While the threat posed by terrorist organizations extends beyond their attacks, political science research has largely remained rooted to analysis of attack incidents. Barak Mendelsohn's book, The al-Qaeda Franchise, departs from this and, as a result, provides a significant and valuable addition to the literature. The main focus of the book is the expansion of al-Qaeda, primarily its strategy of branching out. While most previous work takes an alarmist view when discussing this topic, the author takes a different tack and convincingly argues that expansions represent growing weakness rather than growing strength.

The book has ambitious goals. Of the various organizational choices available to terrorist groups, Mendelsohn directs his attention towards the choice of the “formal organizational expansion.” Through this lens, the book explores four main questions. First, why did al-Qaeda select formal expansion as opposed to other alternatives? Why did the organization create branches in some countries — like Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, and Syria, but not in others (notably Palestine, Egypt, and Libya)? Why were some franchises run by the organization's own fighters but in others, mergers were made with groups already operating within the country? Finally, how has the expansion strategy harmed the organization?

While groups have four ways they can expand, Mendelsohn looks at one — the decision to branch out. This decision, as well as the particular arena to do so, is shaped by three factors: strategy, ideology, and operational considerations. Rather than discern the primacy of any one of these, the author suggests that any choice is most likely due to the interaction of all the factors. This makes intuitive sense; an organization like al-Qaeda is likely to frame this decision on the basis of whether it achieves their strategic goals, is consistent with their ideological perspective, and preserves the organization's future.

The book provides an in-depth, and thoroughly engaging, appraisal of al-Qaeda's attempts to expand. This includes Saudi Arabia (2003), Iraq (2004), Algeria (2006), Yemen (2007), Somalia (2010), and Syria (2011). Mendelsohn also examines the cases in which al-Qaeda has tried and failed — Egypt and Libya, as well as a location where it has never established a franchise — Palestine. The first two were unmitigated failures for the organization; the Iraqi branch was particularly notable for its use of extreme violence against the Shia. In Algeria, Yemen, and Somalia, al-Qaeda had slightly more success. Mendelsohn's negative cases — Egypt, Libya, and Palestine — are also instructive. In Egypt and Libya, al-Qaeda tried to expand to destroy a local rival and to arrest the decline of a wavering group, respectively. In both cases, the targeted organization rebuffed the attempt. In Palestine, it became clear that al-Qaeda would never be successful; as a result, an expansion was not attempted.

In Syria, al-Qaeda attempted to learn from its past mistakes with its franchise Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). No announcement of a relationship between the two was made. Rather, the central al-Qaeda organization hoped that its Iraqi affiliate would provide assistance to the nascent Syrian arm. Instead, AQI grew insolent and tried to subordinate JN and, in the process, revealed JN's relationship with al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri became involved, but his efforts were quickly brushed aside by AQI (now ISIS). He then had no option but to cut ties with ISIS.

Mendelsohn concludes by discussing the consequences of al-Qaeda's franchising. He contends that the organization's future is uncertain because its franchises have either contributed little or worked against the organization. Further, the dilution of al-Qaeda's global vision due to franchising has played into ISIS's narrative that al-Qaeda is insufficiently pious and uninterested in working to bring about the caliphate.

This book makes a variety of contributions. Mendelsohn devises an effective framework for assessing organizational expansion, its precursors, and its consequences. This is important from a theoretical standpoint because it allows us to consider organizational expansion as a useful variable for analysis rather than an unquantifiable instance of terrorist ‘cheap talk’. Moreover, Mendelsohn's account of al-Qaeda's difficulties with its franchises helps illustrate the profound principal-agent problems that bedevil terrorist organizations. As such, this book would make an excellent companion to Jacob Shapiro's, The Terrorist's Dilemma.

While The al-Qaeda Franchise is a worthwhile book, it does have a few minor shortcomings. In one instance, the discussion of the literature on terrorist cooperation — including franchising — is characterized as limited, promising, and then underdeveloped. While this issue may be somewhat ancillary, as the book is not seeking to provide a generalizable theory for all terrorist organizations, a more clear literature review would help to better place this book within the field of terrorism research. Second, the cases of al-Shabaab and JN do not fit the definition of “formal organizational expansion.” They are, in fact, an outlier, as their connection to al-Qaeda was not initially revealed. This may be a good problem for the author to have, as it suggests that his framework may be used to explain both public and non-public franchising decisions. On the other hand, it does raise the question of whether the current typologies and theory are accurately applied.

Finally, the book appears to suggest that affiliates shoulder much of the blame for al-Qaeda's decline. It is clear that principal-agent problems have affected the organization, but a strong case can also be made for the failure of central leadership. The book details many of its failings: rushing franchises into being, ignoring the pleas of local leaders, ignoring challengers, allowing its philosophy to stagnate, and being unresponsive to aberrant behavior. If weak leadership is actually the issue, our policy responses may differ, especially if the solution is a simple change in al-Qaeda's leadership.

On balance, this book is a remarkable piece of scholarship that tackles an important and understudied element of terrorist behavior. The discussions of the formation and behavior of al-Qaeda franchises are detailed, rigorous, and engaging. Disentangling and clarifying the actions of clandestine actors also represents a tremendous undertaking by the author — itself a noteworthy accomplishment. For these reasons, Mendelsohn's The al-Qaeda Franchise makes a valuable contribution to the terrorism literature.