Books on interest groups, lobbyists and “special interests” abound. Indeed, they are the subject of at least one chapter in every standard textbook. Matt Grossmann is hardly, therefore, exploring virgin territory. Nonetheless, his book makes a helpful and constructive contribution to the literature. While many of the popular perceptions of interest-group activity are confirmed, some of the more florid (but oft-made) assertions are reined in.

Grossmann addresses two overlapping questions. First, do the characteristics of a particular constituency (such as doctors) shape the extent to which it is represented through interest organizations in Washington, DC? Second, how and why do some organizations, rather than others, “become prominent voices in the news media and frequent participants in policymaking institutions” (6)?

The answer to the first of these questions is, Grossman suggests, undoubtedly “yes.” Utilizing “behavioral pluralism” he considers the part played by voting rates within particular constituencies, the giving of campaign contributions, and the overall willingness of groupings to mobilize within social and political arenas. Jews are, as a consequence, more extensively represented in the political process than Roman Catholics (67). Similarly, Cuban Americans have greater political weight than other Latino constituencies. Other variables, although often cited in the textbook accounts, matter less. A group's size has little or no significance: “automobile drivers, for example, have produced only a small number of organizations despite their large size” (53). Similarly, the ideology of a group and the social class background of its membership count for little or nothing (if only because the unions and professional associations tend to balance each other out).

So far as the second question is concerned, representation in the media is largely a function of the number of staff members that an organization employs, the age of the organization, and the relative breadth of its agenda (think tanks thereby gain much more attention than single-issue groups). Some other variables, such as having an associated political action committee, or, perhaps more surprisingly, the hiring of lobbyists, are not significant (137).

Grossmann thereby ends up with a relatively benign view of interest-group activity. Although some groupings are represented to a much greater degree than others, that imbalance is largely inevitable. Insofar as there are concerns about the tools and methods that organized interests employ, these are fears “about democratic governance in general rather than about modern social and political organizing” (184).

Although surprises or page-turners are few and far between, The Not-So-Special Interests is an elegant and well-grounded study that will, I suspect, be widely cited by other accounts. Nonetheless, the book illustrates some of the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary political science in the US. The conclusions that are drawn are supported through multivariate regression in a way that puts many European commentaries on the US political system to shame. However, at the same time, relatively little is said about processes used by organized interests that may be hidden, submerged, unconscious, or less conducive to quantitative forms of analysis. Political actors do not always require overt signals before a decision is taken. Issues of ideology and legitimacy also come into play insofar as legislators will follow a particular “logic of appropriateness.” Quantitative forms of analysis only, therefore, capture part of the picture.

While the book explores the instrumental forms of leverage used by particular constituencies, issues of structural power (which have, for example, been considered by Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson) attract little attention. It could thus be argued that the book systematically underestimates the role of business interests. Similarly, the openings offered by the American state to influential lobbies go beyond those that can be formally categorized in studies such as this. As many of those tied to American political development (APD) suggest, the American state is, particularly when compared to its European counterparts, relatively porous and pliant. Although it would be a mistake to neglect the instances where business has been overridden or temporarily hobbled by shifts in the locus of power (such as the shift from the states to the federal government during the 1930s), decision-making is often beholden to those entrenched interests that command very substantial economic resources and can exploit the openness of the state.

There is always a danger that the coverage of questions such as these will descend into crude populism. Fringe (and not-so-fringe) accounts sometimes suggest that there is an organized conspiracy against the public interest by either capital or the “political class.” Some variants of this have at times had an anti-Semitic strain. Nonetheless, what you see in politics is not always what you get. Although The Not-So-Special Interests seeks to calm the waters of debate about interest-group activity, it does not engage with some of the bigger questions.