Although based on different methods, scholarly orientations, and themes, these two books offer innovative and productive approaches for understanding the relationship between the judgments of courts, the development of law, and salient political and moral considerations that affect both.
In The Constrained Court, Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman begin by taking on the “attitudinal model,” which posits that Supreme Court justices are best understood as voting with few encumbrances to achieve their policy preferences. They counter that justices are constrained by both their commitment to legal values and the preferences of competing political officials.
The authors first test whether different justices' ideal ideological positions are impacted by their commitment to three legal values: precedent, deference to Congress, and free speech. Their statistical modeling finds that even after controlling for ideological predispositions, most justices since the 1950s have been impacted by at least some of these legal factors, albeit in ways that interact with their ideological preferences and more individual predilections. For example, they find that for Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, when a case precedent pointed to a liberal outcome, she was moved to vote conservatively only “with 45 percent probability,” while a corresponding conservative precedent prompted her to vote conservatively 85% of the time (pp. 73–74).
Having concluded that “law matters and that the way it matters varies across individual justices” (p. 79), the authors next examine several external factors and actors that influence the Court. Their original research shows that the Court's statutory and constitutional interpretation changes in the face of political shifts that leave it as a vulnerable policy outlier. For example, when the Court's median ideology is liberal relative to a more conservative Congress and president, the Court moves to the right, as occurred following Richard Nixon's 1968 victory when four justices from this era “became significantly more conservative after the election” (p. 113).
Bailey and Maltzman also consider the solicitor general as a source of executive branch signals that incline members of the Court away from their preferred ideological positions. Indeed, some justices seem especially swayed by the government's top legal advocate, often in ways that reinforce underlying ideological predispositions. For example, the authors' simulations indicate that while Justice Anthony Kennedy votes liberally in about 20% of the cases where the solicitor general takes a liberal position, he votes conservatively in 96% of the cases where a conservative brief is filed.
While much of this territory will be recognizable to judicial politics scholars, one of the many merits of this book is its deployment of imaginative new tools for testing somewhat familiar hypotheses. Traditionally, interbranch and over-time comparisons of ideology are based on different scales and agendas—apples-to-oranges comparisons that muddle our understanding of justices' ideal preferences, especially relative to the other branches. We score the preferences of members of Congress using interest-group voting records while deriving the ideology rankings of justices from, say, newspaper editorials. In lieu of these approaches, the authors offer “bridging techniques that link actors across time and institutions” (p. 19), providing measures that allow for more fungible interbranch and inter-era comparisons. For example, they rely on Court cases “where members of Congress take public positions” (p. 27) so that we can more readily plot, compare, and model ideological votes in the two institutions.
This approach, too, is not without peril: Members of Congress “position take” in sometimes contradictory ways, and some important “cross-cutting” issues may be placed on the Court's docket precisely because lawmakers are unwilling or unable to articulate a clear position on the underlying controversy. Still, Bailey and Maltzman's approach in this and other aspects of their argument is self-conscious, thoughtful, and informed, and may well beat any existing methodological alternatives.
This is a short book, but a treasure trove of observations, data, and arguments that will provoke additional queries and interest in an unusually wide range of scholars. To cite just one example, Bailey and Maltzman's data show the Court deferring to Congress from the 1950s through the 1980s for legal reasons, but then becoming increasingly strategic—perhaps giving empirical validation to the notion that the Court has become a more political entity over recent decades.
One leaves The Constrained Court impressed by the power of many of its conclusions, but also searching for a bit more. The book is framed as a critique of the attitudinal model and, having set this target, the authors seem content to conclude that by marshaling “solid evidence” that law matters, we can dismiss “the view that justices are purely political animals who utilize their positions in pursuit of their policy preferences” (p. 79).
In inviting us to consider a “constrained Court,” however, this book seems more ambitious and one keeps hoping that the authors will offer even the sketch of a model for better compiling, understanding, and comparing these limits. Why not take stock of the book's many telling observations to offer broader conclusions about trends on the Court, which kinds of justices are likely to be especially influenced by law (or strategic calculations), or the preconditions that incline the Court to greater constraint or attitudinalism? Given Bailey and Maltzman's insights, how can we become wiser about knowing when the Court will stand up for rights or legal principles—especially in the face of political pressure? The call here is not to write a different book—this project is rewarding on its own terms—but to outline where we go next. What theory or problems strike the authors as the most promising for development and future research in filling out our picture of what makes the constrained Court tick?
