Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2004
This dissertation concerns the role of specialization and asymmetric information in contributing to the rise of the American regulatory state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1
This dissertation was completed in 2003 in the Department of Economics at Washington University, St. Louis under the supervision of Sukkoo Kim (chair), Gary Miller, Douglass North, and John Nye.
Since Adam Smith, economists have recognized that specialization increases the gains from trade. Specialization is productive because it enables each of us to do what he or she does best. However, specialization also comes at a cost, because transaction costs must be overcome for us to capture the gains from trade.2
Wallis and North, “Measuring the Transaction Sector.”
Akerlof, “Market for Lemons.”
The forces of specialization clearly played an important role in shaping the United States economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Falling transportation costs brought about the integration of the national economy, leading to regional specialization and urbanization.4
Kim, “Economic Integration” and “Urban Development.”
Among economists, there is recognition (at least in theory) of the productive role that regulation can play in markets characterized by asymmetric information. However, economic historians and political economists have generally ignored or minimized its importance in their accounts of the emergence of the regulatory state. Much scholarship on the rise of regulation in American economic history emphasizes special interest motivations for regulation and their redistributive consequences.5
Hughes, Governmental Habit; Higgs, Crisis.
Niskanen, Bureaucracy; Kolko, Triumph of Conservatism.
The essays in this dissertation suggest that a better understanding of the emergence of the American regulatory state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may be obtained by taking explicit account of how specialization and asymmetric information altered the markets for many goods and services. Using examples from food, drug, and occupational licensing regulation, I attempt to show that, at least in some contexts, regulation emerged in response to problems of asymmetric information, and that regulation played an important role in making a market for certain goods and services. Although these examples may not characterize all regulations that were enacted at the turn of the century, I think they are sufficient to illustrate that specialization and problems of information were also important forces driving the rise of regulation during the Progressive Era.
The first essay in this dissertation is about the origins of state pure food regulation in the late 1800s. In this essay I argue that specialization and technological change in food production made it difficult for consumers to judge product quality and created opportunities for cost-reducing deception by firms. Reputation mechanisms may not have been effective in dealing with this asymmetric information problem because advances in science made it possible for firms to adulterate their goods in ways that were not easily perceived by consumers. State regulation of product labels therefore arose as a solution to this “lemons” problem regarding product ingredients because regulators had a comparative advantage over consumers in detecting food and dairy adulteration.
The available evidence is more consistent with this hypothesis than the main alternative hypothesis, which argues that pure food and dairy laws were enacted to increase the market power of the producers of “traditional” food items. Three pieces of evidence appear to support my claim. First, using city-level panel data on the prices of six “traditional” food and dairy items, I find no evidence that pure food and dairy regulations favorably affected the prices of these items. Hence, although producers of these traditional foods may have wanted regulation to increase their market power, the price evidence does not suggest that this occurred. Second, cross-sectional data on food consumption in different states reveals that the consumption of food items that were commonly adulterated was higher in states where pure food laws were stricter. I interpret this evidence as implying that pure food regulation played a role in reducing consumer uncertainty about product quality. Finally, qualitative and quantitative data on the political economy of the pure food movement suggests that certain consumer interests were at least as important as producer interests in determining the timing, enforceability, and comprehensiveness of pure food and dairy regulations. The fact that both consumers and producers were part of the political constituency in favor of pure food and dairy laws is more consistent with my hypothesis than with the alternative, because regulations that solve a lemons problem should benefit both producers and consumers whereas regulations that increase market power should only benefit producers.
The second essay examines the enforcement of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, the first major federal law regulating interstate commerce in food and drugs. Some scholars of food and drug regulation in America maintain that the fledgling Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was unsuccessful in enforcing the Pure Food and Drug Act because the way this law was written made it difficult for the FDA to prosecute offenders in court.7
Hutt and Hutt, “History.” Until the late 1920s, the organization that we know today as the FDA was the Bureau of Chemistry, an agency within the US Department of Agriculture. In 1927 the name of this organization was changed to the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration, and in 1930 it was shortened to the Food and Drug Administration. Henceforth, I shall refer to the Bureau of Chemistry as the FDA.
Coppin and High, Politics of Purity.
The evidence indicates that although the FDA was unsuccessful in enforcing the law through the courts, the FDA was still able to obtain compliance from firms in many segments of the food industry because it was able to offer benefits to producers in the way of product quality certification and direct assistance in improving product quality. By engaging in this kind of ex ante enforcement strategy, the FDA was able to circumvent problems associated with coercive ex post enforcement through the courts. Although it is difficult to determine whether special interests from industry “captured” the FDA, the evidence suggests that the FDA's enforcement work did not tend to confer exclusive advantages on incumbent firms. In particular, an analysis of the FDA's enforcement program generally shows that its ex ante enforcement efforts did not create barriers to entry. I interpret these facts as implying that industry did not “capture” the FDA (at least in the narrow sense of using the FDA to impose entry barriers) and that the FDA was reasonably effective in enforcing the law.
This analysis of the FDA's enforcement work is also suggestive of the broader role that regulators can play in shaping the markets for goods and services. The economic literature on regulatory enforcement has traditionally focused on the “cops and robbers” side of enforcement and generally does not analyze of alternative methods of enforcement and their long-run impact on the nature of the markets for goods and services.9
See Polinski and Shavell, “Economic Theory.”
The third essay deals with the rise of “professionals”—whom I define as individuals who acquired a university-based education as an integral part of their vocational training—and the emergence of occupational licensing regulation in the late 1800s and early 1900s. I argue that the expansion of specialized knowledge made it advantageous for individuals engaged in certain occupations to acquire a systematic university-based education. Hence, the university gradually displaced the apprenticeship as the primary vehicle for vocational training and professionals came to dominate many occupations. I also argue that the expansion of specialized knowledge contributed to the adoption of modern occupational licensing laws. Professional licensing regulations emerged in response to an asymmetric information problem that arose as specialization and the growing complexity of many professional services made it increasingly difficult for consumers to accurately discern service quality. Although market mechanisms may also help solve asymmetric information problems, the effectiveness of market solutions will depend on the nature of the service being transacted, the ability of buyers of the service to determine quality, and the ability of sellers of the service to signal quality. Licensing laws that specified the qualifications needed to practice certain occupations were a partial solution to this asymmetric information problem, particularly for those services where market mechanisms were less likely to be effective in guaranteeing quality.
If licensing laws were adopted to solve the asymmetric information problem, then “stricter” licensing laws should be adopted for those occupations where the asymmetric information problem was such that market forces were less likely to work effectively to assure consumers of service quality. Hence, to test this hypothesis, I examined cross-occupational variation in the strictness of occupational licensing laws to see if stricter licensing laws were indeed adopted for those occupations where market forces were less likely to be effective. I measured strictness in a variety of ways: by comparing the provisions of state licensing laws for different occupations, by a detailed analysis of the licensing laws for two major professions (law and medicine), and by exploiting cross-state variation in the timing of these laws to econometrically estimate the effect of these laws on entry into 11 different occupations. In general, I found that stricter laws were adopted for professions such as medicine where market forces were least able to guarantee quality and that less strict laws were adopted for architecture, engineering, teaching, law, and other professions where market forces were likely to work reasonably well. I interpret this evidence as being consistent with the hypothesis that licensing laws were a partial solution to the asymmetric information problem that arose in the markets for increasingly specialized services.
My econometric analysis of the effect of regulation on entry also allowed me to test the main alternative hypothesis that has been advanced to explain the origins of occupational licensing laws—that these laws were enacted to serve as an entry-barrier.10
See, for instance, Moore, “Purpose of Licensing.”