Cheng Chen's study of liberal nationalism in postcommunist states is a path-breaking volume that analyzes with great erudition the important subject of the lingering legacies of Marxist-Leninism on postcommunist states. A central focus of Chen's study is to what degree the Leninist legacy will harm, or assist, in the successful emergence of liberal nationalism and, by extension, a consolidated democracy. Following an extensive and thorough discussion of the theoretical literature on nationalism and communist systems, Chen then focuses on four different country case studies: Russia, Hungary, Romania, and China. Chen convincingly argues that where there was a greater fusion of Leninism and nationalism (as in Russia), the chances of liberal nationalism (and democracy) are least likely. In Hungary, where the fusion of Leninism and nationalism was least implemented of the four country case studies, there is the greatest possibility of the consolidation of liberal nationalism. Romania and China lie between these two poles, with Romania moving toward liberal nationalism and China moving toward a post-Leninist authoritarian state.

Leninism and nationalism existed in constant tension in all communist states. Chen discusses factors that can lead to rising nationalism, such as minorities and economic crises, but concludes that they would not necessarily lead to a growth in illiberal nationalism. Russia, for example, underwent a profound economic crisis in the 1990s but is experiencing its greatest growth in illiberal nationalism during a period of economic growth since 2000 (as is China during its economic boom). According to the author, “Post-Leninist nationalism could therefore become more illiberal either in a time of economic success or hardship—economy does not tell us much about the specific outcome” (p. 213). Chen falls back on the communist era's nation-building policies as best explaining the type of nationalism (illiberal or liberal) to emerge in the post-Leninist era.

Of the four country cases, Hungary's and Romania's communist regimes adopted diametrically opposite nation-building strategies. Hungary's nationalism was crushed during and after the 1956 uprising by the Warsaw Pact's invasion and repression of “counterrevolutionaries.” Hungary also differed from Romania in not possessing minorities. The Janos Kadar regime (1956–89) sought to depoliticize its citizens, divert their interests from politics to consumerism and thereby obtain passive acquiescence. The 1989 revolution in Hungary was “rapid and almost painless” (p. 188) led by reformers in a Communist Party whose leader was the most popular in Central-Eastern Europe. The Kadar regime gave full external support to the USSR while being permitted flexibility in its domestic ideological policies. In the post-Leninist era, Hungary's successor Communist Party was the first in Central-Eastern Europe to reform into a social democratic party, and liberal nationalism rapidly established itself as the dominant form of Hungarian nationalism. Romania's communist regime took an opposite path of foreign policy independence from the USSR while instituting a dogmatic and repressive national Stalinism at home. National Stalinism was intolerant of the Hungarian minority and fused Romanian nationalism with Leninism. As Chen writes, “In a sense, Leninism could be seen as an extreme version of a collectivist and integralist politics that had been implicit in Romanian nationalist discourse since 1848” (p. 157). Post-Leninist social democrats aligned with extreme nationalist parties such as Greater Romania (PRM), which at its peak obtained a third of the popular vote.

China and Russia represent two additional case studies where communism was introduced through indigenous revolutions. In China, nationalism had always been present in Chinese communism, Chen believes, because of the fusion of national liberation and Leninist ideologies. The “Sinification” of Leninism was evident throughout communist rule in China in its domestic and foreign policies, and nationalism was present through an illiberal worldview, irredentism, authoritarianism, “xenophobic narcissism,” and a memory of victimhood and humiliation (p. 123). Leninism and nationalism were never fully fused and, with minorities a small percentage of the total population, post-Leninist illiberal nationalism has greater influence on foreign rather than domestic policy. Chen sees growing nationalism, racism, and xenophobia in Russia as evidence of the historic fusion of Leninism and nationalism that has produced a robust illiberal nationalism in the post-Leninist era. Alone of the 15 Soviet republics, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (SFSR) had no republican institutes, with only Soviet institutions in Moscow. “Russia” and the Soviet Union were therefore fused, and Russians looked upon the USSR as their “homeland.” The Russian SFSR was the only republic never to declare independence from the USSR, and Russia's “independence day” is based on its June 1990 declaration of sovereignty, which was economic and political, unlike national sovereignty proclaimed by the non-Russian republics. The Boris Yeltsin era in the 1990s witnessed little attempt at instituting civic (liberal) nationalism, and from the mid-1990s, illiberal nationalism had moved from the extreme right to also dominate democrats and communists. Under Vladimir Putin's presidency (2000–2008), illiberal nationalism was given greater encouragement, with Russians choosing an autocratic great power state over the democratic “chaos” of the 1990s. Chen concludes that “the success of liberal nationalism in Russia remains a remote scenario” (p. 92).

Two areas that are missing from this otherwise excellent study are the existence of national minorities and external factors in shaping the direction of nationalism toward liberal and illiberal outcomes. The quick success of the consolidation of liberal nationalism in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary could be due to an unexpected by-product of Joseph Stalin's rule over his outer Soviet empire. All three countries became mono-ethnic states after World War I and II (Hungary) or World War II (Poland, Czech Republic), and the absence of national minorities removed the grounds upon which nationalist forces could draw popular support. Poland and Hungary both had poor precommunist policies toward minorities. The European Union's offer of membership has been a major factor in assisting reform laggards, such as Romania (and Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia), in overcoming major domestic obstacles. Without the EU, it is unlikely that the nationalism that came to triumph in Romania and Bulgaria would have been liberal.

Chen's book is a masterful study of the interplay between Leninism and nationalism, a complex problem. I heartily recommend it for scholars of postcommunist politics, comparative politics, and nationalism.