Introduction
Tolerance refers to the willingness to accept differing views or groups without necessarily agreeing with them. Many highlight it for its potential to prevent social conflict and promote pluralist democracies (Menchik and Pepinsky 2018). While scholars frequently associate tolerance with secularism rather than religion, questions remain about how religious organisations engage with it (Menchik 2016: 3). Many studies focus on whether such groups foster tolerance or exhibit intolerance (Ellison and Musick Reference Facal1993; Facal Reference Fealy2020; Guiora Reference Hendrick2014; Kurtz Reference Martudji2005), yet they tend to overlook the complexities of these organisations. They typically frame tolerance as a dichotomy, portraying organisations as either tolerant or intolerant without considering the complexities that inform their attitudes toward tolerance. In reality, the capacity for tolerance within a religious organisation is not always dichotomous. Instead, its socio-political context nuances and informs it. This article examines the nuanced manifestations and operationalisation of tolerance within Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s – and the world’s – largest Islamic organisation and its adherents.Footnote 1 More broadly, it illustrates the dynamic nature of tolerance within an organisation as large as NU.
Scholars have recognised NU as a crucial champion of tolerance, which it promotes through its theological principles (Bush Reference Ellison and Musick2009; Fealy Reference Feillard1998; Van Bruinessen 1994), leaders’ perspectives (Barton Reference Bush2002; Hefner Reference Jurnaliston and Galih2000; Mechik 2016; Mujani and Liddle Reference Nasution2004; Ramage 1995), and various activities (Bush Reference Ellison and Musick2009). The organisation’s efforts have earned broad public appreciation, including endorsements from former Indonesian presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2014) and Joko Widodo (Jokowi) (2014-2024) (Liputan 6 2010; Rizqo 2021a).Footnote 2 NU even received a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 (The Jakarta Post 2019).Footnote 3 Nevertheless, little research has focused on the dynamic nature of NU’s tolerance.
NU stands out among Islamic organisations for promoting tolerance, and many regard it as the most tolerant in Indonesia. Menchik’s research reveals NU’s superior commitment to tolerance compared to the Islamic Union (Persis) and Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second-largest Islamic organisation, also known for its tolerant stance (Menchik 2016: 6, 138, 142). Globally, NU remains a steadfast advocate for tolerance, while other prominent organisations’ influence has waned. For example, scholars often regard Turkey’s Gülen Movement and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood as champions of tolerance, despite some contestation (Hendrick Reference Kadir2013; Wickham 2011; Yavuz 2013). However, their alleged threats to ruling regimes led to bans in their home countries, causing significant declines in their influence (Al-Anani Reference Al-Anani2016; Hendrick Reference Kadir2013; Wickham 2011; Yavuz 2013).Footnote 4 Therefore, NU’s commitment to tolerance distinguishes it both nationally and globally.
However, this perception of NU’s tolerant nature is subject to debate. Recent studies, including those examining NU’s stance on tolerance, reveal instances of intolerance. Menchik asserts that NU is the most tolerant Islamic organisation in Indonesia compared to Muhammadiyah and Persis, yet it remains intolerant towards groups like the Ahmadiyya and communists (Menchik 2016: 138). Menchik’s perspective diverges from the findings of Mietzner and Muhtadi, who surveyed a raft of NU followers before concluding that “while there are indeed tolerant streams within NU, this is not more so than in most other Muslim mainstream organisations or among non-affiliated Muslims” (2020: 59). They perceive NU’s stance as less about democratic principles and pluralist ideals and more about protecting its interests (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2020: 80).
While they do not directly address NU’s tolerance, several scholars have identified varying degrees of tolerance among NU’s membership. For example, Kayane notes the presence of intolerant kyai (Islamic clerics) within NU who have engaged in and promoted sectarianism in her article on Sunni-Shia sectarianism (Kayane Reference Lindsey2020: 91-92). She also reports instances of NU members involved in violence against religious minorities and attributes it to intolerance driven by internal power struggles (Kayane Reference Lev2019: 28). Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali shows that while NU scholars generally promote tolerance in social interactions, their views on non-Islamic religions range from rejection to acceptance (Ali Reference Arifianto2020: 466-467, 478-479).
Scholarly consensus on NU’s understanding and practice of tolerance remains elusive. While many studies depict NU as a tolerant organisation, recent research addressing tolerance within it reveals inconsistencies, prompting the question: Is NU tolerant or not? When considering this question, one should avoid the trap of viewing tolerance as a zero-sum game, that is, one that necessitates a binary choice. A binary choice leads to incomplete conclusions and fails to explain specific aspects because NU’s complexity makes it challenging to categorise it definitively as tolerant or intolerant.
Rather than questioning whether NU is tolerant, scholars should scrutinise the nuanced comprehension and application of its tolerance. Menchik’s research highlights the organisation’s dynamic nature, shaped by context and capable of fostering either tolerance or intolerance (Menchik 2016: 20-21, 126, 138-142). He defines it as “communal tolerance,” contrasting with the secular-liberal perspective, by prioritising communal unity and religious identity over individual freedoms or diverse ideologies (Menchik 2016: 124, 138-142, 146-148). However, his analysis overlooks NU’s dynamic aspects, including catalysts for change and various ways of understanding tolerance within NU (Buehler Reference Capoccia, Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate2019; Hamayotsu Reference Hosen2017). This limitation arises because Menchik’s study compares NU with Muhammadiyah and Persis, eschewing detailed analysis solely of NU’s tolerance dynamics.
