During the last decade, the convergence-versus-divergence debate has engaged the attention of comparative corporate governance scholars. The proponents of the convergence approach assert the idea that globalization and factors of competition would inevitably drive corporate systems around the world towards the optimally efficient endpoint of the shareholder-oriented corporate governance model with dispersed outside shareholding in companies. Such a model presently exists at best in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), with shareholding of companies in most other countries largely witnessing concentrated shareholding held by insiders. Sceptics, on the other hand, point to various path dependencies that would cause countries’ corporate ownership structures and governance norms to persist, thereby militating against the convergence thesis. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the discourse has become enmeshed in emotion and grandiloquence. While the debate is yet inconclusive, any hopes of a resolution have faded in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, which has engulfed the so-called outsider economies.
Given this background, The Globalization of Corporate Governance is a refreshing and timely contribution to this area of scholarship as it adopts a balanced approach, and is devoid of emotion or pontification. Rather than advocate either convergence or divergence as the end result, the authors prefer to employ a clinical analysis of various factors of globalization and their impact on corporate governance systems. Their principal thesis, which they demonstrate through analysis in the course of the book, is that even when factors of globalization aim to produce uniform outcomes for corporate governance systems, the result is the generation of very uncertain outcomes. National corporate governance systems are unlikely to react similarly to common external stimuli. In a departure from the conventional convergence debate that focuses on neoclassical equilibria (whereby in a single perfectly competitive market, models of corporate governance will compete against each other and the most efficient among them will prevail), the authors employ institutional analysis as the theoretical frame of reference by reviewing the various institutional subsystems that embed each corporate governance system. Using a multidisciplinary approach that encompasses law, finance, economics, and history, the authors analyse the effect of globalization in the outsider systems of the UK and US and the insider system of Germany.
The book is divided into two parts. “Part 1: Theorizing Corporate Governance Change”, consisting of four chapters, lays down the theoretical framework within which the transformation of corporate governance systems due to globalization will be observed. It begins with a discussion of various theories that describe the nature of the corporation, resulting in two broad conceptions, viz. the shareholder-oriented approach and the stakeholder-oriented approach. A notable omission in this discourse is the team production theory that has currently made some inroads as an alternative to the agency theory.Footnote 6
The authors then establish the institutional context within which change can be observed: the institutional subsystems identified are corporate law, the financial system, the industrial relations system, and subsystems relating to the government demand function, particularly competition and effective demand. The agnosticism expressed as to the role of corporate law in affecting corporate governance tends to defy the tenets of mainstream corporate governance scholarship. That may perhaps arise out of the narrow scope within which corporate law is examined, because the globalization of securities markets and the market for corporate control are found to apply pressure for transformation into outsider corporate governance systems. It is a different matter that the authors question whether law impacts corporate governance systems at all as they constantly challenge the “law matters” thesis propounded by La Porta, et al., though without engaging in any extensive discussion or reasoning that justifies such assertion. Other significant institutional factors such as interest-group politics (and rent-seeking) and culture do not find mention in the principal analysis although they are said to be powerful determinants of corporate governance systems.Footnote 7
Using the theoretical framework established earlier, “Part 2: Observing Change and Transformation in the UK, US, and Germany” takes the reader through a historical sojourn discussing turns of events impacting corporate structures and governance in these countries. The first two chapters in this section compare and contrast developments in the UK and US. While claims regarding commonalities of corporate structures and shareholder-orientation in these systems due to shared institutional history are not altogether novel, the abundance of discussion regarding the factors which were at play during various points in time that resulted in both these jurisdictions adopting outsider models is useful. Although literature in this area has been dominated by the Berle and Means account of separation of ownership and control that was prevalent in the early part of the twentieth century, the authors here adopt a more nuanced approach and trace subsequent developments which reveal several twists and turns in shareholder-orientation, with the UK and US emerging as shareholder-oriented outsider systems only by the end of the 1980s.
A strong insider-orientation in Germany’s corporate governance system is compounded by the role of employees through co-determination and works councils and that of banks that double up as shareholders as well as creditors. However, as the authors detail in two subsequent chapters, forces of globalization and regionalization (through pressures to conform to the European Union model) have caused elements of outsider models to be transplanted to Germany. Nevertheless, their interaction with path dependence has produced mixed outcomes with the continued existence of co-determination and bank control, albeit in different and more flexible forms. In other words, while globalization has induced changes within the German corporate governance system, it is not being perceived as a transformative event and it does not look as though the move towards an outsider system has occurred in Germany.
The Globalization of Corporate Governance comes at an appropriate moment. At a time when the authors appear to have been giving final touches to the book, the global financial crisis put paid to optimism that favours complete convergence. Although it is premature yet to hazard a guess as to the path this will drive the convergence-versus-divergence debate towards—and the authors deftly steer clear of that question—the book provides an elegant platform for furthering research in the field. Moreover, despite the limited frame of reference in the work that covers the two outsider economies of the UK and US and the one insider economy of Germany, the tool of institutional analysis and methodology used by the authors is capable of replication in other insider economies as well with suitable adjustments, particularly those that adopt the bank model of corporate governance, thereby enlarging its contribution. The book is evidently the fruit of painstaking research by the authors. The authors’ thesis and arguments are extensively supported by theory as well as empirical data, and the use of graphs and tables to enunciate principles is particularly helpful. A remarkable reflection of the book’s multidisciplinary nature lies in the fact that its content and style obscure its authorship by professors from the discipline of law. One may always bemoan the absence of reference to a particular theory or the use of a particular type of institutional analysis, but that does not in any way take the sting out of the completeness of this work. Overall, The Globalization of Corporate Governance is a book that should find its place in the library of anyone with an interest in corporate governance, particularly of the comparative variety.
