“Global citizenship” may seem a strange term in a book title given the absence of a global republic. But the term refers us to an innovative argument in this engaging work. Luis Cabrera proposes an individual ethics for the world as we know it, based on an analysis of those duties we would have if we were citizens of “fully integrated” global institutions (p. 69). He engagingly motivates this ethical stance by drawing us into moving and morally instructive stories of agents acting within what he characterizes as an ethics of global citizenship. For example, he contrasts the ethics of “No More Deaths” groups, who offer life-saving assistance to illegal immigrants crossing dangerous, arid US borders, and who treat those immigrants as fellow humans vulnerable to exposure and death and so in need of assistance, with the exclusionist ethics of group- or state-centered activists, such as the “Minutemen,” who organize vigilante action to prevent border breaches. One group exemplifies the global ethic, the other its negation.
A challenging question for Cabrera's analysis and his attractive book title, however, is why we need to describe these phenomena as “global” anything, or for that matter as expressing an ethics of “cosmopolitanism” (pp. 14 ff.). As attested by Cabrera's own interviews (Chap. 4), the outlooks motivating many of the activists are religious or secular humane commitments. There is no evidence that they are, or indeed need to be, overwhelmingly motivated by a distinctively “globalist” political morality. One can just as well describe these motivations in terms of a familiar humanist ethics that contrasts with tribalism and mean-spiritedness. The crux of the author's globalist analysis, then, must lie in showing how this ethics must connect with his institution-regarding cosmopolitan account of justice.
Cabrera identifies justice with human rights that protect “vital human interests” (p. 40), partly because human rights supposedly offer a clearer basis for specifying corresponding responsibilities than do alternative accounts of justice (p. 36). Yet the book does not work very hard at giving the reader a convincing account of the content of these rights. For example, it accepts the possibility that the specific definition of rights protections is open to being democratically decided, so long as we maintain a core commitment to “human moral equality” (pp. 38–39). Yet the key notions of “core,” “vital interest,” and even “protection” are left unanalyzed. So it is unclear why this approach to justice offers any more precision than competing egalitarian accounts of social justice, according to which social burdens and benefits are to be distributed fairly by, for example, prioritizing the least advantaged, or pursuing equality of opportunity. The author seems to be working with a “sufficiency” approach to justice (pp. 35 ff.). But sufficiency accounts have been roundly criticized in the literature (e.g., Paula Casal, “Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough,” Ethics 117 [January 2007]: 296–326), and Cabrera certainly does not deal with the objections. Take, for example, a society in which important goods such as political office are distributed only to members of one religion, or gender, while everyone enjoys a basic minimum protection of vital interests. It is plausible to criticize such a society as unjust. So he needs a good reason for eschewing accounts of social justice that account for such injustices.
Furthermore, Cabrera proposes a Rawlsian account of natural duties corresponding to human rights (p. 43 ff.), but he does not discuss, we should note, John Rawls's account of the content of justice itself. For Rawls, natural duties include obligations not to be cruel to others, not to unnecessarily harm, to offer assistance, to show respect, to support just institutions that apply to us, and to further just institutional arrangements where they are not established and it is not excessively costly to us to do so. Natural duties do not specify the content of justice. That is because justice consists in principles for distributing social benefits and burdens in a morally justified way. Institutions are needed for this purpose because only institutions can respond appropriately to variations in agents' capacity to contribute, as well as to changes in distributions of advantage due to normal human interactions (accumulations and losses over time). In this sense, institutions mediate justice in a political community (see Rawls, Political Liberalism, 2nd ed., 2005, pp. 262–71), and social justice theories are solutions to the problem of mediating institutions and how they should distribute social benefits and burdens.
Cabrera claims that natural duties correspond to human rights, and ultimately to everyone's moral equality (p. 49). Yet outside of an institutional context in which people's demands of justice on one another are mediated, natural duties of mutual assistance do not refer to justice as such. They offer no strict instructions to address the vital interests of all those in need because without mediating institutions, the burdens for any one person to address those interests would be unreasonable. It is reasonable to think that we have a strict moral duty to assist someone we meet in the wilderness whose life we can save with our spare rations, yet that is perfectly compatible with a belief that we do not personally have a general and strict duty to provide sustenance to all needy people we might help. Interpersonal duties of assistance, in this sense, are not about what is owed to all, but rather about what can be owed to people in specific circumstances (cf. Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 2011, pp. 277 ff.).
Duties, like those felt by the activists discussed by Cabrera, imply some degree of discretion as to how much burden we should take on for a cause, given potentially interminable demands on our time and resources, and the differing yet legitimate commitments we incorporate into our lives (the author, to some extent, recognizes this problem [p. 6]). Duties with a degree of discretion are known as “imperfect duties,” the discretionary element meaning that they do not correspond to rights held by others against us. One attempt to get around this problem has been to posit a duty to create institutions under which we will have clear, strict (“perfect”) duties that will be fair and will fulfill everyone's human rights (Henry Shue, “Mediating Duties,” Ethics 98 [July 1988]: 687–704). While Cabrera does not discuss this question, he does propose duties to advocate for reform that leads to an interstate system in which everyone's vital interests are fulfilled (pp. 65, 67). However, those duties, too, would have to be imperfect, as there is no clear notion of what constitutes their fulfillment or breach (cf. pp. 78 ff.). Duties not to harm others or to avoid imposing poverty on them institutionally might be clearer, but Cabrera rejects this approach, favoring more positive duties to satisfy vital interests (pp. 91 ff.).
Note that the imperfect, humane duties of assistance do not require reference to institutions in order to be understood and pursued. They are, in that sense, conceptually independent from the duties we might have in an “integrated institutional order.” “Advocacy duties” do refer to institutions, but these do not connect with existing people's human rights. It is also even less clear what such (imperfect) duties might demand. Cabrera names two models: European Union integration and the incorporation of democratic accountability into the World Trade Organization. Yet, as we are witnessing, EU integration depends on contextual economic contingencies for its success, and it is unclear how to judge measures that any individual might take toward implementing either model globally. Focusing on imperfect duties of assistance seems more reasonable. So, as rich as the book is, more could have been said on the link between the humanist ethics motivating it and global justice that warrants putting “global citizenship” in the title.