This article addresses this research gap by examining how the organisation and its members, known as nahdliyin, conceptualise and practice tolerance. The analysis of NU as an organisation focuses on official decisions, including congressional outcomes, formal statements from the sitting chairman of NU’s Executive Board (PBNU, NU’s apex body at the national level), and the organisation’s work programmes. Additionally, the study considers the nahdliyin, defined as individuals and communities associated with NU, regardless of their level of active involvement in the organisation.
This research employs qualitative methods, including interviews and document studies, and applies critical juncture analysis alongside case studies. Critical juncture analysis examines past events with long-term impacts, focusing on key actors, events, and institutional contexts that have significantly shaped institutions (Capoccia Reference Esposito2016; Mahoney Reference Mudzakkir, Pamungkas and Permana2000; Pierson Reference Rizqo2000). Through this approach, the study identifies and analyses pivotal moments in NU’s history where tolerance evolved, especially NU’s congresses (muktamar) from 1954 to 2015. The PBNU and its affiliated institutions stored and officially released the muktamar reports this research investigates. It considers the 1984 Muktamar a critical turning point, solidifying NU’s commitment to tolerance through formal decisions.
In addition to critical juncture analysis, this article uses case studies that examine NU’s interactions with Islamic factions, including the Ahmadiyya and radical groups, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). These case studies complement the critical juncture analysis by highlighting how NU limits and varies its approach, notwithstanding its increased emphasis on tolerance after 1984. This analysis also reveals instances where certain communities within NU displayed intolerant behaviour.
The research identifies three key characteristics of NU’s dynamic tolerance. First, NU’s commitment to tolerance evolves in response to changing social and political conditions. Secondly, NU, as an institution, upholds tolerance under specific circumstances, notably when issues align with the public interest and involve groups that do not contradict Islamic principles or threaten the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Thirdly, tolerance among NU’s followers varies and does not always reflect the organisation’s stance, influenced by differing fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) interpretations and internal factions. A key challenge for NU is maintaining consistent tolerance among its membership, given the longstanding nahdliyin community that predates the organisation and NU’s moderate, non-dogmatic positioning.
These characteristics enrich discussions of tolerance within religious organisations. They move beyond simplistic binary views of tolerance to show NU’s tolerance as dynamic, with evolution, inherent limitations, and variations between the organisation and its members. This characterisation complements prior analyses, particularly Menchik’s work, which links NU’s tolerance to context, inconsistency, Islamic teachings, and ahl sunna wal-jama’a or aswaja,Footnote 5 as this study reaffirms. This paper expands Menchik’s findings by highlighting NU’s evolving tolerance since 1984, which Islamic values and a commitment to the Indonesian Republic have shaped. Internal group variations also affect interpretations of tolerance, with some factions acting intolerantly against NU’s stance. These characteristics are key to understanding NU’s dynamic tolerance.
The following section examines the findings of critical juncture analysis, revealing shifts in how NU and its members practise tolerance. The second section highlights case studies illustrating NU’s relationship with religious groups and its approach to tolerance. The article’s conclusion analyses how tolerance operates within NU and elucidates its three defining characteristics.
The Critical Juncture of Tolerance within NU and its Followers
NU was established in 1926 as a formal organisation by traditional kyai, including K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah and K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari. Unlike modernist Muslims, who espouse adherence to religious beliefs and practices outlined in the Qur’an and sunnah, traditionalists believe that cultural diversity has influenced Islamic practises in Indonesia (Esposito Reference Fealy2009b: 27). They respect a local culture as long as it does not violate Islamic sharia (Van Wichelen 2010: 3). NU was also established to maintain traditionalist Islamic values, particularly in Java, as modernist Islam acquired a stronger foothold in Indonesia and puritanical Islam emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 1920s (Fealy and Bush Reference Guiora2014; Saenong Reference Suryana2021; Van Bruinessen 1994).
Any discussion of tolerance within NU entails considering the organisation’s fundamental principles. NU, a Sunni Islamic organisation, adheres to aswaja, which embraces four key principles: at-tawassuth (moderation), at-tawazun (balance without extremism), al-I’tidal (justice and fairness), and tasamuh (tolerance).Footnote 6 Specifically, by adopting a tasamuh attitude, NU respects differences and people with different life principles, though it does not imply acceptance of or belief in those principles (PBNU Reference Rochmat, Muchlishon and Fathoni1989: 177). This tolerant attitude extends beyond religious differences to encompass cultural diversity, as respect for local traditions is fundamental to NU’s identity as a traditional Islamic organisation. Thus, promoting tolerance is central to NU’s mission and values.
The next question is how NU and its members implement tasamuh. Therefore, this study explores NU’s historical path, including the results of the NU muktamar – the highest forum for crucial decisions – from 1954 to 2015.Footnote 7 Analysing statements and decisions made in these various congresses reveals that the NU has consistently prioritised tolerance (see Table 1). Although it does not always explicitly refer to tolerance, the word tasamuh and messages promoting tolerance appear consistently in the muktamar reports.
NU’s Positions on Pluralism and Tolerance in its Muktamar (1954 to 2015)
Source: The NU Muktamar Results from 1954 to 2015.
NU’s commitment to tolerance has evolved and strengthened over time, as its organisational statements and muktamar decisions evince (see Table 1). One can observe this development through three levels of change in NU’s stance on tolerance. First, between 1954 and the 1970s, NU recognised and respected Indonesia’s diversity and plurality. For instance, during the 1954 Muktamar, NU acknowledged the nation’s ethnic and cultural diversity, as the Qur’an described (NU Reference Nuryanti, Wu, Bandyopadhyay and Lee1954: 4). Similarly, at the 1979 Muktamar, NU emphasised the importance of cultural diversity, urging the organisation to prioritise this issue (NU Reference Pelletier1979: 4, 33).
