is not reflexive because goods are not exchanged for themselves. However, he shows that Marx provided a formally correct equation of exchange by way of his labor theory of value. Moreover, by chiding John Hicks for his “unrealistic marginalist theory of money,” in which “people do choose to hold money” (p. 113), Fayazmanesh hints indirectly at the choice-theoretical approach to reflexivity: The decision to hold a good can be interpreted as an intertemporal exchange with itself, preferred to trading it at the given price. If Aristotle and other early thinkers did not see such routes to consistency with the mathematical relation of equality, their concepts of exchange may be deemed incomplete, but not “simply untrue.”
The other aspects of realism (likeliness and “reference to something actual”) show up in Fayazmanesh's construction of the medieval economy. He claims that barter was widespread and easy in that era and concludes that it is unlikely that the evolution of monetary economies was caused by difficulties of barter. He considers the scholastic definitions of just prices to be out of touch with the actual markup pricing and cheating in medieval markets. Yet markup pricing directly invites debates about cost calculations and norms for minimizing conflicts in the marketplace. The medieval institution to which most scholastics belonged, the church, had the political and economic power to play the roles of a norm setter and arbiter. Even Fayazmanesh cannot do without some implicit price norm when he asserts that medieval trade was characterized by “fraud and deceit” (p. 45). The scholastic writings and the abacus manuals could thus be seen as two sides of the same reality, just as the literatures on optimal market regulation and on strategic management or other business practices in our days.
Furthermore, Fayazmanesh does not provide quantitative evidence for the “prevalence” of barter in his construction of “the medieval economy,” which remains almost as vague in terms of time, location, and structures as the barter economies of the folktales that he criticizes. Contrary to his assertions that barter was widespread and “not difficult,” the abacus manuals seem to indicate that barter was largely the domain of high-skilled middlemen in special trades. These intermediaries could command a premium (or markup) over the cash price for their services, which consisted of employing arithmetics and other special skills required for barter, and of carrying liquidity risks (in the presence of money as a general means of payment). Thus we see some “difficulties of barter” creeping back through the texts that Fayazmanesh intended to use as evidence against them.
But if middlemen helped to solve the difficulties of barter and let it coexist with monetary exchange, why did it disappear? And what is the “more realistic” alternative to the primitive barter folktales in monetary economics? In my view, these questions can be answered only if credit is taken into account. In the historical development of market systems, money, barter, and credit evolved together. Both barter and credit were means to economize on the use of the money commodities (such as gold and silver) that often tended to be scarce. The abacus examples of sophisticated barter were based, not only on the use of money as the unit of account, but often also on credit relations and clearing mechanisms (described in other parts of those manuals). Once commodity money was replaced by credit-based forms of money (such as bank notes and fiat money), barter lost ground insofar as it was relatively costly. It was largely reduced to a subordinate form of international trade, where currency reserves are often as scarce as commodity money was at various stages of the Middle Ages. John Hicks's Market Theory of Money (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1989) provides interesting hints for an evolutionary theory along these lines. Even though Fayazmanesh makes various references to Hicks, credit is conspicuously absent from his study of money and exchange.