While this book seeks to move us past the conventional wisdom of the attitudinal model, Limits of Legality advances a quite different challenge to a widely held view about the proper relationship between judging and the rule of law. Jeffrey Brand-Ballard invokes an array of sophisticated, tightly nested arguments to lay out the ethical shortcomings of judicial fidelity to law—in effect, arguing that a form of attitudinal judging is philosophically justified. To take one of the author's examples, even if we conclude that constitutional law does not permit the Court to invalidate a state law criminalizing contraceptives (Griswold v. Connecticut), justices can still nullify the statute to achieve a better moral outcome (pp. 94–95).
Brand-Ballard begins by surveying and rejecting various arguments concerning whether judges must obey “nonpermissive” rules to uphold the law in all cases. His conclusion is that judges are “morally permitted to deviate in suboptimal result cases” (p. 178) where law dictates rulings with problematic moral consequences.
How often can judges deviate and under what circumstances? In Part II, Brand-Ballard advances a “normative structure” (p. 309) for disciplining this practice. He considers and concedes reasons for adhering to legally determined results, concluding that having judges always deviate when law produces suboptimal moral outcomes is an “impermissible practice in realistic legal systems” (p. 180). Thus, we need guidelines for balancing the benefits of fidelity to law with the responsibility of judges to advance ethical concerns.
The first such rule instructs judges to identify an “optimal average rate of deviation in suboptimal-result cases” (p. 243). In effect, judges have a finite number of “deviance credits” (p. 254) to expend during their careers to set aside even clear legal commands in order to advance moral causes. This approach is intended to achieve the balance of maximizing moral outcomes without encouraging all judges to deviate too aggressively—especially important since some will poorly assess moral factors and will, therefore, break from the law even when its results are ethically optimal. Brand-Ballard does not give much guidance for calculating precise deviation rates, an omission reflecting his expectation that the frequency will vary depending upon the overall level of justice that prevails in a given legal system. Aside from this initial rule, the author identifies other guidelines for lawless judging, such as requiring judges to deviate in “more suboptimal” (p. 264) cases, that is, the most morally egregious ones.
This book addresses an important and underexplored subject relevant to scholarship on political obligation, rule-based adjudication, and law and society, as well as wider debates about the (im)proper role of judges. Even if one does not agree with all its conclusions, Limits of Legality offers a thorough, intricate, carefully considered argument for how to regulate lawless judging, and it should be an unavoidable reference point for future research on this topic.
As comprehensive as Brand-Ballard's case appears to be, there are areas where his claims could stand additional elaboration and defense. One of the author's contentions is that when judges deviate from law, their resulting opinions should be “fallacious” and “minimalist” (p. 284). In other words, instead of owning up to the nonlegal justifications impelling their rulings, they should offer only a brief pretext of legal argument. This will result in a “happy compromise” of avoiding undue attention to the deviating judge while also not propagating unsubstantiated legal views that might be followed as precedent.
Despite the author's hopes, such an approach could simultaneously weaken both the rule of law and the capacity of judges to serve as moral agents. Brand-Ballard argues that a case like Griswold represents a just outcome despite its reliance on flawed legal reasoning that the justices could “not rationally intend” to serve as precedent. Setting aside this assessment of the Griswold Court's intentions and reasoning, we can fairly conclude that the case has indeed served as a major precedent for some of the most important privacy cases of the past 50 years. If the author's assessment of Griswold is correct, then its legal foundations (not to mention cases like Roe and Lawrence) are suspect and the case for fallacious minimalism looks weaker.
In addition, those who issue fallacious, minimal opinions might well be belittled by their peers, threatened with impeachment or other sanctions, and derided as the kinds of judges who should never be appointed. These reactions, in turn, may have a chilling effect on other judges who would follow Brand-Ballard's theory. In sum, we have sound reasons to suspect that deceptive and minimal judging, in the purported service of moral and legal values, actually damages both.
Brand-Ballard could also have better defended the relative capacity of judges to engage in moral analysis—explaining why they have the training and information necessary for this task. Moreover, most legal systems provide means through which electorally accountable officials can use moral judgments to steer or blunt the law's commands, including mechanisms such as pardons and prosecutorial discretion. We need a more systematic account of the way that “lawless judging” takes into account these nonjudicial participants in legal systems and their contributions to minimizing “suboptimal” moral results. These figures would seem especially important given their freedom (unlike that of deviating judges) to discuss the relationship between morality and law openly with both colleagues and the public.
Both The Constrained Court and Limits of Legality challenge established paradigms in their fields, introduce inventive and original research, and seek to transform the ways in which we think and talk about the nature of judging. It is a testament to the energy, imagination, and erudition of their authors that they can legitimately take credit for having advanced these objectives.
