Historiography and Analytical Theory

While discussing a newly published book, The Natural History of Work, by the physician and labor expert Leopold Besser, the Prussian conservative social magazine Berliner Revue declared in one of its first issues, in 1855, that “social policy recognizes God’s order in the entirety of creation; not merely in the laws of nature but also in those laws on which the life and growth of society rests. It [social policy] originates in the conviction that it is the obligation of the individual, as well as of the government, to obey those natural and social laws in which God’s will is revealed.” ^{Footnote 1}

Many scholars who have written about the social politics of nineteenth-century German conservatism do not seem to have assigned adequate attention to religious motivation as a factor in the formation of conservative social policy or in the conservative social worldview. Indeed, the religiosity of conservatives, the hardcore of whom belonged to the Prussian agrarian aristocracy, occupies a significant place in explaining the cultural background of the supporters of tradition and defenders of the hierarchical social order. The Christian religion has received little consideration as a mainspring behind the forging of conservative social policy from the first half of the nineteenth century until the foundation of the German welfare state during the 1880s. In fact, the most extensive discussion of such ideas and policy, that of Hermann Beck, barely addresses the subject of religious motivation at all. ^{Footnote 2} Historians have tended to focus on political and social interests as the main incentives behind the politics of the conservative agrarian and bureaucratic aristocracy. This group sought to preserve the remnants of the eroding privileged status of the nobility through the modern state that gradually replaced the old Ständestaat. ^{Footnote 3} Others have contended that the endorsement by bureaucrats—many of them of aristocratic descent—of the authoritative state made conservatives turn toward social policy. Still other scholars have pointed toward the “bourgeois” nature of part of this policy, which was intended to create self-disciplined and responsible individuals. ^{Footnote 4}

In other words, most discussions about the religious dimension of the conservative Sozialpolitik seem to focus mainly on its “defensive” or even tactical nature. The few works that do consider the influence of Christianity in molding social attitudes prior to 1871 were published sixty years ago and cover only specific aspects. ^{Footnote 5}

I would like to suggest a different approach toward examining the emergence of conservative social policy, from the time of the Vormärz (the years from 1815 to 1848) until the 1880s, one that attempts to expose the religious and moral origins of German conservative social and political thought. Such conservative thinking conceptualized social order, crisis, and solutions through the prism of Christian theological morality. I argue that it evolved over the course of a century, through the idea of the Christian State, into a comprehensive social system that culminated in Bismarck’s welfare policy. This by no means negates hitherto accepted historical interpretations; rather, it offers a reconsideration of religious and moral ideas as having a more active role than was previously thought. To demonstrate the applicability of my argument, I will utilize the conceptual metaphor theory of cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who suggest an alternative method for analyzing political discourse.

According to this theory, the ordinary conceptual system, within which people think and act, is metaphorical in nature. Mere reasoning is frequently metaphorical, as the essence of the metaphor itself is the understanding and experiencing of one specific category in terms of another. Thus, the metaphorical structure of meaning is directed toward a definite way of perception, in the sense that abstract ideas and thought are comprehended in terms of tangible concepts and categories of experience. The use of metaphors implying an “imaginative rationality” or, more explicitly, an “ordinary rationality,” is actually imaginative by nature. On the basis of this meaning of metaphors, and the actual use of metaphors in philosophical political discourse, it is evident that metaphorical reasoning is significant in the evolution of political concepts, social phenomena, and causality. ^{Footnote 6}

In another discussion, Lakoff demonstrates the applicability of specific metaphors to conservative and liberal political discourses in America in recent decades. According to his argument, conservatism is centered on the Strict Father model or metaphor, and thus conservative morality is based on the family (although Lakoff himself indicates that welfare ideas were not part of this morality). The association of family-based morality with that of politics rests on the conceptualization of the nation as a family, and the use of familial metaphors. These common and sometimes unconscious metaphors correlate closely with the metaphor of the government as parent. ^{Footnote 7}

I will attempt, therefore, to analyze the German conservative discourse with the assistance of these metaphorical aspects, and illustrate their importance in the development of a social policy concept throughout the century and up until the formation of the welfare state by Bismarck during the 1880s.

Several theories exist regarding the meaning of conservatism and its particular German version, as well as its social and political manifestations. Karl Mannheim wrote that “natural conservatism” (natürlicher Konservatismus) is a reaction to any attempt to change the existing reality, and therefore by nature is more psychological than political-ideological. ^{Footnote 8} Mannheim’s discussion of “modern conservatism,” however, seems to correspond with what Samuel Huntington defines as the “aristocratic theory” of this ideology. In this case, conservatism is presented as an ideological reaction to the French Revolution and is characterized by values such as feudalism, social status, and agrarian interests. ^{Footnote 9} German conservatives, though, were not a homogeneous group and were divided over a variety of issues. “Romantic,” “liberal,” and “realistic” conservatives, following Sigmund Neumann’s typology, were three groupings that existed simultaneously within German conservatism in the post-1848 period, each holding divergent views regarding the appropriate way to handle the new forces unleashed in the wake of revolution. ^{Footnote 10}

In this article I will try to consolidate the various meanings of German conservatism through an analysis of the dominant parental metaphor, ^{Footnote 11} and thus explore other common denominators that characterized the conservatives’ concept of society. Yet before elaborating on the parental metaphor, I will examine the more elementary familial one upon which the parental metaphor is based. I will then analyze the meaning of the parental metaphor in conservative social discourse and its association with the Christian State ideal. The practical dimensions of such discourse, especially in terms of actual policy and Bismarckian social legislation, will be the focus of the last part of the article.

