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36 Different Chocolate Directives: How Does the Setting Influence Negotiation Outcomes in an EU Simulation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2026

Simon Fink
Simon Fink*
Affiliation:
University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstr. 21, Bamberg, 96045, Germany
*
E-mail: simon.fink@uni-bamberg.de
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Abstract

The article analyses how the setting of EU simulations influences negotiation outcomes, that is, the content of the simulated directives. We have played the same simulation of the chocolate directive – the same roles and the same Commission proposal – in various settings (with different kinds of participants, various group sizes, for one or two days, with instructors or participants playing the European Parliament (EP)). A quantitative analysis elucidates relations between settings and outcomes we would not see when considering only one simulation at a time. First, the simulation scales well. Simulation duration, number and kind of participants have little impact on the range of outcomes. Second, the directive is more liberal if participants play the EP, indicating that our instructors play the EP too tough. Third, Swiss participants negotiate stricter and more consensual directives. These results can inform the further evolution of the simulation based on hard data.

Keywords

simulationsteaching and learningproblem-based learningactive learning

Information

Type
Symposium
Information
European Political Science , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , September 2015, pp. 241 - 253
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 European Consortium for Political Research

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material

The online version of this article (doi: 10.1057/eps.2015.21) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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