My right to free speech does not imply your duty to listen. When people cannot avoid listening, the Supreme Court has sometimes ruled that there is no right to speak. In Frisby v. Schultz, for example, the Supreme Court held that states may ban residential picketing. “Although in many locations,” the justices declared, “we expect individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, the home is different.” This privilege to avoid speech clearly extended to speech that in other circumstances would enjoy the highest degree of constitutional protection. Residential picketers, the Frisby Court indicated, have no more right to shout obscenities than to read from the Federalist Papers.
Patrick M. Garry superficially seems committed to extending this right to escape from unwanted speech. His Rediscovering a Lost Freedom: The First Amendment Right to Censor Unwanted Speech insists that Americans in a media age have lost their capacity to avert their eyes. Positive government action, he insists, is necessary for individuals to regain control over their speech environments. What begins as promising and intriguing advice, however, turns into a fairly unoriginal attack on speech that presently merits constitutional protection. Rather than defend a right to censor speech that particular citizens find offensive, Garry too often veers into advocating limitations on speech he finds offensive.
Rediscovering a Lost Freedom details how Americans at the dawn of the twenty-first century are consistently exposed to expression they find distasteful and often disgusting. People watching their favorite football team on television inevitably witness vacuous political ads and commercials proposing that they act immediately to increase their sexual virility. Keeping children off the internet is next to impossible, given the high percentage of school assignments that require surfing. Blithe claims that individuals can do without the media or the internet in this age are unrealistic. Rediscovering correctly notes that “averting one's eyes is completely disconnected from the realities of the modern media world” (7). “Offensive speech,” Americans have learned to their sorrow, “can appear anywhere and at anytime, with little advance warning” (3). Averting one's eyes on highways is rather difficult when, at first glance, one may not be able to tell the difference between a sign announcing the next exit or that one's children are doomed to eternal damnation.
Much of this speech seems far removed from the original purposes of the First Amendment. Garry observes that “the vast majority of contemporary media speech is mere entertainment, which is essentially a mass-produced commodity, no different from a set of golf clubs or a new CD player” (5). Worse, the volume may be harmful. “By flooding individuals with inane, ugly, and indecent speech,” Rediscovering complains, the media have “dulled their senses and diminished their ability to discern quality, much less truth” (25). At the very least, these observations suggest, citizens should have a right to avoid speech when the only countervailing interest is the interest of a media corporation in increasing the bottom line.
The best sections in Rediscovering make sensible suggestions that would enable Americans to regain a degree of control over their speech environment without sacrificing any first amendment rights. Better filters for the internet might prevent orgies from appearing on the screen whenever one mistypes a web address. Giving consumers the power to purchase more cable channels separately would also promote consumer sovereignty without preventing speakers from engaging willing listeners. Garry has a free speech interest in selling his book for $29.95, rather than enabling persons to buy individual chapters at ten dollars each. The local cable company's decision to force me to buy ESPN and Fox News for fifteen dollars rather than purchase ESPN for ten dollars seems to be based entirely on profit margins.
Problems result when Garry attempts to limit the speech parents and others might wish to censor. He insists that “because of the primacy of political speech within the First Amendment, it cannot be subject to any governmental infringement, even if that infringement is done for the sake of facilitating a private right to censor” (113). Frisby and captive audience cases demonstrate that claim is mistaken. Speech that is otherwise constitutionally protected may be banned in circumstances where constitutional authorities believe persons are forced to listen. Liberal parents should be as free to keep Rush Limbaugh's voice out of their house as conservative parents are to keep sex scenes on prime time television.
Mistakenly excluding political speech from the right to exclude, Garry then defines political speech very narrowly so as to give communities and individuals maximum power to censor speech he finds offensive. Although he asserts that “the private-right-to censor model does not deny First Amendment protection to non-political speech” (122), Garry's analysis for permitting individuals to censor such speech is nearly identical to the standard arguments for permitting government to ban such speech. If one accepts the notion that “the vast majority of media entertainment has no such social significance or importance” (8), then little reason exists for providing such speech with any protection. Rediscovering insists that “no one has ever been able to prove what valuable truth has been produced by pornography of the type that appears in Larry Flynt's Hustler magazine” (19). Such an assertion, if correct, justifies prohibiting Hustler, or at least not affording constitutional protection to journals of that ilk. In the absence of any explanation as to why the speech Garry detests should enjoy any degree of constitutional protection, his book often has the feel of an essay by a militant pro-life advocate defending the constitutionality of bans on partial birth abortions using premises that support overruling Roe v. Wade.
The last chapter in Rediscovering, which attacks federal court decisions using the first amendment to protect violent video games, highlights how far that work drifts from its stated concern with promoting private rights to avoid unwanted speech. A good case can be made that “the ‘speech’ of video games is nothing like the kind of speech meant to be protected by the Framers” (142). This premise, however, justifies regulations of video games that go far beyond ensuring that they are not forced on parents or children. Parents may not have complete control over the video games their children play, but keeping violent video games out of the house is far easier than limiting access to the internet or soft porn reality shows on prime-time television.
Consumer sovereignty is a central principle of the first amendment. As Garry notes, “the First Amendment speech clause is about individual control” (27). Subject to a set of contested limitations, individuals have the right to advocate their ideas in whatever manner they believe is most persuasive. A first amendment right to avoid unwanted speech should be similarly rooted in the principle of consumer sovereignty. Where feasible, persons ought to have as much right to avoid being exposed to George Bush or Hillary Clinton as they do to avoid advertisements for Viagra or violent video games. Rediscovering a Lost Freedom, unfortunately, combines some sound proposals to increase personal and parental control over speech environments with some very conventional conservative arguments against contemporary culture. By doing so, Garry distracts readers from the merits of his more reasonable suggestions.