The Familial Contours of Nation and Society

Although attempts to formulate political conservative theory were apparent before the French Revolution, the writings of the Prussian political theorist and literary critic Adam Müller seem to represent the beginning of a coherent, rather romantic, conservative ideology. ^{Footnote 12}

In a series of lectures published as a book, entitled Elements of Statecraft, in 1809, Müller discussed the metaphoric parallel between two social frameworks: the family and the nation. He states clearly that every political philosophy has to begin with the theory of the family, and the family is actually the first social structure in which God’s laws became evident. Marriage in its original and natural form is eternal and constitutes a variety of contradictions that are manifested similarly in the state: authority and love, rigor and tenderness. ^{Footnote 13} Understanding of the state as a familial structure appears again in Müller’s discussion of the household. He asserts that “the state household (Staatshaushaltung) of past times was like that of the extended family,” and envisages mutual social relations of people within the nation as analogous to the bonds that hold family members together. As in the family, so in the nation, equality does not exist and everyone has their own duties to perform, thus enjoying the feeling of belonging. ^{Footnote 14} The family, according to such a romantic perception, is described as the organic source of the state, and the rules that govern the family should be extended to their highest developed stage, the state. ^{Footnote 15}

During the 1830s, explication of the state as a family was reintroduced in the writings of the Prussian conservative jurist Carl Ernst Jarcke, who was also the first editor of the conservative weekly Berliner Politisches Wochenblatt (BPW), established in 1831. It voiced the opinions of a circle to which Catholic conservatives— such as Jarcke himself, Joseph Maria von Radowitz, and Carl Ludwig von Haller—belonged and collaborated with their Protestants counterparts, among them Leopold and Ludwig von Gerlach, Hienrich Leo, and Carl von Voß-Buch. ^{Footnote 16}

In his essay “Family, Society, State” from 1837, Jarcke asserts that the essence of the state is constituted from “familial and social elements.” However, the familial nature of the state is evident in the structure of rule. The father’s paternal authority is maintained through the natural evolution of the family into a tribal and political organization. Although the ruling position of the “founder” (Stifter) can also be understood through familial extension, Jarcke cites an additional reason for such an association. He explains that members of the social organization also want to retain this manner of authority because they desire to preserve their close relations and not have them disintegrate. Such a need “rests on deep and ineffaceable tribal and family love (Stammes- und Familienliebe).” ^{Footnote 17} These ties are similar to the original intimate setting that emerged at the very beginning of the family.

This metaphorical conceptualization of the nation was expressed also by Ludwig von Gerlach, the unofficial leader of Prussian conservatives in the 1848 Revolution. ^{Footnote 18} During the revolution he wrote that “nations, like families, never rise from below. As only fathers [can create] families, so only tribal fathers (Stammväter) and tribal princes (Stammfürsten) can establish or constitute states, authorities or nations.” ^{Footnote 19} According to this metaphor, authority lies in the hands of the family head and the head of state, and not of their members. And although all members of both the family and the state are subjected to a higher authority, they invest the entire group with a specific identity. However, the authoritative aspect that is bound to the metaphor of the nation as a family is always associated with the male authority, whether a monarch or a father. Following the traditional family ideal, the father is conceived as having the main responsibility for the family’s provision and protection—the same responsibility that grants him moral authority over his wife and children. This gender-oriented role also had religious origins and legitimacy. As explained by Bavarian conservative historian Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl in 1855, labor, and hence the responsibility/authority division, was commanded by God. It was discernible, according to Riehl, in the command of God to Eve in the Book of Genesis: “Your desire will be for your husband, and he will rule over you.” Adam, accordingly, was told: “By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food.” This Godly designation, following Riehl, sets the familial structure and the roles assigned by the Creator to the first family. ^{Footnote 20}

German conservatives adhered vehemently to the social familial-like organization of the state, since the indivisible relations between state and society governed the German political system throughout most of the nineteenth century, in contrast to the situation in other European states. In England, as Werner Conze argues, a clear separation between state and society had already taken place in the seventeenth century. The English government became the executive authority of society, which was represented in parliament through those who enjoyed political rights. In this manner the division between state and society established a constitutional reality that survived political and social crises and upheavals in the following centuries. In France, such a division was attempted during the 1789 Revolution but was not wholly successful. France underwent a continuous revolutionary process that destabilized the state until the Fourth Republic. In the German lands, however, the reign of absolutism continued well into the nineteenth century, and therefore German society was deprived of real autonomous status. Its organization and interactions were directed from above, through the absolute monarchy. ^{Footnote 21} And although Prussian conservatives, especially the agrarian aristocracy, rejected the idea of absolutism as a mechanistic apparatus, they continued to emphasize the organic development of society into a state, and held that any severance between them into two separate entities was unnatural. ^{Footnote 22}

The central place occupied by the family metaphor in conservative political discourse stemmed also from their understanding of the family, and consequently society and state, as organic bodies not created by the people’s will or consent, but through natural, moral, and historical evolution. The organic essence of these bodies was considered sacred and moral because it paralleled that of God. At this point, as the metaphors of family and father begin to bear clear moral connotations, another aspect of the conceptual metaphor theory seems relevant.

According to Lakoff, a moral system is a prism through which people view the world. Different moral systems produce categories that help people classify speech and actions as moral or not. Some metaphors imply a clear moral or immoral meaning regarding certain interactions. ^{Footnote 23} For example, anything associated with God or nature will usually be considered moral, and anything that appears to negate such associations tends to be deemed morally wrong. In the conservatives’ discourse, their perception of family, society, and state as organisms presupposed their sanctity a priori, thus revealing the very intimate association of religion and politics. This association was articulated in detail in the theories of Friedrich Julius Stahl, who, from the late 1840s, became the leading theoretician of German conservatism.

