The case studies presented in this book, which forms part of a larger three-volume comparative study, are its greatest strength. The analysis of the development and impact of the Internet in the many countries of these diverse regions clearly demonstrates that it has varied according to the specific constellation of historical, political, and socioeconomic forces. Consequently, Franda convincingly establishes that a broader “understanding of the relationship between the Internet and international relations will require familiarity with these differences” (p. 3).

While this book is not directly about the socalled digital divide, it nevertheless reveals how skewed the development of the Internet has been. The stark nature of this divide, especially in such regions as Africa and Central Asia, is important in supporting another of Franda's claims, namely, that the “thickness” of globalization has also been overstated. Drawing on the work of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, he argues that globalization is ultimately a measure of the thickness of global linkages. Yet when we examine the density of transnational interdependence, it often is thinner than many analysts claim. In the case of the Internet, for example, “in more than eighty of the ninety-six countries, less than 2 percent of the population had access to the Internet …. In more than two-thirds … far less than 1 percent had access” (p. 227). Among the reasons cited for the “thinness” of Internet penetration and development, Franda highlights the lack of adequate telecommunications and Internetrelated infrastructures; government-run telecommunications monopolies; a limited desire for reform by certain governments (especially in the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union); the lack of skills, resources, and awareness to use the Internet (with notable exceptions in such countries as India, Bulgaria, and Romania); and the fear of the impact of the free flow of information on security (e.g., Russia and China) and religious/cultural values (especially Saudi Arabia and Iran).

While Franda is skeptical about the overall impact of the Internet, the picture that he paints is not all bleak. In his chapter on Central and Eastern Europe he highlights how several states have made great progress in modernizing their telecommunications infrastructures and attracting foreign investment into the Internet sector. Such states include the Baltic States (especially Estonia), the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Slovakia. However, Franda argues that the principal impetus behind this progress has not come from internal forces but instead from “the desire of national leaderships to join the European Union, which has developed admission guidelines that include a central role for IT and the Internet” (p. 152). He also highlights the potential of such states as Hungary, Romania, and India. While the case of the software industry of Bangalore is well known, he reveals that Romania, Hungary, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria have attracted foreign companies because of the large number of scientific and engineering personnel available at comparatively low wages. Romania, for example, “has twice the number of computer science graduates per capita as the United States and seven times the rate in India” (p. 165).

In terms of critique, the book adopts a rather unsophisticated Realist interpretation of international relations that largely downplays the more dynamic potential of the Internet. It rejects both the idealism of liberal internationalist visions of a future world order and those that argue that we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of regional and global governance. Instead, the state is regarded as being central not only to the international system but also to the development of the Internet both nationally and internationally. A problem here is the distinction between intent and capability. Indeed, at several points throughout the book, the author himself recognizes that while many governments are trying to control the Internet, their desire to do so often exceeds their ability. Nevertheless, if the Internet is to be “controlled” and “managed” internationally, then it will be the nascent international regime that will do so. However, while each chapter discusses the contribution (or lack of it) of states to this regime, it gets no specific coverage in the book except for a few pages in the first chapter and the conclusion. Perhaps this will come in the later volumes of this study, but given the emphasis on regime theory, it is surprising that this book did not include a chapter in its own right on this regime.

While some attention is given to the efforts of individuals, groups, and businesses within respective countries, ultimately the success or failure of the Internet is down to the role of the state. However, more emphasis could be made on the role of other actors in the development of the Internet, such as “virtual communities” and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In the case of the former, emphasis is made in several chapters on the role of diasporas in the development of the Internet (e.g., in Slovakia, India, Hungary, and the Middle East), while for the latter, the chapters on the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provide detail on the role played by NGOs in the development of basic Internet infrastructures, especially the role of George Soros's Open Society Institute.

Overall however, this is a well-written and thoroughly researched book, which fills the gap in the comparative analysis of the impact of the Internet on international relations. I look forward to reading the future volumes in the broader study that the author is producing.