In this essay, we specify three arenas of inquiry for interrogating the “digital age,” and explore the relevancy of these arenas for contemporary politics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We begin by reflecting on implicit assumptions undergirding several kinds of investigation into digital technologies and their intersections with social movements and political events in the MENA since the Arab Spring. We suggest that impact studies should move beyond replicating “optimistic” versus “pessimistic” hypotheses in deductive forms of investigation, and develop richer inductive, comparative case studies to more thoroughly chart the long-term processes, politics, and consequences of digital infrastructure adoption in the MENA. We then discuss not only the uses and pitfalls of communication technologies during moments of political upheaval, but also the transnational political economy of digital infrastructure, which has had long-term and far-reaching consequences for the digital media landscape in the MENA. We conclude by drawing attention to a currently underexamined but important aspect of digital politics since the Arab Spring, namely, the substantive international efforts, now involving advanced Western democratic states, to promote “Internet freedom” in the region.Footnote 1 Our goal is to help broaden the scope of democratization studies by encouraging further research on how these technologies and the infrastructure undergirding them were developed in the first place and on the international politics now surrounding global media and communication technologies in the region.
Investigations into digital media in contemporary MENA politics tend to focus on social media and the Internet, dealing in particular with the question of whether in the digital age the MENA region is experiencing digitally enabled democratization. Much analysis of MENA politics shares the tendency to see digital media and Internet communications technologies (ICTs) as valuable to civic advancement and democratic social movements in nondemocratic and repressive political systems.Footnote 2 While scholars of civil society and democratization are correct in focusing on digital media's contribution, and lack thereof, to political change, we see this focus as only one dimension of the topic. Observing civic actors (i.e., digital activists) and global events since the Arab Spring, it is apparent that digital media have been invaluable to democracy supporters. In the fragile state of Pakistan, activists have turned repeatedly to digital media as an important tool for organizing and sustaining protests after attacks on school children. Similarly, protesters in Turkey voiced strong views on the importance of social media spaces in organizing the Gezi protests. Even in recent large-scale protests that have taken place far from the MENA, in Hong Kong and the Ukraine, citizens actively use and express support for digital media technologies as necessary resources for advancing their work. During the Arab Spring protests, as well as more recently, scholarly analysis and activists themselves support the idea that digital media technologies have enabled popular protest movements at levels that would not have been easily possible without them. However, this digitally enabled democratization is turned on its head when it comes to state power and security forces, which have used digital technologies to pursue surveillance and repression. The flip side of digitally enabled democratization is digitally enabled repression.
We must recognize the ways in which states have securitized digital media and ICTs and turned them against social actors by shutting down digital infrastructure; censoring specific web spaces; harassing users offline; and targeting Internet service and mobile infrastructure providers and pressuring them to carry out political repression on the state's behalf. For example, the Erdogan regime in Turkey targeted social media networks to “root out” activists organizing protests in Gezi park; in October 2014 in Egypt, ʿAlaʾ ʿAbd al-Fattah struggled to overturn his fifteen-year jail sentence for work he did as a dissident blogger; and during the same month, three Saudi lawyers were jailed and sentenced to eight years in prison for allegedly undermining the regime by tweeting. With this in mind, should we expect digitally enabled democratization or digitally enabled repression in the MENA region?
We should expect both, because we have already observed both. If we continue to seek evidence of the widespread diffusion of new media and ICTs assisting social movements in gaining an upper hand against repressive rulers, past investigations and current events support such expectations. Similarly, if we suspect that these technologies may be turned against social movements by states, existing analyses and recent events provide support for this thesis as well. Rather than assuming that only one of these diametrically opposed hypotheses can be true, we encourage future researchers to take a process-tracing approach by embracing the multiple causal pathways reflected in digital media and MENA politics. Such an approach to digital media use across the Arab Spring's popular cascades observed six important stages patterned across many affected states: first, a drawn-out preparation phase, where activists used digital media over several years to build social networks and to identify collective identities; second, an unprecedented ignition moment where movement leaders activated these digital networks toward off-line protests, which ruling elites frequently underestimated or ignored; third, a protest phase, where pre-existing digital and social networks morphed into large-scale offline showings of popular support and resistance; fourth, an overlapping international outreach phase, where movement leaders coordinated with diasporic publics and drew on broadcast networks to expand local protests into global iconic moments; and fifth, a climax phase, where authoritarian state powers and their security forces maneuvered to appease public discontent and to regain control of both the web and public space. In all of the Arab Spring cases, there was also a sixth phase in which political actors and institutional stakeholders took to the international stage to engage in postprotest information warfare through which they continue to compete for control over Internet and mobile infrastructure via proxy tactics (e.g., international pressure, economic sanctions, and lobbying efforts).
The second arena is digital infrastructure politics itself. During the Arab Spring it was the long-term diffusion and presence of information infrastructure—especially for mobile connectivity—that was consistently a key ingredient for explaining regime fragility and social movement success. While recent studies have focused on the immediate uses and consequences of digital media during periods of protests (and state responses to them), there is a need to interrogate how Internet infrastructure is established in different states to begin with. For this research, the units of analysis are not social movement leaders and protest organizers, but rather governmental agencies, private technology providers, and policymakers. In many countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the state's construction of Internet infrastructure was politically calculated and began more than a decade before the Arab Spring. Elsewhere, such as in Egypt, the state took less interest in this process. In order to gain control over mobile phones during the Egyptian uprising, the Mubarak regime had to coerce the UK-based Vodafone corporation to turn off cellular networks on its behalf, for it had not designed centralized “kill switch” strategies.Footnote 3
More recently, in many MENA countries, repressive regimes use censorship protocols and surveillance softwares developed by multinational private technology companies—many based in advanced industrialized countries—to monitor and control citizens’ online experiences. So an important offshoot of the digital infrastructure politics arena is also the arena of Internet freedom promotion.Footnote 4 Since the Arab Spring, Internet freedom promotion efforts and investments by advanced industrialized Western democracies have grown in resources and scope. Under the auspices of the Freedom Online Coalition and the Digital Defenders Partnership, Western governments have dedicated over $100 million to support digital activists living under repressive regimes.Footnote 5 These projects aim to create secure and anonymous Internet access points and technologies for political dissidents in the MENA.Footnote 6 In this recent arena of the digital age in the MENA, Western states’ “democracy promotion” efforts have broadened to include a new set of norms surrounding global information technology policy. In other words, many advanced democracies are beginning to treat technology infrastructure development and global telecommunications policy as a critical component of their foreign policy in the region. Thus, the foreign policy goals of states outside the MENA must be interrogated in future examinations of the digital age within the MENA.