Stahl was born in 1802 into a Jewish family in Bavaria and converted to Protestantism at the age of seventeen. He studied law and became a professor of Roman law at the University of Würzburg. In 1840 he was appointed to a chair at the University of Berlin. During the 1830s Stahl developed his political and legal philosophy, which was published in two volumes as The Philosophy of Law. The agrarian aristocracy was suspicious of his constitutional ideas, and it was only after the publication of The Monarchial Principle in 1845, where Stahl reasserted the superiority of monarchial sovereignty, that he became the leading ideologist of Prussian and German conservatism. ^{Footnote 24}

In The Philosophy of Law, Stahl began to elaborate his Christian State ideal, a political and social organization intended to embody the values of the Christian religion. This model is part of his political theory, which rests primarily on Protestant theology and which evolved from a religious comprehension of the origins of the family into society, and then the state. He argued that the essence of what is organic is analogous to the “Personality of God” (Persönlichkeit Gottes), the same principle that organizes the world. The notion of God’s personality as organic is reflected in the image or metaphor of His powers: “As God expresses his own essence, the wealth and inner bond of his forces in one body, so the organic essence comes into being.” These forces, which according to Stahl are like different limbs, can multiply and develop freely. The concept of the nature of the organism is parallel to that existing in human beings, too, and exalts the organic development of life. ^{Footnote 25} At a later stage of his thesis, Stahl returns to the source of society’s morality: just as a person needs a body for his soul, so people need a kingdom—a political body that is the framework for lasting moral relationships in the family, state, and church and extends to property as well. The “body of the kingdom” (Leib des Reiches) is a means for God to lead people through history. Yet this metaphor of the body in relation to God is not physical but moral; it evolves through the actions of people and the natural relations between them, and is therefore a body in “the most actual manner.” Such relations are organic and embody the variety of social ties that exist in the family, society, and state. ^{Footnote 26} Hence, the apparent conclusion is that the family, among the other institutions mentioned, is a symbol of the moral relations sanctified by God. The family is also the metaphor representing the right morality: every action that defends familial-like relations is moral. The father, accordingly, bears responsibility for the appropriate and moral functioning of the family. In this regard Stahl reinforces the view that the cohesion of society is based on religious conviction and common Christian morality, values that also constitute the essence of the Christian State, as will be demonstrated further.

Paternalism as Parental Morality

Following the Strict Father metaphor, the father as a parent possesses moral authority in the family analogous to God’s authority, which endorses the entire moral system. As the authority figure, the father sets the standards of behavior, thus reflecting his care for the family. Metaphorically, the father figure is associated with God—with his authority, his requirement of obedience, and his care for those He created—and with the political ruler who possesses the same responsibilities toward his subjects. Authority and morality of this kind also have a broader social implication, as they allow a certain group or class to exercise power, since it is natural and moral. ^{Footnote 27} Conservative ideology that, especially in the German case, characterized considerable parts of the agrarian and bureaucratic aristocracy, seems to have developed in conformity with these hierarchical patterns.

Yet the familial and parental metaphor according to Lakoff’s theory was relevant not only in conservative political thought but in liberal thought as well. Indeed, not a few German liberals saw a close similarity between the family and the state. ^{Footnote 28} But in contrast to the conservative Strict Father metaphor, the liberal one had several different connotations. The liberal attitude was that of the Nurturant Parent model. Less inclined toward authority and hierarchy, this variant of the family metaphor interpreted interdependence and authority not as a result of specific status, but of the ability to nurture. In this system of familial relations, morality was expressed in empathy toward and nurturing of children and the needy. ^{Footnote 29}

However, liberal social concepts of the period deviated considerably from the Nurturant Parent metaphor. Indeed, liberalism was not a single set of ideas in either its American or European version. Some liberals on both sides of the Atlantic followed the classic principles that many associated with John Locke, and that included strict commitment to capitalist individualism. There were also reformist liberals—like the Progressives in America and the forerunners of social democracy in Europe—who defended the individual and the competitive capitalist economy but at the same time advocated stronger commitment of the state to regulation. ^{Footnote 30} Yet as the German historical case demonstrates, most liberals seemed to depart from any model of Nurturant policy. With a few exceptions, German liberals, such as David Hansemann and Heinrich von Sybel, were hostile to the idea of equality. Others believed that the state should limit its intervention in economic and social matters to a minimum, while a few, such as Johannes von Miquel, linked the relief of the suffering classes to the economic prosperity of the state. Nevertheless, although German liberals were conscious of the continuing “social question,” they did not produce any comprehensive social programs, ^{Footnote 31} and thus nurturing of the weak, as the metaphor about liberalism suggests, does not seem to correspond with the dominant aspects of nineteenth-century German liberalism.

In addition, not all German conservatives of that era were supporters of social relief policy. Members of the conservative journal Historisch-politische Zeitschrift, such as Ernst von Bülow-Cummerow, Johann Gottfried Hofamann, and Georg Wilhelm Keßler, defended Adam Smith’s theory and individual economic freedom rather than patriarchal welfare. ^{Footnote 32} Yet other German conservatives, as will be discussed below, realized that preserving specific elements of the “appropriate” social order depended on the performance of particular social functions—those that also appear as part of the Strict Father metaphor.

Carl Ludwig von Haller, mentioned above, was one of the most influential thinkers of German conservatism during the Restoration period that followed the Congress of Vienna. Although he was the son of an aristocratic Swiss family, Haller’s writings were highly appreciated by his German counterparts, and he frequently wrote in their press. His major treatise, Restoration of the State Science, appeared in six volumes between 1816 and 1834. ^{Footnote 33} Haller argued that the state of nature reflects the natural order created by God, and comprises social relations that are based on hierarchical interactions between rulers and ruled, masters and subordinates. The existence of might and natural primacy among a certain group of people correlates with the need for nutrition and protection. Such social relations may be expressed in a man’s authority over his wife, and the right of a father to command his children. Haller concluded, therefore, that where power and needs meet, dependent relations are created. ^{Footnote 34}

