Merrilyn Thomas's monograph takes as its starting point the visit of a group of young Christians – herself among them – from Coventry to Dresden in 1965. Organised by Coventry Cathedral and, in the German Democratic Republic, by Aktion Sühnezeichen (‘Action Atonement’), ostensibly the project was as an act of reconciliation, achieved by the rebuilding of a church hospital destroyed by British bombing in 1945. This was only the surface of things. Thomas's achievement is to have conducted a forensic examination into the depths of what might be called the ‘hypo-sphere’ of Cold War politics. The usual rationale for such a visit – there is a valuable portrait included here of how Cold War hostilities extended down to ‘twinning’ and other schemes at local level – was as part of the GDR's campaign for recognition as a legitimate state. However, whilst this was usually priority number one for East German foreign policy, the Coventry-Dresden project was not used in this way. The author's contention is that the visit was used by the GDR leadership to adjust Church–State relations in its favour. A policy of Christian-Marxist dialogue was then being pursued by the State to weaken the Church – the only significant institution outside the totalitarian state. Bishop Gottfried Noth, whose diocese included Dresden, responded to this by advocating ‘silence’. In this context, the project pulled Church and State into co-operation, whilst the leaders of the Coventry party – themselves supporters of Christian-Marxist dialogue – were allowed to broadcast that message far and wide. It is also suggested that for the British side – on which Richard Crossman played a principal part – the visit was covertly supported for a similar reason. From this perspective, stability within the GDR was desirable not only to maintain peace in Europe, but as part of a long-term policy to erode the regime by opening it up to the forces of capitalism and liberal pluralism. The construction of this narrative is noteworthy in that much is achieved with evidence which is fragmentary and sometimes peripheral. In Britain, MI6 refused to break its conventional silence; in Germany, although insights were gleaned from the files of the Stasi, those of the body dealing with foreign intelligence (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung) were not open. Whilst two of the principal players were interviewed – Hans-Joachim Seidowsky, ex-Stasi, and Paul Oestreicher, formerly of the British Council of Churches and self-described ‘non-governmental’ envoy to the GDR – they both suffered from (it is inferred) a conveniently poor memory. Consequently, conjecture plays a significant part here, for example the ultimate authority for the project in Germany is traced to the top and Walter Ulbricht in this way. Although Merrilyn Thomas has been exhaustive in her research, probing in her analysis, and judicious in her conclusions, as she concedes it has only been possible to dispel some of the Cold War ‘fog’. Ultimately, the period is essentially enigmatic – to repeat Seidowsky's words ‘things were not how they seemed’.