Second, since the 1980s muktamar, NU has fortified its commitment to tolerance by emphasising its importance and establishing it as an organisational principle. Notably, at the 1984 Muktamar, NU formally declared tolerance, or tasamuh, one of its core societal principles (NU 1984: 102, 106). NU reinforced this stance by introducing the “Ukhuwah Trilogy,” which outlines three forms of social relationships: Ukhuwah Islamiyah (relationships among Muslims based on shared faith), Ukhuwah Wathaniyah (connections rooted in nationality and civic ties), and Ukhuwah Basyariyah (universal human relationships based on shared humanity). The first two, Ukhuwah Islamiyah and Ukhuwah Wathaniyah, emphasise NU’s commitment to fostering unity within the Muslim community and with broader religious and national groups (NU 1984: 142-143).
Since the 1990s, NU’s commitment to tolerance has matured, as some of its programmes promoting tolerance within NU and the broader community illustrate. For instance, the 1994 Muktamar emphasised strengthening human resources through training and education grounded in tolerance (PBNU Reference Rohman, Pamungkas and Permana1994: 163). It also mandated that NU’s legal aid and service programmes respect cultural and ethnic diversity (PBNU Reference Rohman, Pamungkas and Permana1994: 167). Additionally, NU has fostered interfaith dialogue and collaboration with state-recognised religious groups, including Protestant Christians, Catholic Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians. Notable initiatives include the International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), held from 2004 to 2010, and the Religion of Twenty (R20) forum in 2022, which aimed to enhance religious harmony.
Besides PBNU, NU’s autonomous bodies conduct programmes to strengthen their ties with non-Islamic religious groups. A prominent example of NU’s tolerance toward other religious groups is Gerakan Pemuda Ansor (GP Ansor/the Ansor Youth Movement), NU’s youth organisation, which offers protective services to other religious congregations. One of the most notable instances was the death of Riyanto, a GP Ansor member, who died when a bomb exploded while securing a Christmas Eve service at the Eben Haezer Church in East Java on 24 December 2000 (Melani 2020).
The results of NU’s congresses show how NU’s commitment to tolerance has strengthened over time. As Table 1 shows, NU’s commitment to significant tolerance appears to have gathered momentum at the 1984 Muktamar. After 1984, NU consolidated its commitment to tolerance, particularly from 1994 onwards, when tolerance transitioned from an idealised concept to a tangible and operational programmatic framework (see Table 1).
The 1984 Muktamar marked a pivotal moment in NU’s commitment to tolerance, with the election of Abdurrahman Wahid (aka Gus Dur) as PBNU chairman, a position he held from 1984 until 1999. Combining insights from pesantren Footnote 8 education and Western scholarship, Wahid revitalised NU’s discourse on pluralism and tolerance (Interview with Ahmad Zainul Hamdi Reference Keren2021; Menchik 2016: 109). His status as the grandson of NU’s founder, Kyai Hasyim Asy’ari, and his strong communication skills helped him convince many of his progressive ideas despite initial resistance from some kyai.
Wahid also promoted tolerance among young nahdliyin, inspiring them to advocate for tolerance individually and within their communities. Comprising mainly university students and graduates with NU pesantren backgrounds, young nahdliyin embraced his progressive ideas. They were engaged in NU organisations or nahdliyin-based communities and organisations such as Gus Durian and the Wahid Institute and expanded and reinforced the concept of tolerance (Bush Reference Ellison and Musick2009: 88-98). Together, they created an alternative discourse on tolerance, distinct from the more orthodox NU kyai, and promoted pluralism by encouraging a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives (Eck Reference Esposito2005: 41-43).
After President Suharto’s downfall in May 1998, Wahid and his followers shaped NU and civil society by promoting tolerance as integral to democracy and unity. Amidst rising sectarianism and radicalism, NU organisations and activists launched initiatives to foster religious harmony. For instance, the ICIS programme —a PBNU initiative and Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs— promoted tolerant Islam, especially in response to terrorist attacks by radical Islamic groups and, most notably, the 9/11 attacks in the United States. This era was crucial for reaffirming and expanding NU’s commitment to tolerance, building on its development since 1984.
The significance of the 1984 Muktamar in bolstering NU’s tolerance stemmed from Wahid’s internal emergence as a leader and the prevailing socio-political circumstances, which were influential external factors. Suharto’s regime pressured all organisations to adopt Pancasila, Indonesia’s national ideology, which includes belief in God, humanitarianism, unity, social justice, and democracy (Kadir 1999; Van Bruinessen 1994). While many Islamic organisations hesitated or outright rejected Pancasila as their exclusive ideology, NU obliged (Kadir 1999; Van Bruinessen 1994).
Echoing discussions from the 1983 NU Alim Ulama Conference, Wahid, at the 1984 Muktamar, proposed ideas to align Islam with Pancasila. The 1984 Muktamar’s chief outcome was the conclusion that Pancasila, the foundation of the Indonesian Republic, was not a religion and could not replace or function as one. NU embraced Pancasila as a way for Indonesian Muslims to practise their faith while fostering unity and religious tolerance, later integrating it as the organisation’s ideological cornerstone.
Integrating Pancasila as a foundational ideological tenet within its organisational framework was not the first time NU acknowledged its significance. Indeed, before 1984, NU demonstrated its approval and recognition of Pancasila on several occasions, most notably when Indonesia enacted its 1945 Constitution and reinstated it in 1959. These events highlight NU’s early embrace of Pancasila and mark key points in the evolution of its ethos of tolerance, deserving scholarly attention.