While Haller tried to save the remnants of the feudal ideal that was still part of the ethos of the German agrarian aristocracy during the Restoration years, his followers, especially Ludwig von Gerlach, sought to uphold this model of social relations in the emerging industrial economy. Ideas about the “feudalization” of capitalistic industrial relations appeared already in the late 1830s within the conservative circle behind the BPW, which also dealt with the “social question” (die soziale Frage)—a term given to the growing distress of widening parts of German society. Some writers in this journal, such as Josef Maria von Radowitz, Jarcke, and Gerlach, combined social awareness with ardent religious beliefs. During the 1830s these conservatives realized that the estate-based society, the Ständegesellschaft, was undergoing irreversible disintegration, while the final form of the new version of the industrial state and society did not yet seem clear. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that mechanization was an integral part of the modern economy and that the social conditions of the workers needed to be improved. Neglecting social distress might lead to revolution. It was essential, therefore, to provide the modern age with the “true” spirit of Christianity in order to defend against the destructive impact of secularization. For those conservatives, the solution to the “social question” lay in reforming the Ständestaat, thus reknitting the unraveling social bonds. In this regard, the feudalization of industry appeared as a possible remedy. Workers would not be separated from the factory owners, who would guarantee their rights and needs, as the feudal landlords had done in relation to their peasants. ^{Footnote 35} In metaphorical terms, the owners would function like fathers.

As one of the dominant personalities of German conservatism during and after the 1848 Revolution, Gerlach set the tone in various articles he published in the newly established conservative newspaper, Neue Preußische (Kreuz-) Zeitung. As a devoted Lutheran, he perceived industry and progress as compatible with God’s will, and, as such, factories should be conducted according to Christianity’s ideals of justice. The paternalistic system, then, should be applied also in factories and in relations between workers and employers. The factory, in Gerlach’s vision, would function similarly to a noble estate, where the workers would treat the factory owner as master and comply with his rules. The owner would be required to secure the workers’ material maintenance in cases of illness and old age, provide them with a savings program, limit the work hours of women and children, and allow all employees to rest on Sundays. ^{Footnote 36} Gerlach adhered to this paternalistic ideal even during the 1860s, and he still believed that in cases of necessity workers should be supported through charity, encouraged by energetic re-Christianization. ^{Footnote 37} This industrial-paternalistic ideal seems to exemplify the Strict Father metaphor. Accommodating principles and values associated with paternalism in a society that was undergoing a period of transformation as a consequence of the emerging capitalistic, industrial economy would preserve God’s authority and moral laws in a changing reality.

However, the conservative desire to apply the owners’ parental authority to the workers by changing to the feudal-paternalistic system could not materialize for several reasons. Above all, it was obvious, especially after 1848, that feudalism and paternalism as patterns of social relations between one authoritative personality and a group of people subordinated directly to their power was impractical and irrelevant. The revolutions in Prussia and other German states had turned each of them constitutional, although the sovereign still enjoyed considerable legislative power and, together with the bureaucracy, functioned as the main executive. ^{Footnote 38}

In the aftermath of the revolution, most German conservatives realized that political and social modernization was irreversible. With the consolidation of the Rechtsstaat, the feudal-paternalistic authority of the agrarian aristocracy, the Herrschaft, became primarily a symbol. As the status of that aristocracy continued to decline, and revolution was no longer a theoretical alternative, conservatives relied heavily on the state. ^{Footnote 39} It was the main agency that could ensure the appropriate social order by resolving the “social question” according to religious values. Yet the mere shift to the state authority was also a result of a different conceptualization of the state, one that was conceived in religious terms and that had already begun to crystallize during the years of the Vormärz.

The Christian State: Pietism and Moral Obligations

Unlike the absolutist state, which conservatives abhorred, their ideal was that of a state that embodied God’s laws and reaffirmed religious consciousness. It was conceived now as a moral agency in the service of Christian necessity. This development was part of an extended process—a religious awakening and renewed pietism that emerged after the Wars of Liberation and continued throughout the Vormärz period, corresponding to what Thomas Nipperdey called a “re-confessionalization of religion” (Rekonfessionalisierung der Religion). ^{Footnote 40} At the same time, however, the reemergence of the pietist movement helped strengthen the paternalist ideology in the more intimate and symbolic sphere of the manor house, as well as in the public one, the state.

While diverting from the course taken by the pietists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, those of the Restoration period were deeply engaged in the public and political sphere. This growing religious concern was shared alike by liberal and conservative circles, although it was experienced differently. Many German liberals of the period—such as Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, and Friedrich Jacobs—merged the renewed interest in religion with rising national sentiment. This national-religious synthesis, however, did not draw upon traditional Christian theology, either Protestant or Catholic. Rather, it had a more secular nature and became an “enlightened Christianity.” Although it adopted the rational approach of the Enlightenment and criticized orthodox theology, it did not concede the intimate and romantic facets of “true” religion altogether. These Protestant liberals had anticlerical attitudes but at the same time endeavored to retain authentic aspects of Christianity and the original bonds that coupled the German people with their religion. ^{Footnote 41}

Criticism of the church was also shared by German pietist conservatives, but from a different perspective. The latter thought that the church had developed sterile practices distorted by rational elements. Since most Prussian nobles were Lutherans, they followed Luther’s teaching that human reason was unreliable and that religious faith was the sole method of redemption. And while embracing the ideal of the priesthood of all believers, they tried to avoid regular church services held by pastors—whom they regarded as “nonbelievers” and “rationalists”—and conducted their own services, conventicles, often held in manor houses of nobles, together with lords, day laborers, peasants, and servants. But regardless of the apparent democratic nature of this religious practice, pietism in its conservative version, as demonstrated by Robert M. Berdahl, was not directed at transforming the hierarchical social order. The peitists followed Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms that regarded all as equal before God, but at the same time sanctified inequality as essential in the temporal world—a kingdom of authority and order created by God in order to command the sinful nature of man. It was He who destined everyone to a certain vocation in life, and thus any attempt to contest that position was a sin. In this respect pietism reinforced the paternalist ideal of domination by insisting on the preservation of the sacred structure of worldly authority, while at the same time mitigating this power with paternal charity. Revivalist Christians thus exercised religious devotion through charities and contributions, while Christianity itself was perceived as a form of agrarian community, based on a social, familial-like hierarchy. ^{Footnote 42}

