Deborah S. Cornelius's Hungary in World War II: Caught in the Cauldron is reminiscent of much of the existing literature on the history of Hungary during this conflict. Like Stephen D. Kertesz in Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia (South Bend, IN, 1953) and former U. S. Ambassador to Hungary John Montgomery in Hungary: The Unwilling Satellite (Morristown, N.J., 1993), Cornelius emphasizes Hungary's lack of agency as a small state situated between two powerful neighbors. The book starts from the premise that Hungary's “geopolitical situation in Central Europe . . . predetermined her participation” in World War II (5). Cornelius argues that the country's alliance with Nazi Germany was all but inevitable, especially given Hitler's willingness to help Hungary recover some of the territories it lost in 1918. Throughout, she ascribes prominence to the actions and inactions of larger European states, particularly Germany and the Soviet Union, and implies that forces beyond Hungary's borders were responsible for many of the country's experiences during the war.

The chronological and topical scope of Cornelius's work is in fact much more expansive than her title reveals. She covers World War I and interwar antecedents at length and dedicates a chapter to postwar developments. Thus, the monograph in fact considers roughly the first half of the twentieth century. Although Hungary in World War II gives ample attention to the well-established narratives of foreign policy and Hungarian-German relations, it also considers the less familiar topics of the home front, youth movements, and Hungarian populism. Cornelius's account of the destruction of the Hungarian Second Army at the Don River in 1943, juxtaposed against the tranquility at home, is one of the strengths of the work. The section effectively conveys the seeming contradiction in World War II Hungary that, prior to German occupation in April 1944, the country remained relatively prosperous and stable despite complete military ineptitude and decreasing political maneuverability. Cornelius also goes to considerable effort to situate the Hungarian story within a larger European framework.

Hungary in World War II suffers from some interpretive inconsistencies, especially concerning Regent Miklós Horthy, who is described as “impulsive and prone to hasty decisions” (35) yet with the foresight to remain at his post after German occupation in the hopes of obtaining a favorable peace settlement for the country at war's end (287). Cornelius makes heavy use of politicians' memoirs and at times she treats them uncritically. The discussion of the “Jewish question” in Hungary is similarly confusing. Cornelius emphasizes that the 1939 Jewish Law was not fully implemented by the government due to fears that removing Jews from certain industries would adversely affect the Hungarian economy (108). Regardless, hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews experienced persecution under the law, which set important precedents for more radical laws and, eventually, deportations and exterminations. Cornelius also claims that Reich Plenipotentiary to Hungary Edmund Veesenmayer's comment that Hungarian assistance was critical to carrying out Jewish deportations was “only partially true” (298). She points the finger at certain high-ranking individuals like László Baky and László Endre, largely absolving the Hungarian population of collaboration. In general, systemic anti-Semitism is given short shrift in the discussion of the “Jewish question.”

This book's potentially broad appeal as a synthesis makes it all the more unfortunate that the author and Fordham University Press seem to have put little effort into editing and standardizing the manuscript. On some occasions, Cornelius fails to introduce obscure historical actors properly. At other times, she describes the personalities of individual public figures at great length, weakening her modest attempts to include the experiences of average Hungarians. Furthermore, misspellings are scattered throughout the volume. The text refers to Count István Csáky, Hungary's foreign minister from 1938 to 1941, also as Csaky and Czaky, just one example of the abundant inconsistencies and errors.

Cornelius rightly points out in her introduction that many topics concerning World War II Hungary, even since the regime change in 1989, are “discussed only hesitantly or . . . not at all” (2). However, if historians are to reinterpret the standard narrative, they must break with Kertesz, Montgomery, and Cornelius's tradition and take the agency of small states seriously.