In 1945, as Indonesia declared independence, debates arose over establishing either an Islamic or secular state (Nasution Reference Peterson1995: 59). NU and other Islamic groups favoured an Islamic state, citing their obligation to uphold sharia (Feillard Reference Hamayotsu1999; Nasution Reference Peterson1995; Wahid 1989). Under Sukarno’s leadership, they reached a compromise, resulting in the adoption of the Jakarta Charter with Indonesia’s independence on 17 August 1945 (Kusuma Reference Melani2009; Nasution Reference Peterson1995). The Jakarta Charter, a preamble to the Constitution, established Pancasila as its foundation but obliged Muslims to practise sharia (Maarif Reference Mietzner and Muhtadi2006).
One day later, however, the accord to enact the Jakarta Charter faced opposition. Criticism from non-Muslim groups, secular nationalists, and those in eastern Indonesia led to its removal during an Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI) session on 18 August 1945. Consequently, the PPKI revoked the charter and revised the preamble from ‘belief in God’ to ‘belief in One Supreme God’ (Kusuma Reference Melani2009; Nasution Reference Peterson1995).
NU pioneered other Islamic groups to accept the Jakarta Charter’s revocation. Wahid Hasyim, NU’s chairman from 1951 to 1954 and the son of NU’s founder, advocated that the phrase “belief in One Supreme God” conformed to Islamic monotheism (Sitompul Reference Wahid and Sitompul1989: 96-97). This decision promoted Indonesian unity while subtly upholding Islamic tenets within the state’s highest law (Feillard Reference Hamayotsu1999: 35). Subsequently, other Islamic factions followed NU’s stance. They agreed to the revocation with the understanding that discussions on the state’s foundational law would resume in the legislature within six months (Sitompul Reference Wahid and Sitompul1989: 96-97).
Following Indonesia’s inaugural parliamentary Election in 1955, discussions about the Constitution recommenced, although prolonged beyond the pledged six months. The assembly, known as the Konstituante, convened to revise the Constitution, reigniting debates on sharia. Some NU figures and other Islamic party leaders advocated incorporating the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution, considering it a Muslim obligation and a political promise (Kusuma Reference Melani2009; Nasution Reference Peterson1995). Nationalist factions resisted its inclusion. After a three-year deadlock (1956 to 1959), President Sukarno issued a decree dissolving the Konstituante and reinstating the 1945 Constitution in 1959 (Kusuma Reference Melani2009: 24).
Under Idham Chalid’s leadership (1956-1984), NU again endorsed excluding the Jakarta Charter from the Indonesian Constitution. In return for this concession, Chalid sought acknowledgement that the Jakarta Charter informed the drafting of the 1945 Constitution, which Sukarno conceded (Feillard Reference Hamayotsu1999: 58-59). NU asserted that the Constitution already integrated Islamic principles, making the advocacy for an islamic state unnecessary, while also ensuring that non-Islamic communities felt included within the Indonesian nation.
NU’s shift from advocating an Islamic state to endorsing Pancasila in 1945 and 1959 and fully embracing it in 1984 reveals its commitment to national unity and religious diversity. Ideological commitment propelled this shift, along with pragmatic political considerations, including strategic adjustments to regimes and a desire for survival and influence. Close ties between NU figures like Kyai Wahab Hasbullah and Idham Chalid with President Sukarno were also pivotal in NU’s acceptance of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (Van Bruinessen 1994: 65-66). Sukarno’s reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution in 1959, alongside the establishment of semi-authoritarian “guided democracy,” ended parliamentary democracy and compelled NU to pursue political compromises for survival. Unlike Masyumi, the Islamic modernist party that opposed Sukarno until its dissolution, NU aligned with Sukarno and joined his cabinet to preserve its political influence and to avoid allegations of corruption involving some of its elites (Lev Reference Menchik and Pepinsky1966; Maarif Reference Mietzner and Muhtadi2006). The survival imperative resurfaced in 1984 when NU, under Suharto’s authoritarian pressure, embraced Pancasila as its ideological foundation. Wahid emphasised that rejecting Pancasila at that point would have jeopardised NU’s existence (Bush Reference Ellison and Musick2009; Feillard Reference Hamayotsu1999).
Therefore, a critical juncture analysis indicates a shift in NU’s tolerance regarding the organisation and its adherents. That tolerance appears to have strengthened, transitioning from a concept to a programmatic commitment, while its support for Pancasila espouses inclusivity regardless of religion. The 1984 NU Muktamar was a pivotal moment in this shift. However, preceding events, such as the debates regarding the Constitution and Pancasila in 1945 and 1959 and subsequent events following post-Suharto political reform in 1998, were also decisive.
Exploring NU’s Interactions with Ahmadiyya, FPI, and HTI: A Case Studies Analysis
This article further explores NU’s approach to tolerance through case studies of its interactions with the Ahmadiyya and more radical Islamist factions, including FPI and HTI. These cases are revealing because the Ahmadiyya and radical fringe groups represent minority factions within Islam. However, NU’s relationships with their organisations and adherents are distinct. Understanding these interactions offers valuable insights into the nature of NU’s tolerance.