This concept had a direct impact on the attitude of noble estate owners, especially in Pomerania, such as Adolf von Thadden, who were disturbed by the fact that not all noble estate owners performed their paternal (väterliche) duties toward their subordinates properly, although they were supposed to be a symbol of Christian charity. Other members of the agrarian aristocracy, such as the families of Senfft-Pilsach, Kleist-Retzow, the Below Brothers, and the Gerlachs, as well as Bismarck himself, were all inspired during this period by the Protestant conservative social ethic and transformed many estates into Christian communities. Accordingly, these landowners appeared to rule the residents of their lands like biblical patriarchs. ^{Footnote 43}

This concern with social and paternalist practices, however, led to a fusion of the worldly ideal of religion with the monarchial conservative sociopolitical order. And when Frederick William IV ascended the Prussian throne in 1840 and stated his wish to become a Christian sovereign, awakened pious conservatives directed their efforts at social reform into Prussian political life. Many of these pious conservatives believed that religious and moral obligations should be associated closely with social and political affairs. The Christian religious adherence of these Lutheran Protestants brought them also to sympathize with some parallel Catholic ideas. An “ultramontane element” was accommodated within their social worldview, and in Prussia, Catholic ideals of political romanticism won legitimacy with the monarch himself; in fact, one of his closest friends and advisers, who was also closely engaged with social theories of reform, was the Catholic Joseph Maria von Radowitz. Indeed, and especially in the first half of the nineteenth century and as part of the general religious revival, confessional differences between Protestants and Catholics were reduced considerably. Conservatives of both religions tried to underline their unitarian and complementary aspects while admitting that differences between them were inevitable since this was a period of transition in the history of Christianity, before the dawning of the age of Christian conciliation and the emergence of a united church. For some of them, especially those conservatives that gathered at the early 1830s around the BPW, such a confessional union could produce “evangelical Catholicity” (evangelische[n] Katholizität). ^{Footnote 44}

The indispensable correlation between politics and religion acquired its most coherent formulation through the Christian State ideal advanced by Stahl in his Philosophy, and particularly in his essay “The Christian State and its Relation to Deism and Judaism” from 1847. Stahl, it should be noted, was a member of the neo-pietist circle that emerged in Prussia and other German states in the first half of the century, and he participated in the conventicles. Like other pietists of the period, he believed in the Lutheran idea of two realms—the earthly one and God’s kingdom—but he did not consider them divided spheres. For him, Christianity and the idea of God were of practical importance in the transformation of the earthly order through the state. According to Stahl, the state had a duty to disseminate and implement Christian values. Since the state’s laws were grounded in ethics, and the basis of ethics was religion, the common religious conviction of the nation should be manifested in the state. In this regard the state was the revelation of the ethical spirit of the nation. ^{Footnote 45} But Stahl’s ideal of the Christian State also had clear modern and public features, considerably different from the feudal ones envisioned by Haller. The state in Stahl’s philosophy represented public authority. It was a “public matter” (öffentliche Sache), and thereby acquired a constitutional nature. ^{Footnote 46} Accordingly, from the late 1840s, the state as a public institution assumed paternalistic-constitutional authority through its head. The metaphor of the monarch as a parent, which had been used by the conservatives in an earlier period, persisted. Now, however, this metaphor preserved the paternal image of the modern state, not the feudal or absolutist one.

Based on their organic concept concerning the evolution of family into society and then to state, and the metaphoric use of the family in order to elucidate the meaning of social relations, conservatives envisioned the modern state as an entity founded on solidarity and interdependent relations, and not on the accomplishments of the individual. Stahl conceived of the association between the ständisch structure and the roles of each Stand (estate) within the state as unbreakable, with each performing specific functions. This reasoning accounts for why he and other conservatives did not revoke the role of the aristocracy altogether vis-à-vis the lower classes, even though they realized that the modernization of state and society was irreversible. Now, however, the concept was transformed. Stahl believed that the aristocracy should become more romantic and serve as a unique moral force. ^{Footnote 47} Similarly, Viktor Aimé Huber, a member of the Prussian conservative circle and professor at Berlin University between 1843 and 1851, also thought that the aristocracy should redefine its place and functions due to changing circumstances. As well as serving God and the monarch, the aristocracy should attend as much as possible to the materialistic, intellectual, and moral well-being of the working class. ^{Footnote 48} But as noted, it was the state authority that now played the main parental, paternalistic role.

One of the most influential voices regarding the paternalistic function of the modernized monarchy was that of Hermann Wagener. He was the first editor of Kreuzzeitung, and from 1857 he participated in publishing the social-conservative journal Berliner Revue (BR), founded in 1855. Between 1862 and 1873, he served as Bismarck’s adviser for social affairs. According to his understanding of the social problems of the age, the masses were asking for material support, but it would come neither from the “capitalists” nor the “oligarchy of the Junkers” (Junkeroligarchie). The state should be a “social monarchy” (soziale Monarchie)—a model introduced earlier by Lorenz von Stein—and not hesitate to fulfill their demands. The monarchy’s task, according to Wagener, was “to be the only solid refuge for the people’s prosperity,” while the monarch himself must act as the “savior and father of the masses” (der Retter und Vater der Massen des Volkes). ^{Footnote 49}

