In Playing Fair, Richard Dagger provides a comprehensive account of the justification of punishment as emanating from political obligations that citizens living within bounded, meaningful polities assume. As promised, he brings together political and criminal-law theory and argues that “we have a right to punish lawbreakers because we have a right to expect people to live up to their political obligations” (1). His theory is based on an attempt to balance out the burdens and benefits of living in a polity, by asking all members to do their fair share: if the polity is reasonably just, it can be considered a cooperative practice and its members may be thought of as engaging in fair play whereby breaching the “rules of the game” provides justification for punishment.
Dagger's book is a welcome and much-needed attempt to couch the justification of punishment in citizenship obligations. He skillfully deviates from the common approach, which views criminal offenders as liable to the state, by considering them liable instead to the polity, or rather to their co-citizens: “the obligation, in other words, is owed not to some impersonal force—usually called the state or the government—but to those persons whose cooperative efforts and sacrifices make it possible for others to enjoy the benefits of the political order” (102). By so doing, he conceives of punishment as a justified reaction to the failure to live up to co-citizenship duties (which makes his account clearly retributive, even if in a different sense from the usual one), but also demands that the imposed sanction be forward looking in that its form and substance have a propensity to bring the offender back to the community and ensure that the future of the cooperative practices is not endangered.
Leaving aside common objections to the viability of the theory itself, which Dagger addresses mostly in chapter 6, I focus my attention on two implications of his approach: first, I consider what it means for the punishment of noncitizens, and second, I probe the extent to which his approach can offer useful guidance for determining the appropriate amount of punishment, by focusing on the case of criminal disenfranchisement. While these two concerns would appear not to strike at the core of his theory, they raise important questions which may undermine some of the basic assumptions on which the theory is based.
While the fair-play theory certainly seems coherent when it comes to the punishment of full members of political communities—unless the polity falls below the “reasonably just” threshold, cooperative practices bring the citizens certain benefits for which they must bear certain burdens—this line of reasoning provides weaker grounds to punish noncitizens that have broken the law. Dagger clearly reserves his justification of punishment only for full citizens and perhaps the quasi citizens that have resided in the country long enough: “a political obligation is a moral duty that only a citizen or perhaps a permanent resident can have, for it is an obligation that attaches to members of a polity” (25, emphasis added). The word “perhaps” seems to suggest that Dagger is himself unsure whether the justification of punishment in line with his account should extend to anyone who does not have a claim to full membership. On the opposite end, he justifies the punishment of transient foreigners—tourists—by arguing that even if they do not assume political obligations (because they do not receive sufficient benefits to justify imposed burdens), they still have a legal obligation towards the legal rules of the country that they are visiting: “legal obligations, by contrast, attach themselves to anyone who is subject to the pertinent law or laws, including tourists who owe no allegiance to the country they happen to be visiting” (25).
But what justifies the punishment of all those categories of people who are neither citizens nor transient foreigners? This is more than a pedantic observation, taking into account, for instance, a significant number of people who “reside” in foreign prisons. Recent data show that the proportion of foreigners is 31.3% in Germany, 33.7% in Italy, 44.3% in Belgium, 54.7 % in Austria, and 71.5% in Switzerland (World Prison Brief, available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/world-prison-brief-data). While data give no indication as to the degree of “foreignness” and while many of these foreigners may indeed be permanent residents, it is safe to speculate that at least some of these foreigners will be exposed to (possibly hard) burdens emanating from punishment without having enjoyed significant benefits. What justifies punishment in these cases? How can we determine the exact amount of benefits that one needs to be receiving to justify the imposition of burdens? Furthermore, Dagger often emphasizes the intergenerational element of cooperative practices: apart from their static component, they evolve over time and are transferred from one generation to another. This clearly seems to exclude all those who have not permanently and intimately linked their lives and destinies to a particular polity.
Consequently, this puts us in a very uncomfortable position when it comes to punishing foreigners and leaves us with three options. First, we may need to justify punishment of foreigners differently, which risks making it an entirely different practice when applied to citizens as opposed to noncitizens. Second, we can continue punishing foreigners aware that they have not received sufficient benefits, which would make their punishment unjust. Third—if we want to be consistent in applying Dagger's theory—we must refrain from punishing all those foreigners who have engaged insufficiently in cooperative practices. All three solutions seem unsatisfactory and require further analysis.
In terms of Dagger's attempt to expand his theory from providing justification to the practice of punishment to providing guidance on the appropriate amount of punishment, similar concerns arise, at least in the case of criminal disenfranchisement. Dagger first provides a justification of criminal disenfranchisement which is consistent with his general account: voting disqualifications may be imposed on offenders during imprisonment for violating “civic trust” which thus makes such restrictions “not a departure from justice, or a disqualification in addition to … punishment, but an element of … just punishment” (255). While this is consistent with the theory itself, the “fair play” principle does not seem to offer guidance as to why—among a number of existing sanctions that have a “civic” nature—is criminal disenfranchisement considered an appropriate restriction? Why not some other restriction—more lenient or harsh? Additionally, have all those who have been sanctioned with imprisonment violated civic trust equally to deserve disenfranchisement? Has every offender equally breached the rules of the game?
Finally, when it comes to the length of disenfranchisement, Dagger suggests that once punishment ceases, voting rights of criminal offenders should be restored, as they once again become fully cooperating members of political communities. To some extent this is puzzling because criminal offenders have, by disrespecting their political obligations, provided solid proof of their inability to be “fair players,” and the mere fact that their sentence has expired gives us no reason to believe that they will play fairly in the future (unless we believe that prison effectively rehabilitates offenders, which, judging from criminological research, we should not). This objection relates to Dagger's more general omission to establish conditions under which a citizen may be considered to have the capacity to engage in cooperative practices (he does inquire into the conditions that a polity ought to satisfy to be considered “reasonably just,” so there is every reason to look at the qualities of citizens as well). While we should probably expect most people to possess the required capacity, some people will certainly fail to understand that as a compensation for receiving benefits they should bear some burdens, and some such people will be criminal offenders. That they have “paid their debt” to society by serving punishment is a weak reason to consider them as having a capacity to engage in future cooperative practices.
In conclusion, Playing Fair is an excellent, enjoyable, and intuitively appealing read; it is one of the most refreshing accounts of the justification of punishment in recent years. While the focus on co-citizenship obligations as the basis of punishment is an interesting shift away from the prevailing notion of authority-based punishment, the basic tenets of the theory present a problem for the justification of punishment of all those who do not participate in tight-knit cooperative practices and the account still offers insufficient guidance for determining the appropriate “amount” of punishment. While this does not undermine the overall value and contribution of the book, it does raise some important issues that could be discussed in the future.