NU’s Response to Ahmadiyya’s Existence
The Ahmadiyya belief system, founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in India in 1889, entered Indonesia in 1925 and gained official recognition from the state in 1953 (Esposito Reference Fatiara2009a; Suryana 2020; Triyana 2011). The Ahmadiyya community has two factions. The Qadian faction, to which most Indonesian Ahmadis belong, recognises Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a non-legislative prophet after Muhammad and often considers non-Ahmadis unbelievers (Esposito Reference Fatiara2009a; Suryana 2020). Meanwhile, the smaller Lahore faction sees Ahmad as a renewer of Islam (Esposito Reference Fatiara2009a; Suryana 2020). Although the exact number is unknown, estimates suggest there are approximately 500,000 Qadian followers and 2000 Lahore followers in Indonesia, mostly in West Java (Suryana 2020). As a religious minority in a predominantly Sunni Muslim country, Indonesia’s Ahmadiyya population faces discrimination and persecution for their beliefs about the prophethood.
Since its inception in Indonesia, the Ahmadiyya have received criticism from Islamic organisations, including NU. In 1930, during a muktamar in Pekalongan, NU declared the Ahmadiyya heretical (Platzdasch Reference Saenong, Upal and Cusack2013: 220). They reiterated this decision after the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) proposed banning the Ahmadiyya in 1980 and 2005. In 1980, MUI, with NU’s participation, issued a fatwa, a legal opinion based on an interpretation of Islamic law, that declared the Ahmadiyya heretical (Platzdasch Reference Saenong, Upal and Cusack2013: 220-221). Despite this ruling, the Ahmadiyya community persists, although sporadic attacks from some Muslim groups have targeted it. During the reform era, radical Islamic groups, such as HTI and FPI, intensified the attacks. In response, MUI, in 2005, issued a second fatwa, declaring the Ahmadiyya outside of Islam, heretical, and misleading (Platzdasch Reference Saenong, Upal and Cusack2013: 224). The PBNU supported MUI, again declaring the Ahmadiyya a heretical sect in 2005.
The PBNU officially declared Ahmadiyya heretical during a meeting in Bogor from 9 to 11 September 2005 because they refused to recognise Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet, as the Qur’an states. However, the executive board urged peaceful responses to the Ahmadiyya and emphasised that only the government and law enforcement had the authority to ban the group formally. Additionally, NU called for the government to issue an official stance on the Ahmadiyya (NU Online Reference Maarif2008).Footnote 9
In 2008, the Ministry of Religion, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General’s Office issued a Joint Ministerial Decree (Surat Keterangan Bersama, SKB) ordering the Ahmadiyya to cease activities and the dissemination of interpretations conflicting with Islamic teachings on prophetology. The decree also affirmed that citizens had to maintain religious harmony and not violate the law. The joint decree received NU’s support, with PBNU stating that the decision to dissolve the Ahmadiyya was solely the government’s authority (Kemenag 2008).Footnote 10
Since the 1930s, NU has consistently viewed the Ahmadiyya as heretical. The nahdliyin, however, have responded differently to the Ahmadiyya, especially its dissolution, about which NU remains unsettled. For example, former general chairmen Abdurrahman Wahid and Hasyim Muhzadi held differing views. Hasyim Muhzadi, PBNU chairman from 1999 to 2010, believed the government should disband the Ahmadiyya because its presence created social unrest (Martudji Reference Mujani and William Liddle2011). In contrast, Wahid argued that while Islamic organisations could label the Ahmadiyya as infidels, the 1945 Constitution protects their right to freedom to organise, thereby preventing the public from forcing the government to dissolve it (NU Online Reference Maarif2008).Footnote 11
Hasyim and Wahid’s divergent views on the Ahmadiyya reflect broader divisions within nahdliyin factions. NU kyai from East Java, who participated in the activities of the Ulama Council forum in February 2011 at the Sidogiri Pesantren, an affiliated pesantren within the NU network, and members of the conservative NU Garis Lurus (NUGL), supported the dissolution of the Ahmadiyya (Kayane Reference Lindsey2020; Kemenag 2011).Footnote 12 In contrast, NU clerics in Cirebon and Central Java did not (Keren Reference Maarif2008; Rosyidi and Anam Reference Sudrajat2013).
The PBNU considers Ahmadis apostates but condemns violence against them. In practice, the Institute for Studies and Human Resources Development (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia/Lakpesdam) has long worked in Tasikmalaya to mitigate violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya (Sudrajat Reference Yavuz2020), and GP Ansor pledges to protect them from assaults (Antara 2010; Jurnaliston and Galih Reference Kusuma2018).Footnote 13 However, there have been instances of NU followers engaging in violence against the Ahmadiyya, such as the 2007 attack on an Ahmadiyya mosque in Kuningan, West Java, involving local NU leaders and followers (Arifianto Reference Barton2017: 254-255).
NU’s Response to the Presence and Dissolution of Radical Groups: HTI and FPI
NU’s response to the dissolution of the Islamic radical groups HTI and FPI also illustrates its approach to tolerance. HTI was founded in the 1980s as part of the broader global Hizbut Tahrir movement, primarily aiming to restore the Islamic caliphate (Osman Reference Pierson2010: 735). FPI was founded in 1998 with the support of high-ranking members of the political elite, government administration, police, army, and underworld and sought to integrate the Jakarta Charter into the 1945 Constitution (Facal Reference Fealy2020: 7-8). While FPI’s advocacy for sharia and violent tactics was clearly radical, many considered HTI radical for promoting the caliphate and its anti-democratic, anti-secular views even though it was typically non-violent (Facal Reference Fealy2020; Osman Reference Pierson2010).