During the 1860s and 1870s, as part of his work as social adviser, Wagener proposed some social programs aimed at providing workers with basic social conditions through the state, ^{Footnote 50} and which bore a close correlation to the ideas of Ferdinand Lassalle, whom he knew and allegedly tried to introduce to Bismarck. Yet Wagener’s social worldview, like that of many other German conservatives, was closely interwoven with his political one. He was a supporter of the monarchial authority principle and believed in the traditional hierarchical structure of society. Indeed, he was deeply concerned about avoiding a potential revolution and therefore adhered to the idea of a paternalistic social monarchy that would rescue the poor and win their support for the king and the conservative cause, even through clear political manipulation. ^{Footnote 51} But Wagener was also a fervent Christian, who had joined the Londoner Catholic Apostolic Church, that of the Irvingians, in 1848. His religious beliefs were crucial in molding his political and social stance. Thus, for example, he criticized liberalism for its “antichristliche Weltanschauung.” ^{Footnote 52} And as Hans-Joachim Schoeps has argued, in order to assess Wagener properly one must seriously consider his religious background. ^{Footnote 53}

The social duties Wagener attached to property and to the idea of the social monarchy can also be ascribed to Christianity. In an address from 1861, published in the Preussisches Volksblatt, he stated that there was a need to form a social order that would not rest on everyone competing against one another but on the pervasion of the “Christian spirit.” ^{Footnote 54} And in a memorandum he wrote for Bismarck in April 1863, he expressed his view that in the struggle against the liberal Fortschrittspartei the monarchy had only one way to guarantee political freedom and independence, and that was through institutions based on Christianity. ^{Footnote 55}

The religious contours of Wagener’s ideal of the social monarchy, along with his political aim to avoid revolution, reflect another aspect of the Strict Father metaphor. Central to this parental model was the correlation between obeying authority and consequent rewards and punishment for disobedience. Yet, nurturing the subordinated was not only a means of guaranteeing their appropriate behavior as subjects. Rather, because needy people were like the children of the father-monarch, they obeyed his rules and thus deserved his support, which was an integral part of parental authority itself. As the Strict Father metaphor suggests, if everyone performed his own “natural” vocation, nurture and support would follow naturally without the continual evocation of punishment and fear of it. ^{Footnote 56}

According to the Strict Father metaphor, as exemplified in conservative thinking, authority and punishment were not intended to overlook nurture and cultivation. Training people and society as a whole to conform to rules and instructions from a higher authority—as parents usually do with children—was interpreted as a kind of caring in itself. Punishment for disobedience, in fact, reflected the care of the authoritative personality for the subordinated. According to Lakoff, if the latter (children) were disciplined and did not challenge the authority, there would be much nurturing and little need for punishment. ^{Footnote 57} Therefore, as long as the needy strata of society did not defy the legitimate Father-ruler, they were fully eligible to receive support from him.

Stahl’s philosophy seems to demonstrate the appropriate practice of the ruler and the state, which, ultimately, was supposed to benefit all. Unlike the earlier conservative theoreticians, he did not regard the state as the feudal domain of the monarch and drew closer to the idea of the Rechtsstaat. But in the political sense, too, he emphasized the parental-like obligations of the state’s highest authority, the monarch. In his Philosophy, he maintained that since the state was an “instrument of God” and existed under His providence, it was legitimized neither by the people’s will nor by that of the prince. However, there was a close congruence between the monarch’s conduct and that of the state. First, he declared that kings enjoyed a special status because they represented the general interests of the people they ruled. The monarch’s rights and limits in the use of them corresponded with the attainment of those interests. Stahl then clarifies that God did not subordinate human beings to the authority of individuals (that is, rulers), but created a higher order and institutions, and rulers were entitled to exercise their might solely within these structures. ^{Footnote 58} Continuing the Strict Father metaphor—although parents had full authority over and responsibility for their children, they still could not govern them in whatever manner they pleased. There was a higher system of values and morality that they had to obey.

Conduct that made the parental model of authority-subordination relations function in a manner more nurturing than punitive was required not just from the head of state, but also from those who owned property and enjoyed its ensuing power. The insurrection of the lower strata in the 1848 Revolution, which went far beyond the demand for German national unification, caused some conservatives to consider their own deficient behavior as property owners. Some of them, especially Gerlach, reminded their aristocratic associates of the peculiar nature of the landed nobility. This was not merely an altruistic statement but was aimed at preserving the privileged status of the agrarian nobility. Nevertheless, it reflected the ideals and ethos of the aristocracy and its responsibilities, so that the “appropriate” order of society was preserved. Gerlach argued that the importance of property should be assessed by its attendant social obligations and moral values, and much less by its materialistic worth. It was sacred only when those who possessed property acknowledged the role that derived from it. Property was a “duty endowed by God,” and only thus entailed political rights. ^{Footnote 59}

Gerlach was not alone. During the revolution, Heinrich Leo—the conservative historian from Halle who also belonged to the circle of the BPW—published a short series of articles in the conservative newspaper Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung. Under the title “Property and Its Adversaries,” Leo elaborated on the meaning of property possession. He suggested that ownership was first and foremost an “obligation” (Pflicht) and a “duty” (Amt), and only through these qualities could it endow the proprietor with rights. Leo made it clear that matters related to “obligations” and “duties” had a social nature involving the welfare of society as a whole. ^{Footnote 60}

Such behavior seems to comply with aspects of the Strict Father metaphor. But if we look closely at the theory of this metaphor, it appears there is another aspect that does not seem to conform to nineteenth-century German conservatism. Following Lakoff, any social or political system that rewards people who are unwilling to help themselves is immoral. Accordingly, people must depend upon their own abilities. They deserve to be helped if they are harmed by external adversity. ^{Footnote 61} In this sense, German conservatives conceptualized the transformation of the social order from a traditional into a more modern and industrial organization as an act caused by others, and thus justifying support for the weak. The BR, for example, regarded the social and economic reforms that began in Prussia in 1807 as a breakdown of the traditional organization that legitimated the economic ideas of Adam Smith. The liberal economy was harshly criticized for having caused social disintegration and reducing the status of land to that of goods traded in markets. ^{Footnote 62}

This viewpoint won further official expression through the State and Society Lexicon, published between 1859 and 1867 under the editorship of Hermann Wagener. While discussing the changing status of the nobility, the lexicon lists a series of political, social, and economic changes that brought about irreversible transformation. ^{Footnote 63} Most explicitly, the impression that everything around was crumbling appeared in a letter from Otto von Manteuffel, the conservative Prussian chancellor during the 1850s, to King Frederick William IV’s adjutant Leopold von Gerlach. The chancellor wrote that “following the dissolution of feudalism, the former structure of society has disintegrated, the authority principle has weakened and the princes have become isolated. Therefore, a means should be found to bring about a new coherence to this loose society.” ^{Footnote 64} Caring for the weak, according to the Strict Father metaphor, was thus applicable not just because it was a moral duty but also because the circumstances were independent of the conduct of the subordinated and required the intervention of authority holders.

