Readers of Peter Gordon's first book, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy ( 2003) will find themselves in familiar territory as they enter the pages of Continental Divide. It was Rosenzweig's apparently paradoxical, counterintuitive, positive identification with Heidegger's position in the famous philosophical disputation between Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in Davos, Switzerland, in March 1929 that first motivated Gordon to examine more intensely the ambivalent status of Heidegger's philosophical “revolution” in the history of continental European thought in the twentieth century. As Gordon notes, however, Rosenzweig's identification with Heidegger's existential ontology was a mere sideshow in a historical drama in which the Davos disputation was clearly a main event, an event in which the most distinguished representatives of opposing positions articulated their differences in a public debate. Or at least in the public memory of continental philosophy and modern European intellectual history more broadly the Davos debate between Cassirer and Heidegger took on the allegorical significance of a fundamental rift, “between humanism and anti-humanism, enlightenment and counter-enlightenment, or rationalism and irrationalism, as if the defining struggles of twentieth-century thought were crystallized within this single event” (p. 1). The task Gordon sets himself is not just to expand his analysis of the content and significance of Heidegger's early philosophy by setting him in relation to the major representative of the neo-Kantian tradition, but also to examine the process of historical memory construction itself. What is the relationship between the philosophical dispute as it occurred in 1929 and the general cultural meanings that have become embedded in our memory of it? How can historical analysis help us distinguish between memory and event?
The three major sections of Gordon's work develop his argument carefully and patiently, with great attention to textual detail and conceptual nuance. The lengthy introduction and first two chapters lay out what we might see as the plausible perspective of a well-informed imaginary historical and philosophical investigator who could have attended the disputation in 1929. Summaries of the philosophical development of both Cassirer and Heidegger, clarifying the development of their respective critical, revisionist perspectives within the neo-Kantian and phenomenological traditions, is followed by a wide-ranging account of the various philosophical positions and schools that both shaped and revealed the distinctiveness of Cassirer's and Heidegger's positions within the context of a widely perceived philosophical crisis and transformation during the Weimar era. Chapter two, “Setting the Stage,” completes the introductory section with an account of the institutions and individuals involved in the Davos Conference and the general expectations directly and indirectly expressed about the potential significance of the debate. Gordon's intention in these opening chapters is first of all to emphasize the extent to which Cassirer and Heidegger operated within a shared intellectual world or common philosophical discourse during the decade leading up to the Davos disputation. Although obviously rooted in divergent sociocultural contexts and marked by different educational influences, they spoke the common language of the German idealist tradition; and Gordon also claims that, despite the differences in their career trajectories or generational status (Cassirer was older and more obviously an academic figure with an established record and reputation), they defined their revisions of the central focus of their teachers (Cohen and Husserl) in parallel ways, emphasizing the historical and more broadly cultural dimensions in the transcendental analysis of the conditions of knowledge and meaning. Intimations of possible fundamental divergences in philosophical positioning were not totally absent from the minds of the philosophical disputants or their audience as they came to Davos, but they were defined almost exclusively within the framework of German (idealist) philosophy, not in terms of competing worldviews, cultural ideologies, or political commitments.
The middle two chapters of Continental Divide are devoted to the intellectual content of the conference and its concluding disputation. Gordon carefully reconstructs the independent lectures presented by Cassirer and Heidegger during the first days of the conference, revealing the ways in which they were directed at dissecting the philosophical frameworks (philosophical anthropology and neo-Kantianism) of their opponents. Again, methodical textual analysis, conceptual clarity, and attention to nuance mark Gordon's reconstructions, which reveal not only a growing mutual recognition of divergence on fundamentals by the protagonists, but also a continued commitment to a common frame of reference and understanding in which differences could be discussed and not simply expressed. After such careful preparation, the reader might imagine finding little that is or could be surprising in the actual transcription of the disputation itself in chapter four. Gordon's own extensive commentaries interspersed between textual citations highlight the often partially veiled differences of perspective that have been brought to our attention in the earlier chapters. In the direct confrontation of question and answer and in the mutual attempts to affirm the significance of philosophical disagreement, these differences begin to appear as an irreconcilable opposition regarding assumptions about the fundamental nature of human beings and the conditions of knowledge, meaning construction and ethical action. Both Cassirer and Heidegger increasingly emphasized the pivotal historical significance of their philosophical choices, restating their differences concerning the transcendental conditions of meaning as differences between a historical recovery of the basis of ontological knowledge in the everyday thrownness of existence in time on the one hand and the progressive unveiling of the truth of human existence as the overcoming of limitations of finitude in the symbolic and conceptual self-expression of autonomous agency on the other.
The final chapters of the book directly address the process of inscription of philosophical difference into history as an intrinsic component of philosophical thinking, at least within the historically self-conscious post-Kantian continental traditions. Gordon begins this analysis by interrupting his chronological format, moving backward in time for a reexamination of critical differences that Cassirer and Heidegger articulated regarding each other's philosophical premises during the 1920s. His point is that the expansion of the significance of philosophical disagreement into differences of fundamental historical/cultural perspective, into different commitments to a normative image of what it means to be human, were embedded in philosophical argumentation from the start and informed Cassirer's and Heidegger's mutual criticism from the time of their first contacts. Gordon describes these opposing normative images succinctly with the terms “spontaneity”—for Cassirer's a priori commitment to an image of human being as progressive, self-revealing creativity—and “receptivity” or “thrownness”—for Heidegger's image of man as finite existence potentially open to the disclosure of Being. The shift toward a historical mythologization of their confrontation after Heidegger's positive response to the advent of National Socialism was thus not simply an anachronistic act of inscribing the present into the past. But the expansion and solidification of the symbolic divide to include not only fundamental assumptions about Being and beings but also particular cultural, ideological, and political commitments, represented, in Gordon's view, a reductive destruction of the freedom and reality of philosophical thinking, transforming processes of thought into mere expressions of contingent empirical choices and commitments, breaking down the conditions of communicative interaction and critique.
Continental Divide is a powerfully argued defense of the (relative) autonomy of intellectual history as the history of thinking, and thus also of its capacity to interact with, rather than be reduced to, other levels of cultural discourse. At the same time Gordon insists on the need for contextualized historicization to explicate the processes of “ramification” through which thinking becomes embedded and embeds itself in other dimensions of individual and collective existence. The interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy is clearly a touchstone for this issue because of the ways his thinking has been read through the lens of his political commitments after 1933. Heidegger's analysis of existence is framed by an a priori image of human being as “receptivity,” but careful historical analysis of thinkers who assimilated Heidegger's basic principles both before and after 1929 suggests that the kinds of religious, political, and ethical doctrines that can be constructed on the assumption of essential human finitude are diverse and contingent. It is also important to note that Gordon claims that the “contrast between spontaneity and thrownness” should be “understood as working out two distinct approaches to the problem of transcendental conditions. It should not and cannot be understood as a radical opposition” (p. 8). Unfortunately Gordon does not pursue this inner connection between the two normative images, using them primarily as “ideal types” of difference to organize a history of thinking activity that restlessly moves within the tension of their dialectical opposition, rather than as magnetic poles that energize the constantly renewed attempts, as many of the “disputes” in post-Davos continental philosophy reveal, to formulate a stereoscopic image of humanity as both product and producer.