Historically, NU emerged in response to Islamic puritanism and its threat to traditional Islam in Indonesia. NU’s history has informed its unwavering rejection of radical Islamic movements, which it considers incompatible with its Aswaja Islamic values. Following the resurgence of Islamist radicals after Suharto’s fall, NU reiterated its rejection of these groups (Fealy Reference Ghani and Awang2004: 104). At its 31st Muktamar in 2004, NU officially condemned all forms of fundamentalism and extremism as threats to the NKRI and Aswaja and nahdliyin traditions, such as tahlilan (prayers for the deceased) and mauludan (commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday) (Lembaga Ta’lif wan Nasyr PBNU Reference Menchik2016; Sekretariat Jendral PBNU Reference Van Bruinessen2005).
Part of NU’s firm rejection of radical Islamic groups included a persuasive and dialogical approach rather than an aggressive one. Despite radical Islamic groups’ anarchic tendencies, NU supports a law protecting religious freedom, allowing citizens to practise their beliefs while respecting others. It first tabled this initiative at the 2010 NU Muktamar and reiterated it at the 2015 Muktamar. Although it was on the list of draft laws for the national legislature to debate, the law has yet to materialise (DPR RI n.d.).Footnote 14
At the beginning of the post-Suharto reform era, NU did not promote dissolving radical Islamic groups, including HTI and FPI. However, it altered its stance in 2013. At a 2014 meeting, PBNU urged the nahdliyin to disapprove of or avoid involvement in HTI and FPI activities, citing inconsistencies with Aswaja Islamic values. NU considered HTI’s movement contrary to Pancasila (Alhafiz Reference Arifianto2014). In 2013, NU decisively supported disbanding FPI and, in 2017, dissolving HTI (Akuntono Reference Ali2013; Rochmat and Fathoni Reference Sitompul2017).
Driving NU’s call to dissolve HTI and FPI was their involvement in the blasphemy case and conviction of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), the then-governor of Jakarta and then-President Jokowi’s close political ally. Before the 2017 Jakarta election, Ahok, the gubernatorial incumbent and a popular candidate of Christian faith and Chinese descent, referenced a Qur’anic verse his political opponents used to discourage Muslim voters from supporting him. Consequently, his remarks led to a grand-scale Islamic movement under the moniker ‘Action to Defend Islam’ (Aksi Bela Islam), spearheaded by a coalition of Muslims from numerous groups, including HTI, FPI and others. The series of Aksi Bela Islam— particularly the 414 action on 4 November 2016 and the 212 action on 2 December 2016— played a prominent role in Ahok’s electoral defeat and his subsequent two-year prison sentence for blasphemy.Footnote 15
The ability to mobilise the masses during the Ahok blasphemy case empowered radical Islamic groups, including HTI and FPI, boosting their political influence. Moreover, they criticised President Jokowi (2014-2024), threatening his re-election in 2019. Many observers viewed the Aksi Bela Islam, ostensibly a coalition of Islamists united in defence of their religion, as a political tool. Scholars have argued that political actors politised religious issues to block political opponents (Kingston Reference Mahoney2019; Lindsey Reference Mietzner2016; Peterson Reference Rosyidi, Ahmad and Anam2020). In 2017 and 2020, Jokowi’s administration dissolved HTI and FPI, arguably in response to generating his ally’s political demise. The administration cited violations of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and emphasised the need to maintain social order (Fatiara Reference Fealy and Bush2020).
As an organisation, NU condemned the 212 Action and its aftermath. Even before the 212 demonstration, Said. A. Siradj, the PBNU’s then-chairman, urged the nahdliyin not to participate, claiming Ahok’s case should be handled legally (Peterson and Schafer Reference Rizqo2021: 111-112). He asserted that these actions were more about politicising religion than religious revival (Rizqo 2021b). However, the nahdliyin were divided, with some supporting and joining the 212 demonstration and subsequent demonstrations (Mudzakkir Reference Nakamura2020; Nuryanti Reference Peterson, Schafer and Tay2021). Some even travelled from as far as East and West Java to participate (Mudzakkir Reference Nakamura2020; Rohman Reference Sobary2020).
NU’s support of the government’s decisions to disband HTI and FPI bolstered its relationship with the Jokowi government (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2020: 65-66). While some allege that NU gained political and economic benefits, this does not mean the organisation supported the government solely for these reasons. The political momentum after 2016, however, led to a shared orientation between Jokowi and NU in efforts to prevent the rise of radicalism. Remember, well before 2016, NU had already positioned itself against radical Islamic groups, including HTI and FPI. Therefore, dissolving HTI and FPI aligned with NU’s longstanding position.
While NU firmly opposes radical Islamic groups, including HTI and FPI, not all the nahdliyin adopted the same stance. Some followers, including local organisation leaders, participated in HTI and FPI activities and even became their members. Frustration with NU’s passive approach or limited advancement within its ranks led some nahdliyin to align with FPI (Facal Reference Fealy2020: 17). Meanwhile, NU followers who believed that NU had enmeshed itself in Indonesia’s corrupt politics or supported restoring the Islamic caliphate shifted their allegiance to HTI (Osman Reference Pierson2010, Reference Platzdasch and Yew-Foong2018).
A Dynamic Tolerance within NU and its Characteristics
Critical juncture and case studies analyses reveal that tolerance within NU is highly dynamic. However, portraying NU as a dynamic organisation is not novel. Indeed, scholars often characterise NU as changing political orientations and making inconsistent decisions, but its dynamics of tolerance are not immeasurable or inexplicable. Three characteristics explain how NU’s dynamic tolerance operates.
Evolved Tolerance
Over time, tolerance within NU has deepened, as Table 1 depicts. It began with respecting Indonesia’s diversity and stressing the significance of tolerance and evolved into concrete programmes to bolster it. The pivotal 1984 Muktamar significantly advanced NU’s commitment to tolerance, building upon decades of recognition of plurality and tolerance. Yet, other events also contributed to NU’s tolerant stance, including discussions on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the 1959 context, and post-Suharto political shifts from 1998 onwards.