The Praxis of Parental Authority: From the 1850s to Bismarck’s Social Policy

Bearing in mind the various aspects of the Strict Father metaphor and their manifestation in German conservative thought, the question remains whether those conservative ideas obtained any practical application. Indeed, it is not always possible to determine the motivation behind a specific act. It is essential, however, to consider the factors that might inspire and encourage people to perform certain deeds. The fact that conservatives initiated and supported social programs might not serve as ultimate evidence of their religious motives, but they cannot be overlooked.

Although in the Vormärz period social policy was hardly implemented, the aftermath of the revolution and the ensuing decades witnessed the employment of real measures by conservatives. During the Reaction decade that followed the 1848 Revolution, Manteuffel’s government tried to support the peasantry. In 1849 Manteuffel, while still Prussian minister of the interior, prepared two draft proposals regarding criteria for peasant ownership of land and extension of credit to independent farmers. These drafts were eventually ratified as laws in March 1850. The first law abolished all servile obligations to all forms of land ownership. Peasants could now convert manorial dues into rental money. The second law enabled peasants to raise financial resources to acquire agricultural independence through the setting up of loan banks that gave long-term, low-interest credit. ^{Footnote 65} During the same decade, however, the agrarian aristocracy managed to regain some of its privileges, although not for long. The noble estate-owners also won considerable political power through the establishment of the Prussian upper house, the Herrenhaus, in 1854. Nevertheless, conservative governments and legislatures in Prussia and other German states advanced social legislation. The Prussian lower house approved the government policy of supporting the guild system and thus helped reestablish thousands of guilds over several years. A law passed in 1854 mandated strict governmental control over labor welfare funds. Westphalian textile workers now received state loans and professional training. In Hannover, the state restored corporate control even before the revolution was over. A law passed in September 1851 introduced special requirements for practicing crafts in Saxe-Gotha, in order to restrict unlimited production. In 1853, Bavaria regulated the employment of apprentices, sales of handcraft, and possession of artisan shops. In the same decade, Prussian officials began to strictly enforce the 1837 law regarding suspension of work on religious holidays. Moreover, in 1853 the chamber approved a law prohibiting the employment of children under twelve years old, and limiting to six hours the work of those between the ages of twelve and fourteen. Children, moreover, were not allowed to work at night and were required to attend school. ^{Footnote 66}

From the late 1850s and during much of the 1860s, conservatives, especially in Prussia, suffered a series of electoral defeats that weakened their parliamentary influence but did not put an end to their social policy initiatives. The economist Karl Rodbertus called for the emancipation of the “fourth class,” the workers. This was not meant as political emancipation, but rather as securing the workers’ basic material needs and education. ^{Footnote 67} Hermann Wagener went even further. He demanded the foundation of special shelters (Asyle) for “labor invalids” (Arbeits-Invaliden)—those workers in factories who due to illness or old age could not work or support themselves. Low-priced housing should also be offered to single men and women workers. ^{Footnote 68} Though some of the conservatives objected to Wagener’s proposals, the Kreuzzeitung came out with its own social program that included support from the state for professional training, savings funds for workers, protection of artisans, and the rigorous imposition of such measures. ^{Footnote 69}

Social legislation reached its height under Bismarck’s welfare policy during the 1880s. Various factors led the conservative chancellor to follow a social course during this period. It was not the antisocialist struggle he declared in 1878 that drove his seemingly worried turn toward the working and other lower classes; rather, it was part of a continuous effort by the chancellor to win over those social strata in support of the monarchy and against the liberal opposition, as well as the rising socialist movement. Social and economic considerations also played a part in the chancellor’s social orientation. The growth of the industrial working class and increased mechanization, for example, had led to a rise in work accidents, which the existing statute on the matter from 1871 no longer adequately addressed. Moreover, sickness insurance funds, available during the 1870s, had increasing difficulty coping with the financial onus of long-term illness and required reform. State dependence on the private economy, in turn, seemed to require a social policy that would ease the burden on the bourgeois-industrial sector. It was a strategy of “avoiding conflict” (Strategie der Konfliktvermeidung), as defined by Hans-Ulrich Wehler. ^{Footnote 70} These and other factors, dealt with extensively in the historical research, ^{Footnote 71} served as the basis for the enactment of the Sickness Insurance Act (1883), the Accident Insurance Act (1884), the Old Age and Disability Pension Act (1889), and a few other laws that made Germany one of the first modern welfare states.

But there was another reason behind these social policies that should be considered as well. Since the years of the Vormärz, Bismarck had also been motivated by paternalistic Christian values and a sense of concern toward the poor strata of society that accorded with the conservative ideals discussed above. Yet many historians who have written about the chancellor’s social policy during the 1880s have not paid sufficient attention to the religious and moral background that appeared to inspire Bismarck’s social view. The welfare legislation he supported has been interpreted mainly as a cloak for the stern Realpolitik that characterized his conduct. ^{Footnote 72} Few scholars who wrote about Bismarck’s social attitude did not take into account the broader context of the conservative social worldview that developed throughout the nineteenth century, and that Bismarck’s policies seemed to echo. Therefore, an examination of his political and social attitudes might introduce another dimension.

