Although tolerance is typically characterized as an ideal that is taught, preached, promulgated, and sometimes fought for, Wendy Brown argues that it is neither a universal value nor an impartial practice. Instead, tolerance “designates certain beliefs and practices as civilized and others as barbaric, both at home and abroad; it operates from a conceit of neutrality that is actually thick with bourgeois Protestant norms” (7). Moreover, its grounding on individual moral autonomy allows the deployment of tolerance in ways that can block the attainment of substantive equality and freedom. Brown argues that invocations of tolerance function to depoliticize conflict. First, tolerance discourse portrays group conflict as a natural or inherent hostility rooted in religious, ethnic, or cultural differences, which are themselves essentialized, rather than recognized, as socially and historically constituted. Second, the solution to conflict is suggested to be attitudinal or behavioral change in the personal sphere, rather than equality or justice in the public sphere. “A justice project is replaced with a therapeutic or behavioral one” (16).
For Brown, then, below the surface, tolerance is ultimately a discourse of power. Although it is a middle road between suppression and assimilation, it manages threats represented by difference by maintaining that difference. “What is tolerated remains distinct even as it is incorporated” (28). Historically, where liberal equality is premised on sameness, tolerance is grounded on difference. Hence, tolerance functions as a supplement to liberal equality, as a tool for managing that which cannot or should not be made the same, even as the discourse of tolerance itself “produces the differences it seeks to protect” (47). Brown's point is well illustrated by her discussion of the “Jewish question” in postrevolutionary France. Jews were to be citizens individually rather than as members of a corporate subcommunity. When their religious identity was privatized, however, they became racialized, or Jews independently of belief or practice who were still marked as Jews. Thus, “Political and civic tolerance … emerges when a group difference that poses a challenge … must be incorporated but also must be sustained as a difference: regulated, managed, controlled” (71).
Expanding upon Foucault's conception of “governmentality,” or the use of formally nonpolitical forces and institutions to organize and manage citizens, Brown argues that “Tolerance discourse masks the role of the state in reproducing the dominance of certain groups and norms” (84). Grounded on assumptions that citizenship is passive and that individuals are isolated by their aversions to one another, “tolerance is countenanced not to dissolve the hatred but only to forestall the crime” (88). Moreover, through invocations of tolerance, government manipulates citizens into managing each other. In the months after September 11, 2001, for example, the United States government called for tolerance while simultaneously abrogating civil liberties and rights for individuals suspected of terrorism. “The state issues calls for tolerance not because it is or can be tolerant, but so that we will be and it does not have to be—so that it can act like a state” (101). Ultimately, then, the discourse of tolerance can function to legitimate some kinds of state violence.
Brown's longest chapter (42 pages) is a critique of the presentation of tolerance as a discourse of depoliticization at the Los Angeles Museum of Tolerance, founded in 1993 by the Simon Wiesenthal Center. She then addresses the ostensible opposition in tolerance discourse between culture and individual moral autonomy. Because liberal tolerance valorizes choice in matters of belief, culture, and even ethnic membership, tolerance is too often thought to require liberalism as its precondition. But when we regard culture as an object of private choice by individuals who are outside of and above culture in a constitutive sense, we also depoliticize culture, failing to recognize that liberalism is itself a cultural form, and an impure one at that.
In the end, argues Brown, the liberal conception of tolerance eventuates in a “civilizational discourse,” in which “liberalism acquires moral superiority through its ability to tolerate in its midst those thought not to be able to tolerate liberalism in their midst” (187, emphasis added). But if the compulsory veiling of women in some Islamic societies is not a choice, by what logic, Brown asks, is the often skimpy attire of American teenage girls a reflection of free choice? “What makes choices freer when they are constrained by secular and market organizations of femininity and fashion rather than by state or religious law?” (189). Controlling cultural norms can limit freedom and manage subjects nearly as readily as legal ones. Although tolerance is certainly preferable to violent conflict, tolerance, whether conferred or withheld, imputes superior standing to those who are tolerating—or not tolerating. Although Brown would not reject or replace tolerance, she wants to promote more widespread intelligence about its function as a discourse of power and control.
Brown offers a provocative and valuable account of the little-noticed functions of tolerance. Grudging tolerance is often compared unfavorably to respect or affirmation. William Galston has stated, however, that “In the real world, there is nothing ‘mere’ about toleration” (Liberal Pluralism [Cambridge University Press, 2002], 120). And I have stated elsewhere that the freedom-of-conscience model, grounded in the value of individual choice, is “the ‘gold standard’ of liberal toleration” (Becoming Free [University Press of Kansas, 2001], 139). Brown implies that any “gold standard” is, in fact, necessarily tarnished: tolerance is always conferred by some entity that has the power to set its terms.
As we have seen, a central feature of Brown's account is the ostensible opposition that liberalism poses between culture and individual moral autonomy. Here, Galston would be in agreement with Brown's critique, as would theorists such as Chandran Kukathas, John Tomasi, and to some extent Jeff Spinner-Halev. This critique prompts some reflections, however, that I imagine might be shared by other theorists such as Amy Gutmann, Stephen Macedo, Eamonn Callan, and to some extent Will Kymlicka. First, if, as Brown states and I agree, liberalism is itself a culture, why should its emphasis on choice not be respected like any other artifact of a particular culture? Although the market may shape secular liberal culture in ways that thoughtful liberals see as unhealthy, surely there are thoughtful citizens in Islamic societies who question the setting of cultural norms by the state or religious law. Cultures are not monolithic. Members of all cultures should, in theory, be able to champion what they view as positive features of both their own and other cultures, while simultaneously recognizing the faults of both. In my view, the imperfections of one culture do not delegitimize possible criticisms of other cultures.
Second, all cultures necessarily espouse some values at the expense of others. Criticizing John Rawls and Michael Sandel, Bonnie Honig states, “Each depoliticizes remainders and treats the other as an outside agitator who comes from somewhere else to disrupt an otherwise peaceful and stable set of arrangements,” failing to recognize that their political and institutional arrangements themselves produce and construct these “remainders” (Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics [Cornell University Press, 1991], 10). As with Brown, in other words, differences are not necessarily essential but are socially and historically constituted. But every culture's instantiation of its values will necessarily create some remainders. What is needed is a reformulation of the discourse of tolerance, a repoliticization that heightens our awareness of the difference between tolerance and justice. This book is a crucial step toward the achievement of that end.