NU’s increased tolerance stems from internal and external social and political dynamics. Internally, Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership and evolving thoughts since the 1984 Muktamar were pivotal and fostered diverse perspectives within NU. The emergence of a younger generation aligned with Wahid’s tolerant vision and disseminating it beyond NU’s confines bolstered his influence. Wahid’s dedication to tolerance and NU youth activism introduced a paradigm distinct from conservative interpretations prevalent among some NU kyai and other Islamic groups in post-Suharto Indonesia.
External socio-political factors significantly shaped NU’s tolerance alongside internal dynamics. During pivotal moments, such as the drafting of the 1945 Constitution and the adoption of Pancasila as the state foundation in 1945 and 1959, NU’s transition from advocating an Islamic Sharia-based state to supporting a unitary state based on Pancasila reflected its acknowledgement of Indonesia’s religious diversity. Various factors influenced this shift, including NU’s commitment to national unity, personal connections to Sukarno, and the need to maintain political influence. Similarly, in 1984, amidst Suharto’s authoritarian rule, NU’s adoption of Pancasila as its organisational ideology demonstrated its dedication to national integrity and responded to political pressures, reaffirming its commitment to tolerance in challenging times.
The political changes following Suharto’s regime boosted NU’s commitment to tolerance, which was essential for unity in a democracy that faced rising sectarianism, radicalism, and religious division. This context emphasised the importance of NU’s tolerance initiatives, influenced by Wahid, for promoting tolerance within society. For instance, events like the 9/11 attacks in the United States and cases of intolerance in Indonesia underscored the need for tolerance and NU’s related programmes, which garnered increased government support and collaboration, such as ICIS and R20. Moreover, the rise of radical Islamic groups promoting intolerance compelled NU to reaffirm its identity as a moderate Islamic organisation. The politicisation of religion, particularly in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, bolstered the influence of groups such as HTI and FPI (Mietzner 2018: 262). In this competitive Islamic landscape, NU has taken a firmer stance against radicals to dissuade its members from joining them and to maintain and reassert its religious authority (Arifianto Reference Buehler2021; Pelletier Reference Ramage2021).
Limited Tolerance
The NU organisation steadfastly upholds the principle of tolerance, and its commitment to this value has deepened over time. Nevertheless, NU limits its tolerance via three boundaries. First, it encourages tolerance regarding public interests and group rights, but not individual rights, aligning with muktamar outcomes (Table 1) and Menchik’s thoughts on communal tolerance (Menchik 2016; PBNU Reference Rohman, Pamungkas and Permana1994). Consequently, NU fosters tolerance towards religious, minority, gender, and ethnic groups.
Second, NU directs its tolerance towards groups whose values accord with the Qu’ran and the Aswaja tradition’s Islamic principles. NU evinced this boundary by rejecting the Ahmadiyya, whose belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s prophethood conflicts with the Qur’an’s teaching that Muhammad is the final prophet. As a result, NU has declared the Ahmadiyya heretical since 1930. Despite this stance, NU, particularly the PBNU and national-level autonomous bodies, opposes violence against the Ahmadiyya and leaves any decision regarding its disbandment to the government.
Notably, while NU limits tolerance to groups whose values align with the Qu’ran and Aswaja, it is not intolerant of non-Islamic religions. NU maintains harmony and tolerant relations with other faiths, as Islam recognises the existence of different religions and encourages tolerance towards them. This principle underpins NU’s support for interfaith dialogue and harmony, as the various programmes NU and its affiliated organisations carry out demonstrate.
Third, NU’s tolerance does not extend to those threatening the unity of the Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila. This stance aligns with NU’s commitment to NKRI and Pancasila in the 1940s-1950s and 1984 after it changed its position from initially seeking a Sharia-based Indonesian state. Hence, NU condemns radical Islamic groups that promote an Islamic state and caliphate, including HTI and FPI, while not deeming their respective interpretations of Islam deviant. Socio-political contexts also influenced NU’s level of tolerance. As mentioned, NU has long opposed radical Islamic groups. Since 2014, however, the increased politicisation of religion spurred NU to express its disapproval of these groups, going beyond mere disagreement with HTI and FPI activities to calling for their dissolution.
Unequal Understanding of Tolerance
Understanding NU requires acknowledging its diversity. It has fortified its tolerance post-the 1984 Muktamar, with NU organisations and autonomous bodies, particularly at the national level, demonstrating their dedication to tolerance. However, NU followers exhibit diverse perspectives in understanding and practising tolerance, sometimes in discord with the organisation. Not all nahdliyin are equally committed to practising tolerance, leading to variations in how followers perceive and enact it within NU. These variations, often construed as inconsistencies, highlight NU’s multifaceted approach to tolerance.
The case studies here reveal internal discrepancies within NU. While NU’s interactions with religious groups reveal solid respect and tolerance, some nahdliyin exhibit intolerance. Similar circumstances arise concerning the nahdliyin’s reaction to the Ahmadiyya. While NU does not accept Ahmadiyya beliefs, it opposes violence against them. Nevertheless, some NU followers have participated in violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya. Some nahdliyin have also engaged in activities associated with HTI and FPI, demonstrating their intolerance of religious minority groups.