In a letter Bismarck wrote to his wife, Johanna, in 1847, he confessed: “When I think about it, how one Thaler could help a starving family, it looks to me like theft from the poor, the hungry and the freezing if I spend thirty [Thalers] for a trip [to Reinfeld].” Later, his paternalistic stance appeared clearly when he added: “How far can I consider myself empowered to use what God has entrusted to my authority for my own pleasure as long as there are people near me who suffer from privation and frost, whose beds and clothes are lacking.” ^{Footnote 73}

His view about the moral obligation of an authoritative personality was reflected in a letter he wrote to Prussian Chancellor Otto von Manteuffel in October 1852, in which he noted that “I cannot see what might hold a person who does not believe in duties imposed on him through divine revelation.” ^{Footnote 74} Yet, as Walter Vogel observed, already at this early stage Bismarck believed that in the social sphere the individual could do much good to help the needy, but at the same time he realized that the “social question” could be solved only through the state ^{Footnote 75} and according to Christian values. ^{Footnote 76} In the spirit of the Christian State idea propagated by Stahl since the 1840s, Bismarck asserted that “every state that seeks to secure its continuous existence, that seeks to verify its right to exist when contested, must stand on religious ground (religiöse[r] Grundlage). ^{Footnote 77}

Although later in his career Bismarck advocated industry and a free economy, he still believed that the liberal economic doctrine was too individual and led to the creation of a “monarchy of beggars” (monarchie des gueux), which was in contrast to the “social monarchy” of the Prussian kings. But Bismarck’s idea of “social monarchy” was conceived as a political and Christian requirement, a notion that was intimately associated with Hermann Wagener, with whom he had close relations since 1848. These ties tightened further when Wagener became the chancellor’s adviser for social affairs in 1862. ^{Footnote 78} Wagener attempted to influence Bismarck’s social policy even after his dismissal in 1873, and he appears to have inspired Bismarck’s social legislation in the 1880s. ^{Footnote 79}

During the 1880s, Bismarck was working with another adviser, Theodor Lohmann, who, after joining the Prussian Ministry of Trade and Industry in 1871, had advocated the social protection of workers and factory legislation. From 1866, Lohmann had been a prominent figure in the Inner Mission, an organization of the Protestant Church that pursued the creation of voluntary charities. He saw social discontent as an outcome of liberal individualism, but at the same time considered socialism as irreligious and too materialistic. Christianity, according to Lohmann, was the only moral framework for salvaging mankind from social evil. The church and the Inner Mission should also act as agents in establishing a just social order. ^{Footnote 80}

Bismarck, however, was not attentive to all of Lohmann’s ideas. He thought that the church should not exercise any influence over the state on social questions, while the state itself should exercise its paternalistic authority. He assured Lohmann that “state socialism is basically a consequence of the modern Christian State idea.” ^{Footnote 81} One of the disagreements between the two was evident in the case of accident insurance. In 1879, Lohmann proposed the foundation of joint insurance associations on a trade basis, with contributions by employers as well as by workers, but Bismarck rejected it. While he agreed that employers and higher-paid workers should contribute equally to the insurance program, lower-paid workers should be exempt. Their part would be disbursed by employers and public funds, thus entrusting the Reich with an obligation toward the needy. Although the insurance bill would undergo further amendments, Bismarck’s insistence on state financing seems to exemplify the paternalistic model he envisioned, and corresponds to a certain degree with Wagener’s ideal of “social monarchy.” ^{Footnote 82} This tendency of the chancellor was also reflected in his stance toward the idea of old-age insurance as early as 1880. Unlike other welfare schemes, he thought of extending pensions to other sectors, beyond industrial workers, and subsidizing them with public funds. Later he told Lohmann that he was considering taxing luxuries in order to increase the Reich’s revenues. Such a step, together with a monopoly on tobacco, would enable the state to provide the propertyless with pensions, and at the same time induce them to adopt conservative attitudes. Eventually, however, Bismarck’s plans for increasing the Reich’s revenues through these measures did not materialize, and pensions were financed by state subsidies, together with payments out of wages by both employers and workers. ^{Footnote 83}

Moreover, Bismarck’s view on workers’ insurance had not been intended originally to balance his antisocialist acts with positive policy. Certainly, the break with the liberals in 1878–79 was necessary for the introduction of the chancellor’s social policy, since the former opposed any program of this kind. But social reform as an instrument in the conflict with the socialists had already been rejected by the chancellor in 1878, although later he fully agreed with Lohmann that such a strategy was of real political importance. ^{Footnote 84}

Bismarck further expressed his Christian paternalistic state ideal in a series of statements and speeches he made during the 1880s. On April 2, 1881, while debating the first draft of the Accident Insurance Act, Bismarck addressed the German Reichstag and responded to criticism from two liberals, Eugen Richter and Ludwig Bamberger: “If Mr. Bamberger . . . wants to find a name for our endeavors, which I will be ready to accept, then it is practical Christianity (praktisches Christentum), but sans phrase; we disburse the people not with speeches and phrases but want to grant them something real.” ^{Footnote 85}

In a Reichstag discussion about legislation regarding work in factories that took place on January 9, 1882, the chancellor clarified that what he regarded as praktisches Christentum was the realization of the Christian ethic in the sense of brotherly love (Nächstenliebe). Even those who did not believe in the Christian revelation, he asserted, should understand that ethics, respect, and a sense of commitment were remnants of their fathers’ Christianity. Bismarck added that he could not understand how people could acknowledge the commandments of Christianity in their private life and reject them as part of legislation that would apply to 45 million civilians. ^{Footnote 86} And during the reading of the third draft of the Old Age and Disability Pension Act on May 18, 1889, Bismarck explained that an old man who could not work must somehow live and be fed if paternalistic relations were to be realized. ^{Footnote 87}

In many respects, Bismarck stood out as a “revolutionary” compared to most other conservatives of his time. In matters of social views and policy, however, he seemed to follow the essential conservative tradition established in the first half of the nineteenth century. ^{Footnote 88}