Various factors contribute to the diverse levels of tolerance among the nahdliyin. First, the interpretations of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) among NU followers constitute a broad spectrum, ranging from liberal to conservative (Interview Ahmad Zainul Hamdi Reference Keren2021; Interview with Effendy Choirie Reference Kingston2022). At one end of the spectrum is a progressive faction that advocates for tolerance. At the other end is a conservative camp, including NUGL, advocating conservatism and challenging moderate views on tolerance (Arifianto Reference Buehler2021: 96). Those adhering to conservative views are more prone to intolerance (Burhani Reference Eck and Boase2019: 5), as they tend to interpret Islamic rules more textually than contextually. Several conservative-leaning nahdliyin have also maintained close ties to radical and intolerant Islamic groups, participated in their activities, and even become members (Anonymous interview Reference Athyal2021; Burhani Reference Eck and Boase2019).
Secondly, NU, as a vast organisation, often splits into factions based on ideology, politics, and personal loyalties to senior kyai and influential figures. As the case studies demonstrated, this division leads to varying degrees of tolerance within NU. For example, factions differ on whether the Ahmadiyya should be disbanded, with prominent figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Hasyim Muhzadi championing these contrasting views. Similarly, while NU discouraged involvement in FPI and HTI’s intolerant actions, some members, including local leaders, joined the organisations and participated in such actions. Conservative nahdliyin view HTI and FPI as alternative channels for their Islamic values, in contrast to the more moderate NU, which opposes these organisations.
Exploring why the largely tolerant NU could not spread the same tolerant commitment to all its followers is intriguing. Two factors elucidate this incongruity. First, the nahdliyin community predates NU. Traditionalist pesantren and kyai established bonds among nahdliyin, especially in rural areas of Java. This connection does not exist because NU exists. Instead, NU exists because the community exists. Many people self-identify as nahdliyin without official registration. Pesantren, while affiliated with NU, often maintain independence. This dynamic has influenced NU’s loose organisational style, with NU’s policies serving as guidance rather than strict rules. Pesantren and kyai hold fervent authority, informing the varied adherence of the nahdliyin to NU’s determinations (Hosen Reference Kayane2021; Interview with Achmad Suaedy Reference Kayane2021).
Additionally, NU is a moderate and non-dogmatic organisation that promotes dialogue on variations in Islamic values (Interview with Ilham Khoiri Reference Kurtz2021). This openness is evident in bahtsul masail (deliberation forums, an institution within NU), which discuss diverse issues lacking clear laws. In these forums, religious experts with perspectives ranging from conservative to moderate or even liberal engage in conversation. This tradition of fostering diverse views and debates is not new for NU, as Mitsuo Nakamura observed at the 1979 NU Muktamar (Nakamura 1981: 197-198). NU’s commitment to preserving diversity within the organisation encourages the nahdliyin to be open to differences and gain a broad perspective. It poses challenges, however, for NU to convince them and those outside the organisational structure to accept its decisions.
Delineating these three key characteristics of tolerance within NU contributes to a deeper understanding of how the organisation perceives and practises tolerance. Tolerance within NU transcends a simplistic “zero-sum game” framework that limits choices to absolute tolerance or its absence. Instead, it is dynamic, evolves, has clearly defined boundaries, and is subject to individual members’ diverse interpretations. Despite its inherent limitations and the presence of some less tolerant members, empirical evidence reveals a noticeable trend toward increased tolerance within NU since 1984. While many perceive this situation as inconsistent, we must recognise that tolerance cannot and does not remain constant over time. Tolerance within NU is inherently dynamic and influenced by the socio-political context within and outside the organisation.
Conclusion
By adopting critical juncture and case study analyses, this study reveals that tolerance within NU is dynamic and characterised by three factors. First, NU’s commitment to tolerance adapts to changing social and political circumstances. Second, NU upholds tolerance as an organisation when doing so serves the public interest, when the groups in question align with the Islamic principles NU upholds, and when those groups do not threaten Indonesia’s unity. Third, tolerance among the nahdliyin varies and does not always align with NU’s official stance.
These findings reveal that Islamic organisations practise tolerance, often associated with secularism, dynamically and with specific characteristics. This finding challenges the binary view that Islamic organisations are either tolerant or intolerant. NU’s tolerance confirms that it is not always dichotomous. Rather, tolerance may evolve with inherent boundaries and acquire different understandings within the organisation and its membership. Assessing tolerance in Islamic organisations requires considering their complexity and surrounding context.
This article stimulates debate on religious organisations’ level of tolerance. It also encourages further discussion on the characteristics of tolerance within NU. For instance, its analysis focuses on how NU limits its tolerance to those whose values do not conflict with Islamic principles, as its stance towards the Ahmadiyya demonstrates. Further exploration could extend to other cases, such as NU’s approach towards communist and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) groups. Additionally, this discussion could compare NU and other Islamic organisations in Indonesia, such as Muhammadiyah, and international organisations, like the Gülen Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood, to understand variations in tolerance across different contexts better.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Prof. Okamoto Masaaki for his guidance, input, and advice in developing this article. The fieldwork for this research was supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 17th Singapore Graduate Forum on Southeast Asian Studies, organised by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore (ARI–NUS). I extend my thanks to Erica Larson, Paul Nerney, Susan Nerney, Yang Yang, and all conference participants for their valuable inputs and suggestions to improve this article. I also thank Ahmad Suaedy, Mitsuo Nakamura, and Daniel Peterson for reading this manuscript and providing substantial input. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of the manuscript and their insighful comments and suggestions, as well as to the journal editors. Finally, my gratitude to all interviewees I met during my fieldwork in Indonesia—Jakarta, East Java, Central Java, Lampung, Banten—as well as in Japan—Tokyo and Kyoto—from 2021 to 2024.
Competing interests
The author declares none.
